Objective: Mindfulness-based intervention has been proposed to alleviate loneliness and improve social connectedness. Several randomized controlled trials have been conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of MBI. This study aimed to critically evaluate and determine the effectiveness and safety of MBI in alleviating the feeling of loneliness.Methods: We searched Medline, Embase, PsycInfo, Cochrane CENTRAL, and AMED for publications from inception to May 2020. We included RCTs with human subjects who were enrolled in MBI with loneliness as an outcome. The quality of (...) evidence was assessed using Cochrane's Risk of Bias tool and Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development, and Evaluation. A random-effects model was used for meta-analysis.Results: Out of 92 articles identified, eight studies involving 815 participants were included in this study. Most trials conducted a minimum of 8 weeks of MBI. Most of the trials used UCLA-Loneliness Scale. A pooled analysis combining three trials and compared with wait-list showed significant improvement in loneliness score reduction using the UCLA-R scale with MD of −6.33 [95% confidence interval : −9.39, −3.26]. Subgroup analysis with only two Cognitively-Based Compassion Training trials also showed similar MD of −6.05. The overall quality of evidence was low.Conclusions: Mindfulness intervention with an average length of 8-week duration significantly improved the population's loneliness level with no mental health issue. However, this evidence had a low GRADE level. (shrink)

To date, game-based learning programs that include comprehensive creativity skills and disposition training are still very limited. The present researchers developed a comprehensive game-based creativity learning program for fifth and sixth grade pupils. Further analysis presented relationship trends between mindful learning experience, flow experience, self-efficacy, and mastery experience. Eighty-three 5th and 6th grade participants undertook the six-week game-based creativity learning program. Upon the completion of experimental instruction, those who scored higher on the concerned variables improved more (...) in self-evaluation of both creativity ability and confidence, than their counterparts. Additionally, path model analysis revealed that mindful learning experience was a powerful predictor of both mastery experience and flow experience; it also influenced mastery experience through flow experience and self-efficacy during game-based creativity learning. The findings support the effectiveness of the game-based learning program developed in this study. Moreover, this study contributes to the theoretical construction of how game-based learning can be designed to facilitate mindful learning experience, flow experience, self-efficacy, and mastery experience during creativity training among pupils. Effective mechanisms include providing rewards for high-quality performance, challenging tasks, free choices of design components, immediate feedback, and idea sharing. The profound theoretical framework proposed in this study provides a valuable approach for creativity instruction through game-based learning or classroom instruction. (shrink)

Minds are said to be systematic: the capacity to entertain certain thoughts confers to other related thoughts. Although an important property of human cognition, its implication for cognitive architecture has been less than clear. In part, the uncertainty is due to lack of precise accounts on the degree to which cognition is systematic. However, a recent study on learning transfer provides one clear example. This study is used here to compare transfer in humans and feedforward networks. Simulations and analysis (...) show, that while feedforward networks with shared weights are capable of exhibiting transfer, they cannot support the same degree of transfer as humans. One interpretation of these results is that common connectionist models lack explicit internal representations permitting rapid learning. (shrink)

Aesthetic non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express genuinely aesthetic beliefs and instead hold that they work primarily to express something non-cognitive, such as attitudes of approval or disapproval, or desire. Non-cognitivists deny that aesthetic statements express aesthetic beliefs because they deny that there are aesthetic features in the world for aesthetic beliefs to represent. Their assumption, shared by scientists and theorists of mind alike, was that language-users possess cognitive mechanisms with which to objectively grasp abstract rules fixed independently of (...) human responses, and that cognizers are thereby capable of grasping rules for the correct application of aesthetic concepts without relying on evaluation or enculturation. However, in this article I use Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations to argue that psychological theories grounded upon this so-called objective model of rule-following fail to adequately account for concept acquisition and mastery. I argue that this is because linguistic enculturation, and the perceptual learning that’s often involved, influences and enables the mastery of aesthetic concepts. I argue that part of what’s involved in speaking aesthetically is to belong to a cultural practice of making sense of things aesthetically, and that it’s within a socio-linguistic community, and that community’s practices, that such aesthetic sense can be made intelligible. (shrink)

I discuss the ubiquity of power law distributions in language organisation (and elsewhere), and argue against Miller’s (The mating mind: How sexual choice shaped the evolution of human nature, William Heinemann, London, 2000) argument that large vocabulary size is a consequence of sexual selection. Instead I argue that power law distributions are evidence that languages are best modelled as dynamical systems but raise some issues for models of iterated language learning.

