: Interpreting results of contemporary neuroscientif studies, I present a non-reductive physicalist account of mind-brain relationship from which the criticism of unintelligibility ascribed to the notion of mental causation is considered. Assuming that a paradigmatic criticism addressed to the notion of mental causation is that presented by Jaegwon Kim’s analysis on the theory of mind-body supervenience, I present his argument arguing that it encompasses a formulation of the problem of mental causation, which leads to difficulties by (...) him pointed. To ask "how mental events, being a non-physical property of the brain, could act causally on brain structure and functioning?", is not to treat the mind as a property of the brain, but as a Cartesian substance. I argue that, rather than asking "how does mind could act causally on the brain?", as if the mind were something apart and independent of the brain, it would be more in line with a non-reductive physicalist view to ask "how the brain, guided by its mind, could act causally on itself?". To justify this last formulation of the problem of mental causation, I propose a "double face view", which consists in considering the consciousness as the essential property of the mind, and mind and brain as inseparable, dependent and irreducible faces. It means, in general terms, that the conscious mind is the result of brain structure and activity - "conscious mind as brain" - and that the brain, using its conscious mind as a guide to its actions, interacts with its body, and with the physical and sociocultural environment, constructing and being constructed by both - "brain as conscious mind". Resumo: Interpretando resultados de estudos neurocientíficos contemporâneos, apresento, em linhas gerais, uma abordagem fisicalista não-reducionista da relação mente-cérebro, a partir da qual a crítica de ininteligibilidade atribuída à noção de causação mental é considerada. Assumindo que uma crítica paradigmática à noção de causação mental é aquela apresentada por Jaegwon Kim, em suas reflexões sobre a teoria da superveniência mente-corpo, considero criticamente o seu argumento, oferecendo uma concepção geral a respeito da relação mente-cérebro, a qual acredito tornar a noção de causação mental inteligível. Penso que o principal problema do argumento de Kim se relaciona à formulação da questão da causação mental por ele aceita. Por exemplo, ao perguntar "como os eventos mentais, sendo propriedades não-físicas do cérebro, podem agir causalmente sobre a estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro?" a mente está sendo considerada não como uma propriedade do cérebro, mas como uma substância cartesiana. Entendo que, em vez de perguntar "como a mente age causalmente sobre o cérebro?", como se a mente fosse algo dele separada e independente, seria mais conforme a uma concepção fisicalista não-reducionista perguntar "como o cérebro, guiado por sua mente, pode agir causalmente sobre si mesmo?" Para justificar essa formulação do problema da causação mental, proponho uma "abordagem dupla face" da relação mente-cérebro, segundo a qual a consciência é a propriedade essencial da mente, sendo a mente inseparável do cérebro, embora a ele irredutível, e a estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro dependente numa certa medida da existência da mente. Isso significa, em termos gerais, que a mente consciente resulta da estrutura e funcionamento do cérebro - "mente consciente como cérebro" -, e que o cérebro, usando a mente consciente como um guia para sua ação, interage com seu corpo e com o ambiente físico e sociocultural circundante, construindo e sendo construído por ambos - "cérebro como mente consciente". (shrink)

The mind-body relationship has vexed philosophers of mind for quite a long time. Different theories of mind have offered different points of view about the interaction between the two, but none of them seem free of ambiguities and questions. This paper attempts to use a mathematical model for mind-body relationship. The model may generate some questions to think about this relationship from the viewpoint of operator theory.

If education is to make a difference it is widely acknowledged that we must aim to educate for understanding, but this means being clear about what we mean by understanding. This paper argues for a concept of personal understanding, recognising both the commonality and individuality of each pupil's understandings, and the relationship between understanding and interpretation, analysis and synopsis, and the quest for meaning. In supporting this view, the paper advocates an emergentist notion of person‐hood, and considers the neurophysiological (...) reasons for asserting the individuality of human minds, brains, and the creation of personal meanings. The notion of personal meanings would, however, seem to run counter to the post‐modern denial of the autonomous self, and the tradition in philosophy, most recently stemming from Wittgenstein, that insists that meanings and understandings are essentially social, and not personal—a view also advocated by John White in regard to education. In contrast, this paper argues that meanings and understandings are both social and personal. Once we reinstate the notion of personal minds and personal understandings, alongside the social, we may see more clearly what it means to educate for understanding, and why this might begin to make a difference. (shrink)

Quantum mechanics as conceived by Niels Bohr and formulated in rigorous terms by John von Neumann is expressed as quantum neuroscience: a description of the relationship between certain conscious experiences of an observer that are described in terms of the concepts of classical physics and neural processes that are described in terms of the concepts of quantum physics. The theory is applied to recent neuroscience data to determine the rapidity of the observer's probing actions that is needed to account (...) for the capacity of a person's mental intentions to influence that person's bodily actions in the intended way. Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt; mso-para-margin:0in; mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;}. (shrink)

