This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only (...) within a shared national public culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts. (shrink)

This article has been written in response to the texts by Richard Robson (“In What Sense is Multiculturalism a Form of Communitarianism”), and Slobodan Divjak (“Communitarianism, Multiculturalism and Liberalism”) with which the Balkan Journal of Philosophy (vol. 10, no 2, 2018) started a discussion on the theme Liberal Democracy and Cultural Diversity. I try to contest the position of these two authors–that multiculturalism and communitarianism belong to one and the same paradigm in political philosophy–by pointing out essential (...) class='Hi'>liberal normative elements in multiculturalist theory. My main thesis is that in order to clarify the relation between multiculturalism and communitarianism, we have to differentiate between descriptive and normative communitarianism. The latter is guided, in my opinion, by values, which stand in stark contrast with the liberal ones, whilst this is not the case with multiculturalism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Interpreting from the IntersticesThe Role of Justice in a Liberal Democracy—Lessons from Michael Walzer and Emmanuel LevinasNicholas R. Brown (bio)1As anyone who is familiar with more recent theological debate can attest, the appraisal of the liberal democratic tradition has undergone a radical reevaluation in the wake of Stanley Hauerwas’s and Alasdair MacIntyre’s scathing critiques. As a result of their blistering assault, religious ethicists and philosophers now (...) find themselves operating within a discursive milieu that is almost the photo negative of the one they previously inhabited. For what has followed After Virtue and After Christendom is a situation in which compliance with liberal democratic norms is now perceived as actively inveighing against justice rather than as an integral prerequisite to its pursuit.There are cracks, however, beginning to emerge in the MacIntyre/Hauerwas edifice. For what is becoming disputed and increasingly so among a growing chorus of religious ethicists and philosophers is whether their critical reading of liberal democracy offers the most [End Page 155] helpful or even the most biblical way to think through its own moral dimensions as well as those undergirding its relationship with justice.It is the emergence of these criticisms that forms the basis for this essay. For the thesis that I wish to advance below is that liberal democracy offers religious ethicists and philosophers alike a moral framework and vocabulary from which it is possible to comprehend and enact the normative precepts encapsulated within a biblical understanding of justice. Accordingly, some aspects of my argument will build upon the rhetorical trajectories that have been already charted by the ethicists and philosophers I mention above.What distinguishes my approach, however, is that I will proceed from a more focused examination of some of the ethical and political undercurrents found within contemporary Jewish thought. More specifically, I want to probe the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and the political philosophy of Michael Walzer, for I believe the juxtapositional methodology of interpretation which informs each of their perspectives is illustrative of an interstitial hermeneutic that helps further illuminate the moral compatibility between biblical and democratic accounts of justice.2By now, MacIntyre’s and Hauerwas’s critiques of the liberal democratic tradition have been so thoroughly documented, discussed, and dissected that a review of their perspectives cannot help but have a certain pleonastic quality.Probably the most significant and disturbing problem that MacIntyre and Hauerwas see belying the liberal democratic tradition stems from its conception of time and space, or more precisely, its lack thereof. For what they discover upon a more careful probing of its moral and epistemological underpinnings is a pursuit of transcendence not dissimilar to Gnostic metaphysics. In the case of liberalism, however, the existential encumbrances to be excised are not corporeal and carnal in nature, but historical and social. [End Page 156]Such conditionalities, surmise liberal theorists, are so shot through with conceptual prejudices that they comprise an interpretative straight-jacket that vitiates against the kind of objectivity necessary to engage in a nonparochial process of moral and political discernment. For it is precisely this ability “to be able to stand back from any and every situation in which one is involved, from any and every characteristic that one may possess, and to pass judgment on it from a purely universal and abstract point of view that is totally detached from all social particularity” which MacIntyre sees as constituting “the essence of moral agency” of modern liberalism (AV 31–32). Therefore, “liberalism is successful,” maintains Hauerwas, “exactly because... [it] provide[s] that philosophical account of society designed to deal with” the moral and political implications such a social and historical denuding portends, namely “a system of rules that will constitute procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their various interests.”1However, what liberalism defines as success MacIntyre and Hauerwas see as anything but. Instead, both judge its “system of rules” to be an insidious prescription for a particularly virulent form of moral nihilism and political bankruptcy. For by stripping moral and political discourse of their historical and social referents, liberalism, ironically and tragically, eviscerates itself of the very heuristic and discursive practices necessary to make those... (shrink)

I claim that the revisions John Rawls made to his theory of justice—as seen in his political conception of justice as fairness in the revised edition of Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement—result in him being able to secure justice for all persons even in their private lives. Thus, I defend his theory against common communitarian and feminist criticisms, viz the lack of moral community and inability to secure justice for individuals in the private domain. I demonstrate that (...) justice is secured from the categorical requirement that all associational life and moral doctrines must adhere to the constraints of justice, by (what Rawls terms) the indirect application of the first principle of justice. The implications of and necessity for this indirect application are precisely what I interrogate in this thesis. I suggest that this indirect application requires unconditional acknowledgement and internalisation of the values of liberty and equality (political values of the first principle) into all aspects of civil society. I claim that Rawls realised this necessity for the congruence between the moral powers of persons, the spheres of society, and the right and the good and, as such, developed a complementary relation between these three features. Coherence between these three aspects is essential; without coherence, citizens would have a split moral personality, the public and the non-public spheres would be in conflict, and the political values and the moral doctrines of individuals would undermine one another. The significance of this strict coherence is that it can ensure the adequate development of individuals’ capacity for citizenship during the three stages of moral development. This results in citizens being able to form bonds of civic friendship necessary for justice as reciprocity to be realised. Thus, in this thesis, I position my argument against theorists such as Nancy Rosenblum, who argue for a more relaxed congruence between political institutions and civil society, as according to her illiberal forms of associational life can help form the necessary bonds of love and care needed for mutual cooperation in a liberal society. In opposition to this, I claim that strict congruence is necessary; without it, a stable liberal society is not possible as the citizens would not be able to able to respect one another on free, equal, and mutually beneficial terms. I rely on Hochschild’s sociological evidence to demonstrate that civic friendship has not been developed, due to a lack of reciprocity, impacting the negative development of one’s sense of justice. I then illustrate how this lack of reciprocity is amplified by digital and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The significance of this thesis is that I claim, firstly, Rawls’s last revisions and works before his death demonstrate that justice is a collective non-comprehensive good that results by constraining individuals’ associational life and their partial comprehensive doctrines to Rawlsian demands of justice. Thus, Rawls takes seriously the feminist and communitarian critiques he received. Secondly, I claim that this interpretation of Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be conceptualised in terms of a binary presentation of the priority of the right versus the good debate and, instead, I argue for a reconceptualisation of the priority of the right versus the good as ranges on a continuum of structural relations between the right and the good. (shrink)