Imitation has been understood in different ways: as a cognitive adaptation subtended by genetically specified cognitive mechanisms; as an aspect of domain general human cognition. The second option has been advanced by Cecilia Heyes who treats imitation as an instance of associative learning. Her argument is part of a deflationary treatment of the “mirror neuron” phenomenon. I agree with Heyes about mirror neurons but argue that Kim Sterelny has provided the tools to provide a better account of the nature (...) and role of human imitation. What we call imitative learning is an instance of social learning. It has little to do with empathy, emotional contagion, or mind reading. (shrink)

The way students perceive a learning climate (e.g. controlling or stimulating) is significantly influenced by feedback and assessment. However, at present much is unclear about the relation between feedback and motivational state. More specifically, the interplay with student characteristics is unclear. Since there is a strong increase of group work, the central research question is what are the effects of positive, neutral or negative feedback presented to collaborating teams of students, on students? intrinsic motivation, performance and on group processes? (...) One hundred thirty?eight higher education students participated in this study. There were no significant differences in performance across conditions. Multi?level analysis enabled a detailed comparison between groups and individual members of groups. Amongst others, it was found that feelings of competence facilitate the effect of positive feedback at the group level, which suggests that positive feedback boosts interest especially in groups of highly competent students. (shrink)

In response to increasing calls to realize more potential from diversity in organizations, Frances Hesselbein, CEO of Peter Drucker Leadership Institute, challenged management scholars to enrich the understanding of diversity. Her challenge contains descriptive and normative elements, and extends beyond learning only "about" others, toward "diversifying oneself." With this purpose in mind, this two-stage study develops a framework of divergent learning. The first stage describes a philosophical foundation grounded in literature that orients its key concepts toward divergent (...) learning. The second stage adds a layer of practical insights, gathered from professionals in eight different fields, providing channels of access and application within organizational contexts. (shrink)

Agnostic analyses of unique video material from a Mother and Baby Unit were carried out to investigate the usefulness of such analyses to the unit. The goal was to improve outcomes: the health of mothers and their babies. The method was to implement a learning machine that becomes more useful over time and over task. A feasible set-up is here described, with the purpose of producing intelligible and useful results to healthcare professionals at the unit by means of a (...) vision processing pipeline, grouped together with multi-modal capabilities of handling annotations and audio. Algorithmic bias turned out to be an obstacle that could only partly be handled by modern pipelines for automated feature analysis. The professional use of complex quantitative scoring for various mental health-related assessments further complicated the automation of laborious tasks. Activities during the MBU stay had previously been shown to decrease psychiatric symptoms across diagnostic groups. The implementation and first set of experiments on a learning machine for the unit produced the first steps toward explaining why this is so, in turn enabling decision support to staff about what to do more and what to do less of. (shrink)

We prove that the set of all recursive functions cannot be inferred using first-order queries in the query language containing extra symbols $\lbrack +, . The proof of this theorem involves a new decidability result about Presburger arithmetic which is of independent interest. Using our machinery, we show that the set of all primitive recursive functions cannot be inferred with a bounded number of mind changes, again using queries in $\lbrack +, . Additionally, we resolve an open question in (...) [7] about passive versus active learning. (shrink)

