This dissertation will use neopragmatist philosophy to examine three important concepts in entrepreneurship theorizing: entrepreneurial uncertainty, venture ideas, and entrepreneurial opportunities. Neopragmatist philosophers typically understand meaning, objectivity, correct reasoning, and knowledge in terms of social-linguistic interpretive practices. Each of these concepts are perspectival in the sense that different people will interpret others as having a different view than themselves on what is actually objective etc.. According to neopragmatists we should analyse these concepts not by trying to identify any (...) sort of criteria which distinguishes which perspectives are actually correct, but instead identify how these concepts are used when people try to interpret the perspectives of others in relation to their own. This dissolves many difficult ontological problems. I will argue that the concepts ‘entrepreneurial uncertainty’, ‘venture ideas’, and ‘entrepreneurial opportunities’ are similarly perspectival and that a neopragmatist lens allows us to fruitfully understand them in terms of how we scholars use them when interpreting the perspectives of the entrepreneurs we are studying—who are in turn interpreting the perspectives of their stakeholders. In chapter two I will argue that Knightian uncertainty seems largely irrelevant to practicing entrepreneurs, and that we should reconceptualize and study entrepreneurial uncertainty as a lack of social justificatory resources. In chapter three I argue that instead of conceptualizing venture ideas as mental representations we should instead conceptualize them in terms of their role in social justificatory practices whereby entrepreneurs have to navigate how their perspectives diverge from their stakeholders. In Chapter four I argue that when an entrepreneurship scholars says that an entrepreneur pursues an opportunity they are not only claiming that the entrepreneur perceives the course of action as favourable, but are themselves taking a stand on its favourability relative to whatever theoretical lens they are using. The question “what are entrepreneurial opportunities” ceases to be an ontological debate and becomes instead a more fruitful debate about how we scholars can bring relevant theoretical insights to the perspectives of practicing entrepreneurs. (shrink)

This paper argues that a neopragmatist approach can allow for normativity to be integrated into a thoroughly naturalist account of mental disorder. A recognition of the malleability of norm-governed social practices reveals language, rationality, and mind to be open-ended, fluid processes that resist characterization in terms of fixed mechanistic structures. This, we will argue, foregrounds the import of vocabularies in determining the structure and content of mindedness. Specifically, the broader role that our discursive practices play in generating minds means (...) that the conditions contemporary psychiatric practice seeks to treat are themselves partly constituted by the vocabularies of treatment adopted. We then offer some positive proposals about how mindfulness based cognitive therapy (MBCT) may be enhanced once we replace representational approaches to mind with a vocabulary that explicitly articulates the inherent fluidity of self. To do this we draw on insights from mindfulness’s contextual home, namely Buddhism, and elaborate on the significance this tradition places on the doctrine of “not-self” (_anātman_) as a necessary framework for successful mindfulness practice– a framework that neatly slots into the neopragmatist understanding of mind and self as dynamic and socially constituted. (shrink)

There are significant differences between the neopragmatism as formulated by Rorty, based on James’ and Dewey’s pragmatism, and what Peirce, in order to distinguish his own approach from the last two thinkers, called pragmaticism. I take in this paper the concept of solidarity as a focus, from which those differences will be implied, albeit many other points could be chosen. I highlight that the usual Rorty’s sentence beginning with ‘we pragmatists…’ shall necessarily exclude Peirce. Exemplarily, I could mention the concepts (...) of representation, which for Peirce has nothing to do with mirror, and of truth that, for him, also has no relation at all with fixed essences. Those differences will not only mark a very clear border between the two concepts of pragmatism, but also will question how the idea of community can be supported only by dialogical agreements, without the anchor of common open human experience. Pragmaticism and neopragmatism differ not only regarding their specific range of philosophical problems but, moreover, on what kind of problems they really consider as genuinely philosophical. (shrink)

Twin Earth thought experiments are a standard philosophical tool for those offering, or criticizing, metasemantic theories: theories that attempt explain why referring words have the particular referents they have. The general recipe for Twin Earth thought experiments centrally features the description of a planet and population just like Earth and Earthlings, but with some single crucial differeence. In Hilary Putnam’s original version of the experiment, the difference is that the chemical composition of the stuff that looks and behaves like (our) (...) water is XYZ rather than H2O. Such cases show how variation in the physical environment can induce a corresponding variation in reference. In other versions, variations in the linguistic dispositions of speakers are shown to induce corresponding variations in reference. The extension of the word ‘red’ depends on how the linguistic community is disposed to apply that word, as against ‘purple’ or ‘orange’. Perhaps most interestingly, basic normative terms like ‘ought’ or ‘immoral’ seem to vary in neither of these ways. Even if Earthlings and Normative Twin Earthlings consistently made moral judgments in line with two quite distinct moral theories, they might still be talking about the very same property: moral wrongness. The present paper describes and applies a general metasemantic view that yields plausible claims about all three sorts of cases. The view I will defend—neopragmatism—is a fully generalized version of the sort of local expressivism defended in the past by people like Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard. Throughout the paper, a contrast is made with a rival approach to the same phenomena: an appeal to reference magnetism. (shrink)

The essays collected in this volume and authored by Sami Pihlström emphasize that our relation to the world we live in and seek to represent and get to know better through our practices of conceptualization and inquiry is irreducibly valuational. There is no way of even approaching, let alone resolving, the philosophical issue of realism without drawing due attention to the ways in which human values are inextricably entangled with even the most purely “factual” projects of inquiry we engage in. (...) This entanglement of the factual and the normative is, as explicitly argued in Chapter 7 but implicitly suggested in all the other chapters as well, both pragmatic (practice-embedded and practice-involving) and transcendental (operating at the level of the necessary conditions for the possibility of our representing and cognizing the world in general). The author claims we need to carefully examine the complex relations of realism, value, and transcendental arguments at the intersection of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. This book does so by offering case-studies of various important neopragmatists and philosophers close to the pragmatist tradition, including Hilary Putnam, Nicholas Rescher, Joseph Margolis, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It appeals to scholars and advanced graduate students focusing on pragmatism and analytic philosophy. (shrink)

