In his Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Robert Musil has the character Clarisse comment on a debate between her husband, Walter, and Ulrich, the “man without qualities,” about the “impossible” relation between art and life. “‘Ich find das doch sehr wichtig,’ sagte sie, ‘daß in uns allen etwas Unmögliches ist. Es erklärt so vieles. Ich habe, wie ich zuhörte, den Eindruck gehabt, wenn man uns aufschneiden könnte, so würde unser ganzes Leben vielleicht wie ein Ring aussehen, bloß so rund um etwas.’ Sie (...) hatte schon vorher ihren Ehering abgezogen und guckte nur durch seine Öffnung gegen die belichtete Wand. ‘Ich meine, in seiner Mitte ist doch nichts, und doch sieht er genau so aus, als ob es ihm nur darauf ankäme.’” The English translation is even stronger: “There is nothing inside, and yet it looks as though that were precisely what matters most.” This essay interrogates this “nothing” that matters most in relation to the crown of royal authority, the “hollow crown,” as Richard II calls it in Shakespeare’s play. I further flesh out the matter and materiality of this bit of nothing in relation to the struggle between Creon and Antigone in Sophocles’ play about the foundations of royal authority. The queen in the former play and Antigone in the latter are presented as being too much sad, as manifesting a grief that pertains to this nothing, to an indeterminate loss they both “encyst” (upon) in their subjective stances. (shrink)

This article takes its starting‐point in the current resurgence of interest in negative theology. Being especially prevalent among postmodern thinkers, this interest coincides with a strong conviction concerning the absence of the divine. In the postmodern context the interest in negative theology leads quite naturally into a debate on negative anthropology, as humanity's increasing awareness of its own finitude appears to reflect a similar break with the metaphysics of being.To analyze the tradition of negative theology, (...) the article goes back to its prime architect, Pseudo‐Dionysius . By comparing him to an author who preceded him, viz. Augustine, and one who followed him, viz. Eriugena, the article aims at giving a ‘thicker’ description of his position by framing it historically. In doing so it draws two conclusions. It first shows that the connection between negative theology and negative anthropology is indeed Dionysian; as such it is rightfully pointed to in postmodern thought. In contradistinction to postmodern applications, however, Dionysius' interest in negativity is shown to reflect before all a desire to wrestle with the overpowering presence of the divine instead of concluding to its absence. (shrink)

Review essay about Günther Anders, Die Weltfremdheit des Menschen, Munich 2018.

I explore how many within modern industrial societies currently understand, manage, and respond to their emotional suffering. I argue that this understanding and management of suffering has radically altered in the last 30 years, creating a new model of suffering, “the negative model” (suffering is purposeless), which has largely replaced the “positive model” (suffering is purposeful) that prevailed in the 18th and 19th centuries. This shift has been hastened by what I call the “rationalization of suffering”—namely, the process by (...) which suffering is predominantly now understood in biological and psychiatric terms rather than in religious, philosophical, or moral. This process accompanied the great forces of secularization, medicalization unleashed at the enlightenment—forces gaining their modern expression through psychiatry, the behavioral psychotherapies, the happiness industries, as well as through aggressive market, individualistic, medical, and positivistic ideas and movements. This shift has entailed many socio/cultural implications important for anthropologists to explore further. (shrink)

Arnold Gehlen's attempt to give anthropological grounds for morality stems from Kant's idea that being freed from the compulsion of instinct left human beings in need of compensation for the loss of the practical guidance which instinct had hitherto provided. Whereas Kant thought this compensation was to found only in reasoned morality, Gehlen would argue that morality provides recompense by becoming a quasi-instinct that functions without reflection and that needs to be bred into human beings. The author maintains that in (...) comparing animals and human beings. Gehlen posits will as a deficient instinct as deficient will; because each side is characterized as the negative of the other, Gehlen's starting point fails to meet the conditions for a valid comparison. (shrink)

이 논문은 「인간학」에서 개진된 광기(Verrücktheit)에 대한 헤겔의 논의를 자연에서 정신으로의 이행이라는 관점에서 해명한다. 「인간학」에서 헤겔은 광기를 의 두 번째 단계 ‘자기느낌(Selbstgefühl)’에서 주제화하는데, 논자는 자기느낌이 어떤 점에서 자기의식과 달리 자연적 주체성인지, 자연적 주체성은 또 어떤 의미에서 광기라는 현상을 낳는지, 헤겔에게 광기는 무엇을 의미하는지, 그리고 그것이 「인간학」에서 이루어지는 정신(Geist)의 전개에 어떤 역할을 하는지를 상세히 분석하여 보여주고자 한다. 논자는 (1) 헤겔 「인간학」의 해석과 관련하여 자기느낌 개념에 주목해야 하는 철학사적이고 연구사적인 이유를 간략히 살피고, (2) 헤겔 철학에서 자기느낌 개념의 의미 그리고 「인간학」에서 주제화되는 자기느낌의 문제가 (...) 무엇인지를 정리한 후, (3) 「인간학」에서 개진된 헤겔의 광기 개념 및 광기 분류를 상세히 살필 것이다. 그리고 이를 토대로 (4) 헤겔이 광기의 원인으로 개념화하는 신체성은 영혼과 세계 사이의 관계에 대한 헤겔 특유의 존재론적 사유를 전제로 이해할 수 있다는 점을 논증하고, 이를 토대로 (5) 광기의 필연성이 정신의 부정성을 나타내는 여러 의미를 고찰할 것이다. (shrink)

