논자는 이 글에서 한국의 현행 고교 윤리(도덕) 및 철학 교과서에 나타난 반철학적·비철학적 교화의 흔적들을 적시하며 그것들을 극복하는 올바른 방향성의 윤곽을 시론적으로 제시해 보았다. 『고등학교 생활과 윤리』, 『고등학교 윤리와 사상』, 『고등학교 고전과 윤리』, 『고등학교 철학』 등 네 종의 검인정 교과서를 검토한 결과, 논자는 각각 ‘평면적·나열적 내용 구성’, ‘윤리의 도구적 합리화’, ‘동아시아 전통의 특권화’, ‘의사소통의 수직적 왜곡’으로 요약되는 네 가지 문제점이 그러한 교화의 흔적으로 교과서에 나타남을 발견할 수 있었다. 맨 먼저 논자는 ‘평면적·나열적 내용 구성’에 대해 향후 교과서의 내용 구성을 단순히 평면적이고 나열적인 (...) 방식에서 보다 더 입체적이고 문제 제기적인 방식으로 바꿔 나가야 한다고 주장했다. 둘째로 ‘윤리의 도구적 합리화’에 대해서는 교과서가 도덕적인 양심을 자양하는 밑거름이 되어야지 단순히 유불리에 따라서만 행동하는 타산성의 배양토가 되어선 안 된다고 주장했다. 셋째로 ‘동아시아 전통의 특권화’에 대해서는 동아시아 사상을 단순히 그것이 ‘우리 것’이란 이유로 윤리책에 싣기 전에 그중에서 윤리와 관련 있는, 그래서 윤리책에 실릴 만한 요소들을 가려내는 ‘윤리적 여과’가 선행되지 않으면 안 된다고 주장했다. 넷째로 ‘의사소통의 수직적 왜곡’에 대해서는 수업에서 행해지는 토론이 무리한 다수결로 결론을 급조하는 형식적 의결의 절차가 아니라 모두가 자신의 생각을 충분히 드러내고 타인의 생각을 충분히 경청하며 ‘함께하는 발견’에 도달하는 합리적 의사소통의 절차로 재정립되어야 한다고 주장했다. (shrink)

If we are to understand the nature of science, we must see it as an activity and achievement of the human mind alongside others, such as the achievements of children in learning to talk and to cope with people and other objects in their environment, and the achievements of non-scientists living in a rich and complex world which constantly poses problems to be solved. Looking at scientific knowledge as one form of human knowledge, scientific understanding as one form of human (...) understanding, scientific investigation as one form of human problem-solving activity, we can begin to see more clearly what science is, and also what kind of mechanism the human mind is. -/- By undermining the slogan that science is the search for laws, and subsidiary slogans such as that quantification is essential, that scientific theories must be empirically refutable, and that the methods of philosophers cannot serve the aims of scientists, I shall try, in what follows, to liberate some scientists from the dogmas indoctrinated in universities and colleges. I shall also try to show philosophers how they can contribute to the scientific study of man, thereby escaping from the barrenness and triviality complained of so often by non-philosophers and philosophy students. -/- A side-effect which will be reported elsewhere, is to undermine some old philosophical distinctions and pour cold water on battles which rage around them -- like the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and the battles between empiricists and rationalists. -/- Key idea: A major aim of science is not to discover and explain laws, but to discover what is possible, and how it is possible. -/- This view of science developed further in Sloman (1978) helps to explain the contributions of Theoretical Linguistics, Chemistry, Artificial Intelligence, and Computer Science insofar as they all enrich our understanding of what is possible and how it is possible. -/- Download: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/papers.html#1976-01 . (shrink)

Gettier cases are scenarios conceived by philosophers to demonstrate that justified true beliefs may not be knowledge. Starmans and Friedman (2020) find that philosophers attribute knowledge in Gettier cases differently from laypeople and non‐philosophy academics, which seems to suggest that philosophers may be indoctrinated to adopt an esoteric concept of knowledge. I argue to the contrary: Their finding at most shows that philosophical reflection is fallible, but nevertheless able to clarify the concept of knowledge. I also suggest that their (...) experiments could be modified to help determine when philosophical reflection might yield plausible results. (shrink)