This dissertation develops a conception of reasonableness that can adequately respond to agonistic critiques of this concept. As an aspect of practical reason, reasonableness refers to the moral capacity of citizens to cooperate politically, especially in pluralistic societies. More specifically, the principles or rules of political association governing society ought to be acceptable to all reasonable members of that society. This relates, furthermore, to the idea of justification: the acceptability of fundamental political principles refers to their justifiability. Justification, in turn, (...) requires ideas of public reason and political deliberation: political deliberation, for example, facilitates the ability of citizens to determine what political principles are justifiable. The explication of justifiability in terms of universal acceptability (acceptable to all reasonable persons, for example) is indicative of a central concern of proponents of reasonableness (and public reason), namely, that politics at least at a fundamental level ought to be governed by consensus. However, this conception of reasonableness has been the target of critique by agonistic theories of democracy. These theorists deny that politics ought to be governed by such a consensus. Most importantly, this orientation toward consensus ignores, or at least underestimates, the antagonistic and hegemonic nature of the political. That is, the consensus orientation of proponents of reasonableness and public reason suggests that society can be given a non-hegemonic and rational foundation. This goal, in turn, leads to the suppression or exclusion of dissensus. Nonetheless, this dissertation affirms the importance of reasonableness to democratic theory and identifies an implicit commitment to reasonableness within agonistic democratic theory. This commitment is evident, for example, in the claim that that political participants must adhere to the basic principles and institutions of liberal democracy. Given this implicit commitment, this dissertation will formulate a middle ground between prominent proponents of reasonableness and their agonistic critics. The primary goal will be to construct an agonistic conception of reasonableness, or reasonable agonism, in light of agonistic critiques of this concept. The agonistic conception of reasonableness developed in this dissertation is understood primarily in terms of the deliberative relationships citizens form and maintain. This opposes accounts of reasonableness and justification that privilege the universal acceptability of political principles and related idealizations of practical reason (understood in terms of its capacity for determining universally acceptable reasons). The defining feature of an agonistic conception of reasonableness is not the universal acceptability of political principles or of the reasons offered in political deliberation, but rather the maintenance of adversarial deliberative relationships. This approach to reasonableness does not require a consensus orientation and it is more sensitive to the antagonistic nature of the political. That is, political participants are able to adhere (at one level) to a particular, partisan conception of justice, as long as (at another level) they remain committed to maintaining deliberative relationships with their political rivals. In this way, an agonistic conception of reasonableness combines the best features of reasonableness and agonism, while addressing the shortcomings involved in theories of both concepts. Additionally, this account of reasonableness has a related critical function, namely, the contestation of prevailing normative orders that can be viewed as illegitimate or unjustifiable by those excluded from such orders. (shrink)

Liberal democracy is often considered to be unstable, consisting of two markedly different ideals that remain in tension. Yet the thesis regarding the alleged insta...

Western democracy theorists accept the "liberal democracy thesis" and claim that the only morally justifiable conception of democracy is liberal democracy regulated by substantive liberal values. According to this thesis, democracy not regulated by liberal values in nonliberal nations, if at all feasible, necessarily leads to the oppression of minorities and is therefore morally unjustifiable. This article aims to refute the liberal democracy thesis by arguing that (...) democracy in "decent" nonliberal nations is not only feasible but also morally justifiable. (shrink)

The civic republican tradition in political thought includes Niccolo Machiavelli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Alexis de Tocqueville. The belief that it is imperative that citizens participate actively and disinterestedly in public affairs, i.e., that they possess "civic virtue" or "public spirit" is a prominent family resemblance between its members. Civic republican thought has undergone a recent resurgence, and one consequence is that political philosophers and other theorists have begun to ask whether liberals can take civic virtue seriously. Certain critics of liberalism, (...) including Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor, have answered this question in the negative. They give a variety of reasons for this answer, ranging from the inability of the atomistic ontologies underlying many liberal theories to make sense of the existence of a common good to the inability of the liberal state to concern itself with the character of its citizens. ;For the most part, unsurprisingly, these antiliberals direct their arguments at the work of twentieth-century "deontological" liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. While Rawls and Dworkin say relatively little about civic virtue, many earlier liberals believed firmly in its importance. John Stuart Mill's centrality to the liberal tradition and the thoroughgoing nature of his liberalism make him an especially interesting "civic liberal." My central thesis is that the civic and liberal components of his political philosophy combine to form a coherent whole. In my early exegetical chapters I provide the first systematic exposition of the frequently ignored civic component. I then address the work of several of Mill's interpreters who either explicitly or implicitly point to possible problems with his attempt to weave together the civic and liberal strands in his thought, and conclude that these problems are either not real or not insoluble. Finally, I consider whether the arguments which Sandel and Taylor, et. al., have given to show that contemporary liberal theories cannot consistently incorporate the civic republican belief in the importance of active and disinterested civic participation might have force against Mill. I show that they do not, and not simply because On Liberty is not A Theory of Justice but because the many of the objections are poorly reasoned. (shrink)

This article addresses two great global challenges of the 2020s. On one hand, the accelerating climate crisis and, on the other, the deepening crisis of representation within liberal democracies. As temperatures and water levels rise, rates of popular confidence in existing democratic institutions decline. So, what is to be done? This article discusses whether sortition – the ancient Greek practice of selecting individuals for political office through lottery – could serve to mitigate both crises simultaneously. Since the 2000s, sortition (...) has attracted growing interest among activists and academics. Recently it has been identified in countries like the UK and France as a mechanism for producing legitimate political answers to the climate challenge. However, few theoretical reflections on the potentials and perils of sortition-based climate governance have yet emerged. This article contributes to filling the gap. Based on a critique of the first successful case of sortition used to enhance national environmental policy – in Ireland in 2017–18 – we argue that sortition-based deliberation could indeed speed up meaningful climate action whilst improving the health of democratic systems. However, this positive outcome is not preordained. Success depends not only on green social movements getting behind climate sortition but also on developing flexible, context-specific designs that identify adequate solutions to a number of problems, including those of power ; expertise ; and participation. (shrink)