Is anthropology a science? To put the question today amounts to a reply in the negative. The representatives of the ‘true’ sciences are not alone in suggesting a conjunctural or crippling lacuna which would preclude membership by right of the prestigious world, which, however, the name ‘humanistic sciences’ seems to demand. We should remember that some years ago Claude Lévi-Strauss caused a shudder to run through his discipline by describing it as a ‘flattering imposture’. Since then denigration has (...) spread constantly, and it no longer consists of deploring a slowness, an equivocation or a handicap which we would have the hope of remedying: it is definitely a fatality which we are from now on invited to confirm. (shrink)

This article argues against a leading cognitivist and moral interpretation of shame that is present in the philosophical literature. That standard view holds that shame is the felt-response to a loss of self-esteem, which is the result of negative self-assessment. I hold that shame is a heteronomous and primitive bodily affect that is perceptual rather than judgmental in nature. Shame results from the breakdown and thwarting of our desire for anonymous, unexceptional, and disattentive co-existence with others. I use the (...) sociological theory of Erving Goffman and the theory of shame found in philosophical anthropology to support this view. I also use the cases of shame and chronic shame that often accompany disability to show that shame is separable from negative self-assessment and, instead, emerges as an affective response to a world (of equipment, things, and people) that disallows unburdened and unreflective interpersonal equilibrium. (shrink)

Beller, Bender, and Medin should be congratulated for their generous attempt at expressive academic therapy for troubled interdisciplinary relationships. In this essay, I suggest that a negative answer to the central question (“Should anthropology be part of cognitive science?”) is not necessarily distressing, that in retrospect the breakup seems fairly predictable, and that disenchantment with the cognitive revolution is nothing new.

In the following essay I would like to clarify the connection between philosophical anthropology and fundamental questions in ethics with regard to the subject of negativity. When I first began a systematic analysis of the presuppositions of moral praxis, I came upon the problem of the basic conceptual framework for ethics. The pursuit of these questions brought about a radicalization in my thinking about ethics, which in turn led me to inquire into the fundamental question of philosophy. I want (...) to present this path of reflection, using a discussion of Hegel and Heidegger as a background, in four steps: first, the fundamental question of philosophy; second, the ground of philosophy; third, an anthropological analysis of temporal finitude ; and fourth, the practical-philosophical meaning of negativity. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the current academic debate on the nature of embodied, intentional consciousness, specifically the attempt to inaugurate a rapprochement between phenomenological existentialism and critical theory. This is accomplished through a critical comparison of the concepts of negative experience and nonidentity in Theodor Adorno's negative dialectics and Jean-Paul Sartre's early phenomenology. By comparing how each engages with Hegel, I suggest that Sartre offers a broad, anthropological account of negative experience and nonidentity helpful to critical theorists (...) but that there remains a critical deficit which Adorno's more restricted—and political—sense of nonidentity remedies. Sartre's anthropological portrayal of ‘persistent negation’ worries Adorno but I suggest that it can be understood as a pragmatic presupposition for problem-solving rather than as a transcendental condition of experience. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropologies (PAs) – ontological assumptions about human species-nature – have long faced Foucauldian post-structural rejection of their value and legitimacy in explaining sociological problematics. In this article I endorse Bourdieu’s resistance to a post-PA momentum, arguing that PAs need assuming in sociological research. In the process, I explore PAs within Bourdieu’s research framework, including how his key empirical-analytic concepts – ‘habitus’, ‘field’, ‘illusio’ and ‘forms of capital’ – echo the PAs he assumes. Yet I argue his conceptual framework would (...) do better without a PA he sometimes explicitly invokes: a ‘libidinal’ drive to compete for power in ‘games’ of social-field labour. I then draw on data from a survey of Australian education academics, who comment on how workforce restructures negatively affect their research and teaching labours. From the data, I argue that assuming a power-competitive PA as a driver of field labours inhibits attention to ethically-motivated desire for better labour purposes, fuelling critically-reflexive capacities to challenge field-structured power games. In turn, I diagnose that Bourdieu’s conceptual framework needs, but lacks, Marxian assumption of a human-species impulse for labours to serve use-valued social purposes, and that commodification of labours generates emotional alienation. I therefore suggest a ‘Marxification’ of Bourdieu’s framework. (shrink)

The Power of Example is an interdisciplinary examination of the integral role that examples and exemplification play in anthropological theory and practice. Explores the evocative and persuasive power, both positive and negative, of ‘exemplary examples’ in social life Includes contributions from established and up-and-coming anthropologists, as well as leading scholars of religious and cultural studies Features an international array of case studies on exemplification from Left radical activists in Denmark to scientific metrological practice in Brazil.