In the second part of the Triptych, Mystique non-philosophique à l'usage des contemporains, François Laruelle puts to the test of "non-philosophy" the field of phenomena that are termed as "religious" whether Christian, Judaic or Gnostic. Non-philosophical mystique is born in the spirit of heresy rather than sanctity. It springs from the effort to join Man with himself rather than with God founding the radical cause of the new Logos in the One-in-One. Man is emptied from his identity, becomes a (...) Christ-subject who comes to fight for the World. Future mystique ends as the amorous knowledge, an erotic a priori constitutive of the mystical subject: it is not an illusory transformation of Man or a revision of his relation to God or the World. The final aim – as I will try to show – is to transfigure the heretical experience, mystical as well as erotic of the human such as it becomes capable of a form of unison with itself as unique Other. (shrink)

Direct epistemic consequentialism is the idea that X is epistemically permissible iff X maximizes epistemic value. It has received lots of attention in recent years and is widely accepted by philosophers to have counterintuitive implications. There are various reasons one might suspect that the relevant intuitions will not be widely shared among non-philosophers. This paper presents an initial empirical study of ordinary intuitions. The results of two experiments demonstrate that the counterintuitiveness of epistemic consequentialism is more than a philosophers' worry---the (...) folk seem to agree! (shrink)

In this essay I argue that (by and large) film does not do philosophy, but that it nevertheless provides insights that are important to both professional philosophers and their students. Since those insights are at least partially due to the filmic qualities of the medium, using films can significantly contribute to our philosophizing, both in the classroom and in research. In fact, it is precisely because films differ from philosophic treatises that they can help us to explore some issues more (...) effectively than simply byusing traditional texts. (shrink)

This paper follows Francois Laruelle’s non-philosophy and his non-religion and non-theology to suggest anon-philosophical approach to the sociology of religious pluralism. The entanglements of experiences of the religious end-user are analysed vis-a-vis Laruelle’s thought and a dogma free inclusive approach to religion is envisaged.

The purpose of this paper is to philosophy and have not received professional training, but are engaged in professional ethics teaching university teachers teach to share my personal views of professional ethics. Basically, the professional ethics courses, each of us is being in the study. My idea is to敎good this course, we must first increase the individual's moral experience, and the introduction of the professional conduct of the consideration; Second, to strengthen their own for the professional in the most optimal (...) technology knowledge for professional societies code or the industry standard to be familiar with, discuss and reach a consensus, in addition, it should gradually increase their knowledge of the basic ethics. Among them, the benefits on to deontology, virtue theory by the obligation on the layers to turn into, should be more clearly identified, as well as any professional conduct, can be used to preserve, develop, free will, excellence and harmony criterion, training moral judgments, to implement in practice behavior. This is an essay on what university professors, not philosophically trained, should do when teaching professional ethics. Initially, they should employ ethical reflection toward their professional behavior. They should also familiarize themselves with optimal technical rules and professional ethical codes. Through these ethical values , they could then transform technical rules and codes of behavior into ethical rules. These rules could not be properly called ethical unless they brought these codes up to the level of ethical theory and ethical criteria. In this essay we will examine ethical theories such as utilitarianism , obligation ethics and virtue. We will then discuss five criteria derived from the theories: conservation, development, free will, excellence and harmony. In summation, we will refer them to concrete applications in professional ethics. (shrink)