French political philosophy has experienced a renewal over the last twenty years. One of its leading projects is Marcel Gauchet’s reflection on democracy and religion. This project situates itself within the context of the French debate on modernity and autonomy launched by the work of Cornelius Castoriadis. Gauchet’s work makes a significant contribution to this debate by building on the pioneering work of Lefort on the political self-instituting capacity of modern societies and the associated shift from religion to ideology. (...) It thus explores the centrality of the notion of sovereignty in the advent of liberal democracy and conducts this reflection within an overall discussion of the role played by Christianity in the genesis of European modernity. It elaborates an anthropology of modernity which explores the relationship between individualism and democracy and redefines modernity as a project of sovereignty which aims at creating a radically new society, the society of individuals. (shrink)

Public reason liberals disagree about the relationship between public justification and deliberative democracy. My goal is to argue against the recent suggestion that public reason liberals seek a ‘divorce’ from deliberative democracy. Defending this thesis will involve discussing the benefits of deliberation for public justification as well as revisiting public reason’s standard Rawlisan restraint requirement. I criticize Kevin Vallier’s alternative convergence-based principle of restraint and respond to the worry that the standard Rawlsian restraint requirement reduces the likelihood (...) of public justification by limiting the diversity of inputs into the justificatory process. (shrink)

After the fall of the “Iron Curtain,” Francis Fukuyama formulated a thesis on structural victory of liberal democracy and its fundamental values, such as freedom of speech, freedom of thought, freedom of worldview, freedom of the press etc. This thesis was demonstrably erroneous, as at the beginning of the 21st century, the crisis of liberal democracy in relation to the growth of populist movements is mentioned more and more frequently. While seizing power through democratic (...) means, populist parties abandon the ideals of liberal democracy and values and pivot towards an autocratic governance model while ostensibly adhering to the rules of formal democracy. It was Hannah Arendt, who warned against such a situation saying that tendencies to move towards autocracy within democracies are specific for multi-party systems, while two-party systems in democracies are relatively less prone to such transformation. With regard to the above, the problem which philosophy of politics calls a “paradox of democracy” reappears. Among other things, it is related to the question on the limit of tolerance the liberal democracy has for thoughts, attitudes, actions and words which are substantially opposed to democracy and may lead to autocracy. At the same time, we are observing the fact of reappearance of the militant democracy theory, formulated by Karl Loewenstein. The aim of this article is to look closely at the theory and its suggested modifications (described as neo-militant democracy), as well as to answer the questions on what tools are needed and if they are even possible to be used to defend not only procedures, but also values of democracy from its progressive destabilisation in the face of digital revolution. (shrink)

This is a work of normative political philosophy that seeks to identify the legitimate goals of public education policy in liberal democratic states and the implications of those goals for arguments about public funding and regulation of religious schools. ;The thesis of the first section is that the inferiority of certain types of religious school as instruments of civic education in a pluralist state would not suffice to justify liberal states in a general refusal to fund such (...) schools. States with no position on the value of autonomy for the good life would have to balance civic concerns against the preferences of religious parents who want to send their children to narrowly religious schools to shield them from exposure to ethical diversity. But, I argue, the principles of liberal democracy actually presuppose the value of autonomy. ;In the second section, I develop a conception of ethical autonomy and argue for its adoption as a public value. Autonomy, understood to entail distinctively rational reflection that must nonetheless inevitably be situated within an unchosen cultural context, can be publicly justified as having instrumental value to all persons in their quest to live a good life. And I defend the legitimacy of adopting autonomy as a goal of public education policy against a series of objections, most notably those grounded in claims about parental rights and fairness to traditional cultures. ;In the third section, I explore the implications of the autonomy goal for religious schools. After defending secular public schools from several prominent criticisms, I consider the argument that religious secondary schools are unsuitable to deliver education for autonomy because they provide children with inadequate exposure to and rational engagement with ethical diversity: I conclude that states cannot justify prohibiting or even presumptively denying public funding to all religious secondary schools, but that there is need for extensive public regulation. Finally, I argue that religious primary schools should be treated differently because of the particular developmental needs and capacities of pre-adolescents. Religious primary schools whose pedagogy is non-authoritarian are specially suitable to lay the foundations for autonomy in young children from religious families. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on the contemporary debate over moving from an individualist form of liberalism to one that seeks to accommodate the special claims of various groups in modern society. I deal with authors who examine ways that group dynamics affect the individual. They are worried about whether it is possible or wise to extend individualist liberalism into a group-accommodating liberalism. Presently, it is a matter of deep controversy how liberal democracies ought to interpret and accommodate the social reality (...) and normative claims of racial minorities. ;Race denotes privilege, it precipitates class antagonisms, hostility, and anger between various groups, it motivates misconceptions and misunderstandings. Racism is responsible for both immediate and intergenerational harm. And yet, the members of disadvantaged racial groups see their racial identity as something precious that should be preserved. For many the opportunity to identify with others in terms of a common racial heritage is an important source of pride. This disparity poses special problems for philosophical liberalism. What is the philosophical import of race and racism for various political theories within the contemporary Anglo American tradition of individualist liberalism? How ought the liberal tradition, an individualist thesis, to interpret and accommodate racial identity? ;This dissertation casts the philosophical debate concerning race in a new light. I argue that whether racial identities are compatible with liberal democratic ideals depends on how one defines race and the liberal ideals involved. Hence, I urge a critical stance on the issue of race. I am critical of both classical individualist liberalism, and the stand that groups do not pose any problems in a modern liberal democracy. (shrink)

The best way to divide control over children’s education between private and state authorities is unclear. This task has ethical implications that this thesis explores—in the context of a pluralist liberal democracy. In cases where authority over children’s education is granted to private groups, like ethnic or religious minorities, rights are often part of the default vocabulary adopted by politically liberal commentaries. These rights are often viewed as a shield that offers the group immunity from state (...) interference. Some illiberal minority groups argue that they need to be shielded from state interference because the persistence of their cultural or religious identity depends on it. For example, the Amish community in Wisconsin argued in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the future of their community would be jeopardized if they were forced to send their children to school beyond the age of fourteen. While a rights-based approach does explain many of the variables connected with cases like these, the explanation is incomplete. I will offer two clarifications to the rights-based view. First, in the event that a minority group is shielded from state interference, it is not clear that it would be morally legitimate for the group to take over the authority of the state. I will, then, offer a plausible theory that could justify the self-governing authority of minority groups in these situations. My second clarification is that the concept of individual autonomy, often the central liberal value protected by rights, is too broad to support a zero-tolerance approach toward illiberal groups. This indicates that illiberal minority groups might still have a claim to self-governing authority even though they arguably interfere with the autonomy of their children. Some interference with minor elements of individual autonomy should arguably be tolerated in cases where the ruination or assimilation of the group’s unique culture or religion is at stake. (shrink)

The thesis that cultures oppose the emphasis on emancipative values and liberal democracy has mostly been criticized for its political instrumentality. By contrast, the empirical claim about most AsiansWestEast’, confirming a universal model of human development rather than Asian exceptionalism, or any other form of cultural exceptionalism.