The purpose. Explore the major ideological patterns of development of a socially philosophies of education in the context of the problems of institutionalization of knowledge about human and social development. To analyse system-integration aspect of social philosophy and education management in interaction of concepts of an instrumentalism of a pragmatism and a neopragmatism with model of «new humanism» in formation of socially valuable orientations. Methodology. Classification existing in the western philosophy of education and education of directions is spent, proceeding from (...) basic principles of philosophical school or a current, first of all considering those the purpose and means which are really involved by them in process of education, social development and socially-moral education and being based on the basic installations, the purpose expressed by that or other direction, how its supporters imagine the person, its requirement, a social role, модус behaviour which the education system and education urged to form. Scientific novelty. In conditions when against crisis of an education system of the government of the USA and the leading countries of Europe are compelled to begin its long-term reform, its theorists substantially pay attention to democratic workings out of concepts of an instrumentalism of a pragmatism/neopragmatism in modern social philosophy of education, in particular on their aspiration to introduce in process of social development, education and education idea and practical model both educational, and a social equality. Considering growing requirement of a practical embodiment of ideas of freedom, justice, aspiration to realization of the human rights proclaimed a society, supporters of the concept of «new humanism» see the main objective in blocking a way to conformism, to a manipulation behaviour of the person and to create conditions for its free self-expression, for realization by the person of a fundamental choice of acts in a concrete situation and by that to warn danger of formation of the unified form of behaviour. In it principles of «new humanism» approach with a position of «new humanism» instrumentalism and neopragmatism. Conclusions. Before social philosophy of education/education it is necessary to define a problem factors which cause achievement of its main objective, to state an estimation to moral principles and personal qualities with which actually the education/education theory connects realization of the problems, to show, why these, instead of any other principles and qualities open to the person possibility to choose in a concrete situation socially powerful both morally defensible and comprehensible line of conduct in public the relation. Statement of a question on necessity of the philosophical analysis of problems of education and education in a social context serves as an indicator of understanding philosophers, teachers of an increasing role of the human and moral factor in society development. And, at last, the aspiration to develop socially-philosophical bases of pedagogics in general and education in particular, testifies that the western and domestic philosophers, teachers, representatives of social and psychological sciences, at least, the majority of them, have realized the public importance of an education system and education, its global character. (shrink)

This article gives a historical-philosophical overview of three generations of pragmatist thinking centered around the question of democracy. It serves as an introduction and contextualization to the papers that develop a third generation pragmatic point of view in the remainder of the special issue. The perspective is from one American-trained philosopher of education who has studied and written widely in pragmatism and European social theory. The article has sections on three generations generally described and with primary influences of John Dewey, (...) Richard Rorty, and Bruno Latour. In each generation, other important philosophic contributions discussed come from C. S. Peirce and William James, Hilary Putnam, Donna Haraway, and Isabelle Stengers as well as relevant commentators. The first two, Dewey and Rorty, contribute to a sub-theme of democracy in their writings that the third, Latour, continues in politics in a section elaboration. The introduction sets forth a generational theme and an international setting for pragmatism. The conclusion summarizes the article's key ideas and points to a need in education for a democratic future. (shrink)

Definitions of pragmatism increasingly turn on understanding and relating the philosophies of Richard Rorty and John Dewey. Rorty is often the first and most important lens through which many encounter pragmatism or Dewey; thus, it is crucial to know where “Rorty” ends and where “Dewey” begins. To find that line, this chapter answers the question: What did Rorty believe Dewey contributed to pragmatism, to philosophy, and to humanity? After reviewing how Rorty's personal and academic beginnings intertwined with Dewey, preliminary context (...) is provided by reviewing Rorty's view of pragmatism and neopragmatism and his general interpretive approach to Dewey. These preliminaries yield to analytical descriptions of the main areas in Dewey's work which Rorty was concerned to present: experience; objectivity and truth; inquiry and scientific method; ethics, politics, and democracy; and, finally, the general purpose of philosophy. (shrink)

In the twentieth century, questions of meaning and representation played a central role in the development of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. Present-day neopragmatism, such as Huw Price's “global expressivism,” is often framed in terms of a nonrepresentationalist theory of meaning. While some neopragmatists, such as Robert Brandom, advocate a more local approach, this article argues for taking Price's global expressivism to its next logical step: global pragmatism. Global pragmatism prioritizes the behavior-guiding function of language and redefines representation in operational terms. (...) This operational approach stresses the action and conduct-guiding role of language use, highlights the connection between meaning and action, and addresses issues facing Price's global expressivism. (shrink)

This article examines Richard Rorty's approach to the self in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity . In spite of their differing philosophical bases, Rorty and Emmanuel Levinas converge methodologically in their treatments of the self by avoiding paradigmatic notions of human nature and a philosophical project of justification. Although Rorty refuses to prioritize a moralist account of the self over its romanticist rivals, his presentation relies on the reader's response to the ethical appeal of the other as depicted by Levinas: Rorty (...) ultimately de-divinizes the moralist self on an ethical basis. Finally, a Levinasian approach would supplement Rorty's view of the self by manifesting: concern for victims of de-moralization, greater appreciation for philosophical rationality and justification, and acceptance of self-critically executed paternalistic interventions. In addition, Rorty's mistrust of universals converges with Kant's apprehension that ethical universalization could treat human beings as less than ends in themselves. Key Words: ethics • Immanuel Kant • Emmanuel Levinas • neopragmatism • phenomenology • postmodernity • psychology • Richard Rorty • the self • solidarity. (shrink)

Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism is more similar to the self-described pragmatisms of his contemporaries Jürgen Habermas and Hilary Putnam than it is dissimilar from them. Indeed, the only significant difference between Rorty’s views and those of his interlocutors, and what forms the basis of their many public exchanges, is their respective stances toward the status of epistemic norms. Rorty’s arguments against Habermas’s endorsement of transcendental conditions that ground successful communication, and against Putnam’s contention that there exists a limit conception of truth (...) upon which the possibility for critique depends speak to the very heart of his philosophical differences from the Kantian pragmatisms of Habermas and Putnam. -/- This paper engages in a detailed exploration of the debates between Rorty and Habermas and between Rorty and Putnam over these matters. These debates provide us with a direct route to understanding Rorty’s own views on epistemic norms. That is, the comparison between his own position and those of his fellow neopragmatists throws into sharp relief Rorty’s belief in the radical contingency of epistemic norms. -/- This exploration profits from engaging a feminist lens because feminist critiques, specifically of Habermas’s work, draw attention to the inadequacies of his views that Rorty seeks to correct, inadequacies that can be easily translated to Putnam’s case as well. By approaching this issue from a feminist angle, the paper highlights the dissimilarities in the theoretical positions between Rorty and his contemporaries, and shows why this difference is more significant than it might seem at first blush. The paper concludes with the suggestion that Rorty’s emphasis on the radical contingency of epistemic norms can provide a basis for the kind of revolutionary social, political, and cultural change that is central to much recent feminist theory. (shrink)