Il n'y aura pas de retour du Christ, la guerre des religions continue. Après tant de philosophies réduites au débat du grec et du juif, de Platon et de Levinas, quelle place reconnaître au christianisme, gnose comprise, et comment l'arracher au dernier fond religieux et philosophique dont il a tenté de libérer es sujets humains? Après tant d'appels au meurtre de Dieu, à la mort du christianisme, tant de sommations d'athéisme, tant de haines religieuses enfin, quelle pensée universelle du monde (...) est encore possible pour la dernière fois, moins tapageuse que l'athéologie et moins obscurantiste que la théologie, qui ne lie plus le sort de l'Homme, soit par refus soit par identification, à celui des religions? Posant l'axiome inverse de celui des religions qu'entérinent encore les philosophies, l'Homme comme être sans-religion, mais comme Étranger ou Messie affrontant clandestinement les religions auxquelles il est condamné par l'histoire et le monde, quelle pratique est-il en son pouvoir de mener pour transformer ce destin? La solution est dans la découverte d'une foi ou d'une messianité immanente, strictement humaine, qui sous-vient au monde ou subvertit les religions. De là cette théologie clandestine destinée aux Étrangers ou aux Messies que nous sommes et qui se fonde sur notre indifférence comprise de manière non-nihiliste, comme humaine ou "radicale", aux religions. Comme toujours il s'agit avec cette confession de foi du non-philosophe d'un manuel théorique, d'une pratique de la théorie théologique en faveur d'un Verbe tout de messianité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

En 1975, au sortir de la période la plus intensément politique de son oeuvre et de sa vie, Louis Althusser décide de rédiger un manuel de philosophie qui serait enfin accessible à tous, sans préparation. Initiation à la philosophie pour les non-philosophes en est le résultat. Mais bien loin d'être un simple ouvrage de vulgarisation ou d'introduction, c'est en réalité un véritable précipité des thèses les plus fondamentales de sa propre pensée qu'offre Althusser. Entre cent autres considérations, nulle part ailleurs (...) ne va-t-il aussi loin dans la distinction entre la philosophie et les autres pratiques ; nulle part non plus ne développe-t-il avec tant de détails le concept de "pratique" lui-même. Pourtant, parmi les nombreux apports cruciaux d'Althusser au "moment philosophique des années 1960", ce concept est peut-être celui qui a bénéficié du plus grand succès et été à la source du plus grand nombre de malentendus. Moment de synthèse dans l'oeuvre d'Althusser, instantané d'une des plus influentes philosophies de la seconde moitié du XXe siècle, cette Initiation est donc aussi un manifeste pour la pensée à venir - une pensée dont le succès contemporains des enfants d'Althusser (de Rancière à Badiou, de Zizek à Balibar) manifeste assez la contemporanéité et l'urgence. (shrink)

We examined the effects of order of presentation on the moral judgments of professional philosophers and two comparison groups. All groups showed similar-sized order effects on their judgments about hypothetical moral scenarios targeting the doctrine of the double effect, the action-omission distinction, and the principle of moral luck. Philosophers' endorsements of related general moral principles were also substantially influenced by the order in which the hypothetical scenarios had previously been presented. Thus, philosophical expertise does not appear to enhance the (...) stability of moral judgments against this presumably unwanted source of bias, even given familiar types of cases and principles. (shrink)

In 1980, at the end of the most intensely political period of his work and life, Louis Althusser penned Philosophy for Non-philosophers. Available here for the first time in English, Philosophy for Non-philosophers constitutes a rigorous and engaged attempt to address a wide reading public unfamiliar with Althusser's project. As such, the work is a concentration of the most fundamental theses of Althusser's own ideas, and presents a synthesis of his sprawling and disparate philosophical and political writings. Nowhere else (...) does Althusser push the distinction between philosophy and other disciplines as far, or develop in such detail the concept of 'practice'. Rather than a work of 'popular philosophy', Philosophy for Non-philosophers is a continuation and conglomeration of Althusser's thought; a thought whose radicality is still perceptible in those that have followed since. Philosophy for Non-philosophers thus provides a vivid encapsulation of Althusser's seminal influence on the leading thinkers of today, including Ranciere, Badiou, Balibar, and Žižek. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the claim that in Plato's Republic the most important distinguishing feature between the philosopher and non-philosopher is that the philosopher has knowledge while the non-philosopher has, at best, true opinion. This claim is, in fact, inconsistent with statements Plato makes in later books of the Republic. I submit that the important distinction Plato makes concerns the type of knowledge possessed by the philosopher-ruler. As a result, we need to amend widely held scholarly interpretations of (...) important passages in the Republic ; most notably the passages containing the Sun, Line, and Cave. I consider the views of a number of important scholars and suggest a proposal that avoids this inconsistency with the text. An important consequence of my argument is that Philosophers are indeed not the only ones with knowledge in the Kallipolis. (shrink)