Persistent disagreement is perhaps one of the defining features of modern liberal democracy. Disagreement, though, is not merely a philosophical nuisance, but a source of friction and conflict. The goal of this work is to inquire, whether we can conceive of a political order that might be judged superior to our current modus vivendi arrangements for settling conflict from a diverse set of normative standards or perspectives. In this essay we develop the concept of Polycentric Democracy.

-/- In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to (...) be claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy. (shrink)

This contribution aims at discussing constitutional democracy in the age of populisms, by explaining how populist movements oppose liberal-democratic constitutionalism and by presenting the thesis of a so-called ‘populist constitutionalism’, as proposed by Mark Tushnet. In the first section, a general and analytic exploration of populist phenomena will be drawn, by focusing on the so-called thesis of a ‘populist’ constitutionalism. In the second part, Tushnet’s arguments for a populist constitutionalism will be presented, through the analysis of (...) his two main contributions: Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, in which Tushnet develops his critique of legal constitutionalism and judicial review as an undemocratic power by unelected justices, and Authoritarian Constitutionalism, a recent article in which Tushnet distinguishes between ‘authoritarian’ and ‘populist’ definitions of constitutionalism. In conclusion, such arguments will be discussed, by proposing a critical response to Tushnet’s position and presenting some risks of a majoritarian and populist constitutional democracy. (shrink)

Charles Taylor’s conception of the relationship between democracy and social creativity developed through a critical synthesis of various traditions, including the Romantic Movement and liberal political philosophy. However, it is argued that Taylor’s understanding of the implications of religion and revolution significantly differentiates his standpoint from that of pragmatism and theories of democratic creativity. Taylor’s defence of religious transcendence is shown to give rise to tensions with the latter perspective. The theorists of democratic creativity suggest that democracy (...) originates in the rupturing of religious significations and their closure of meaning. Taylor essentially inverts these arguments and perceives that the loss of transcendence may lead to a closed world structure. Taylor claims that the dilemmas of the modern immanent frame were prefigured in the French Revolution’s inability to generate an institutional form consistent with its understanding of democracy and that social creativity should be qualified in light of this historical experience. (shrink)

In this paper, the author contends that Leader's attempt to ground the value of toleration on a common understanding of democracy faces a number of fundamental obstacles. Such obstacles could only be overcome if both liberals and their opponents were to reach an agreement on the value of democracy and thereby converge in their support of toleration. The author shows that far from providing a common ground that liberals and their opponents can share, the so‐called “shareable understanding” of (...) democracy appeals primarily to liberals. The author also argues that Garzón Valdés's thesis that democracy is the system best suited to the flourishing of toleration faces the same kind of difficulty, namely, that not every group in a liberal constitutional regime can be convinced of the priority of democratic principles over their other fundamental value‐commitments. (shrink)

This article is an analysis of Anthony Giddens' attempt to articulate a globalization-friendly alternative to traditional social democracy (the `old' Left) and neo-liberal market fundamentalism (the `new' Right). Specifically, I focus on Giddens' insistence that globalization is not merely an economic phenomenon but also, and more profoundly, a political and cultural force of `time-space distanciation'. Whereas Giddens conceives of a direct causal connection between the disembedding forces of globalization and outcomes of democratization, I argue that such a conception (...) is deeply flawed. Indeed, rather than develop a politically useful explanatory social theory of the complex relationship between globalization and democracy, Giddens' `third way' theorizing merely hypostatizes the former by invoking it as a cause of the latter. I provide a series of arguments designed to highlight the weaknesses of Giddens' position, and conclude by questioning the general thesis that underlies Giddens' account of globalization. (shrink)

John Dewey argued that democracy is a way of life. Over the course of a professional career which lasted nearly seven decades, Dewey developed a comprehensive social philosophy which had as its central purpose to engage in the project of realizing democracy as a way of life. This dissertation examines John Dewey's democratic theory as found in his four major political works and myriad occasional addresses during the period between the world wars. Dewey argued that capitalism, and particularly (...) the pecuniary culture of capitalism, represented a challenge to realizing democracy in America. The context of industrial capitalism during the depression era represented a challenge to liberalism, both in thought and practice. This dissertation examines Dewey's call for a reconstruction of liberalism in order to realize democracy. I argue that his mature political writings are best understood as an attempt to reconcile this fourfold matrix which included the material context of industrial capitalism, the institutional context of liberal political institutions, the intellectual context of liberal political thought, and the normative vision of realizing democracy as a way of life. (shrink)

How can liberal democracies mobilize their citizens and effect their social integration, while accommodating their tremendous heterogeneity and respecting their freedom? Neo-Kantian liberals and cosmopolitans such as Habermas reject appeals to shared ethnicity, culture, or nation, for fear that they effect the suppression of difference; communitarian critics retort that theories like Habermas's are impotent to motivate social integration. My goal is to show that this theoretical impasse is an artifact of the fact that both camps articulate their disagreements within (...) the tacitly shared parameters inherited from the long-running debate between philosophy and rhetoric. By first interrogating the posited relationship between rhetoric, passion, reason, and politics in Rousseau's oeuvre, I illustrate the reception of this ancient debate in modern political theory, a reception that has effected a series of binaries such as reason/passion and abstract/concrete---the first terms associated with impotence, the second with motivational efficacy. I then turn to contemporary cultural nationalist thought, and demonstrate how these binaries are deployed to critique doctrines such as Habermas's constitutional patriotism. The Rousseauist assumption that affect requires "concrete" sites to motivate social integration is invariably combined with the presupposition that bounded communities such as the nation instantiate the required concreteness. The implausibility of that presumption such communities are "imagined" and not concrete in any relevant sense---is masked by the category of territory, which serves as a trope for concreteness. Tracing the roots of this dubious trope to Rousseau shows how "territory" reproduces the exclusionary features that the distinction between ethnic and civic-territorial nationalism tends to attribute solely to ethnicity: concreteness often means either an exclusionary boundedness directed against the foreign other, or an ossification of collective identities that stifles difference internally. Finally, turning to the discourse-ethical theory's promise to avoid this suppression of difference, I argue that Habermas fails to shake the charge of motivational impotence precisely because he is just as beholden to the philosophy/rhetoric binaries as his critics. Drawing on an Aristotelian art of rhetoric, I show how Habermas's category of discursive rationality can be reconstructed as a mode of organizing, rather than expelling, rhetoric and the passions. (shrink)