Does science argue against the existence of the human soul? Many scientists and scholars believe the whole is more than the sum of the parts. This book uses information and systems theory to describe the "more" that does not reduce to the parts. One sees this in the synapses--or apparently empty gaps between the neurons in one's brain--where informative relationships give rise to human mind, culture, and spirituality. Drawing upon the disciplines of cognitive science, computer science, neuroscience, general (...) systems theory, pragmatic philosophy, and Christian theology, Mark Graves reinterprets the traditional doctrine of the soul as form of the body to frame contemporary scientific study of the human soul. (shrink)

Contra common belief, idealists need to account for the relationship between the mind and the brain every bit as much as do physicalists and dualists. However, they must conceive of that relationship in a very different way to either of their metaphysical rivals. This paper presents an appropriate idiom in which idealists may describe that connection. But the gain is not simply one of language, for it is argued that this idiom rules out understanding mind- (...) class='Hi'>brain correlation either a relationship of causation or as one of identity. Exploiting literary parallels, it is further suggested that this lexicon for understanding how mind and brain stand one to another highlights the subsidiary status of physical reality, turning the mind-brain correlation from an apparent refutation of idealism into something that in fact vindicates it. (shrink)

In recent years, a keen interest has emerged in the world of science regarding the relationship between the biological and the psychological aspects of the mind. How can the neural activity of the brain create thoughts, memory, feelings, and emotions? The answer to this question is the subject of this book. Jorge Angel M.D. posits that, although the mind is the byproduct of the firing of neurons in different parts of the brain, it is also (...) the organizing principle of brain activity. The brain and the mind have a symbiotic relationship that is present throughout the life span of the individual. In an effort to find answers to the riddle of the mind-brain relationship, Dr. Angel describes his personal experiences of many years in the practice of the healing arts, and he draws on a lifetime of study into the biology of the brain. The author maintains that the mind is much more than consciousness. Consciousness has been described metaphorically as the small tip of an iceberg floating in a sea of unconsciousness. Dwelling on the evolutionary development of the brain, he explains how intellectual experience arises from the activity of cell aggregates in the residual reptilian, residual mammalian, and rational parts of the brain that we have inherited from our animal ancestors through billions of adaptive trade-offs over millions of years. The human mind is one of the last unresolved mysteries in the world of science. This book provides a meaningful insight into the nature and function of the mind in normal subjects and their ability to think, feel, and remember. It also portrays in detail the changes that can be brought on the mind of humans by an assortment of psychological and neurological disorders. (shrink)

Why do some philosophers, despite all we know about evolution and embryology, think that consciousness makes the mind-body relation a problem still unsolved and perhaps insoluble by those with human brains? They ask how consciousness arises in matter, not in living organisms, whereas non-philosophers ask how far down the ladder of life it extends and when it arises in individuals of sentient and intelligent species. They desire the privacy of Locke's closet, furnished with phenomenological properties; and besides replacing Aristotle's (...) ‘folk’ conception of causation by Hume's, they mathematicise physical explanation in line with Newton's First Law of Motion. Non-philosophers operate with ‘vague’ concepts of life, sentience and intelligence which allow them to treat these things as truly and naturally emergent. Machines that perform intelligent tasks are no more conscious of the reasons for their movements than actors performing them on the stage. (shrink)

The “default system” of the brain has been described as a set of regions which are ‘activated’ during rest and ‘deactivated’ during cognitively effortful tasks. To investigate the reliability of task-related deactivations, we performed a meta-analysis across 12 fMRI studies. Our results replicate previous findings by implicating medial frontal and parietal brain regions as part of the “default system”.However, the cognitive correlates of these deactivations remain unclear. In light of the importance of social cognitive abilities for human beings (...) and their propensity to engage in such activities, we relate our results to findings from neuroimaging studies of social cognition. This demonstrates a remarkable overlap between the brain regions typically involved in social cognitive processes and the “default system”.We, henceforth, suggest that the physiological ‘baseline’ of the brain is intimately linked to a psychological ‘baseline’: human beings have a predisposition for social cognition as the default mode of cognizing which is implemented in the robust pattern of intrinsic brain activity known as the “default system”. (shrink)

In some recent papers, Max Coltheart has questioned the ability of neuroimaging techniques to tell us anything interesting about the mind and has thrown down the gauntlet before neuroimagers, challenging them to prove he is mistaken. Here I analyze Coltheart ’s challenge, show that as posed its terms are unfair, and reconstruct it so that it is addressable. I argue that, so modified, Coltheart ’s challenge is able to be met and indeed has been met. In an effort to (...) delineate the extent of neuroimaging’s ability to address Coltheart ’s concerns, I explore how different brain structure‐function relationships would constrain the ability of neuroimaging to provide insight about psychological questions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH 03755; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a ‘loss-of-function lesion premise,’ according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason (...) to doubt the mind-brain identity. On the other hand, dualism or idealism (in one form or another) regard consciousness and mind as something other than the sole product of cerebral activity pointing at the ineffable, undefinable, and seemingly unphysical nature of our subjective qualitative experiences and its related mental dimension. Here, several neuroscientific findings are reviewed that question the idea that posits phenomenal experience as an emergent property of brain activity, and argue that the premise of material monism is based on a logical correlation-causation fallacy. While these (mostly ignored) findings, if considered separately from each other, could, in principle, be recast into a physicalist paradigm, once viewed from an integral perspective, they substantiate equally well an ontology that posits mind and consciousness as a primal phenomenon. (shrink)