Kritische Theorie und Philosophische Anthropologie gelten noch immer als grundsätzlich einander widerstreitende Strömungen. Die Philosophien Helmuth Plessners und Theodor W. Adornos jedoch lassen sich, so die These dieses Buches, unter dem Namen der negativen Anthropologie zusammenführen. Edinger begreift negative Anthropologie im systematischen Sinn als strukturell negativ verfasstes Konzept, um elementare und exklusive Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Adorno und Plessner sichtbar zu machen. Neben den grundsätzlichen Überlegungen, u.a. zum Konzept der Anthropologie bei Sonnemann und Gehlen, widmet sich der Autor auch beispielhaft den (...) Motiven der Kritik der Moderne und die Kritik der Geschichtsphilosophie durch Plessner und Adorno. Damit erreicht er eine neue Sicht auf das Verhältnis der beiden philosophischen Richtungen, die die gemeinhin akzeptierte unversöhnliche Frontstellung von philosophischer Anthropologie und Kritischer Theorie aufhebt. (shrink)

The relation between critical theory of society and philosophical anthropology is a very interesting and exciting but also problematic one. On the one hand, since Hork- heimer’s seminal essay Remarks on Philosophical Anthropology critical theorists have always expressed a clear distaste for anthropological speculation. On the other hand, notwithstanding Adorno’s aim in Negative Dialectics to “vetoe any anthropol- ogy” and criticize “the question of man [as] ideological”, he frequently mentioned the project of a “negative anthropology” (...) or “dialectical anthropology” as an important one. In this context, it is especially noteworthy that Adorno developed a significant philosophical and also human relation during the 1960s with Arnold Gehlen, one of the founders of 20th-century philosophical anthropology. In my contribution I will fo- cus on some aspects of the Adorno/Gehlen relation, mostly approaching this topic at a historical-philosophical level rather than at a strictly theoretical level, and offering some remarks on certain affinities between their aesthetic theories and also on cer- tain philosophical elements that emerge in a powerful and significant way from the public debates between Adorno and Gehlen that took place in the 1960s on radio and TV. (shrink)

The covid-19 pandemic and the increasingly polarized political situation in many countries today have highlighted the significance of various humanly natural intellectual mistakes, cognitive biases, and widespread inferential errors. This essay examines, at a philosophical meta-level, the relation between our natural epistemic errors and the kind of humanly unavoidable transcendental illusion analyzed by Immanuel Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic of the First Critique. While both kinds of illusion are usually primarily discussed in an epistemological context, my approach is not exclusively (...) epistemic. Rather, my main argument extends the broadly Kantian critique of reason – as a critical via negativa focusing on what is epistemically “wrong” about us, as the kind of cognitive agents we human beings naturally are – into a pragmatically enriched investigation of “the negative” as constitutive of the human condition, that is, our lack of sufficiently critical epistemic and ethical capacities, including our propensity to both cognitive error and moral evil. Our being inescapably inclined to manifest such negativities in our epistemic and ethical lives, and our insufficient awareness of doing so, are, arguably, “transcendental facts” about us, to be critically examined in terms of a Kantian-cum-pragmatist philosophical anthropology. This significantly enriches our picture of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)

The thesis of the present volume is critical and dual. (1) Present day philosophy of man and sciences of man suffer from the Greek mis taken polarization of everything human into nature and convention which is (allegedly) good and evil, which is (allegedly) truth and fal sity, which is (allegedly) rationality and irrationality, to wit, the polar ization of all fields of inquiry, the natural and social sciences, as well as ethics and all technology, whether natural or social, into the (...) totally positive and the totally negative. (2) Almost all philosophy and sci ences of man share the erroneous work ethic which is the myth of man's evil nature - the myth of the beast in man, the doctrine of original sin. To mediate or to compromise between the first view of human nature as good with the second view of it as evil, sociologists have devised a modified utilitarianism with deferred gratification so called, and the theory of the evil of artificial competition (capitalist and socialist alike) and of keeping up with the Joneses. Now, the mediation is not necessary. For, the polarization makes for abstract errors which are simplistic views of rationality, such as reductionism and positivism of all sorts, as well as for concrete errors, such as the disposition to condemn repeatedly those human weaknesses which are inevitable, namely man's inability to be perfectly rational, avoid all error, etc. , thus setting man against himself as all too wicked. (shrink)

There can be a temptation to dismiss moral pushback against novel science and technology, particularly commonplace labels for nanotechnology and synthetic biology like “playing God” or “messing with nature". One of the reasons for this is an implicit association between tragic themes and a lack of constructive benefit. Therefore, this paper uses concepts from art and cinema to offer a new perspective on public "fears": ecstatic reframing. By treating negative narratives not as roadblocks to progress, but portals into latent (...) dreams, this novel method reframes such views as housing a positive vision. However, while this offers a new approach regarding public talk of emerging science and technology, lay ethics is ultimately insufficient to deal with the underlying problems that stimulate their tragic tone. This paper uses a classic concept from anthropology--rites of passage--to argue that public unease is fundamentally cultural: modernity's lack of a collectively agreed upon worldview and primordial ritual structure for stewarding change. This "cultural deficit" may lie at the core of tragic narratives regarding emerging science and technology. (shrink)