Rorty's neopragmatism is an attempt to retrofit Dewey's experimentalism for the post-modern situation. Specifically, he substitutes "language" for "experience" and "culture" for "science", to arrive at a philosophy "no closer to science than to art". I argue that the first move results from misunderstanding of the role experience plays in the context of verification in Dewey's experimental logic. The second move leaves Rorty without any alternative method even for approaching the very problems which Dewey proposed to solve with his experimentalism.

History of philosophy is embedded into the theory of history. Two different philosophies, but we still have similar basic connections between different parts of each philosophy and a closer similarity of these two relativist thinkers. Gadamer, as a disciple of Heidegger, worked out the philosophical hermeneutics (Truth and Method, 1960) established by Heidegger in the early 20s. He embedded his approach of the history of philosophy in his hermeneutics, particularly in his description of history grasped as a chain of historically (...) effected events. Rorty, as a neopragmatist thinker, classified first the philosophers as systematic and edifying in his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), but later, in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989), he already speeks about history of philosophy as the history of metaphors. Despite their differences, it may be proved, on the one hand, that some part of their philosophies is primus inter pares; on the other hand, they both are relativists in some sense, and claim that we can have only narratives about the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The article opens (§ 1) with the paradoxical situation of philosophical anthropology between a heralded destiny of decadence (W. Schulz) and the surge of its argumentations and notions in the present-day debate on ethical themes and on the very idea of “human nature,” as well as in the redefinition of social philosophy (J. Habermas and P. Sloterdijk). It seeks, then (§§ 2-5), to trace a sort of “metaphilosophy” of philosophical anthropology, discussing the principal interpretations (H. Schnädelbach, H. Paetzold, O. Marquard, (...) W. Lepenies, etc.) that characterize it as reactive, open to a broader range of disciplines (the natural, human, social and cultural sciences) and installed in the clash between nature and history, intertwining empirical and theoretical elements and capable of providing a descriptive base for moral choices. It then takes up (§§ 6-8) the more recent perspectives of a philosophical anthropology for the twenty-first century that oscillate between its reconstruction around a strong theoretical core – excentric positionality – as a current of unitary thought and the divergent interpretation that focuses on the biopolitical approach, in order to redefine the specifically human along the vertical axis of anthropogenesis and evolutionary comparison and the horizontal axis of the analysis of diverse cultures in search of the premises of human vital practice. It concludes (§ 9) by suggesting an exploration – through the articles that follow – of the role of stimulus that philosophical anthropology and its authors play in the most disparate currents on the scene of contemporary German philosophy, such as critical theory, historical anthropology, neopragmatism, social philosophy, and the philosophy of culture. (shrink)

The Pragmatism Reader is the essential anthology of this important philosophical movement. Each selection featured here is a key writing by a leading pragmatist thinker, and represents a distinctively pragmatist approach to a core philosophical problem. The collection includes work by pragmatism's founders, Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, as well as seminal writings by mid-twentieth-century pragmatists such as Sidney Hook, C. I. Lewis, Nelson Goodman, Rudolf Carnap, Wilfrid Sellars, and W.V.O. Quine. This reader also includes the most important (...) work in contemporary pragmatism by philosophers like Susan Haack, Cornel West, Hilary Putnam, Richard Rorty, Cheryl Misak, and Robert Brandom. Each selection is a stand-alone piece--not an excerpt or book chapter--and each is presented fully unabridged. The Pragmatism Reader challenges the notion that pragmatism fell into a midcentury decline and was dormant until the advent of "neopragmatism" in the 1980s. This comprehensive anthology reveals a rich and highly influential tradition running unbroken through twentieth-century philosophy and continuing today. It shows how American pragmatist philosophers have contributed to leading philosophical debates about truth, meaning, knowledge, experience, belief, existence, justification, and freedom. Covers pragmatist philosophy from its origins to today Features key writings by the leading pragmatist thinkers Demonstrates the continuity and enduring influence of pragmatism Challenges prevailing notions about pragmatism Includes only stand-alone pieces, completely unabridged Reflects the full range of pragmatist themes, arguments, concerns, and commitments. (shrink)

The article discusses the relevance of ontology, the metaphysical study of being, in social sciences through a comparison of three distinct outlooks: Roy Bhaskar's version of critical realism, a pragmatic realist approach the most renowned representatives of which are Rom Harré and Hilary Putnam, and the authors’ own synthesis of the pragmatist John Dewey's and the neopragmatist Richard Rorty's ideas, here called methodological relationalism. The Bhaskarian critical realism is committed to the heavy ontological furniture of metaphysical transcendentalism, resting on (...) essentialist presumptions of causality and social structures, tacitly creating a dualism between individuals and society. Pragmatic realists, for their part, carry much lighter metaphysical baggage than critical realists and, much in a pragmatist vein, accept the idea that social scientists should study society by studying social life—the interwoven activities of individuals. Nevertheless, pragmatic realists only reluctantly, if at all, renounce the subject–object dualism and its ontological implications. Drawing on the ideas of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, the writers outline their own antirepresentationalist, antiessentialist approach to social sciences. The proposed methodological relationalism is a pragmatist approach of Deweyan origin. Based on a Darwinian understanding of human beings as organisms trying to cope with their environment, it emphasises the insight that one can neither step outside one's own action, nor withdraw from the actor's point of view, just as one cannot cognitively step outside language. (shrink)