The work of creating the future is being done now ─ and much of it is unsustainable in terms of natural and cultural resources. How will the next generation of leadership for environmental sustainability be raised up? Can we imagine sustainable futures, and can we enable transformative leadership to help us realize them? How can we best ensure that the several generations share their particular knowledge? What are the ethical frameworks, methodologies, curricula, and tools necessary for advancing and strengthening education (...) for intergenerational sustainability learning and leadership? In this book, 82 authors from 26 countries across 6 continents seek answers in 32 essays to the many questions related to the intergenerational collaboration that holds promise for creating sustainable futures. The authors themselves represent a diversity of geography, gender, and generation ─ and include the institutions comprising the emerging International Intergenerational Net-work of Centers. They speak to key principles, perspectives, and praxes at the intersection of intergenerational learning and transformative leadership in the context of education for sustainability. A visionary tour de force, this book explores the challenges and complexities of future learning models beyond the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development. It provides a timely discourse encompassing intergenerational and cultural dimensions, including ethics. Contributors articulate a deeper understanding of leadership in the post-Enlightenment era. Chapters in the book offer examples cutting across a diverse range of experiences worldwide, making this volume not only refreshing for practitioners, but also invaluable to policy-makers. ─ Dzulkifli Abdul Razak President, International Association of Universities Former Vice-Chancellor, Universiti Sains Malaysia These are critical times for the global community. Big issues are on the table: security, climate change, environmental destabilization, disease, hunger, and others. Actions we take today must embrace lessons from the past, present realities, and the rights and interests of future generations. Indeed, intergenerational learning is vital to education for sustainable development. This book makes a very timely and urgent call, challenging our traditional learning approaches and inviting us to dig deeper, stretch our minds wider, and see farther. ─ Akpezi Ogbuigwe Former Head of Environmental Education and Training, United Nations Environment Programme Executive Chairperson, Anpez Center for Environment and Development, Port Harcourt, Nigeria Achieving sustainable development requires generations, young and old, to engage with and learn from each other, and for leadership to embrace change. That is one of the key messages of this remarkable book. I wish I had this book when I took up the leadership role of my university two decades ago. I wish I could have given this book to my sons as they started their university education. ─ Goolam Mohamedbhai Former Secretary-General, Association of African Universities Honorary President, International Association of Universities. (shrink)

This paper studies efficient learning with respect to mind changes. Our starting point is the idea that a learner that is efficient with respect to mind changes minimizes mind changes not only globally in the entire learning problem, but also locally in subproblems after receiving some evidence. Formalizing this idea leads to the notion of uniform mind change optimality. We characterize the structure of language classes that can be identified with at most α (...) class='Hi'>mind changes by some learner (not necessarily effective): A language class L is identifiable with α mind changes iff the accumulation order of L is at most α. Accumulation order is a classic concept from point-set topology. To aid the construction of learning algorithms, we show that the characteristic property of uniformly mind change optimal learners is that they output conjectures (languages) with maximal accumulation order. We illustrate the theory by describing mind change optimal learners for various problems such as identifying linear subspaces and one-variable patterns. (shrink)

Deep learning is currently the most prominent and widely successful method in artificial intelligence. Despite having played an active role in earlier artificial intelligence and neural network research, philosophers have been largely silent on this technology so far. This is remarkable, given that deep learning neural networks have blown past predicted upper limits on artificial intelligence performance—recognizing complex objects in natural photographs and defeating world champions in strategy games as complex as Go and chess—yet there remains no universally (...) accepted explanation as to why they work so well. This article provides an introduction to these networks as well as an opinionated guidebook on the philosophical significance of their structure and achievements. It argues that deep learning neural networks differ importantly in their structure and mathematical properties from the shallower neural networks that were the subject of so much philosophical reflection in the 1980s and 1990s. The article then explores several different explanations for their success and ends by proposing three areas of inquiry that would benefit from future engagement by philosophers of mind and science. (shrink)

Research on adaptive rationality has focused principally on inference, judgment, and decision-making that lead to behaviors and actions. These processes typically require cognitive representations as input, and these representations must presumably be acquired via learning. Nonetheless, there has been little work on the nature of, and justification for, adaptively rational learning processes. In this paper, we argue that there are strong reasons to believe that some learning is adaptively rational in the same way as judgment and decision-making. (...) Indeed, overall adaptive rationality can only properly be assessed for pairs of learning and decision processes. We thus present a formal framework for modeling such pairs of cognitive processes, and thereby assessing their adaptive rationality relative to the environment and the agent’s goals. We then use this high-level formal framework on specific cases by demonstrating how natural formal constraints on decision-making can lead to substantive predictions about adaptively rational learning and representation; and characterizing adaptively rational learning for fast-and-frugal one-reason decision-making. (shrink)

In an attempt to bridge the vast divide between classical Asian thought and contemporary Western philosophy, Joel J. Kupperman finds that the two traditions do not, by and large, supply different answers to the same questions. Rather, each tradition is searching for answers to their own set of questions--mapping out distinct philosophical investigations. In this groundbreaking book, Kupperman argues that the foundational Indian and Chinese texts include lines of thought that can enrich current philosophical practice, and in some cases provide (...) uniquely sophisticated insights. Special attention is given to the ethical issues of formation and fluidity of self, the nature and possibilities of choice, the compartmentalization of life implicit in some ethical systems, the variations of ethical demands from person to person, and the nature of philosophy itself as a communicative activity. This study will provide a wealth of information for philosophers seeking a closer knowledge of Asian philosophy and general readers with an interest in Eastern thought. (shrink)