Long before criticism of anthropocentrism became commonplace in the early twenty-first century, Michel Foucault was asking questions about the origins and cultural conditions of human self-referentiality. In his writings of the 1960s, this theme proved to be one of the key, if not the main one. Exploring the history of the emergence of insanity as a subject of psychiatric knowledge, mental illness, and then studying the change from the episteme of classical rationalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the (...) modern one, Foucault discovered what he called the "anthropological circle". This is the situation in the history of thought when man became the object of positive knowledge, when his mental life became objectified, resulting in the formation of modern anthropocentrism. Man finds himself at the center of modernity not as a godlike Renaissance titan at the center of the cosmos, but as a finite human being who acts as a condition for the production of modern types of knowledge, including knowledge about himself. However, the more concrete and cognizable this man becomes, the more his essence slips, according to Foucault, into the realm of the unthinkable. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the central role of the notion of " habit " (Gewohnheit) in Hegel's theory of " embodiment " (Verleiblichung) and to show that the philosophical outcome of the Anthropology is that habit, understood as a sensorimotor life form, is not only an enabling condition for there to be mindedness, but is more strongly an ontological constitutive condition of all its levels of manifestation. Moreover, I will argue that Hegel's approach somehow makes (...) a model of embodied cognition available which offers a unified account of the three main senses of embodiment understood as both a physiological, a functional, and a phenomenological process. In this sense Hegel's approach to habit can make a useful contribution to the contemporary debate on embodiment in philosophy of mind, the cognitive sciences, and action theory. For a long time habit in 20th century philosophy and science has been mostly read in a negative way, identified with mechanical and repetitive routine. The reconstruction of Hegel’s approach is particularly relevant here and can fruitfully contribute to this discussion, since it offers us not only a model that assigns to habit a positive constitutive role in the formation of embodied human mindedness but which also overcomes the dualism between habitual motor routine and intentional activities that is prevalent nowadays in the cognitive sciences and in action theory, and allows for some sense of natural agency as belonging to animal life. Furthermore, Hegel’s approach cuts across the great divide between associationist and holistic approaches to habit that has for a long time dominated the philosophical debate on habit and still shapes the current opposition between classical cognitive science and embodied cognitive science. (shrink)

This article argues that shame is fundamentally interpersonal. It is opposed to the leading interpretation of shame in the field of moral psychology, which is the cognitivist, morally rationally, autonomous view of shame as a negative judgment about the self. That view of shame abandons the social and interpersonal essence of shame. I will advance the idea, as developed by the tradition of philosophical anthropology and, in particular, in the works of Helmuth Plessner, Erwin Straus, F. J. J. (...) Buytendijk, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that shame is a heteronomous affective response that is caused by a breakdown in our fundamental interpersonal connection with others. It is a feeling that comes from the denial of our basic need to live with others in a state of trusting acceptance. (shrink)

This article argues that negative dialectics operates within a depth realist framework. Depth realism posits an independent, historically situated, emergent, structured, and differentiated world in which human beings are immersed and with which they interact to preserve or transform. This understanding of the world is explicitly theorized, not by Adorno, but by Roy Bhaskar's depth realism (critical realism). My intention is to firstly highlight the close similarities between Adornoian and Bhaskarian dialectics. Secondly, I highlight some important divergences, especially the (...) deficiencies in Adorno's theory of constellation that stem from his lack of realist theorization, specifically his reliance on concepts that cannot reach beyond a form of subjective idealism. Despite this criticism, I argue that if nonidentity concepts are grasped in the wider context of the basic anthropological materialism or “axial turn” that informs Adorno's thinking, and from which they derive, a case can be made in defense of Adornoian realism. The final two sections explore the implications a depth realist interpretation has for Adorno's understanding of the subject‐object mediation in his social theory, allowing us to move beyond Adorno's famous pessimistic views about the possibilities for political change. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The study aims to define and comprehend the phenomenon of freedom as an anthropological problem in the Christian philosophical heritage of A. Augustine and H. Skovoroda. The objectives of the study are: a) to identify the main aspects of the problem of freedom in the Christian philosophy of Augustine; b) to clarify the essence and specificity of understanding of freedom in the philosophical anthropology of H. Skovoroda; c) to compare the peculiarities of the statement of the problem of (...) freedom by Augustine and Skovoroda. _Theoretical basis._ The achievement of the purpose is based on theoretical-methodological, historical-philosophical and comparative analysis of the content of the concept of freedom within the philosophical views of A. Augustine and H. Skovoroda. Also, the analysis of the original sources of the thinkers has allowed to formulate the theoretical and practical significance of their ideas in this field and their importance for the further development of world philosophy. _Originality._ It has been confirmed that in the religious philosophy of Augustine, freedom appears on an immanent-spiritual plane and is a phenomenon manifested as a person’s ability of self-determination in his actions. Augustine explains freedom by raising the question of free will, evil, salvation, predestination and divine grace. It is substantiated that the analysis of the problem of freedom in the philosophy of H. Skovoroda presupposes an understanding of the main components of his philosophical and anthropological theory: ontological (the doctrine of "two natures" and "three worlds"); gnoseological (the concept of self-knowledge); ethical (the problem of happiness, good, etc.). It is determined that human freedom in the work of both philosophers is defined in conceptual and semantic aspects as a moral and ethical choice between good and evil. It is established that both Augustine and Skovoroda emphasize the discovery by man of the moral, spiritual law and life in accordance with its norms – this is a kind of idea of positive freedom ("freedom for"), and the call to escape from the world of evil is the idea of negative freedom ("freedom from"). _Conclusions._ Thus, we continued the historical-philosophical study of the peculiarities of the understanding of the concept of human freedom in Ukrainian philosophical thought, which is manifested by comparing it with the theoretical heritage of world philosophy, with the spiritual and philosophical experience of the past. The ideological kinship of the concepts of freedom of Aurelius Augustine and Hryhorii Skovoroda is obvious. (shrink)