This paper represents the first installment of alarger project devoted to the relevance of pragmatism forbioethics. One self-consciously pragmatist move would be toreturn to the classical pragmatist canon of Peirce, James andDewey in search of substantive doctrines or methodologicalapproaches that might be applied to current bioethicalcontroversies. Another pragmatist (or neopragmatist) move wouldbe to subject the regnant principlist paradigm to Richard Rorty'ssubversive assaults on foundationalism in epistemology andethics. A third pragmatist method, dubbed ``freestandingpragmatism'' by its proponents, embraces a ``pragmatist'' approachto (...) practical reasoning without discernable moorings either to theclassical canon or to Rorty's neopragmatism. This thirdpragmatist approach to method in practical ethics is the subjectof this article. I begin with an examination of freestandingpragmatism in the theory of judicial decision making. I arguethat this version of legal pragmatism – so described on account ofits commitments to contextualism, instrumentalism, eclecticism,and freedom from grand theory – bears a striking resemblance tomuch self-described pragmatist work in bioethics today. Ifurther argue that if this is what we mean by ``pragmatism,'' thenin a certain sense ``we are all pragmatists now.''. (shrink)

Social theory is the theoretical core of the social sciences, clearly distinguishable from political theory and cultural analysis. This book offers a unique overview of the development of social theory from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the present day. Spanning the literature in English, French and German, it provides an excellent background to the most important social theorists and theories in contemporary sociological thought, with crisp summaries of the main books, arguments and controversies. It also (...) deals with newly emerging schools from rational choice to symbolic interactionism, with new ambitious approaches, structuralism and antistructuralism, critical revisions of modernization theory, feminism and neopragmatism. Written by two of the world's leading sociologists and based on their extensive academic teaching, this unrivalled work is ideal both for students in the social sciences and humanities and for anyone interested in contemporary theoretical debates. (shrink)

Through an international case study, this paper illustrates how a conversation method was used effectively to address a cross-cultural ethics problem. The method included as moments in one continuous process three different dimensions of postmodernism-Gadamer reconstruction, Derrida deconstruction, and Rorty neopragmatism. In addition to including different dimensions of postmodernism, the method combines effective mutual learning and effective action. Strengths and limitations of the approach are discussed. The article demonstrates how it can be beneficial to build bridges between and within the (...) postmodernism and organization ethics literatures. Also, the article demonstrates how postmodernism can be positively ethical and not necessarily aethical or nihilistic. (shrink)

Rosa Calcaterra has written an extremely learned and thoughtful book about Richard Rorty’s controversial neopragmatism. It is a worthy addition to the growing number of works that offer a more generous and balanced assessment of Rorty’s thought, in contrast to the scores of highly critical treatments it received during his career. But, as Calcaterra insists, her book is “not an apology for Rorty” (Calcaterra 2019: ix); she critically approaches what she calls Rorty’s philosophical “provocatio...

Despite a recent revival of interest in pragmatist philosophy, most work in the analytic philosophy of language ignores insights offered by classical pragmatists and contemporary neopragmatists. In Pragmatism and Reference, David Boersema argues that a pragmatist perspective on reference presents a distinct alternative--and corrective--to the prevailing analytic views on the topic. Boersema finds that the pragmatist approach to reference, with alternative understandings of the nature of language, the nature of conceptualization and categorization, and the nature of inquiry, is suggested in (...) the work of Wittgenstein and more thoroughly developed in the works of such classical and contemporary pragmatists as Charles Peirce and Hilary Putnam. Boersema first discusses the descriptivist and causal theories of reference--the received views on the topic in analytic philosophy. Then, after considering Wittgenstein's approach to reference, Boersema details the pragmatist approach to reference by nine philosophers: the "Big Three," of classical pragmatism, Peirce, William James, and John Dewey; three contemporary American philosophers, Putnam, Catherine Elgin, and Richard Rorty; and three important continental philosophers, Umberto Eco, Karl-Otto Apel, and Jürgen Habermas. Finally, Boersema shows explicitly how pragmatism offers a genuinely alternative account of reference, presenting several case studies on the nature and function of names. Here, he focuses on conceptions of individuation, similarity, essences, and sociality of language. Pragmatism and Reference will serve as a bridge between analytic and pragmatist approaches to such topics of shared concern as the nature and function of language. (shrink)

Presenting key texts in and about pragmatism, this collection of essays explores pragmatism's origins, applications, and weaknesses, as well as its remarkable versatility as an approach not only to issues of truth and knowledge, but to ethics and social philosophy, literature, law, aesthetics, religion, and education. Exploring a wide range of work on topics spanning from the birth of pragmatism in nineteenth century America, to its contemporary revival as an international and multi-disciplinary phenomenon, the collection: * is international in scope, (...) covering a wide range of sources, including key American pragmatists such as Nelson Goodman and Morton White * includes key articles on the contemporary neopragmatism revival * considers pragmatism's influences across disciplines * presents newly translated papers. With an impressive breadth and range of content, the set also includes a both a general introduction and introductions to each volume by the editor, a chronological table of contents, and a full index to provide a valuable and unique research resource for student and scholar alike. (shrink)

Philosophical controversies within contemporary critical theory arise largely from questions about the nature, scope and limits of human reason. As the linguistic turn in twentieth-century philosophy has increasingly given way to a sociocritical turn, traditional ideas of 'pure' reason have been left further and further behind. There is however considerable disagreement about what that shift entails for enlightenment ideals of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization. In this book two prominent philosophers bring these disagreements into focus around a set of familiar philosophical (...) issues concerning reason and the rational subject, truth and representation, knowledge and objectivity, identity and difference, relativism and universalism, the right and the good. But these "perennial problems" are resituated within the context of critical theory as it has developed from the work of the Frankfurt School in the 1930's and 1940's to the multiplicity of contemporary approaches: genealogical, hermeneutic, neopragmatist, deconstructive, and reconstructive. (shrink)