In this dissertation I seek to answer the question, “What are the virtues of the excellent citizen in a liberal democracy?" This question is important on three levels. First, if civic virtue is as important to the perpetuation of liberal democratic community as neo-liberal and communitarian thinkers have argued, then curiosity alone should motivate us. Second, if projects to foster the virtues are critical, then we must understand the virtues in order to foster them effectively and (...) appropriately. Third, those who wish to attain greater excellence in citizenship need to know what the virtues are so that they may pursue them. In Chapters One and Two, I argue that current accounts of civic virtue are deficient because they fail to explore its basis, nature, and constituents. To better understand civic virtue, we must explore specific citizen virtues. To fulfill this aim, we require a citizen virtue catalog structured by an explanatory framework that is anchored in the role-based nature of citizen virtue. Such a framework provides the rationale for determining which virtues should be included in the catalog and which should not as well as a basis for comparing competing catalogs. As the role of citizen is to assist his state, the citizen virtues are those qualities that enable the citizen to assist the state in achieving its aims” in protecting, promoting, and realizing the liberal democratic ideals (namely, freedom, equality, self-government, collective cooperation, and stability). In the remaining chapters, I survey neo-liberal accounts of citizen virtue proposed by Richard Dagger, William Galston, David Jones, Mark Kingwell, Stephen Macedo, and Thomas Spragens, Jr. I apply the Chapter Two framework to assess the virtue candidates they propose. These chapters share a common format but differ in focus. Chapter Three takes up the citizen virtues that treat political community: cooperation, participation, vigilance, deliberative excellence, and obedience to law. Chapter Four, the liberal citizen virtues: allegiance to liberal democratic community, tolerance, and respect for rights. And Chapter Five, the citizen virtues relating to self-governance: autonomy, responsibility, and restraint. Chapter Six concludes. (shrink)

Japan has often been regarded as an ethnically homogeneous society whose restrictive immigration policies reflect the deep-seated cultural peculiarities of this ‘island nation’. By contrast, I shall argue that Japan’s post- 1945 cultural separation from the other countries of East Asia, and its strict border controls, were to a large extent products of Cold War politics. The postwar democratization of Japan went hand in hand with the introduction of tight restrictions on cross-border mobility: restrictions which had profound consequences for the (...) rights of ethnic minorities in Japan (particularly Koreans and Taiwanese). An exploration of the emergence and impact of this border control regime casts new light, not just on Japan’s role in the Northeast Asian region, but also on key limitations of nation-state centred notions of liberal democracy. (shrink)

: This article discusses the parallels between Friedrich von Hayek and Bruno Leoni’s criticisms of democracy. Both men were leading protagonists of the classical liberal tradition. The thesis contained of this paper is that Hayek, although critical of democratic systems that do not reconcile liberty and equality, still believed in the democratic principle and tried ….

The central thesis of this article is that populism is a side effect of liberal democracy and a reliable indicator of the relationship between liberal democracy and its polar opposite ‒ illiberal majoritarianism. As long as liberal democracy prevails over illiberal majoritarianism, populism remains dormant. Populism rises and becomes conspicuous only if certain manifestations of illiberal majoritarianism or illiberal elitism reach a critical point in terms of number and impact. More exactly, populism becomes (...) active when there are too few reasonable and effective responses to the growth of illiberal majoritarianism. Illustrating the defense mechanism of compensation, the rise of populism correlates with a cluster of exaggerated or overdone reactions to actions inspired by illiberal majoritarianism. These reactions vary sharply from one society to another according to (a) the specific challenges of illiberal majoritarianism, (b) the reactivity of people who bear the liberal democratic values, and (c) the credibility enjoyed by the mainstream liberal democratic forces in that society. In brief, although illiberal majoritarianism sets off a cluster of populist reactions in any society, the rise of populism always takes distinct forms. Thus, it is confirmed the status of populism as a chameleonistic phenomenon. The argumentative thread has four main parts. Firstly, it is developed a constitutive model of liberal democracy as an ideal political system that is underpinned by the following organizing principles or attractors: inclusiveness, political equality, political participation, predominance of concurrent majority, the containment and predictability of the government power, and the enforcement of the non-aggression principle. Secondly, the attractors of liberal democracy are contrasted against the recent state of affairs in the Euro-Atlantic space to illustrate the assertion presented here that today illiberal majoritarianism tends to prevail over liberal democracy. In the third step, it is argued that the countless definitions of populism only emphasize different symptoms of the rise of populism, depending on the particular circumstances in which society evolves. Finally, it is substantiated the claim that populism and populists can and should be integrated into the democratic political system, in particular into the democratic public sphere. (shrink)

The vertiginous rise of right-wing populism, especially in its “nationalist, xenophobic and conservative form”, and some “racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and sexist” drifts associated with this phenomenon – whether real or perceived as such – make the mainstream media play a double role. On the one hand, the mainstream media reflect the struggle for political hegemony between different vested interests; on the other hand, they engage in the fight against right-wing populism blasting both right-wing populist candidates and their voters or supporters. (...) Many mainstream journalists ask citizens to realize a “sanitary cordon”, a “wall” or a “republican front” to block far-right populism and preserve liberal democracy. Moreover, they urge people to be wary of all attempts to “dediabolize” or “normalize” some tokens of right-wing populism. The main idea of this article is that right-wing populism is more harmless than is generally believed and, if excessive, negative media coverage doesn’t baffle but feed it. Populism is essentially a latent side effect of liberal democracy. Populism rises and becomes obtrusive only if a significant part of society perceives a regime of illiberal majoritarianism instead of one of liberal democracy. Right-wing populists are chiefly frustrated “ci-devants” who feel dispossessed of their past, identity, properties, qualities, privileges or titles. Inasmuch as the causes of collective frustration are many and varied (e.g. the real or just perceived corruption of the elites, the “system”, the deep state, the relocation of jobs, immigration, national sovereignty, national identity, communitarianism, radical Islamism, the status of some traditional institutions, some chapters of official history, etc.), there will always be right-wing populists, whether they are self-declared or covert. By adopting David G. Hackett’s thesis that the media are “agents of hegemony”, we applied the critical analysis of discourse to a set of 346 media articles in order to reveal the discursive sources of power, domination, inequality and partiality. The articles appeared in The New York Times and Le Monde during the period 2016-2017, at the time when the presidential elections took place in the United States and France. The articles were selected according to the occurrence of the keywords “Donald Trump” – “populism” and “Marine Le Pen” – “populisme” within the titles. The analysis of these articles reveals a divisive discursive structure that correspond to a real political cleavage in society. It is true that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible. It is also true that mainstream media reinforce this Manichean perspective on society and make populists feel marginalized and politically disempowered. The mainstream media may appease right-wing populism if they treat its followers as legitimate and equal political actors. For this, they have to give up the narrative structures that underscore insurmountable divergences and irreconcilable interests. In a liberal democracy, mass media should chiefly play the role of mediator. They may not aim to defeat or re-educate certain categories of citizens just because they advocate “wrong” political solutions. (shrink)