Presenting some modern views on the problem of the nature of mind and its relationship to the brain, this book, published in 1965, brings together contributors from various disciplines which are affected by this issue. Coming from different philosophical outlooks as well as subjects, these contributors also comment on each other’s’ chapters with a view of developing thought on the approaches to the problem. The theory of mind-brain relationship is vital to human interest and (...) has been in debate throughout western thought over centuries, split mainly into dualist and monistic theories. These discussions had and still have wide impact philosophy, psychology, religion and cosmology, among other areas. (shrink)

John Hughlings Jackson is a major figure at the origins of neurology and neuroscience in Britain. Alongside his contributions to clinical medicine, he left a large corpus of writing on localisation of function in the nervous system and other theoretical topics. In this paper I focus on Jackson’s “doctrine of concomitance”—his parallelist theory of the mind-brain relationship. I argue that the doctrine can be given both an ontological and a causal interpretation, and that the causal aspect of (...) the doctrine is especially significant for Jackson and his contemporaries. I interpret Jackson’s engagement with the metaphysics of mind as an instance of what I call meta-science—the deployment by scientists of metaphysical positions and arguments which help streamline empirical investigations by bracketing off unanswerable questions and focussing attention on matters amenable to the current tools of experimental research. (shrink)

This book explores how the relationship between philosophy and the brain can inform neuroscience, the mind-brain problem and debates about consciousness. Written in a lively style with extensive pedagogy to explain complex concepts, this is interesting reading for students and researchers of psychology, neuroscience and philosophy.

The search for the “furniture of the mind” has acquired added impetus with the rise of new technologies to study the brain and identify its main structures and processes. Philosophers and scientists are increasingly concerned to understand the ways in which psychological functions relate to brain structures. Meanwhile, the taxonomic practices of cognitive scientists are coming under increased scrutiny, as researchers ask which of them identify the real kinds of cognition and which are mere vestiges of folk (...) psychology. Muhammad Ali Khalidi presents a naturalistic account of “real kinds” to validate some central taxonomic categories in the cognitive domain, including concepts, episodic memory, innateness, domain specificity, and cognitive bias. He argues that cognitive kinds are often individuated relationally, with reference to the environment and etiology of the thinking subject, whereas neural kinds tend to be individuated intrinsically, resulting in crosscutting relationships among cognitive and neural categories. (shrink)

In _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's _Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience_ (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond. Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central (...) themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness. In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and Distinguished Professor Emeritus at Georgetown University) explains why this confrontation is so crucial to the understanding of neuroscientific research. The project of cognitive neuroscience, he asserts, depends on the incorporation of human nature into the framework of science itself. In Robinson's estimation, Dennett and Searle fail to support this undertaking; Bennett and Hacker suggest that the project itself might be based on a conceptual mistake. Exciting and challenging, _Neuroscience and Philosophy_ is an exceptional introduction to the philosophical problems raised by cognitive neuroscience. (shrink)