Why has James been relatively absent from the neopragmatist revival of the past twenty years? I argue that part of the reason is that his psychological projects seem to hold little promise for a socially and culturally progressive philosophical project, and that his concern with religious issues makes him seem like a religious apologist. Bringing together James's psychological writings with his philosophical writings shows these assumptions to be wrong. I offer a reading of “The Will to Believe” and The (...) Principles of Psychology to support my position (a) that James's philosophical methodology and his psychological works lend themselves to a naturalized approach to philosophical inquiry, which both allows for a reshaping of traditional philosophical questions and offers a check on scientism, and (b) that, contrary to many commentators' claims, James is not defending religion against science but is instead using science to address epistemic and moral issues more broadly. I conclude with a discussion of the ways in which James's naturalism demands a reconsideration of the nature of philosophical inquiry, as well as a revised view of a scientific psychology that avoids scientism. (shrink)

In spite of the routine acknowledgement of Richard Rorty's ubiquitous influence, those who have invoked his name en route to advancing their case for a pragmatist bioethics have not given us a very clear picture of exactly how Rorty's work might actually contribute to methodological discussion in this field. I try to provide such an account here. Given the impressive depth and scope of Rorty's work during the past two decades, I make no pretense of presenting either a comprehensive or (...) novel interpretation of his project. My primary aim here is simply to sketch what I take to be the implications of Rorty's neopragmatism for our methodological debates within bioethics. I conclude that the yield of Rorty's pragmatism for current methodological debates in bioethics is primarily negative, knocking the props out from under any pretensions to foundations and universal principles of right and wrong. His "professorial pragmatism" and philosophical trash disposal efforts would clearly sweep away some approaches based upon appeals to nature or universal human dignity, and his deflationary nominalist view of principles would threaten the foundations of some influential principlist approaches to bioethics. (shrink)

Rorty on Politics, Culture, and Philosophy: A Defence of his Romanticism Rorty's historicist romanticism is a peculiar and oft criticized feature of his neopragmatism. I attempt to show that it should be regarded not so much as a more or less exceptionable philosophical approach, but rather, as a practice in ‘cultural politics’—which is his ultimate definition for philosophy—prompted by his acute political concerns and his views on the nature of moral progress.

A popular if controversial claim, and troublesome for environmental philosophy, ethics, and related disciplines, is that “there is no such thing as nature.” The social constructionist version of this claim makes it difficult to draw a distinction between human and nonhuman nature. In response, first, the concept of landscape can be helpful in drawing this distinction. Second, taking this approach is consistent with at least one interpretation of Richard Rorty’s neopragmatism. Constructionism can be divided into two forms: moderate and radical. (...) Moderate constructionism allows the landscape/nature distinction; radical constructionism excludes it. Rorty’s claim that independent reality is “the world well lost” apparently marks him as a radical constructionist. Nevertheless, the core doctrines of his neopragmatism constitute a moderate constructionism, allowing the nature/landscape distinction. The real problem is Rorty’s anthropocentric instrumentalist characterization of pragmatic justification. Left in place, it rendersneopragmatism a form of radical social constructionism. Redescribing the terms of justification in less anthropocentric instrumentalist terms is consistent with the anti-Platonist core of neopragmatism. Thus redescribed, neopragmatism is fully consistent with the landscape/nature distinction. Anthropocentric instrumentalism, not social constructionism per se, is the problem. (shrink)

This paper responds to an argument of Hilary Putnam to the effect that the plurality of modern sciences shows us that any natural kind has a plurality of essences. In the past, he has argued that no system of representations, mental or linguistic, could have an intrinsic relationship to the world. Though he has granted that the Thomistic notion of form and its application to the identity of concepts may avoid these earlier objections, he has maintained that the advance of (...) the sciences has shown us that there are too many substantial forms in any particular kind of thing to provide the unity of conceptual identity required by the Thomist’s account. Given the resemblance of Putnam’s position to the “pluralists” against whom Aquinas argued in the Summa Theologiae a consideration of Aquinas arguments is undertaken. Following this, the paper examines a particular case of recent scientific practice, in order to suggest whose position, Putnam’s or the Thomist’s, more adequately captures the practice of the natural sciences of today, and their bearing upon the metaphysical question of the nature of essence in natural kinds. The paper concludes that the Thomist position on the unity of form or essence, with qualifications made about distinct conceptual approaches to some object of investigation, and the use of analogy in sorting through these distinct approaches, is better capable of accounting for the actual goals and practices of scientific understanding as we see it practiced today than is Putnam’s transcendental nominalism and neopragmatism. (shrink)

This dissertation defends an ideal of democratic citizenship inspired by John Dewey’s theory of human flourishing, or “growth.” In its emphasis on the interrelatedness of individual development and social progress, Deweyan growth orients us toward a morally substantive approach to addressing the important question of how diverse citizens can live together well. I argue, however, that Dewey’s understanding of growth as a process by which conflicting interests, beliefs, and values are integrated into a more unified whole—both within the community and (...) within the self—is inadequate to the radical pluralism characteristic of contemporary liberal democratic societies. Given the pragmatist insight into the crucial role of socialization in identity formation, the problem with conceptualizing the ideal self as an integrated unity is that, for many, the complexity and diversity of our social world presents an insuperable obstacle to sustaining a unified (or always unifying) self. Most of us have multiple “selves” forged by the various groups with whom we identify and the often incongruous roles we play in our personal, professional, and/or public lives. Hence I offer a reconstruction of Deweyan growth that accounts for persistent yet positively valued diversity, both within the self and within the community. On the view I urge, which draws on the work of neopragmatist Richard Rorty and Chicana feminist Gloria Anzaldua, divisions within the self and between citizens are not merely problems always to be overcome, but potential resources for creating a stronger, more inclusive democracy. (shrink)

Part of the philosophy of language of the 20th century is marked by a shift from the view of language as a tool of representing the world to its view as a means of interacting with the world. This shift is common to the later Wittgenstein, to pragmatists and neopragmatists including Brandom, and also to Chomsky and his school. The claim of the paper is that though the Chomskyans have offered an admirably elaborated theory of syntax adequate to the interactive (...) view of language, they failed to develop a comparably adequate notion of semantics; and that it is Brandom‘s approach which, though prima facie much more speculative and much less scientific, paves the way to a semantic theory which an ‘interactivist’ should endorse. (shrink)