The problems of transhumanism cannot be considered in isolation from the very rapidly changing advancements of modern technology which has become an immanent part of the modern scientific paradigm and is beginning to affect all people more and more. Focusing the discussion on epistemological and ethical issues alone, while identifying the utopian assumptions of the transhumanism ideology, does not allow to create any useful tools that could restrain the negative phenomena in the world of technoscience. Understanding certain technological concepts (...) developed in environments sensitive to the transhumanist ideas requires appropriate expertise. Many of them touch on the most important aspects of Christian anthropology. In order to understand them properly, it is necessary to investigate the most important results of scientific research carried out in the last few years in the largest scientific laboratories. (shrink)

This is a rich, impressive, and important work in philosophical anthropology. It is rich and impressive in view of the wide range of literature upon which the author draws, and the interdisciplinary competencies which he exhibits. It is important because of the central issue which the work focuses on and analyzes from its interdisciplinary perspective.

For the one who studies the socio-anthropology of religions, the book itself is the main character of the fascinating journey that Moshe Idel proposes in Perfections that absorb. Cabala and interpretation Starting from the imaginary of the book in the Judaic mystical literature, as presented by Moshe Idel, we have found four main hypostases of the book: the book as a pre-existent paradigm, the book as creation, the book as a paradox, and the book as a knowledge tool. We (...) have noticed that these hypostases are to be found also in the folk products from the traditional Romanian settings this showing the presence of similar aspects regarding the representations of the book on a social imaginary level in various cultural areas. Thus, we have tried to present the hermeneutics of the negative and its applicability for the socio-anthropological study of some divinatory phenomena that make reference to the book or whose central point is the book. Moreover, the conclusions of this analysis have demonstrated the large applicability of the hermeneutics of the negative so well described by professor Moshe Idel. This can also be extended to other socio-humanistic sciences. (shrink)

Purpose. The research is aimed at determining the influence of negative ethical emotions on social life and the activity of the individual, which involves solving the following problems: a) to find out approaches to the typology of ethical emotions, b) to highlight individual negative ethical emotions and to determine their ability to influence human behaviour. Theoretical basis. The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is the recognition of the significant influence of negative emotions on human activity (...) in society. In this regard, it is proposed to consider them as a complex multidisciplinary phenomenon, which is predetermined by both social and personal factors of origin and has a certain specificity of objectification. Originality. The authors determined that in addition to destructive effects on a person of negative emotions, they can also have a constructive effect on person’s behaviour, due primarily to the fact that a person does not want to experience these emotions and therefore tries to avoid situations they cause. Conclusions. The ethical emotions of guilt, embarrassment, anger, disgust and contempt can affect, through the cognitive aspect of the emotional process, the decision-making process of people when they predict situations in which they risk to feel such emotions. So the emotion of guilt creates a constructive setup aimed at correcting inappropriate social norms of human behaviour. The emotion of embarrassment motivates a person to behave more benevolently in society in order to integrate in it and get its approval, thus encouraging the person to adhere to social and moral agreements and norms. The emotion of anger motivates a person to act to eliminate injustice, herewith not only in relation to himself, but also in relation to others. Rejecting those people who cause moral and social aversion, society creates a system of punishments and rewards that acts as a strong deterrent to the socio-cultural behaviour. The emotion of contempt performs the function of preventing punishment in relation to the despised individual. (shrink)

In a short section near the beginning of Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Immanuel Kant warns that “observing oneself” can easily lead to “enthusiasm and madness.” The transcripts of his lectures from the 1780s show that Kant did not always regard self-observation so negatively. However, by the time he published the Anthropology in 1798, Kant was convinced that diaries of self-observation contained false accounts of self-observers’ inner states. He also believed that self-observers often mistake imaginary self-images (...) for a self they have passively observed. Kant thought these falsehoods and fictions posed a danger to the mental health of those who practice self-observation. He included a warning about this danger in his Anthropology because of his “pragmatic” approach, which treats anthropology as a kind of medicina mentis. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology is a tradition that is as old as philosophy itself, so much so that it might be said to be indistinguishable from philosophy itself. Philosophical anthropology, extending as it does from Socrates to Sartre, best describes the work of V.Y. Mudimbe. Anthropology, broadly conceived as the science that studies human origins, the material and cultural development of humanity, is always Mudimbe’s first line of philosophical inquiry. It is certainly Mudimbe’s interest in anthropology that allows (...) him to conduct his investigations into Africa, its modes of thinking, and colonialism and its continuing effects on the continent. Writing on the latter issue in The Invention of Africa, Mudimbe, with his customary deftness of mind, argues that colonialism and its aftermath cannot by itself account for the continent’s extant condition: “The colonizing structure, even in its most extreme manifestations... might not be the only explanation for Africa’s present-day marginality. Perhaps this marginality could, more essentially, be understood from the perspective of wider hypotheses about the classification of beings and societies.” [ Making sense of Africa, in Mudimbe’s terms, must begin with a hypothesization that explicates how “beings and societies” come to be classified, the anthropological undertaking par excellence, which also requires a study of the forces that construct, implement and maintain these classifications. (shrink)