Many students of pragmatics and child language have come to believe that in order to learn a language a child must first have a 'theory of mind,' a grasp that speakers mentally represent the content they would convey when they speak. This view is reinforced by the Gricean theory of communication, according to which speakers intend their words to cause hearers to believe or to do certain things and hearers must recognize these intentions if they are to comply. The (...) view rests on an underlying assumption that learning language involves associating words with things (objects, kinds, events, properties and so forth) or with concepts of these, these associations being acquired, one by one, by observing the usage of others. Accomplishing this task is facilitated, it is thought, by engaging in joint attention with speakers who are attending to the things they are talking about as they talk, and joint attention requires an understanding that others have minds that represent things. (shrink)

Learning general concepts in imperfect environments is difficult since training instances often include noisy data, inconclusive data, incomplete data, unknown attributes, unknown attribute values and other barriers to effective learning. It is well known that people can learn effectively in imperfect environments, and can manage to process very large amounts of data. Imitating human learning behavior therefore provides a useful model for machine learning in real-world applications. This paper proposes a new, more effective way to represent (...) imperfect training instances and rules, and based on the new representation, a Human-Like Learning (HULL) algorithm for incrementally learning concepts well in imperfect training environments. Several examples are given to make the algorithm clearer. Finally, experimental results are presented that show the proposed learning algorithm works well in imperfect learning environments. (shrink)

Rethinking organizational ethics training -- Moral intuition: advances in moral psychology and neuroscience -- The social intuitionist model -- Communication and the new organizational ethics -- How cultur(ing) works -- Pluralistic moral ignorance and spirals of silent misdirection -- Here-and-now ethics talk in the workplace -- Sensemaking and identity: what to expect from moral reasoning -- Substituting here-and-now ethics talk -- Organizational learning and organizational communication -- From individual moral intuition to organizational moral learning -- Organizing for moral (...) mindfulness -- Stories of organizational moral learning and ignorance -- Communication practices for managing moral mindfulness. (shrink)

Imagine that you find yourself in a situation of considerable adversity and apparent permanence. Does it make sense for me to advise you to learn to love your situation? I argue that such advice is capable of a robust meaning beyond the mere expression of compassion, and far beyond the pragmatic advice to ‘accept it’ or ‘make the best of it’. I respond to the objections that love cannot be commanded, and that I am counselling pernicious forms of self-deception or (...) self-deprecation. The key, I suggest, is to understand what it means to lead a life ‘from the inside’. (shrink)

Hirst always highlighted knowledge when reflecting on the school curriculum. He replaced his early focus on liberal education, the development of mind and theoretical knowledge by emphasizing the practical and practices as a curriculum starting point and for the framing of educational aims. In this paper I explore links between Hirst’s philosophical treatment of knowledge and some currently contested aspects of UK government education policies. I also note some ways in which his work relates to selected present-day debates in (...) philosophy of education. Examples of UK government policy will include Ofsted’s definition of learning as a ‘change in long-term memory’ and the ways in which they place ‘logical sequencing’ at the heart of teaching, learning, and curriculum. Their learning definition treats knowledge as an individual asset rather than something about individuals as embedded in the social world of practices, a perspective more in keeping with Hirst’s later views. The critique of individualistic notions of knowledge and learning includes some explorations of how learners move into the ‘space of reasons’. Where I draw attention to relationships between Hirst’s thought and contemporary philosophy of education debates, I do not always draw any definite conclusions. (shrink)

In a spirit of collegial support, this paper argues that Beckett and Hager’s theoretical justification and empirical exemplifications do not do full justice to the complexity of group or team learning. We firstly reaffirm our support for the theoretical argument Becket and Hager make, though expressing some reservations about Complexity Theory, to explain the taken-for-granted assumptions that learning by an individual is the paradigm case of learning and that context plays a minimal role in this process. Drawing (...) on our joint and separate work, we demonstrate that Becket and Hager’s argument is less radical than it may initially seem because it is predicated on: (i) cognitive-bounded rather than “distributed” or “extended” conception of mind; (ii) material rather than a “immaterial” conception of activity; and (iii) co-present rather than a “fractional” or “connective” conception of ontology. Despite making this critique, we conclude by making the case that we are adding further substance to Becket and Hager’s overarching argument and, in doing so, encouraging them to be more radical about how they conceptualise the complexity of learning. (shrink)