The relationship between brain and mind has been extensively explored through the developments within neuroscience over the last decade. However, the ontological status of mind has remained fairly problematic due to the inability to explain all features of the mind through the brain. This inability has been considered largely due to partial knowledge of the brain. It is claimed that once we gain complete knowledge of the brain, all features of the (...) class='Hi'>mind would be explained adequately. However, a challenge to such a position is downward causation: How do we explain the causal power that mental states exert over brain activities? If we agree that downward causation occurs, then to what extent could a sole explanation of brain activities account for our behaviour? (For they would in themselves be conditioned by the mental states which are left unexplained). This dissertation is an attempt to understand relation between brain and mind through the concept of emergence, placed in the context of complex systems approach. This will create a space to account for the causal power of mental states. The complex systems approach says that as the complexity of a system increases, we witness the emergence of novel qualities and after a certain threshold (of complexity), the emergence of a novel structure. When the body (and correspondingly, brain) reaches a certain level of complexity, the mind emerges. The brain is a complex system from which the mind emerges. The brain, consisting of billions of neurons interacting with each other, regulates the body placed in the environment. The interaction of neurons (local interactions involving self-organization) result in dynamical brain signatures (global synergy). Such signatures are correlative to mental states. Mind is the process of a living organism embodying an intentional stance. This object could be the subject itself or another distinct from the subject. With the emergence of mind, the causal powers of brain are conditioned by the mind. Such a conditioning is evident through the causal efficacy of mental states. While the brain is minimal condition for the mind to emerge, the mind in itself is embedded (showcased/explicated/manifested) throughout the body. The mind is a process that belongs to body-as-a-whole with the novel quality of intentionality. A preliminary to understanding this relation is its metaphysical inclination. A large portion of the history of philosophy of mind has advocated a metaphysics of entities where the mind and body have been seen as two entities with distinct essences. However, such attribution of entity-ship does not take into account the processual nature of these existents (that they are essentially dependent on their environment for their existence and sustenance). Thus, the category of processual unity has been introduced which sought to account for existent as emergent wholes that move towards a stable equilibrium through self-organization. By considering existents to be processual unities, we can account for their identity as a whole-in-itself (what has been called organizational closure) and also for their processual nature. The brain is a component of the body which is a complex system and is representative of the body’s stance in the world. The brain, consisting of billions of neurons interacting with each other, regulates the body placed in the environment. The interaction of neurons (local interactions involving self-organization) result in dynamical brain signatures (global synergy). Such signatures are correlative to mental states. These mental states in turn condition the brain patterns, that allows the embodying of mental states. Thus, the three-way process of the representation of body in the world by the brain, the emergence of mental state through dynamic brain patterns and the reciprocal causal power on the brain patterns by the mental states marks embodiment. The relation between brain, body and mind can be outlined as follows: A. There are complex interactions in the brain. These interactions are representative of the body’s stance in the world and are present in form of dynamical brain signatures. B. The dynamical brain signatures lead to emergence of mind as a process. The mental state has causal power which conditions the brain. C. The brain conditioned by causal power of the mind carries out embodiment of the mind throughout the body. In the dissertation, an exposition on relation between brain and mind through complex system approach is followed by a brief on relation between body and mind. The radical embodiment approach adopts the nonlinear dynamic systems theory to understand relation of brain, body and mind. It states a shift from mapping of cognitive states onto Neural Correlates of Consciousness to their mapping through dynamic brain signatures. Every mental state is embedded throughout the body. The dissertation explores the three features of consciousness, intentionality and qualia. These have previously formed a challenge within a dualistic framework and the dissertation intends to show a direction in which they can be accounted for, within the complex systems approach and radical embodiment viewpoint. After a certain threshold of the rate of production of cell assemblies is bypassed, we become conscious of the representation itself. This leads to emergence of phenomenal states. Qualia is the qualitative character of such states, which belong to the body-as-a-whole and for this reason, cannot be reduced to properties of any of the components from which it emerges (the dynamic brain signatures) or in which it is embodied (the body and its individual parts) alone. Intentionality is the novel property of mind of moving towards a certain set of attractors where attractors refer to the states that the system prefers (which would positively contribute to its fitness). The scope of this dissertation is to delineate the relation of brain to the mind and unravel some persistent troubles of philosophy of mind within such delineation. The types of components and their relation within the mind preceded by a thorough study of how the mind is embodied is an area yet to be extensively explored in the coming works. (shrink)

The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been a central topic of debate in Western philosophy and theology. This article reviews the ongoing debates about the relationship and nature of bodies, minds, and persons among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The first two parts present some general theological constraints for philosophical theories of persons and describe the basic concepts used (substance, property, supervenience, and physicalism). The views themselves fall into three broad categories. Dualists think that persons (...) are either identical with or partly constituted by non-physical souls. On this view, there are immaterial substances and properties. Hylomorphists maintain that persons are composites of bodies and the souls that inform them. Finally, physicalists claim that there are no immaterial parts to persons. Instead, persons are composed of bodies and brains; the mental properties they have supervene on physical properties. (shrink)

Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) (...) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model's relationship to the expression of attitudes in speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7 considers “two systems” accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectableeventswithin System 2, there are no introspectableattitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of “unsymbolized thinking”. Section 9 considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. Finally, section 10 evaluates the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of metacognition without mindreading. (shrink)

There are two primary philosophical approaches to examining the relationship between human bodies and political bodies. The first, reflected in traditional political theory on the body politic, is concerned with the question of how individuals aggregate into functioning or malfunctioning collectives—how singular citizen bodies come to constitute wider political entities. The second approach, maturing later in 20th century social and political philosophy, considers the opposite relation: instead of evaluating how the body politic emerges from the bottom-up, it focuses on (...) how bodies become politicized from the top-down. This, more sociological, perspective explores how human bodies are disciplined and learn to self-discipline into particular physical forms and functions. Dominant ideologies can infiltrate the bodies of adherents, and the task of the social critic or political philosopher is to delineate how, why, where, and when political structures shape the minds and bodies of citizens, as well as whether the effects are coercive, destructive, or liberatory. I will argue that a political philosophy of mind cannot flourish without attention to the cognitive science of ideologies. Until recently there has been little serious dialogue between biology and political philosophy, partly due to disciplinary balkanization and mostly because of the infancy of empirical biopolitics, the science of how cognitive and neurobiological processes are molded by political ideologies. I will suggest that attending to the emerging science of ideological cognition can allow us to build a stronger, more compelling, and provocative thesis on the mind-shaping consequences of immersion in ideologies than is possible with conceptual tools alone. (shrink)

Preeminent psychoanalyst Mortimer Ostow believes that early childhood emotional attachments form the cognitive underpinnings of spiritual experience and religious motivation. His hypothesis, which is verifiable, relies on psychological and neurobiological evidence but is respectful of the human need for spiritual value. Ostow begins by classifying the three parts of the spiritual experience: awe, Spirituality proper, and mysticism. After he pinpoints the psychological origins of these feelings in infancy, he discusses the foundations of religious sentiment and practice and the brain (...) processes associated with spiritual experience. He then focuses on spirituality's relationship to mood regulation, and the role of negative spirituality in fostering religious fundamentalism and demonic possession. Ostow concludes with an analysis of an essay by the psychoanalyst Donald M. Marcus, who recounts his own spiritual experience during a Native American-style "vision quest" in the woods. Marcus's account demonstrates the constructive potential of spirituality and the way in which spirituality retrieves and recapitulates feelings of attachment to the mother. Persuasively and brilliantly argued, _Spirit, Mind, and Brain_ brings the disciplines of religion, behavorial neuroscience, and philosophy to bear on a groundbreaking new method for understanding religious ritual and belief. (shrink)