At this point I should say something about one of the frequent criticisms addressed to me, and to which I have always wanted to respond, that in the process of characterizing the production of Europe’s inferior Others, my work is only negative polemic which does not advance a new epistemological approach or method, and expresses only desperation at the possibility of ever dealing seriously with other cultures. These criticisms are related to the matters I’ve been discussing so far, and (...) while I have no desire to unleash a point-by-point refutation of my critics, I do want to respond in a way that is intellectually pertinent to the topic at hand.What I took myself to be undertaking in Orientalism was an adversarial critique not only of the field’s perspective and political economy, but also of the sociocultural situation that makes its discourse both so possible and so sustainable. Epistemologies, discourses, and methods like Orientalism are scarcely worth the name if they are reductively characterized as objects like shoes, patched when worn out, discarded and replaced with new objects when old and unfixable. The archival dignity, institutional authority, and patriarchal longevity of Orientalism should be taken seriously because in the aggregate these traits function as a worldview with considerable political force not easily brushed away as so much epistemology. Thus Orientalism in my view is a structure erected in the thick of an imperial contest whose dominant wing it represented and elaborated not only as scholarship but as a partisan ideology. Yet Orientalism hid the contest beneath its scholarly and aesthetic idioms. These things are what I was trying to show, in addition to arguing that there is no discipline, no structure of knowledge, no institution or epistemology that can or has ever stood free of the various sociocultural, historical, and political formations that give epochs their peculiar individuality. Edward W. Said is Parr Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “An Ideology of Difference”. (shrink)

Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and voluntary contribution to public goods provision in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories on the evolution of altruistic in-group beneficial behavior in humans. Many of these theories abstract away from the effects of kinship on the incentives for public goods provision, though. Here, it is investigated analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and experimentally (...) investigate collective action problems: the linear public goods game. Using recent anthropological data sets on relatedness in 61 contemporary hunter-gatherer and horticulturalist societies the relevant parameters of this model are then estimated. It turns out that the kinship patterns observed in these societies substantially reduce the negative effect of increasing group size on incentives for public goods provision. It is suggested, therefore, that renewed attention should be given to inclusive fitness theory in the context of public goods provision also in sizable groups, because its explanatory power with respect to this central problem in the evolution of human cooperativeness and altruism might have been substantially underrated. (shrink)

"The thesis is radical," writes Marshall Sahlins of this landmark text in anthropology and political science. "We conventionally define the state as the regulation of violence; it may be the origin of it. Clastres's thesis is that economic expropriation and political coercion are inconsistent with the character of tribal society - which is to say, with the greater part of human history."Can there be a society that is not divided into oppressors and oppressed, or that refuses coercive state apparatuses? (...) In this beautifully written book, Pierre Clastres offers examples of South American Indian groups that, although without hierarchical leadership, were both affluent and complex. In so doing he refutes the usual negative definition of tribal society and poses its order as a radical critique of our own Western state of power.Born in 1934, Pierre Clastres was educated at the Sorbonne; throughout the 1960s he lived with Indian groups in Paraguay and Venezuela. From 1971 until his death in 1979 he was Director of Studies at the fifth section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris and held the Chair of Religion and Societies of the South American Indians there.Robert Hurley is the translator of the History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault and cotranslator of Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. (shrink)

This chapter relates Kierkegaard’s views on anthropology and selfhood to Kantian and post-Kantian philosophical anthropology. It focuses on Kierkegaard’s contribution to anthropology, and discusses the relation between philosophical and theological anthropology in Kierkegaard. The chapter gives a synopsis of these issues by focusing on The Sickness unto Death, although important elements of this work are anticipated by Either/Or, The Concept of Anxiety and Concluding Unscientific Postscript. After an historical introduction and brief remarks on Kierkegaard’s method, the (...) chapter moves to human nature, selfhood, and despair in The Sickness unto Death. We will see that human nature is interpreted as a synthesis of opposites, whereas selfhood requires self-consciousness and higher-order volition. Nevertheless, The Sickness unto Death approaches selfhood and anthropology negatively by focusing on despair, a deficient form of agency that involves double-mindedness. Kierkegaard argues that despair can only be overcome by wholeheartedness and religious faith. Whereas Part I of The Sickness unto Death provides a philosophical anthropology that distinguishes between inauthentic (non-conscious) and authentic (conscious) despair, Part II develops a theological anthropology that focuses on faith and despair before God. Part I analyses and criticizes various forms of despair on their own terms, whereas Part II identifies despair with sin on the presupposition of divine revelation. Overall, The Sickness unto Death provides a systematic analysis of despair that has been influential in continental philosophy and theology. It is a fascinating contribution to anthropology and theories of selfhood because of its typology and negativistic phenomenology. On the one hand, the analysis of non-conscious despair provides an intriguing account of self-deception, facticity, and freedom. On the other, the analysis of demonic despair—which does evil because it is evil—appears to challenge the widespread idea that all intentional action is prompted by something that appears good). (shrink)