In recent years, the family of algorithms collected under the term ``deep learning'' has revolutionized artificial intelligence, enabling machines to reach human-like performances in many complex cognitive tasks. Although deep learning models are grounded in the connectionist paradigm, their recent advances were basically developed with engineering goals in mind. Despite of their applied focus, deep learning models eventually seem fruitful for cognitive purposes. This can be thought as a kind of biological exaptation, where a physiological structure (...) becomes applicable for a function different from that for which it was selected. In this paper, it will be argued that it is time for cognitive science to seriously come to terms with deep learning, and we try to spell out the reasons why this is the case. First, the path of the evolution of deep learning from the connectionist project is traced, demonstrating the remarkable continuity, and the differences as well. Then, it will be considered how deep learning models can be useful for many cognitive topics, especially those where it has achieved performance comparable to humans, from perception to language. It will be maintained that deep learning poses questions that cognitive sciences should try to answer. One of such questions is the reasons why deep convolutional models that are disembodied, inactive, unaware of context, and static, are by far the closest to the patterns of activation in the brain visual system. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with adaptive learning and coordination processes. Implementing agent-based modeling techniques (Learning Classifier Systems, LCS), we focus on the twofold impact of cognitive and environmental complexity on learning and coordination. Within this framework, we introduce the notion of Adaptive Learning Agent with Rule-based Memory (ALARM), which is a particular class of Artificial Adaptive Agent (AAA, Holland and Miller 1991). We show that equilibrium is approached to a high degree, but never perfectly reached. We (...) also demonstrate that memorization and learning capacities depend upon the relative discordance between the cognitive complexity of agents' mental models and the degree of stability of the environment. (shrink)

Gill’s rich and comprehensive discussion of Stoic ethical thought adopts an approach that would surely have found favour with the Stoics themselves: to present.

Extended and distributed cognition theories argue that human cognitive systems sometimes include non-biological objects. On these views, the physical supervenience base of cognitive systems is thus not the biological brain or even the embodied organism, but an organism-plus-artifacts. In this paper, we provide a novel account of the implications of these views for learning, education, and assessment. We start by conceptualising how we learn to assemble extended cognitive systems by internalising cultural norms and practices. Having a better grip on (...) how extended cognitive systems are assembled, we focus on the question: If our cognition extends, how should we educate and assess such extended cognitive systems? We suggest various ways to minimize possible negative effects of extending one’s cognition and to efficiently find and organise (online) information by adopting a virtue epistemology approach. Educational and assessment implications are foregrounded, particularly in the case of Danish students’ use of the Internet during exams. (shrink)

Bayesianism can be characterized as the following twofold position: (i) rational credences obey the probability calculus; (ii) rational learning, i.e., the updating of credences, is regulated by some form of conditionalization. While the formal aspect of various forms of conditionalization has been explored in detail, the philosophical application to learning from experience is still deeply problematic. Some philosophers have proposed to revise the epistemology of perception; others have provided new formal accounts of conditionalization that are more in line (...) with how we learn from perceptual experience. The current investigation argues that Bayesian epistemology is still incomplete; the epistemology of perception and the epistemology of rational reasoning have not been reconciled. (shrink)

At first, Bloom's theory appears inimical to empiricism, since he credits very young children with highly sophisticated cognitive resources (e.g., a theory of mind and a belief that real kinds have essences), and he also attacks the empiricist's favoured learning theory, namely, associationism. We suggest that, on the contrary, the empiricist can embrace much of what Bloom says.