The relationship of minds, bodies, and persons has been a central topic of debate in Western philosophy and theology. This article reviews the ongoing debates about the relationship and nature of bodies, minds, and persons among contemporary Christian analytic philosophers and theologians. The first two parts present some general theological constraints for philosophical theories of persons and describe the basic concepts used (substance, property, supervenience, and physicalism). The views themselves fall into three broad categories. Dualists think that persons (...) are either identical with or partly constituted by non-physical souls. On this view, there are immaterial substances and properties. Hylomorphists maintain that persons are composites of bodies and the souls that inform them. Finally, physicalists claim that there are no immaterial parts to persons. Instead, persons are composed of bodies and brains, the mental properties they have supervene on physical properties. (shrink)

In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can "illuminate" issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this "illumination" (...) would work between psychology and neuroscience. (shrink)

제럴드 에델만은 단순히 뇌의 작용만이 아니라 뇌와 몸, 환경의 사이에서 일어나는 광범위한 상호작용을 통해 인식이 이루어지면서 마음이 창발 한다고 주장한다. 의식이란 앎의 기능을 수행하는 신경작용의 ‘과정’일 뿐이므로, 뇌의 인식 과정을 밝히면 자연스럽게 의식의 발생과 마음을 이해할 수 있다는 것이다. 이러한 주장의 바탕에는 신경구조들과 신경구조들로부터 생성되는 의식이 인과적 관계를 가지며, 이러한 인과적 관계를 해명하는 것으로 인식과 심신문제를 충분히 해결할 수 있다는 믿음이 깔려 있다. 본 논문의 목적은 이러한 그의 주장이 정당화될 수 있는지를 비판적으로 고찰하는 것이다. 에델만은 인식을 지각 범주화, 기억, 재유입과 (...) 가치-범주 기억체계의 메커니즘으로 분석한 다음 이를 종합적으로 설명함으로써 의식과 의식의 일원성을 설명한다. 과학적 설명만으로 마음을 해명하는 데에는 많은 한계가 있다. 칸트의 심신 상호작용론은 마음의 문제가 개념적으로 접근해야 할 문제임을 보여준다. 이러한 이유들을 통해 에델만의 주장이 정당화되기에는 역부족임을 입증할 것이다. (shrink)

The brain–computer interface (BCI) has made remarkable progress in the bridging the divide between the brain and the external environment to assist persons with severe disabilities caused by brain impairments. There is also continuing philosophical interest in BCIs which emerges from thoughtful reflection on computers, machines, and artificial intelligence. This article seeks to apply BCI perspectives to examine, challenge, and work towards a possible resolution to a persistent problem in the mind–body relationship, namely dualism. The (...) original humanitarian goals of BCIs and the technological inventiveness result in BCIs being surprisingly useful. We begin from the neurologically impaired person, the problems encountered, and some pioneering responses from computers and machines. Secondly, the interface of mind and brain is explored via two points of clarification: direct and indirect BCIs, and the nature of thoughts. Thirdly, dualism is beset by mind–body interaction difficulties and is further questioned by the phenomena of intentions, interactions, and technology. Fourthly, animal minds and robots are explored in BCI settings again with relevance for dualism. After a brief look at other BCIs, we conclude by outlining a future BCI philosophy of brain and mind, which might appear ominous and could be possible. (shrink)

The scientific relationship among self, mind and brain is still not clearly known. Self’s subjective experience of perception and cognition of words, feelings, thoughts etc. is supported by the integrity of human brain. Consequently, neuroscientists, psychologists, psychiatrists, physicists and philosophers have been investigating to find the scientific relationship between mind and brain, consciousness and quantum physics. Recent experimental evidence suggests that the neural correlate of consciousness is located in certain parts of the cortico-thalamic (...) system. But it is not known specifically which parts of the human brain are involved in the human cognitive activity. In this study, the author proposed a tree-pattern architecture of the cerebral neural substrate in cognitive understanding of words, feelings, and thoughts on the basis of the author’s hypothesis of the ultron-logotron theory to explain the neural correlate of consciousness. (shrink)