The essay reconstructs the main aspects of Gernot Böhme’s philosophy of technolo-gy. In polemical reference to Max Horkheimer’s and Jürgen Habermas’ critical theory, Böhme asks about the rationality criteria of technology. He does not view his philosophy of technology as part of the philosophy of science but places it on the boundary between philosophical anthropology and social philosophy. Böhme reflects on the ethically negative, neutral and positive effects of the technification process both on the identity of contemporary humans (...) and the changes taking place in social integration patterns. He also discusses the cultural sources of resistance to “invasive technification” not only in Western culture but also that of the Far East. The author closes his reflections with a set of questions about what he considers to be open issues in the Boehme’s philosophy of technology. (shrink)

The paper explores Burke’s twofold solution to the paradox of negative emotions. His Philosophical Enquiry (1757/59) employs two models that stand on different anthropological principles: the Exercise Argument borrowed from authors like the Abbé Du Bos, guided by the principle of self-preservation, and the Sympathy Argument, propageted by notable men of lettres such as Lord Kames, ruled by the principle of sociability. Burke interlocks these two arguments through a teleologically-ordered physiology, in which the natural laws of the human body (...) and mind, secretly working in the depth of the nerve fibres, ensure both self-preservation and sociability. Utilizing both efficient and final causes throughout his Enquiry, Burke argues that the experiences of pain and terror – under certain conditions – are made agreeable (delight) by providence,so that the physiological mechanisms underlying these experiences could ensure the health and strenuousness of the nerve fibres amidst the corrupting pleasures of commercial society (Exercise Argument). Furthermore, due to the ambiguous character of this delight annexed to such experiences, they also function as exercises for our social passions (Sympathy Argument). Te 'egoistic' anthropological drive to remove the visceral uneasiness that dominates these experiences facilitates moral action when it is needed the most: when others in pain need our help. In accordance with the anthropocentric providentialism of the moderate Enlightenment, it is the design of the human frame that ensures the activities essential to our health (self-preservation) and moral conduct (sociability), a design that not only guarantees that pleasure, if exclusive and excessive, is 'inconvenient', and pain, if mitigated and harmless, is aesthetically agreeable, but also that our 'egoistic' drive to self-preservation ultimately improves sociability. (shrink)

Purpose. Research of the phenomenon of human destructiveness in the context of metaphysical images and violence practices of late Modernism. Theoretical basis. The problem is that the philosophical reflection of violence as objectified, realized destructiveness of man is usually contextual in nature and is on the periphery of understanding its external manifestations. Accordingly, anthropological crisis remains behind the scenes, as evidenced by the devaluation of the humanistic potential of modern culture. That is why one should turn the focus from the (...) obvious, objectively conditioned incarnations of violence in the XXI century to the internal factors that are in the realm of existential. The departure from the consideration of violence as an abstract, faceless or ideologically colored evil allowed us to focus on man, his way of thinking, life and social orientations, feelings and internal contradictions, which find their expression in one or another form of destructiveness. Originality. Based on the works of M. Scheler and E. Fromm defining for philosophical anthropology and psychoanalysis, for the first time the conceptualization of positive and negative forms of manifestation of human destructiveness against the background of sociocultural transformations of late Modernism was carried out. It has been proved that its ontological principles are rooted in specifically human existence and relations with other members of society, while anthropological ones are directly connected with the endless struggle of the life, the vital with the spirit in man. Conclusions. Violence is a tool and a product of man’s transition to more mature and complex forms of existence. The interdependence of the violence and nonviolence practices ensures the progressive movement of humanity towards society humanization. This progress is accompanied by a natural internal conflict of personality, which can be both progressive and regressive. At the metaphysical level, destructiveness appears as a connection between the entropy of world existence as a whole and the instability of human existence itself, which is a complexly organized and open to the world system. Self-transcendence as an anthropological prerequisite for human destructiveness has a dual nature and combines negative and positive characteristics, the content and significance of which were revealed in the study. The authors are convinced that there is no other way to overcome the negative, malignant destructiveness, except for the incessant, daily gathering of life meanings around them and their development. After all, the loss of such core structures of the existence as the meaning, purpose and value of life has become a truly global problem for the modern world. Emphasis is placed on the need to keep in harmony the trinity of body-soul-spirit, which will allow a person in any social transformation to preserve and increase his integrity. (shrink)

"The thesis is radical," writes Marshall Sahlins of this landmark text in anthropology and political science. "We conventionally define the state as the regulation of violence; it may be the origin of it. Clastres's thesis is that economic expropriation and political coercion are inconsistent with the character of tribal society - which is to say, with the greater part of human history."Can there be a society that is not divided into oppressors and oppressed, or that refuses coercive state apparatuses? (...) In this beautifully written book, Pierre Clastres offers examples of South American Indian groups that, although without hierarchical leadership, were both affluent and complex. In so doing he refutes the usual negative definition of tribal society and poses its order as a radical critique of our own Western state of power.Born in 1934, Pierre Clastres was educated at the Sorbonne; throughout the 1960s he lived with Indian groups in Paraguay and Venezuela. From 1971 until his death in 1979 he was Director of Studies at the fifth section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes in Paris and held the Chair of Religion and Societies of the South American Indians there.Robert Hurley is the translator of the History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault and cotranslator of Anti-Oedipus by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. (shrink)