The article considers the anti-representational paradigm regarding the concept of “language” presented by the American thinker, the founder of neopragmatism, Richard Rorty. Richard Rorty is the most cited philosopher in the Western philosophical community, the popularity of the texts of the American thinker, and the resonance of his ideas in the modern philosophical community are of great interest and discussion. The relevance of the topic in the context of postmodern society is dictated by the fact that modern American philosophy, in (...) particular, neopragmatism and the concept of “language”, are insufficiently studied and covered in Ukrainian philosophical studies. The purpose of the article is to update the discussions about the philosophical tradition of neopragmatism by Richard Rorty regarding the concept of “language”. The research methods of the study are comparative analysis and descriptive reconstruction. In the course of the study, the following provisions of the philosophy of Richard Rorty have been analyzed: criticism of the epistemilogization of the discourse of philosophy; analysis of the main provisions of neopragmatism, in particular, the theory of truth and anti-representational paradigm regarding the concept of “language” as the basic concepts of human culture.The analysis of the specifics of the formulation and understanding of the main philosophical ideas in R. Rorty’s neopragmatic theory of knowledge allows approaching their analysis unconventionally, which does not refute, but complements and deepens the classical concepts, allowing them to be fruitfully applied to solving problems of specific sciences. (shrink)

Social theory is the theoretical core of the social sciences, clearly distinguishable from political theory and cultural analysis. This book offers a unique overview of the development of social theory from the end of the Second World War in 1945 to the present day. Spanning the literature in English, French and German, it provides an excellent background to the most important social theorists and theories in contemporary sociological thought, with crisp summaries of the main books, arguments and controversies. It also (...) deals with newly emerging schools from rational choice to symbolic interactionism, with new ambitious approaches, structuralism and antistructuralism, critical revisions of modernization theory, feminism and neopragmatism. Written by two of the world's leading sociologists and based on their extensive academic teaching, this unrivalled work is ideal both for students in the social sciences and humanities and for anyone interested in contemporary theoretical debates. (shrink)

This article reviews the problem of the otherness in contemporary Western philosophy. The peculiarities of the representation of the category of the otherness in the 21st-century anglophone continental philosophy were analyzed. A theoretical base of the research consists of the works by Richard Rorty, Bruno Latour, Richard Kearney, Nancy. Fraser, Dan Zahavi, Chad Kautzer, Eduardo Mendieta, and Slavoj Žižek. Within the frameworks of an Anglophone philosophy, we made a comparison of the 20th-century pragmatist approaches based on the exceptionalism and (...) the exclusion of the Absolute Other from the intersubjective consensus and of the modern neopragmatist tendencies shaped on the principles of the generalized patience and extension of the framing of the subjectivity with the post-territorial regulation. The hermeneutical and phenomenological problems of the otherness typical for continental philosophy were covered with the analysis of the genealogy of the feeling leading to the victimization of the Other, its identification with Me, or its recognition with the preservation of the own identity. The author also analyzes ways to find a social consensus in the conditions of the antagonism between the emancipatory interests of different marginalized groups. Generally, the ways of adequate coexistence, which support the universal solidarity in a situation the global challenges humanity, had been demonstrated. That is why, finding out of a compromise in the analysis of the problem of the Otherness will be achieved with a realization of the following factors: all-affected principle, formed on the basis of the equal agency for all the subjects of communicative action for consensus with the help of a network activism, and a realization of the principles of a diacritical hermeneutics on the basis of the empathy to the Other and the termination of his/her marginalization. For this, it was offered to gain the equal rights for all the living forms for their own modes of existence to avoid antagonism between different social groups and to predict the impact of the obscurantist elites on the mass consciousness.Manuscript received 06.09.2020. (shrink)

In this brief introduction to part 2 of the Common Knowledge symposium “Whatever Happened to Richard Rorty?” the journal’s editor asks why Rorty was dependent on Thomas Kuhn, rather than Paul Feyerabend or the then-rising stars of “science studies” (such as Bruno Latour), for science-centered arguments to support his own philosophical neopragmatism. The editor cites a letter from Rorty sent to him in the early 1990s, suggesting that the differences between Feyerabend and himself were temperamental more than philosophical. Rorty enjoyed (...) referring to himself and others like him as “we atheists,” by which he seems to have meant “those of us repelled by extravagant or overheated claims and absolutes.” His tendency was thus to pull back in what might seem to be bored alarm from treatments of science as superior, perilous, or in any essential way different from other forms of intellectual discourse. Rorty’s understanding of these approaches to science as temperamentally religious appears lately to have been vindicated by the emergence of the primeval goddess “Gaia” in the rhetoric of science studies. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the normative strategy of interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time in modern analytical philosophy, and also proposes a theoretical framework for understanding this strategy as a historical phenomenon. The article describes the development of the normative direction in the interpretation of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. Its first branch—the socio-normative, or the neopragmatist one—is associated with such philosophers as John Haugeland and Robert Brandom. The second one—the ethico-normative, or postneopragmatist one—branch is represented by Steven Crowell and Sacha (...) Golob. It is shown that the first group of normativists focused mainly on implicit social norms and structures of conformity, while the second—focuses primarily on Kantian ethics and Christina Korsgaard’s interpretation of Kant, as well as on the inferentialist philosophy of language of Robert Brandom. The conceptual schemes used by each of the representatives of these approaches are reconstructed. The connections of different approaches within the framework of the normative direction with each other are shown. The concept of a relay race is proposed, which can describe normative Heideggerianism as a historical phenomenon. It is shown that the development of normative Heideggerianism can be characterized as theoretical progress in relation to the accuracy of the interpretation of Heidegger’s texts. The grounds for the comparative “progressiveness” of different normative approaches in the updates of the basic normative conceptual scheme that they involve are clarified. It is also shown that the progress of the normative conceptual scheme in the direction of flexibility and adaptation to Heidegger’s text is fraught with a loss of meaningfulness of the very concept of norm. It is argued that the concept of norm, despite the loss of its empirical content, can be used to translate Heidegger’s concepts for pragmatic reasons. (shrink)

Frederic Kellogg has already published several works on legal pragmatism and on Oliver Wendell Holmes in particular.1 In this volume, he focuses on the early history of Holmes' views, on his readings in law and philosophy, and his interests in science in the years of the Metaphysical Club. Drawing on sources like Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill and Chauncey Wright, Holmes developed an inductive approach to common law reasoning; eventually, as I discuss below, this approach needed refinement when he engaged (...) with constitutional interpretation. Other parts of the book focus on contemporary issues like legal indeterminacy, hard cases, the role of politics in legal interpretation, Rorty's neopragmatism, liberalism and... (shrink)