In the burgeoning debate about neuroscience’s role in contemporary society, the issue of brain optimization, or the application of neuroscientific knowledge and technologies to augment neurocognitive function, has taken center stage. Previous research has characterized media discourse on brain optimization as individualistic in ethos, pressuring individuals to expend calculated effort in cultivating culturally desirable forms of selves and bodies. However, little research has investigated whether the themes that characterize media dialogue are shared by lay populations. This article considers (...) the relationship between the representations of brain optimization that surfaced in a study of British press coverage between 2000 and 2012 and interviews with forty-eight London residents. Both data sets represented the brain as a resource that could be manipulated by the individual, with optimal brain function contingent on applying self-control in one’s lifestyle choices. However, these ideas emerged more sharply in the media than in the interviews: while most interviewees were aware of brain optimization practices, few were committed to carrying them out. The two data sets diverged in several ways: the media’s intense preoccupation with optimizing children’s brains was not apparent in lay dialogue, while interviewees elaborated beliefs about the underuse of brain tissue that showed no presence in the media. This article considers these continuities and discontinuities in light of their wider cultural significance and their implications for the media–mind relationship in public engagement with neuroscience. (shrink)

Dispositional mindfulness and emotion regulation are two psychological constructs closely interrelated, and both appear to improve with the long-term practice of mindfulness meditation. These constructs appear to be related to subcortical, prefrontal, and posterior brain areas involved in emotional processing, cognitive control, self-awareness, and mind wandering. However, no studies have yet discerned the neural basis of dispositional mindfulness that are minimally associated with emotion regulation. In the present study, we use a novel brain structural network analysis approach (...) to study the relationship between structural networks and dispositional mindfulness, measured with two different and widely used instruments [Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale and Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire ], taking into account the effect of emotion regulation difficulties. We observed a number of different brain regions associated with the different scales and dimensions. The total score of FFMQ and MAAS overlap with the bilateral parahippocampal and fusiform gyri. Additionally, MAAS scores were related to the bilateral hippocampus and the FFMQ total score to the right insula and bilateral amygdala. These results indicate that, depending on the instrument used, the characteristics measured could differ and could also involve different brain systems. However, it seems that brain areas related to emotional reactivity and semantic processing are generally related to Dispositional or trait mindfulness, regardless of the instrument used. (shrink)

Many neuroscientific experiments, based on monitoring brain activity, suggest that it is possible to predict the conscious intention/choice/decision of an agent before he himself knows that. Some neuroscientists and philosophers interpret the results of these experiments as showing that free will is an illusion, since it is the brain and not the conscious mind that intends/chooses/decides. Assuming that the methods and results of these experiments are reliable the question is if they really show that free will is (...) an illusion. To address this problem, I argue that first it is needed to answer three questions related to the relationship between conscious mind and brain: 1. Do brain events cause conscious events? 2. Do conscious events cause brain events? 3. Who is the agent, that is, who consciously intends/chooses/ decides, the conscious mind, the brain, or both? I answer these questions by arguing that the conscious mind is a property of the brain due to which the brain has the causal capacity to interact adaptively with its body, and trough the body, with the physical and sociocultural environment. In other words, the brain is the agent and the conscious mind, in its various forms - cognitive, volitional and emotional - and contents, is its guide of action. Based on this general view I argue that the experiments aforementioned do not show that free will is an illusion, and as a starting point for examining this problem I point out, from some exemplary situations, what I believe to be some of the necessary conditions for free will.Key-words: Agent brain, conscious mind, free will, Libet-style experiments. (shrink)

(Part II), "Consciousness" (Part III), "Dreaming" (Part IV), and "Unified Theories of Psychology and Cognition" (Part V), successively.Part I (Chapter 1-3) focuses on the integration of brain, of which neural architectures are regarded as the most reliable empirical basis of mental integration. Tang proposes a theory dubbed Four Functional Systems (FFS) (of the brain) according to four levels of analysis of the hierarchical neural systems. Historically, FFS is in the prospects of extending Alexander Luria's theory of Three Functional (...) Systems (Luria, 1973). The first subsystem makes preparations for potentiation, brain activation, and awareness states; the second one receives, processes, and stores the incoming sensory information; the third one formulates and regulates subsequent mental activities and behaviors; the last one evaluates stored information, then, in turn, generates emotional feelings (as valences). Thus, the complexity of the brain-as an integrated whole-is identical to the brain's quaternary functional systems.Part II (Chapter 4-6) centers on the integration of mind. Tang treats unconscious mental activities as the prerequisites of consciousness. Furthermore, associating with FFS, he points out the mind is involved with four components: arousal, cognition, emotion, and volition (p. 28-30). These components-the tetrads of a mind-are neither operated separately nor combined mechanically. They interact with each other in a self-organizing way.Part III (Chapter 7-12) showcases Tang's theory of consciousness. In Chapter 7, correspondingly, he proposes Four Components of Consciousness (FCC). Consciousness is composed of four elements: awareness, content, intention, and emotion (p. 51). Tang tries to link arousal states of consciousness with energy states of (human) brain anatomical regions. He believes that the interactions of brain regions fundamentally result in those regions' transferable variable states. In particular, based on Fechner's interpretations of external and internal psychophysics, Tang adopts mathematical and physical methods to illustrate consciousness. In his view, consciousness is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon; the emergence of consciousness has a process. Rigorous formulas can describe this process and the relationship between brain and mind (p. 90-95).Part IV (Chapter 13-17) discusses dreaming. Studies have shown that most dreams appear during rapid eye movement. Neurotechnologies, such as electroencephalogram, can record the activation and dynamic changes of different brain regions during dreams, indicating that information processing continues. Information processing occurs during both dreaming and waking states, but the same neural basis corresponds to different characteristics. For dreaming is a unique state of consciousness, understanding the nature of dreaming is of great significance to understanding consciousness.Finally, based on the previous four sections' empirical and theoretical support, Part V (Chapter 18-20) gets ready to construct a unified theory of psychology and cognition. Both psychologists and cognitive scientists aspire to a unified theory of the mind as physicists have expected (simply relatively speaking) in the material realm. Resorting to a general theory of physical and mental integration, Tang plans a Grand Unified Psychology program, whose theoretical framework consists of four parts: (1) central viewpoints and methods of studying psychology and behavioral science; (2) critical examinations of theories in various sub-fields of psychology and somewhat convergent psychological phenomena; (3) essentials of unifying various research fields and disciplines of psychology; (4) essentials of unifying the research diagram. Tang stresses the significance of studying the mind from mental integration (and psychological interaction). Elsewhere, Tang advocates: the processes and phenomena of cognition are only one dimension of the psychological realm; consequently, it is necessary to study different (mental) interactions of psychological experiences and feelings involving cognition, such as understanding, evaluating, monitoring. In short, the units and correlations of various mental interactions involving cognition and feelings are indispensable.Throughout the book, Tang attempts to systematically grasp interdisciplinary advances of physics, psychology, brain science, medicine, technical science, and present his mind and consciousness theory (FFS and FCC). In the end, he offers a sketch of a unified program of psychological and cognitive sciences. This book epitomizes Tang's research on mind, brain, and consciousness over the past two decades and could be seen as the forefront of Chinese scholars' research on consciousness. The only drawback is that the content system it contains is so extensive that some fascinating details, such as experimental studies on mind wandering, quantitative studies of consciousness, cannot be specifically presented. Just as Eric Kandel (2018) stated, "determining the nature of consciousness is one of the greatest scientific challenges of the twenty-first century, so answers will not come quickly or easily," the theories and program proposed by Tang in this book need to be scrutinized further by the contemporaries. (shrink)