Procedural approaches to political legitimacy have become increasingly popular amongst liberals. According to such an approach, the legitimacy of a state decision is primarily derived from the processes followed in order to make that decision and not from the quality of the decision itself. The processes that liberals have in mind are typically those found within a system of democratic institutions. These electoral and legislative procedures are supposed to allow the state’s constitutive members to reach legitimately binding agreements on how (...) the state should exercise its power. In response to this trend in liberalism, this dissertation has two goals. The first is to argue that formal results in the social decision sciences seriously question the viability of these procedural approaches. The second goal, however, is to argue that these results do not necessitate complete abandonment of procedural approaches but require liberals to more carefully specify the sorts of agreements that legitimacy requires and what procedures may reliably produce such agreements. I ultimately agree that procedures are important for liberalism but they require more careful understanding and defense. In order to carry this project out, this dissertation is divided into five chapters. In the first two chapters, I outline a fairly standard account of liberalism while arguing that it contains a serious tension that liberal democratic institutions are supposed to resolve. The second chapter in particular seeks to explain the various ways in which the procedural aspects of democracy are particularly appealing in this respect. In the third chapter, I then present Arrow’s famous impossibility result along with other formal result from social choice theory suggesting that in certain situations there simply is no correct procedure for legitimate outcomes that the liberal state may employ. The fourth chapter responds to this concern by maintaining that there exists a symmetry between how an individual person and the liberal state make decisions, and that insights into individual decision making sheds light on how it may be done by a group of people in a liberal democracy. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I move in this direction by presenting an account of the sort of agreements between individuals that legitimacy ought to be grounded upon. Ultimately, procedures like voting remain an important aspect of liberal democracy for authorizing state action, though not necessarily for the reasons that many liberal democrats endorse. (shrink)

As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law (...) is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared. (shrink)

This article compares the theories of democracy of John Dewey and Claude Lefort, identifying some common themes in their otherwise radically different philosophical outlooks. In so doing, it attempts to analyze the philosophical implications of a ‘democracy first’ approach to politics. It then explains in what sense Dewey’s idea of ‘democracy as a way of life’ and Claude Lefort’s conception of ‘democracy as a form of society’ provide the cornerstone of an original and so far insufficiently (...) explored approach to political philosophy. Such an approach offers an alternative both to the classical-liberal and to the critical-radical projects which still dominate contemporary political philosophy. It then indicates some of the potential advantages of such a ‘wide view’ for contemporary debates in democratic theory. (shrink)

Moses Finley's reflections on ancient and modern democracy, explicitly directed against the liberal mainstream of political science, but also - avant la lettre - against the belittling of Greek democracy that has become fashionable among post-Marxist radicals, can be taken as a starting point for further discussion of historical as well as theoretical questions. The points at issue have to do with the belated recognition of democracy as a part of the Greek tradition, but also with (...) the divided and contested modern tradition that grew out of this new perspective on the past. The French Revolution is crucial to both aspects of the problem. Although it can be shown that the well-known attempts of the revolutionaries to appropriate classical models did not - in the short run - radically alter the image of ancient Greece, the very experience of the revolution - both as an exceptionally dramatic historical event and as a key episode in a more long-term process - was bound to change modern perceptions of the classical world. The new understanding of Greek democracy, made possible by the revolution but not inspired by it, was first articulated by the radical wing of 19th-century liberalism; but it could, in due course, serve to develop a critique of liberalism. (shrink)

Global governance has become a topic of interest to many contemporary political theorists. Issues arising from the nature of global markets and multinational corporations can no longer be locally contained. These developments signal the decline of the nation state and therewith the end of the liberal moral and political theory that justified national institutions. The alternative possible orders appear bleak, including anarchy, hegemonic power or the most horrific of all specters, the liberty crushing “world state.” Kant’s cosmopolitan theory of (...) justice can provide a third way between nationalism and its bleak alternatives, providing a measureof global governance upheld by nations without recourse to a world state. My thesis is that a juridical society of states is necessarily founded upon cosmopolitan right having universal jurisdiction and that the implementation of the norms of hospitality underlying cosmopolitan right requires global institutions based upon democratic representation and accountability. (shrink)

During the 1950s and 1960s, Patrick Devlin and H.L.A. Hart engaged in a heated intellectual exchange over the bases and limits of toleration in democratic societies. By most accounts, Hart is said to have won the debate by successfully refuting Devlin's ‘disintegration thesis’ in favour of liberal principles of political morality. This article draws attention to an unnoticed but essential element in Devlin's case: an appeal to certain principles of democracy. Although Hart is on firm ground in (...) rejecting the disintegration thesis, Devlin's democratic argument confronts Hart with a potentially devastating contradiction, for it rests on a value that liberals themselves accept — that is, equality. Because both supporters and critics of Devlin overlook the element in the debate that poses the most interesting questions about the relation between liberalism and democracy, contemporary students of liberal-democratic thought have good reason to revisit this classic debate. (shrink)