Learn how to develop your reasoning skills and how to write well-reasoned proofs Learning to Reason shows you how to use the basic elements of mathematical language to develop highly sophisticated, logical reasoning skills. You'll get clear, concise, easy-to-follow instructions on the process of writing proofs, including the necessary reasoning techniques and syntax for constructing well-written arguments. Through in-depth coverage of logic, sets, and relations, Learning to Reason offers a meaningful, integrated view of modern mathematics, cuts through confusing (...) terms and ideas, and provides a much-needed bridge to advanced work in mathematics as well as computer science. Original, inspiring, and designed for maximum comprehension, this remarkable book: Clearly explains how to write compound sentences in equivalent forms and use them in valid arguments Presents simple techniques on how to structure your thinking and writing to form well-reasoned proofs Reinforces these techniques through a survey of sets-the building blocks of mathematics Examines the fundamental types of relations, which is "where the action is" in mathematics Provides relevant examples and class-tested exercises designed to maximize the learning experience Includes a mind-building game/exercise space at www.wiley.com/products/subject/mathematics/. (shrink)

Here is a distinction that appears very simple, looks compelling and seems to be deeply rooted in our reflections on learning. 1 The distinction is between activities of learning that involve training and those that involve reasoning. In the former, the pupil is a passive recipient of habits of mind and action. The mechanism by which they acquire these habits is mimesis, not reasoning. In contrast, learning by reasoning involves considerable mental activity by the pupil who (...) has to work out what to think and do. The very mechanism by which the pupil learns is her own capacity to reason, to things work out for herself. In this paper I argue that there is no basis for this distinction. I argue that, contrary to the dominant empiricist thinking about such things, learning by reasoning is the only credible form of learning. I start with a brief characterisation of the distinction and an account of why it seems so compelling. In §2 I review the empirical evidence from developmental psychology for a rationalist account of language learning as learning by reasoning. In §§3 and 4 I provide a philosophical argument against the place of training and in favour of a rationalist model of learning by reasoning. (shrink)

An interpretation of memory from the perspective of logical learning theory is presented. In contrast to traditional associationistic theories of learning and memory, which rest on mediation modeling, LLT rests on a predication model. Predication draws on formal and final causation whereas mediation is limited to material and efficient causation. It is held in LLT that memory begins in predicate organization, where framing meanings are logically extended to targets. Passage of time is irrelevant in this meaning extension. The (...) effectiveness of memory depends on the cohesiveness or "tightness" of meaningful organization as framed by a relevant context. Well-organized contexts facilitate memory and poorly organized contexts are detrimental to memory. Possible reasons for good or poor organization in memory are discussed, and relevant research findings cited. The paper closes with a separate definition of memory as a content and as a process. (shrink)

then essentially characterized the hypotheses that mechanical scientists can successfully decide in the limit in terms of arithmetic complexity. These ideas were developed still further by Peter Kugel [4]. In this paper, I extend this approach to obtain characterizations of identification in the limit, identification with bounded mind-changes, and identification in the short run, both for computers and for ideal agents with unbounded computational abilities. The characterization of identification with n mind-changes entails, as a corollary, an exact arithmetic (...) characterization of Putnam's n-trial predicates, which closes a gap of a factor of two in Putnam's original characterization [12]. (shrink)

David Hume’s skeptical solution to the problem of induction was grounded in his belief that we learn by means of custom. We consider here how a form of reinforcement learning like custom may allow an agent to learn how to learn in other ways as well. Specifically, an agent may learn by simple reinforcement to adopt new forms of learning that work better than simple reinforcement in the context of specific tasks. We will consider how such a bootstrapping (...) process may lead to a system that includes trial-and-error forms of learning like win-stay/lose-shift, probe and adjust, and simple reinforcement itself together with higher-rationality inferential tools. (shrink)

Peer assessment is employed as one fundamental practice of classroom-based assessment in terms of its learning-oriented and formative nature. The exercise of peer assessment has multiple and additional benefits for student learning. However, research into the learning processes in peer assessment is scarce both in theory and in practice, making it difficult to evaluate and pinpoint its value as a tool in assessment as learning. This study focuses both on the learning process and outcome through (...) assessment activities. We set out with three goals in mind: to examine students' assessment performance in context, to evaluate its impact on student progress, and to illuminate teachers on organizing assessment activities. Three specific research questions are answered in this study: How do student raters perform in the process of PA in an advanced English class? To what extent do assessment activities influence the students' speaking ability? What are students' perceptions of PA regarding its benefits and caveats? A total of 29 undergraduate students participated in two assessment activities on argumentative speaking. Many-Facet Rasch Model analysis was conducted to measure the rater effects both at the group level and the individual level. Bias/interaction analyses were performed to diagnose rater behavior in different contexts including the rating session, speaking session, and peer assessment vs. self-assessment. Questionnaire and semi-structured interview data were also collected to explore factors and strategies that could interfere with PA as AaL. Results show that students exhibited stable rating behavior and made progress in argumentative speaking in all dimensions, including delivery, organization, and language use. They are more stringent with themselves than with peers although there is one rare case with a bias against peers. Participants acknowledged the benefits of PA but also shared reasonable concerns in practice. This study validated the feasibility and the effectiveness of PA for student learning. Discussion on findings and guidelines for effective implementation of PA as AaL are provided. (shrink)