The remarkable advances in continuing elucidation of the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the central nervous system in recent experimental animal and clinical studies have provided new contexts for evaluating earlier historical and current controversies on human brain?structure?function and brain?mind relationships. Churchland's Neurophilosophy reviews and critically evaluates the implications of the recent advances in the various neurosciences for formulation of a comprehensive concept of the nature of the mind and the historical controversies on human structure?function and (...) brain?mind relationships. Although uneven, it is a monumental effort and a remarkable achievement that will provide new, broader, and deeper contexts for philosophers as well as for those engaged in the various neurosciences. (shrink)

With all the research on mind/brain connections these days -- Your brain in lust or love! While gambling or feeling envious! While meditating, praying, or having an out-of-body experience! -- it’s natural to wonder about ’big questions’ about the relationships among the mind, the brain, and God. For instance, some people have taken the findings that some spiritual experiences have neural correlates to mean that the hand of God is at work in the brain. (...) Others have interpreted the same research to mean that spiritual experiences are "just" neural, and thus evidence against the existence of God or other supernatural forces. These debates are updated versions of longstanding philosophical and religious wrestlings with how God and nature might or might not intertwine. What’s your own gut view, right now, as a kind of snapshot: Do you think that God is involved in some way in your thoughts and feelings? In your most intimate sense of being? In this essay, we’ll explore what mind, brain, and. (shrink)

As it becomes increasingly plausible that the mind–brain is explicable in naturalistic terms, science‐and‐religion scholars have the opportunity to engage creatively and proactively with facets of brain‐related research that better inform our understanding of human well‐being. That is, once mental health is recognized as being a whole‐body phenomenon, exciting theological conversations can take place. One fascinating area of research involves the “gut–brain axis,” or the interactive relationship between the microbiome in the gastrointestinal tract (i.e., gut (...) bacteria), the central nervous system, and mental health. A growing body of literature explores the immensely significant interactions between the gut microbiome and mental health issues involving depression, anxiety, gene expression, and stress responses. One's mental health does not occur in a disembodied state, but in a complex physical environment that is strongly influenced by environmental factors, many of which we can control. This article argues that science‐and‐religion can welcome scientific research in this area, creatively incorporating such insights into a theology of mental health and physical well‐being. (shrink)

Since Descartes “separation” of the Soul from the Body, we observe a complete confusion in their causal, functional, and semiotic relationships. However, in modern knowledge (about the informational activity of the human brain, the functional and causal properties of its neural networks, the functions of psychic phenomena during the processing of information in it, about the causal “ability” of information) it is time to put an end to this problem. Here, in order to explain what I am talking about, (...) I will use the notion of “information” (which had been unknown by Descartes) regarding the “dispute” between Mind & Body (the Physicality and the Mentality) for “the right” to be a more fundamental ontology of Reality. I will do this by introducing an “arbitrator” — the Objective Reality. This goal is achieved through the study of information activity of the human brain. In the process of this study, it turns out that the information activity of the brain in principle cannot be carried out without mental phenomena. That is, it turns out that the classical physical causality, which operates in the neural networks of the brain, is not able, by itself, without mental phenomena, to implement the information operations that the human brain actually performs. It also turns out that the functional inclusion of mental phenomena (at least, the phenomena of subjective evaluation and mental images) in the neurophysiologic (by and large, physical) activity of the brain explains the possibility and necessity of functional inclusion in this information processing the phenomenon of freedom of choice. After all, the processing information in the brain through mental phenomena allows more than one degree of freedom than it is “allowed” by any physical process. (shrink)