In this century Australia has enjoyed the highest per capita incomes and probably the most equal distribution of income of any nation in the world. Australia has been a lighthouse social democracy. We assess the impact of the vigorous liberal economic reforms of the 1980s on economic management and steering, social integration and cohesion, on the public sector, on civil society and the public sphere. We see that the reforms have been ideologically driven and that they have negatively (...) affected the distribution of income, the deliberative capacity of the policy apparatus, and the unique institutional features of social democracy in Australia. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Girardian Critique of the Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryKyle Scott (bio)IntroductionRené Girard is unfamiliar to most political scientists, but the liberal democratic peace theory (LDPT) is known by almost all in the discipline. René Girard has developed a theory of the origin and perpetuation of violence that is well known to scholars in literature, anthropology, and theology. Girard’s theory can be adapted to the LDPT in order (...) to provide a causal explanation for the empirical evidence that finds democracies do not go to war with one another. Without understanding why democracies do not fight one another, the LDPT is only an empirical artifact. Uncovering a causal explanation, if one exists, can help lead researchers to unravel the paradox of why democracies do not go to war with one another but are just as war prone as nondemocracies. In addition to unraveling this paradox, understanding the causal link between peace and democracy will help us find out whether more democracies will lead to more peace.Girard poses a challenge to the democratization for peace thesis, a thesis that serves as the basis for much of the foreign policy of the United States.1 For Girard, violence originates in desire. A subject desires what others desire and [End Page 45] therefore others are seen as roadblocks to that desire. This can turn violent. But the violence does not have to occur between the two subjects who have the same desire; it can be redirected to a surrogate victim who ends up being a scapegoat. If Girard’s theory is applied to the LDPT, the conclusion would be that nondemocracies are merely scapegoats for democracies so that order can be maintained in communities of democracies. Therefore, if the world becomes composed entirely of democracies, there will be no scapegoats left and democracies will fight one another.Such a theory of violence, and such a critique of the LDPT, is unfamiliar to mainstream political scientists.2 I do not suggest that Girard’s theory holds the answer to the problem of achieving perpetual peace, but the base assumption of Girard’s theory should be addressed by those who favor the LDPT. Girard begins from the idea that to achieve peace one must first understand the origin of violence. The LDPT, on the other hand, looks only at the conditions in which peace occurs, ignoring the origins of violence, thus potentially arriving at misleading conclusions.3 Applying Girard’s theory to the LDPT, and deriving alternative hypotheses from that application, will benefit all those who study war, as Girard provides a fresh perspective in the search for the causal mechanism underlying the empirical findings.Fortunately this article is not the first to apply Girard’s theory outside its traditional arenas. John Steele explains that expressive punishment can be explained in Girardian terms; R. G. Hamerton-Kelly argues that nuclear deterrence can be understood in Girardian terms; and Scott Thomas examines the current state of international affairs in a Girardian context.4 These studies can be used as a template by scholars trying to apply Girard’s theory to a field of study that has not previously used it. I will follow this template by first providing a critical examination of the current state of LDPT scholarship and then moving on to a discussion of Girard’s theory of violence. Section III contrasts Girard’s theory with other alternative explanations of war and peace in order to distinguish Girard’s theory from these explanations and to help clarify Girard’s theory.I. The Liberal Democratic Peace TheoryThe most widely accepted theory in international relations is the LDPT, even though empirical evidence supports both sides in the debate. However, most scholars agree that stable democracies do not go to war with other stable democracies.5 There are critics who suggest that the logic underlying the democratic [End Page 46] peace theory is flawed, and that exceptions to the theory can be found.6 The point of this article is not to contest the findings of those who support or refute the LDPT, but to illuminate one of its gravest shortcomings—the lack of a convincing causal explanation—and to provide direction to... (shrink)

Claude Lefort's rethinking of ‘the political’ has been highly fruitful for political theory, yet its politics remain unclear. It has inspired transformative, radical-democratic projects, but has also served as a basis for more liberal conceptions. This article explores the sources and implications of this ambiguity by setting Lefort's work against the backdrop of the anti-totalitarian moment in French political thought and the trajectories of two of his students, Miguel Abensour and Marcel Gauchet. It emerges that although Lefort's democratic theory (...) cannot be reduced to a defensive liberalism, neither is it as expansive as some might hope. (shrink)

In this paper I am discussing the concept of “objective world”, its hope and aim as vigorously presented in Husserl’s famous discourse of the Fifth Meditation. In this manner, the first part of my work focuses on Husserl’s intentionality as knowledge of the “I” or “my ego” as my primordial identity, in relation to “my culturalcommunity” as its primordial one, too. The thesis will then develop into “intersubjectivity” in which “the other” and his “cultural community” as primordially constituted are (...) objective to be fully understood in terms of synthetic knowledge; namely through psychological, cultural, historical and social forms and contents. The second part of my paper takes off from where transcendental phenomenology is grounded to look into the problem of Globalization and questions of value. If the first part followed Husserlian theoretical investigations, sometimes called interpretive philosophy to hopefully acquire universal principles, the second onecan be called practical doctrine, which studies cases presented by a number of specialists who focus on praxis and consequences of Globalization – a theme for economic concerns, but inherently it affects the stability of the community of mankind. This new world order overtly and covertly critiques traditional concepts of nation and culture as it redefines democratic concept, coming home to human rights. Its challenge has been already about the doubts and contradictoriness of “values” in broadest and “reduction” sense. OBJECTIVITY as a noun, and OBJECTIVE, an adjective and noun are terminologies of extremely complicated shades of meaning in Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, particularly in the fifth one where such terms are used interchangeably to fit the concept of intersubjective Nature; which I will explore and further put it in current economic and political drive to Globalization. In this regard my theme will deal simultaneously with both the critique of Husserlian thought and neo-liberalism (liberal democracy), a twist of democracy for preserving capitalism in what is called a new world order by ordinance and defense of Imperialism as well as the states that so desire to join the world market. (shrink)

Socially and politically significant Muslim communities are posing a challenge to the public spheres of Western Europe: can public reason in a liberal democracy be so conceived as to accommodate the religious reasons of Muslims and other religiously motivated citizens? This question, often discussed from the perspective either of political philosophy or of particular religious traditions, is addressed here instead by drawing on the theory and practice of inter-religious dialogue. The dialogue movement known as ‘scriptural reasoning’ is analysed (...) for its potential to provide a way of conceptualising the nature of reasoning in the public sphere. ‘Reasoning with texts’, it is argued, is a way of describing much of the reasoning that takes place within the public sphere and not just religious reasoning. This approach to understanding public reasoning is established through a combination of example and theory. A model of communicative hermeneutics as public reason based on an textual rationality is proposed. As well as providing space for textually based religious arguments, this textual imagination can be situated alongside and complement postmodern developments of Jürgen Habermas’s conception of the public sphere. Whilst this approach to reasoning in the public sphere initially appears very different from the classic statement of the idea of public reason in John Rawls’s political liberalism, it is shown to have significant continuity with Rawls’s theory when this is viewed through the lens of the Supreme Court as exemplar of public reason. This highest level of public reason involving legislation is also a form of reasoning with texts. But in order for religious and more popular levels of public discourse and deliberation to impact on the political and legislative processes, these too must be conceived as modes of reasoning having some continuity with higher levels of public reasoning. It is such continuity that this thesis seeks to theorise. (shrink)