Analytic philosophy of language has often criticized classical pragmatism for holding to an unwarranted notion of experience which lapses into epistemological foundationalism; defenders of the classics have denied such a consequence. The paper tries to move this debate forward by pointing out that the criticism of the empiricist “given” is not wedded to a specific philosophical method, be it linguistic or pragmatist. From a broader historical perspective drawing in particular on Kant, antifoundationalism turns out to be deeply rooted in modern (...) western philosophy and its ambivalent attitude towards the success of the empirical sciences. This diagnosis allows to reassess classical pragmatism beyond the perceived alternative “language vs. experience”, and to concentrate on antifoundationalism as the real challenge to any modern, epistemologically oriented philosophy. In that perspective, classical pragmatism’s genuine contribution is to do justice to antifoundationalism by focusing on the experimental dynamic of scientific practice, which is most commonly ignored by the analytic tradition. Pragmatism identifies rationality with the practical operation of reflexively determining and articulating what is being experienced. With this approach, it is argued, experiential pragmatism serves modern antifoundationalism ends better than its analytic siblings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content: American Pragmatism: An Introduction by Albert R. Spencer. Polity Press, 2020. Reviewed by: Lee A. McBride III -/- American Pragmatism: An Introduction is a judicious and stimulating read, comprising an introduction and five numbered chapters. The introduction orients the book, offering various ways of conceiving American Philosophy and American pragmatism. Spencer explains that it is difficult to discern the national and cultural variables that make a philosophy an (...) American philosophy. Not all philosophers who practice philosophy in the United States claim the descriptor "American Philosophy." And, within the group that embraces the descriptor, some take American pragmatism to be, in essence, a theory of truth (or a method by which we can make our ideas clear); others take pragmatism to be a method of experience, a pluralistic approach to knowledge creation and social amelioration (2). It is a complicated picture, and Spencer affords ample care and attention to the disparate camps of pragmatism. Chapter 1: "Fallibilism and the Classical Pragmatists" is largely devoted to Charles S. Peirce and William James. Peirce and James, as fallibilists, are contrasted against Descartes and Hume, respectively. Peirce and James diverge in regard to style and their commitments to (scholastic) realism. Spencer discusses Josiah Royce briefly at the closing of the chapter, noting how Royce's work can serve as a foil for both Peircean and Jamesian pragmatisms. Chapter 2: "Meliorism and the Chicago Pragmatists" highlights the pragmatist philosophical contributions of Jane Addams and John Dewey. In this chapter, Spencer emphasizes sympathetic knowledge, cooperative intelligence, the pattern of experimental inquiry, and social amelioration. Spencer deserves kudos for introducing Addams's pragmatist contributions first, then explaining the ways in which her work in community-building and social amelioration influenced Dewey. Chapter 3: "Pluralism and the Harvard Pragmatists" highlights the work of a motley crew: George Santayana, W. E. B. Du Bois, Horace Kallen, and Alain Locke. This chapter draws attention to the pluralism one can detect in Santayana's detached cosmopolitanism, Du Bois's double consciousness, Kallen's cultural pluralism, and Locke's democratic pluralism. We are introduced to a Spaniard, two African American men, and a Jewish man, all of whom had spent time abroad. Each offers a critical perspective that falls outside the conventional view of the purported democratic culture of the United States. Chapter 4: "Verification and the Analytic Pragmatists" turns to the philosophers of the logico-linguistic turn, [End Page 108] featuring C. I. Lewis, W. V. O. Quine, and Richard Rorty. Here, we see a pronouncedly analytic approach to the analysis of propositions, inference, and semantic content—a heightened attention to shoring up defensible conceptions of truth and the real. The goal is to articulate a coherent conceptual pragmatic position that evades both scientistic reductionism and Fregean transcendental presuppositions, all the while offering a feasible conception of truth. Chapter 5: "Hope and the Contemporary Pragmatists" surveys how pragmatists have engaged with various traditions in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to potentially bolster their positions and find hope. Spencer highlights three promising strands. The first strand is that of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas arose out of Frankfurt School critical theory but appropriated pragmatist insights from Peirce, Dewey, and Mead to formulate his conceptions of communicative action and communitive rationality (208). Habermas reconstructed the reductive dialectical materialism of the Frankfurt School, developing a sophisticated theory of democracy as public discourse. Spencer asserts that "ultimately Habermas is the best demonstration of pragmatism's potential when compared with critical theory during the Cold War" (208). Spencer also finds the work of Huw Price promising. Price, in an effort to defuse the tension between neopragmatism's antirealism and scientific realism, offers a tenable theory of truth: truth as a (postulated) practical norm, or "truth as a convenient fiction" (217). Truth, as a practical norm, gives normative structure and impetus to various forms of inquiry. And, to close this chapter on hope and contemporary pragmatism, Spencer delineates a third promising strand. He writes that "perhaps the most promising development among pragmatists results from their increasing engagement with American Indian philosophy and other philosophical traditions throughout the Americas" (219). American pragmatists, following Scott L. Pratt and Bruce Wilshire, are increasingly recognizing... (shrink)

This collection stands out from what has come to resemble a cottage industry of volumes on global democracy and cosmopolitanism. Tan and Whalen-Bridge’s collection has the distinction of exploring whether Deweyan democracy, or the account of democracy inspired by Dewey’s writings and embraced by contemporary Deweyans, can be disseminated globally and across diverse cultures. According to the collection’s editors, the eleven essays share a single approach: ‘By examining the implications for conceiving of democracy as culture, rather than as something that (...) precedes or follows from cultural formations, the essays in this volume consider Dewey’s adumbrations of democracy as one face of globalization’ (1). Since the volume is dedicated to the late Richard Rorty, it is unsurprising that the relevance of Rorty’s neopragmatism to Dewey’s pragmatism also emerges in several of the essays. (shrink)