The manner in which individuals hold various nonevidentiary beliefs is critical to making any evaluative claim regarding an individual's autonomy. In this essay, I argue that one may be both justified in holding nonrational beliefs of a nonevidentiary sort while also being capable of leading an autonomous life. I defend the idea that moral instruction, including that which concerns explicitly religious content, may justifiably constitute a set of commitments upon which rationality and autonomy are dependent. I situate this discussion against (...) the backdrop of a minimalist notion of autonomy. I then consider the case for nonrational beliefs, examining the difference between those whose content is objectionable on evidentiary grounds and those that are immune to verification. Next, I consider the indoctrination/moral instruction distinction through examining the various ways in which indoctrination is defined. I also consider the role that value coherence plays in shaping our identities, paying particular attention to fundamental commitments as defined by our respective families, cultures, and communities. Finally, I argue that individual psychology is central to our ability to assess the outcome of an upbringing purported to be indoctrinatory, and I emphasize the important role that experience and agency play in enabling us to evaluate our beliefs. (shrink)

The nine principles ennumerated below form the core of classroom methodology in any participatory philisophical discussion appropriate to a pre-college setting. They have been taken from the Teacher's Manual of a soon to be available literature based critical thinking and evaluative reasoning text, THE FEILDSTON ETHICS READER, edited by myself and Beatric Banu and published by the Ethical Culture Schools. Although most of these principles are contained either implicitly or explicitly in the manuals for IAPC material and various published books (...) and papers on Philosophy for Children, they have never to my knowledge, been enumerated and presented as conditions necessaryfor philisophical discussions that reflect the centrality of participtory and non-indoctrinating classroom practices and the formation of a Community of Inquiry. Hopefully, thse conditions, presented starkly and without compromise, will furnish a core that defines the essence of a non-didactic and philosophical approach based on the insight of Lipman and others. Such an approach, whether utilizing IAPC materials or other sources more congenial to particular school settings could then serve as a means of distinguishing between programs consistent with the ideals of philosophical thinkingin Lipman's sense and other approaches to critical thinking or reasoning skills development. (shrink)

In some domains experts perform better than novices, and in other domains experts do not generally perform better than novices. According to empirical studies of expert performance, this is because the former but not the latter domains make available to training practitioners a direct form of learning feedback. Several philosophers resource this empirical literature to cast doubt on the quality of philosophical expertise. They claim that philosophy is like the dubious domains in that it does not make available the (...) good, direct kind of learning feedback, and thus there are empirical grounds for doubting the epistemic quality of philosophical expertise. I examine the empirical studies that are purportedly bad news for professional philosophers. On the basis of that examination, I provide three reasons why the empirical study of non-philosophical expertise does not undermine the status of philosophical expertise. First, the non-philosophical task-types from which the critics generalize are unrepresentative of relevant philosophical task-types. Second, empirical critiques of non-philosophical experts are often made relative to the performance of linear models—a comparison that is inapt in a philosophical context. Third, the critics fail to discuss findings from the empirical study of non-philosophical expertise that have more favorable implications for the epistemic status of philosophical expertise. In addition to discussing implications for philosophical expertise, this article makes progress in the philosophical analysis of the science of expertise and expert development. (shrink)