Is liberal democracy appropriate for East Asia? In this provocative book, Daniel Bell argues for morally legitimate alternatives to Western-style liberal democracy in the region. Beyond Liberal Democracy, which continues the author's influential earlier work, is divided into three parts that correspond to the three main hallmarks of liberal democracy--human rights, democracy, and capitalism. These features have been modified substantially during their transmission to East Asian societies that have been shaped by (...) nonliberal practices and values. Bell points to the dangers of implementing Western-style models and proposes alternative justifications and practices that may be more appropriate for East Asian societies. If human rights, democracy, and capitalism are to take root and produce beneficial outcomes in East Asia, Bell argues, they must be adjusted to contemporary East Asian political and economic realities and to the values of nonliberal East Asian political traditions such as Confucianism and Legalism. Local knowledge is therefore essential for realistic and morally informed contributions to debates on political reform in the region, as well as for mutual learning and enrichment of political theories. Beyond Liberal Democracy is indispensable reading for students and scholars of political theory, Asian studies, and human rights, as well as anyone concerned about China's political and economic future and how Western governments and organizations should engage with China. (shrink)

In an era defined by events that continuously shake Fukuyama’s thesis according to which liberal democracy constitutes the end of History, there is need for a democratic ideal that puts the role of civic action at the heart of its justification. In this article, I argue that John Dewey’s democratic ideal understood as a matter of civic co-creation, where democratic pursuits are continually redefined by citizens through solving communal problems - not set by history, once and for (...) all - provides a valuable response to this need. To this end, this article reconsiders Deweyan democracy by:(1) presenting it as a transformational process, in opposition to liberal democracy; (2) discussing Dewey’s conception of active citizenship as requiring more than mere political participation; (3) articulating Dewey’s democratic ideal as a form of applied social intelligence; (4) making explicit the pedagogical consequences of Deweyan democracy; and (5) interpreting it as a form of peaceful conflict resolution aiming at balance in inter-personal relationships. (shrink)

This volume presents influential work by Nicholas Wolterstorff at the intersection between political philosophy and religion, alongside nine new essays on the nature of liberal democracy, human rights, and political authority. These novel essays offer an attractive alternative to the public reason liberalism defended by thinkers such as John Rawls.

In this paper I will examine the relationship between constitutionalism and democracy as the alleged tensions between them appear in diagnoses about the crisis of liberal democracy. The issue is approached through the arguments of the German jurist Martin Kriele, who holds the thesis that there can be no sovereign in the constitutional State. I will begin by explaining this thesis as well as the justification offered by Kriele. According to him, the guarantee of rights (...) and freedoms is only possible within the framework of the constitutional State. Hence, he advances a second related thesis, that democracy can only be developed in the constitutional State, that is, as constitutional democracy. However, this second thesis seems in contradiction with the first if the democratic principle implies popular sovereignty. To resolve this apparent antinomy, I will distinguish with Kriele two rival conceptions of democracy in order to point out the danger of misinterpreting the meaning of constitutional democracy. -/- En este trabajo examino la relación entre constitucionalismo y democracia, puesto que las supuestas tensiones entre ambos aparecen en los diagnósticos sobre la crisis de la democracia liberal. La cuestión se aborda a través de los argumentos del jurista alemán Martin Kriele, quien defiende la tesis de que no puede haber soberano en el Estado constitucional. Empezaré por explicar dicha tesis así como la justificación de ella que ofrece Kriele, para quien la garantía de los derechos y libertades sólo es posible en el marco del Estado constitucional. De ahí que avance una segunda tesis relacionada, cuando sostiene que la democracia sólo puede desarrollarse en dicho Estado constitucional, esto es, como democracia constitucional. Sin embargo, esta segunda tesis parece contradictoria con la primera si identificamos el principio democrático con la soberanía popular. Para resolver esa aparente antinomia, se distinguiré con Kriele dos concepciones rivales de la democracia, a fin de señalar el peligro de malinterpretar el sentido de la democracia constitucional. (shrink)

What role does and should religion play in the legal sphere of a modern liberal democracy? Does religion threaten to create divisions that would undermine the stability of the constitutional order? Or is religious disagreement itself a force that works to create consensus on some of the core commitments of constitutionalism--liberty of conscience, toleration, limited government, and the rule of law? This essay explores these questions from the perspectives of contemporary political philosophy and constitutional theory. The thesis (...) of the essay is that pluralism--the diversity of religious and secular conceptions of the good--can and should work as a force for constitutional consensus and that such a consensus is best realized through commitment to an ideal of public legal reason instantiated by the practice of legal formalism. The case for these claims is made in six parts. After the introduction, Part II, The Fact of Pluralism in the Context of Contemporary Religious Division, explores the idea of religious division in light of an important notion in political philosophy--the idea that John Rawls calls the fact of reasonable pluralism. Part III, Public Legal Reason, argues that the fact of pluralism has important normative consequences for the foundations of normative legal theory and argues for an ideal of public legal reason. Part IV, Legal Formalism, contends that this idea is best realized in constitutional practice through a formalist approach to constitutional interpretation--one that deliberately eschews direct reliance on religious and secular comprehensive conceptions of the good. Part V, Feasibility and Positive Theory, discusses the question whether this ideal of public legal reason and corresponding conception of constitutional formalism are realistic, given the constraints imposed by democratic politics under contemporary conditions. Finally, Part VI, Religious Division Revisited: From Pluralism to Formalism, brings the discussion to a close. (shrink)

The article looks into the critical potential, but also the limits of the current discussion on post-democracy and the crisis of democracy and proposes an examination of the concept of crisis. The thesis is that the current talk of a crisis of democracy suggests an uncritical, namely restitutive understanding of the crisis that could be appropriated for an apology of Western liberal democracy. In contrast, the text argues for a renewed focus on the self-reflexive (...) and critical potential of the term. Based on a pragmatist concept of problem and action, “crisis” is defined as a certain kind of problem-solving problem and further determined on the basis of four criteria. The contribution this definition makes to the current debate is shown by the example of Jacques Rancière’s diagnosis of post-democracy, which can be read as a diagnosis of crisis in the defined self-reflexive and critical sense. (shrink)