The distinctive trait of this newest addition to Joseph Margolis’ magnificent oeuvre of thirty books is its broad-ranging and highly partisan approach to evaluating contemporary trends in Western philosophy. The book is divided into three parts. Part 1 addresses the trifecta of competing philosophical traditions: pragmatism, continental philosophy and analytic philosophy. Based on the book’s title, the reader can easily forecast the winner: pragmatism. Margolis directs Part 2 to the goal of reclaiming naturalism as an antidote to the ailments of (...) all three philosophical traditions. Part 3 concerns the enduring challenge that Immanuel Kant’s model of transcendental reason and G. W. F. Hegel’s subsequent critique pose to contemporary philosophy. The book’s thesis is that pragmatism has lost its distinctly American quality. In its more recent incarnations, pragmatism (or neopragmatism) has been continually cross-pollinated with elements in the continental and analytic traditions. Moreover, this open-ended capacity for hybridization is what constitutes pragmatism’s advantage. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New PragmatismRichard RumanaRichard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism, by David L. Hall; xii & 290 pp. Albany: SUNY Press, 1994, $49.50 cloth, $16.95 paper.David Hall has written a highly creative, original—and idiosyncratic—work on Rorty, with its idiosyncrasy another aspect that makes the book well worth reading. This does not mean that it is always satisfying, however, and since (...) Hall tries to find a blend of “exuberant praise and testy complaint” (p. 7), this review will adopt the same method.On the positive side, perhaps there is no better way to approach Rorty than by employing Rorty’s own method of reading philosophical and literary works: narrative recontextualization. Since Hall states, “Deductive and dialectical logics are irrelevant to (Rorty’s) thought” (p. 9), he had to find a means of avoiding the point/counterpoint strategy of direct argumentation so as to do justice to Rorty’s own conversational strategy of reading texts. Thus, Hall (compared, for example, to Konstantin Kolenda) is unique in his willingness “to follow Rorty through the looking glass” (a reference to Rorty’s discarding the traditional metaphor of the mind as a mirror) and to take seriously Rorty’s thinking as “beyond the philosophical pale” (p. 3). Hall makes a virtue of his strategy: “The best one can do is to judge the relative attractiveness of Rorty’s views by recourse to alternative visions” (p. 4). The breadth of Hall’s background in philosophy, both Eastern and Western, his fine ear for irony, and his acute sense of history make him an exemplary reader who can offer attractive alternate visions by which to examine Rorty’s own vision.The subtitle of the book (“Poet and Prophet of the New Pragmatism”) announces Hall’s underlying theme; he takes his cue from the pragmatic Deweyan aspect of Rorty’s work, with the phrase “new pragmatism” referring to Rorty’s reinterpretation of pragmatism along linguistic lines. Where the original emphasis of pragmatism was on ideas as habits through which experience could be guided for the satisfaction of desires in terms of either private or public goods, Rorty’s neopragmatism replaces ideas and experience with language and alternate vocabularies as the medium through which desires are fulfilled. With this emphasis on language comes Hall’s reading of Rorty as poet and prophet. The desire for self-creation is accomplished through poetry and literature. The desire for social tolerance is marked by Rorty’s commitment to a form of Utopian Democracy. Hall’s reading of Rorty is well grounded in the mutations of Pragmatism from Peirce to Davidson and from aesthetics to social theory.On the negative side, a number of Hall’s claims are open to objection, some of them are minor, some more substantive. Of the minor variety is a footnote for Chapter 2: “Rorty’s Ph.D. dissertation was on Whitehead and Aristotle”—whereas, in Rorty’s dissertation, The Concept of Potentiality (Yale, 1956), Whitehead appears only in the bibliography and is not mentioned in the text at all. [End Page 144]On more substantive issues, Hall’s contention in Chapter One, where he discusses Rorty’s historicism, is that Rorty is unable to free himself from the Kantian problematic of the autonomy of value; he remains, thus, an heir to the “aims of the Enlightenment” (p. 51). This seems to be a narrowly conceived interpretation. Admittedly, Rorty has recently said that he would now not define his thinking as “postmodern” since the term has become laden with excess baggage from other disciplines (although, he still accepts Lyotard’s definition, “distrust of metanarratives,” as pertinent to what he is doing). On the other hand, except for an acceptance of the secularization of the public realm, there seems to be little in his thinking that characterizes him as an “Enlightenment” figure, and Hall himself seems to concede this when he later refers to Rorty as a “Nihilist” (p. 170). Is it possible to be both a nihilist and committed to the Enlightenment? I find it even harder to follow Hall in his belief that Rorty’s nihilism “expresses itself directly in Rorty... (shrink)

This chapter examines Richard Rorty's conception of what it means to be a public intellectual in the modern world and how this conception is related to his pragmatist approach to philosophy. It also discusses the influence that this conception and approach had on Central Europe. In doing so, it outlines for the first time, and in some detail, the close contact that Rorty had, through his books, and more personally through conferences, lectures, and seminars, with philosophers in countries such as (...) Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. (shrink)

This short review raises a trilemma for Chris Voparil’s reading of Richard Rorty. Voparil must deny one of three things. He must deny that Rorty affirmed a Jamesian approach to metaethics; he must deny that Rorty affirmed a version of Peircean realism; or, he must deny that Rorty treated all domains of discourse roughly the same. Because Rorty is quite clear in his commitment to the first and third theses and far less clear in affirming Peircean realism, I argue that (...) Voparil is forced to give up attributing realism to Rorty or must simply concede that his version of Rorty is incoherent. (shrink)

: The revival of philosophical pragmatism has generated a wealth of intramural debates between neopragmatists like Richard Rorty and contemporary scholars devoted to explicating the classical pragmatism of John Dewey and William James. Of all these internecine conflicts, the most divisive concerns the status of language and experience in pragmatist philosophy. Contemporary scholars of classical pragmatism defend experience as the heart of pragmatism while neopragmatists drop the concept of experience in favor of a thoroughly linguistic pragmatism. I argue that both (...) positions engender formidable risks. After discussing the present impasse, I describe a third version of pragmatism which involves a reconstruction of the classical pragmatist concept of experience in light of the criticisms of foundationalism crucial to the neopragmatist linguistic turn. This third version of pragmatism does justice to both Rorty and Dewey by focusing on experience as a temporal field. (shrink)