This volume provides an introduction to the philosophy of education, which will enable students meeting the subject for the first time to find their way among the many specialized volumes. It deals in a non-technical way with the more important issues raised in a philosophical approach to education, and gives a clear idea of the scope of the subject. After discussing different theories of the aims of education, whether mechanistic or organic, the author addresses practical issues - for example, (...) about the curriculum, the distinction between education and indoctrination, the role of authority and discipline, and the place of religious and moral teaching. Finally he deals with some important aspects of education and the influence of different political structures on the philosophy of education. (shrink)

Teaching about technology, at all levels of education, can only be done properly when those who teach have a clear idea about what it is that they teach. In other words: they should be able to give a decent answer to the question: what is technology? In the philosophy of technology that question is explored. Therefore the philosophy of technology is a discipline with a high relevance for those who teach about technology. Literature in this field, though, is not always (...) easy to access for non-philosophers. This book provides an introduction to the philosophy of technology for such people. It offers a survey of the current state-of-affairs in the philosophy of technology, and also discusses the relevance of that for teaching about technology. The book can be used in introductory courses on the philosophy of technology in teacher education programs, engineering education programs, and by individual educators that are interested in the intriguing phenomenon of technology that is so important in our contemporary society. (shrink)

This paper empirically investigates whether people’s implicit decision theory is more like causal decision theory or more like a non-causal decision theory (such as evidential decision theory). We also aim to determine whether implicit causalists, without prompting and without prior education, make a distinction that is crucial to causal decision theorists: preferring something _as a news item_ and preferring it _as an object of choice_. Finally, we investigate whether differences in people’s implicit decision theory correlate with differences in their level (...) of _future bias_: the preference for positively valenced events to be located in the future and not the past, and negatively valenced events to be located in the past and not the future. We find that people are overwhelmingly non-causalists. We also find that implicit causalists _do not_ make the distinction between news items and objects of choice, and that there is little to no correlation between people’s future bias and their implicit decision theory. We end by discussing the philosophical upshots of this work. (shrink)

Introduction. Non-institutional humanities, philosophical practice, and informal education are “a family like” phenomena that are outside the social institution of science and education and are adjacent to socio-cultural activities and social work. The purpose of the article is to outline the contours of the informal educational creative industry in the postmodern society, which combines non-institutional humanities, philosophical practice, and informal education. Methods. The author uses the methods of autobiographical reflection, comparative analysis, empirical observation and analysis of the primary (...) sources of non-institutional humanities. Scientific novelty of the research. The transition to nonmaterial work of the postmodern era is the reason for the relevance of the area under study. The growing demand of a contemporary for such issues as the meaning of life, happiness, the growth of the precariat, the ousting of philosophy from formal education constitute a new social reality that determines the novelty of the research in the informal educational creative industry. Results. The author classifies non-institutional humanities according to the spheres of its existence and the strategies of subject genesis presented in the teachings. The concept of dedifferentiation is considered as an explanation of the area under study in postmodernism. The specificity of the philosophical approach in the work of a practicing philosopher is considered. Conclusions. The author connects the prospects of the informal educational creative industry with institutionalization in the way of leisure, entertainment, and other personal services. The author makes conclusions about the differences between formal and informal education, and indicates the risks and opportunities for the development of the informal philosophical sector. (shrink)

In this chapter, I propose a minimal construal of philosophical health that contains two core elements: variegated coherence and intentional directedness at a trans-subjective good. Combining elements from the works of Iris Murdoch and Marshall Rosenberg, I sketch a practice I dub non-violent just communication and argue that it promotes philosophical health as per the minimal construal and that we can derive from it a principle of philosophical health to complement the list of five principles of (...) class='Hi'>philosophical health that have been proposed by Luis de Miranda. I then show that the practice of non-violent just communication promotes what Miranda Fricker has characterized as hermeneutic virtue and testimonial sensibility and, finally, suggest that my minimal notion of philosophical health is a useful tool to contrast various conceptions of philosophical counselling. (shrink)