Nursing work increasingly demands forms of expertise that complement specialist knowledge. In child and family nursing, this need arises when nurses work in partnership with parents of young children at risk. Partnership means working with parents in respectful, negotiated and empowering ways. Existing partnership literature emphasises communicative and relational skills, but this paper focuses on nurses’ capacities to facilitate parents’ learning. Referring to data from home visiting, day‐stay and specialist toddler clinic services in Sydney, a pedagogical framework is presented. (...) Analysis shows how nurses notice aspects of children, parents and parent–child interactions as a catalyst for building on parents’ strengths, enhancing guided chance or challenging unhelpful constructs. Prior research shows the latter can be a sticking point in partnership, but this paper reveals diverse ways in which challenges are folded into learning process that position parents as agents of positive change. Noticing is dependent on embodied and communicative expertise, conceptualised in terms of sensory and reported channels. The framework offers a new view of partnership as mind‐expanding for the parent and specifies the nurse's role in facilitating this process. (shrink)

Fodor's and Pylyshyn's stand on systematicity in thought and language has been debated and criticized. Van Gelder and Niklasson, among others, have argued that Fodor and Pylyshyn offer no precise definition of systematicity. However, our concern here is with a learning based formulation of that concept. In particular, Hadley has proposed that a network exhibits strong semantic systematicity when, as a result of training, it can assign appropriate meaning representations to novel sentences (both simple and embedded) which contain words (...) in syntactic positions they did not occupy during training. The experience of researchers indicates that strong systematicity in any form is difficult to achieve in connectionist systems.Herein we describe a network which displays strong semantic systematicity in response to Hebbian, connectionist training. During training, two-thirds of all nouns are presented only in a single syntactic position (either as grammatical subject or object). Yet, during testing, the network correctly interprets thousands of sentences containing those nouns in novel positions. In addition, the network generalizes to novel levels of embedding. Successful training requires a, corpus of about 1000 sentences, and network training is quite rapid. The architecture and learning algorithms are purely connectionist, but classical insights are discernible in one respect, viz, that complex semantic representations spatially contain their semantic constituents. However, in other important respects, the architecture is distinctly non-classical. (shrink)

There is an apparent connection between reinforcement learning and agency. Artificial entities controlled by reinforcement learning algorithms are standardly referred to as agents, and the mainstream view in the psychology and neuroscience of agency is that humans and other animals are reinforcement learners. This article examines this connection, focusing on artificial reinforcement learning systems and assuming that there are various forms of agency. Artificial reinforcement learning systems satisfy plausible conditions for minimal agency, and those which use (...) models of the environment to perform forward search are capable of a form of agency which may reasonably be called action for reasons. (shrink)

The paper develops a positive account of the representational capacity of cognitive systems: simple, associationist learning mechanisms and an architecture that supports bootstrapping are sufficient conditions for symbol tool use. In terms of the debates within the philosophy of mind, this paper offers a plausibility account of representation externalism, an alternative to the reductive, computational/representational models of intentionality that still play a leading role in the field. Although the central theme here is representation, methodologically this view complements embodied, (...) enactivist approaches to studying cognition. (shrink)

The long-standing vision of universities as the “alma mater” of students and graduates is a demonstration of its role as sustaining the person, the expert/professional, and the citizen. This role has persisted in the face of rising global challenges such as the emergence of new learning spaces, the growing diversity of publics, the call for productivity and performativity, and the hope for a significant engagement with the community and the public good. These sometimes conflicting tendencies have also stimulated higher (...) education institutions to further pedagogical strategies that articulate in novel ways the classical elements of learning: action/experience and reflection/theory. In this context, service learning received a new impetus, particularly in the post-Bologna European Higher Education Area, as universities were looking for ways in which to articulate the social dimension of HEI and their “third mission” as institutions not only committed to addressing and solving societal problems, but also committed to fostering public-minded alumni through powerful experiences of engagement for both the students and the community.This paper is based on the experience of Erasmus+project ESSA, a service earning based project focused on University social responsibility (USR). ESSA engaged four groups of students from three European universities (Edinburgh, Porto, and Kaunas) in conducting a 1-week on-site USR audit based on an ecologic and situated concept of social responsibility. We will consider the perceived impact of ESSA on 44 students through a thematic analysis of focus group discussions and student self-assessment reports produced during and after their participation in the USR audit. (shrink)