The article assumes that the expression “comparative relativism”—the title of the Common Knowledge symposium in which the essay appears—is neither tautological nor oxymoronic. Rather, the author construes the term as an apt synthetic characterization of anthropology and illustrates that idea by means of four quotations, taken from authors as different as Richard Rorty and David Schneider, Marcel Mauss and Henri Michaux. The quotations can be said to “exemplify” anthropology in terms that are interestingly (and diversely) restrictive: some of (...) them amount to extrinsic negations of anthropology that would paralyze it; others suggest intrinsic negativities that would propel it. All of the passages chosen evoke the idea of belief, which is profoundly implicated, in all possible senses (and especially the worse ones), in the majority of arguments that connect the themes of anthropology, comparison, and relativism. (shrink)

We can see personhood as a philosophical and historical struggle between positive and negative forms of ‘being at one’, a struggle most succinctly described by Hölderlin, a central figure in Romanticism and in German idealism through his close friendship and collaboration with Schelling and Hegel. For Hölderlin, ‘Being at one is god-like and good, but human, too human, the mania / Which insists there is only the One, one country, one truth and one way’. This paper is an exploration (...) of a range of forms of aloneness, linked by the family resemblance of a number of such ‘solitude’ terms (loneliness, solitude, solitary, aloneness, lonesome, individual, atonement) to the idea of ‘oneness’. ‘Being at one’ was distinctively articulated in the Romantic period, in philosophy as well as in the arts. Based on this distinctiveness, this article presents an historical account of the developing philosophical anthropology of being at one, dividing the development of ‘being at one’ between the pre-Romantic, Romantic, and post-Romantic eras. (shrink)

Anniversary commemorations are ambivalent events, particularly when they celebrate philosophers. Such commemorations focus on a life's work and occasionally contribute to its elucidation. However, they frequently do violence to those they intend to honor, by emphasizing primarily those aspects of a thinker's work which make him acceptable to the spirit of the age. And such was the fate of Theodor Adorno, whose eightieth birthday was observed in 1983 at a major conference, held in Frankfurt, West Germany. There his interpreters, embarked (...) on the task of rediscovering, brought out important aspects and opened up new perspectives. But die heart of Adorno's work, the negative dialectic, encountered outright resistance. (shrink)

Dehumanization is observed in adults across cultures and is thought to motivate human violence. The age of its first expression remains largely untested. This research demonstrates that diverse representations of humanness, including a novel one, readily elicit blatant dehumanization in adults (_N_ = 482) and children (aged 5–12; _N_ = 150). Dehumanizing responses in both age groups are associated with support for outgroup inferiority. Similar to the link previously observed in adults, dehumanization by children is associated with a willingness to (...) punish outgroup transgressors. These findings suggest that exposure to cultural norms throughout adolescence and adulthood are not required for the development of outgroup dehumanization. (shrink)

_Purpose._ To substantiate the definition of technics as the attributive characteristics of a human being and the necessity of its orientation towards human flourishing in the context of new anthropological models of the 21st century. _Theoretical basis._ Correlation between technics, technology and the human essence is examined. The role of technics is traced at different historical stages of human development. Negative and positive effects of digital technology development upon a contemporary human being is analysed in the light of new (...) anthropological models: homo technologicus, homo digitalis and homo eudaimonicus. The content of a new worldview-value paradigm of defining goals of technology is outlined. _Originality._ Transformation of the role of technics correlates with value and worldview shifts in person’s understanding of his/her purpose in both natural and social worlds. Nowadays, philosophical analysis of anthropological dimension of technics and technology opens a horizon for seeking effective solutions in the face of the contemporary challenges and anti-utopian threats by means of focusing on the fact that, indeed, technological development is subordinate to the humanist goal that is flourishing, wellbeing and comprehensive development of a human being. _Conclusions._ The essence of technology reveals not through its functional but anthropogenic definitions in a sense of a source of institutionalization and in a sense of a source of realization of a human way of self-identification and self-objectification of human subjectivity. Technics/technology is the attributive characteristics of human essence and being: a human being is as much human as much he/she is a creator of technics. The purpose of technics is not to master the nature and to transform the world; technics is, above all, a tool of human self-improvement and self-creation through broadening the horizon of human capacities. The analysis of new modern anthropological models shows that it is the orientation of technology/technology towards human flourishing that is, on the one hand, a response to the existential demands of modern man, and on the other hand, a way of preventing future threats related to technological development. (shrink)

This article discusses the idea of the German philosopher and psychiatrist Karl Jaspers about a close connection between a psychological disease and unleashing of a human potential. The very psychopathology of a modern man is interpreted as an urge for freedom, that has acquired ugly forms. The author suggests a solution to the problem of mental rigidity. Levels of consciousness development, a psychological triad and its possible manifestations within one’s worldview, as well as positive and negative types of psychodynamic (...) are presented as a plausible paradigm for orientation in the world. The discussed approach can serve as a method of analyzing individual conditioning and a broad range of phenomena of the modern culture. (shrink)