An ideal of education is to ensure that our children develop into autonomous critical thinkers. The ‘indoctrination objection’, however, calls into question whether education, aimed at cultivating autonomous critical thinkers, is possible. The core of the concern is that since the young child lacks even modest capacities for assessing reasons, the constituent components of critical thinking have to be indoctrinated if there is to be any hope of the child's attaining the ideal. Our primary objective is to defuse this (...) objection. We argue, first, that even if the indoctrination objection can be dealt with at the level of beliefs by an account that distinguishes between beliefs instilled in the child at the non‐rational stage that are indoctrinative and those that are non‐indoctrinative, there can be non‐autonomous ‘proto critical thinkers’ who lack autonomy with respect to the requisite motivational components. We then ask what must be added to the account to ensure that proto critical thinkers develop into autonomous ones. We suggest that motivational elements, even if instilled at a stage at which the child has insufficiently developed cognitive capacities, can be ‘truly the child's own’ only relationally: the autonomous motivational elements are ones with respect to which the future child is self‐governing. (shrink)

This paper introduces some basic ideas and formalism of physics in non-commutative geometry. My goals are three-fold: first to introduce the basic formal and conceptual ideas of non-commutative geometry, and second to raise and address some philosophical questions about it. Third, more generally to illuminate the point that deriving spacetime from a more fundamental theory requires discovering new modes of `physically salient' derivation.

Explanations are very important to us in many contexts: in science, mathematics, philosophy, and also in everyday and juridical contexts. But what is an explanation? In the philosophical study of explanation, there is long-standing, influential tradition that links explanation intimately to causation: we often explain by providing accurate information about the causes of the phenomenon to be explained. Such causal accounts have been the received view of the nature of explanation, particularly in philosophy of science, since the 1980s. However, (...) philosophers have recently begun to break with this causal tradition by shifting their focus to kinds of explanation that do not turn on causal information. The increasing recognition of the importance of such non-causal explanations in the sciences and elsewhere raises pressing questions for philosophers of explanation. What is the nature of non-causal explanations – and which theory best captures it? How do non-causal explanations relate to causal ones? How are non-causal explanations in the sciences related to those in mathematics and metaphysics? This volume of new essays explores answers to these and other questions at the heart of contemporary philosophy of explanation. The essays address these questions from a variety of perspectives, including general accounts of non-causal and causal explanations, as well as a wide range of detailed case studies of non-causal explanations from the sciences, mathematics and metaphysics. (shrink)

Donald Davidson has emphasized the importance of what he calls “triangulation” for clarifying the conditions that make thought possible. Various critics have questioned whether this triangular causal interaction between two individuals and a shared environment can provide necessary conditions for the emergence of thought. I argue that these critical responses all suffer from a lack of appreciation for the way triangulation is responsive to the philosophical commitments of Davidson's naturalism. This reply to Davidson's critics helps clarify several metaphilosophical issues (...) concerning the overall significance of this use of triangulation. I illustrate how the network of commitments that make up Davidson's conception of non‐reductive naturalism inform the respective problems and issues that triangulation is introduced to address. This then serves as an example of the way metaphilosophical considerations are useful in clarifying the status of a respective philosophical position and for understanding the philosophical debates surrounding it. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that at least in two phases of pharmaceutical research, especially while assessing the adequacy of the accumulated data and its interpretation, the influence of non-epistemic values is necessary. I examine a specific case from the domain of pharmaceutical research and demonstrate that there are multiple competing sets of values which may legitimately or illegitimately influence different phases of the inquiry. In such cases, the choice of the appropriate set of values—epistemic as well as non-epistemic—should be (...) made on the basis of the set’s viability to promote specific epistemic and social aims of the research, in the case at hand, rather than other competing aims. I put forth an account which addresses two philosophically significant and interrelated questions in the context of values in science debates: which aim should be prioritized when there are different stakeholders who try to achieve competing but, sometimes, conflicting goals; and what should be the criteria according to which the prioritization of a particular goal over other competing goals can be determined? I argue that both these questions can be addressed by invoking the principle of non-arbitrariness and the mere means principle and self-determination right. The philosophical import of raising and addressing these questions from an ethical perspective is that this approach leads to a better understanding of problems in today’s pharmaceutical research and guides us in efforts to alleviate these problems. (shrink)