Creative Ways to Learn Ethics is an accessible, easy-to-read guide that compiles a variety of ethics trainings to help professionals stimulate their minds, relieve stress, and increase engagement and memory retention. The book uses a range of experiential and thought-provoking approaches, including contemplative exercises, expressive arts, games, and media. Each chapter contains objectives, detailed procedures, adaptations for different audiences, and handouts. Trainers, educators, clinicians, and other mental health professionals can use these exercises in various settings and modify them to meet (...) the needs of their clients. (shrink)

Patrick Frierson - Learning to Love: From Egoism to Generosity in Descartes - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.3 313-338 Learning to Love: From Egoism to Generosity in Descartes Patrick R. Frierson The whole of philosophy is like a tree. The roots are metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other sciences, which may be reduced to three principal ones, namely medicine, mechanics, (...) and morals. Descartes is well known for his metaphysics and physics, the roots and trunk of his philosophical project. But Descartes's morals are generally neglected, partly because they are so difficult to find. He does not dedicate a major published work to morality. His most direct comments on it are in letters to Princess Elizabeth and Pierre Chanut. The published work that most touches on moral issues is The Passions of the Soul, which is primarily a treatise on the relationship between mind and body. As a result of this lack of primary sources , there have been only a few significant studies of Descartes's moral philosophy in French, and only two major works devoted to it in English. This neglect of Descartes's ethics is unfortunate, not least since ethical concerns sometimes influence his work in other areas. This.. (shrink)

Tomasello, Kruger & Ratner make the very interesting and valid point that the transmission of culture must depend on understanding others' minds. Culture is shared among a people and is passed on to progeny. The sharing of culture implies that the purpose of (and therefore the meaning behind) any given cultural element (behavioral tradition, word, or artifact) is understood. Because meaning or purpose emanates from minds, something about others' minds must be understood in order to truly learn some element of (...) a culture. It thus makes sense that cultural learning should depend on social-cognitive skills. But what exactly is cultural learning?There are two rival interpretations of the term cultural learning. In the first, one would define a given type of cultural learning by the type of social-cognitive skill it entails. For example, imitative learning would be defined as any learning of a cultural element in which another's goals or intentions are taken into account. This definition of cultural learning, however, would force Tomasello et al.'s argument into a circle: Imitative learning relies on this social-cognitive skill because imitative learning is defined as learning that relies on this social-cognitive skill. Such a circular definition does not do their argument justice. (shrink)

Accuracy-first accounts of rational learning attempt to vindicate the intuitive idea that, while rationally-formed belief need not be true, it is nevertheless likely to be true. To this end, they attempt to show that the Bayesian's rational learning norms are a consequence of the rational pursuit of accuracy. Existing accounts fall short of this goal, for they presuppose evidential norms which are not and cannot be vindicated in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. I propose an alternative (...) account, according to which learning experiences rationalize changes in the way you value accuracy, which in turn rationalize changes in belief. I show that this account is capable of vindicating the Bayesian's rational learning norms in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy, so long as accuracy is rationally valued. (shrink)

Machine learning has been proven useful for solving the bottlenecks in building expert systems. Noise in the training instances will, however, confuse a learning mechanism. Two main steps are adopted here to solve this problem. The first step is to appropriately arrange the training order of the instances. It is well known from Psychology that different orders of presentation of the same set of training instances to a human may cause different learning results. This idea is used (...) here for machine learning and an order arrangement scheme is proposed. The second step is to modify a conventional noise-free learning algorithm, thus making it suitable for noisy environment. The generalized version space learning algorithm is then adopted to process the training instances for deriving good concepts. Finally, experiments on the Iris Flower problem show that the new scheme can produce a good training order, allowing the generalized version space algorithm to have a satisfactory learning result. (shrink)