The relationship of consciousness to brain, which Schopenhauer grandly referred to as the "world knot," remains an unsolved problem within both philosophy and science. The central focus in what follows is the relevance of science---from psychoanalysis to neurophysiology and quantum physics-to the mind-brain puzzle. Many would argue that we have advanced little since the age of the Greek philosophers, and that the extraordinary accumulation of neuroscientific knowledge in this century has helped not at all. Increas- ingly, (...) philosophers and scientists have tended to go their separate ways in considering the issues, since they tend to differ in the questions that they ask, the data and ideas which are provided for consideration, their methods for answering these questions, and criteria for judging the acceptability of an answer. But it is our conviction that philosophers and scientists can usefully interchange, at least to the extent that they provide co~straints upon each other’s preferred strategies, and it may prove possible for more substantive progress to be made. Philosophers have said some rather naive things by ignoring the extraordinary advances in the neurosciences in the twentieth century. The skull is not filled with green cheese! On the other hand, the arrogance of many scientists toward philosophy and their faith in the scientific method is equally naive. Scientists clearly have much to learn from philosophy as an intellectual discipline. Manifestations of Mind: Some Conceptual and Empirical Issues Walter B. Weimer Pages 5-31 The Mysterious “Split‘: A Clinical Inquiry into Problems of Consciousness and Brain Peter H. Knapp Pages 37-69 Mind, Brain, and the Symbolic Consciousness Irwin Savodnik Pages 73-98 Brain and Free Will John C. Eccles Pages 101-121 An Old Ghost in a New Body C. Wade Savage Pages 125-153 How Dogmatic Can Materialism Be? John C. Eccles Pages 155-160 Mental Phenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function R. W. Sperry Pages 163-177 Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System Theory E. M. Dewan Pages 181-198 Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem William C. Wimsatt Pages 205-267 Mind, Structure, and Contradiction Gordon G. Globus Pages 271-293 Problems Concerning the Structure of Consciousness Karl H. Pribram Pages 297-313 The Role of Scientific Results in Theories of Mind and Brain: A Conversation among Philosophers and Scientists E. M. Dewan, John C. Eccles, Gordon G. Globus, Keith Gunderson, Peter H. Knapp, Grover Maxwell et al. Pages 317-328 Scientific Results and the Mind-Brain Issue: Some Afterthoughts Grover Maxwell Pages 329-358. (shrink)

The relation between mental states and brain states is important in computational neuroscience, and in psychiatry in which interventions with medication are made on brain states to alter mental states. The relation between the brain and the mind has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Here a neuroscience approach is proposed in which events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high level as a (...) mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in brains as operating within but not between levels. This allows the supervenient properties to be emergent, though once understood at the mechanistic levels they may seem less emergent, and expected. This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. This approach may provide a way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from dualism and from reductive physicalism, and which is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of operation may be useful in different ways. For example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the neural processing level may be more useful, in for example, the treatment of psychiatric disorders. (shrink)

. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are (...) best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth. (shrink)

A Karger 'Publishing Highlights 1890-2015' title These three volumes are the revised and enlarged edition of a classic work hailed as bringing a new perspective to knowledge of the mind-brain relationship. In the tradition of highest scholarship, the author uses both neurological and epistemological approaches to provide a unique interpretation of the relationship of brain and consciousness.

Is the relationship between psychology and neuroscience one of autonomy or mutual constraint and integration? This volume includes new papers from leading philosophers seeking to address this issue by deepening our understanding of the similarities and differences between the explanatory patterns employed across these domains.

The brain displays both the anatomical features of a vast amount of interconnected topological mappings as well as the functional features of a nonlinear, metastable system at the edge of chaos, equipped with a phase space where mental random walks tend towards lower energetic basins. Nevertheless, with the exception of some advanced neuro-anatomic descriptions and present-day connectomic research, very few studies have been addressing the topological path of a brain embedded or embodied in its external and internal environment. (...) Herein, by using new formal tools derived from algebraic topology, we provide an account of the metastable brain, based on the neuro-scientific model of Operational Architectonics of brain-mind functioning. We introduce a “topodynamic” description that shows how the relationships among the countless intertwined spatio-temporal levels of brain functioning can be assessed in terms of projections and mappings that take place on abstract structures, equipped with different dimensions, curvatures and energetic constraints. Such a topodynamical approach, apart from providing a biologically plausible model of brain function that can be operationalized, is also able to tackle the issue of a long-standing dichotomy: it throws indeed a bridge between the subjective, immediate datum of the naïve complex of sensations and mentations and the objective, quantitative, data extracted from experimental neuro-scientific procedures. Importantly, it opens the door to a series of new predictions and future directions of advancement for neuroscientific research. (shrink)