I advance an objection to Graham Priest’s account of fictional entities as nonexistent objects. According to Priest, fictional characters do not have, in our world, the properties they are represented as having; for example, the property of being a bank clerk is possessed by Joseph K. not in our world but in other worlds. Priest claims that, in this way, his theory can include an unrestricted principle of characterization for objects. Now, some representational properties attributed to fictional characters, a kind (...) of fictional entities, involve a crucial reference to the world in which they are supposed to be instantiated. I argue that these representational properties are problematic for Priest’s theory and that he cannot accept an unrestricted version of the principle of characterization. Thus, while not refuting Priest’s theory, I show that it is no better off than other Meinongian theories. (shrink)

In this paper, non-additivity of a set function is interpreted as a method to express relations between sets which are not modeled in a set theoretic way. Drawing upon a concept called “quasi-analysis” of the philosopher Rudolf Carnap, we introduce a transform for sets, functions, and set functions to formalize this idea. Any image-set under this transform can be interpreted as a class of (quasi-)components or (quasi-)properties representing the original set. We show that non-additive set functions can be represented as (...) signed σ-additive measures defined on sets of quasi-components. We then use this interpretation to justify the use of non-additive set functions in various applications like for instance multi criteria decision making and cooperative game theory. Additionally, we show exemplarily by means of independence, conditioning, and products how concepts from classical measure and probability theory can be transfered to the non-additive theory via the transform. (shrink)

Debates about indoctrination raise fundamental questions about the ethics of teaching. This paper presents a philosophical analysis of indoctrination, including 1) an account of what indoctrination is and why it is harmful, and 2) a framework for understanding the responsibilities of teachers and other educational actors to avoid its negative outcomes. I respond to prominent outcomes-based accounts of indoctrination, which I argue share two limiting features—a narrow focus on the threat indoctrination poses to knowledge (...) and on the dyadic relationship between indoctrinator and indoctrinated person. I propose a system-based account of indoctrination in which actors with authority contribute to the production or reinforcement of closed-mindedness, which threatens both knowledge and understanding. By taking a system-based approach, my account is better equipped to identify the implications of indoctrination for educational policy and practice. (shrink)

The author presents a review of research literature on the analysis of the sphere of informal philosophizing in Russia of the last thirty years. He discusses the genesis and content of the idea of non-institutional creative philosophizing in the works of famous modern Russian philosophers. He notes that philosophical self-identity in today’s Russia is characterized by uncertainty, uncertainty, and mobility. This is directly related to such phenomena as the rapid collapse of book culture, the change of mediums of communication, (...) a clear decrease in the abstracting-reflective component of thinking and the audiovisual turn. The author presents both the review generalized studies of intellectual life and non-institutional philosophizing in modern Russia, as well as works examining the features of theoretical platforms unformal philosophical groups. (shrink)

The non-academic education as the development of socio-cultural experience that takes place outside the pedagogically organized process is considered in the article. The freedom of human cognitive activity, the expansion of the range of his hobbies, the enrichment of the spiritual world is ensured through a network of institutions of non-academic education. Non-academic education institutions transfer the knowledge and skills necessary in the field of work, which does not belong directly to the scientific content of professional activity. The term “non-academic (...) education” is not yet widespread, it is used mainly by practitioners in the field of solving general problems of education, based on human educational needs. However, the reality it reflects is well known to all, it is learning in the process of daily life. In essence and content, it is the same process of acquiring knowledge and skills, deepening worldview and enriching personal potential, which is in academic education. The difference is that it takes place outside the walls of institutions that are part of the education system. Non-academic education takes place in social institutions that perform other functions in the social division of labor: in the family, in the field of work, in various formal and informal groups and associations. A clear training goal is not necessary. Non-academic education is spontaneous, without time limits, not certified, unlike academic. Non-academic education may have some kind of documentary evidence, albeit of a non-state type. A teacher in academic education is necessarily an employee of an educational institution, and in non-academic education it is an employee, a coach, and a teacher. Training in non-academic education can be carried out on the educational portal through social services, distance learning courses of various organizations, mass open courses. (shrink)

Gatchel, R. H. The evolution of the concept.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and rationality.--Green, T. F. Indoctrination and beliefs.--Kilpatrick, W. H. Indoctrination and respect for persons.--Atkinson, R. F. Indoctrination and moral education.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and doctrines.--Moore, W. Indoctrination and democratic method.--Wilson, J. Indoctrination and freedom.--Flew, A. Indoctrination and religion.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination and intentions.--Crittenden, B. S. Indoctrination as mis-education.--Snook, I. A. Indoctrination and moral responsibility.--Gregory, I. M. M. and Woods, R. (...) G. Indoctrination: inculcating doctrines.-- White, J. P. Indoctrination without doctrines? (shrink)

Terms such as 'wisdom' or 'happiness' are commonly held to refer to abstract objects that are properties. On the basis of a greater range of linguistic data and with the support of some ancient and medieval philosophical views, I argue that such terms do not stand for objects, but rather for kinds of tropes, entities that do not have the status of objects, but only play a role as semantic values of terms and as arguments of predicates. Such ‘non-objects’ (...) crucially differ from objects in that they are not potential bearers of properties. (shrink)

Not all scientific explanations work by describing causal connections between events or the world's overall causal structure. In addition, mathematicians regard some proofs as explaining why the theorems being proved do in fact hold. This book proposes new philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics.

My thesis is that any course in professional ethics —even in a philosophy department —is, all else equal, better without moral theory than with it. In defending this thesis, I shall return to a debate I had with Bernie Gert and Ed Harris a few years ago, itself the culmination of almost four decades of teaching professional ethics and more than two decades of teaching others to do the same. I am, I should make clear, not against moral theory (the (...) attempt to understand morality as a reasonable undertaking). Indeed, not only do I enjoy teaching a course in moral theory every few years and publish on the subject now and then, I would agree that, in principle, moral theory can not only enlighten students but also be useful to them, helping them to identify moral issues they might otherwise overlook, seek information they might otherwise not think relevant, and formulate courses of action that might otherwise not occur to them. My thesis is entirely practical: Given the time normally allotted to a course in professional ethics (45 or so classroom hours), moral theory will never be useful enough. There is always a less-timeconsuming way to do what moral theory can also do, leaving more room for other topics that a course in professional ethics should include. Moral theory is, therefore, always a waste of time in a professional-ethics course. (shrink)

There is a certain view abroad in the land concerning the philosophical problems raised by Tarskian semantics. This view has it that a Tarskian theory of truth in a language accomplishes nothing of interest beyond the definition of truth in terms of satisfaction, and, further, that what is missing — the only thing that would yield a solution to the philosophical problem of truth when added to Tarskian semantics — is a reduction of satisfaction to a non-semantic relation. (...) It seems to me that this view either misidentifies the philosophical problem altogether, or encourages a seriously misleading picture of the nature of the problem.The view I have in mind is nowhere more persuasively at work than in a recent paper by Hartry Field.1 In this paper Field argues that a Tarskian theory of truth for a natural language is impossible if we insist on Tarski's case-by-case elimination of ‘satisfies'. More fundamentally, however, he argues that a Tarskian theory could provide nothing of philosophical interest beyond the admittedly interesting reduction of truth to satisfaction, and his ground for this claim is, roughly, that a Tarskian theory does not reduce its primitive semantic relation — satisfaction — to a non-semantic relation. (shrink)