Medical terminology collects and organizes the many different kinds of terms employed in the biomedical domain both by practitioners and also in the course of biomedical research. In addition to serving as labels for biomedical classes, these names reflect the organizational principles of biomedical vocabularies and ontologies. Some names represent invariant features (classes, universals) of biomedical reality (i.e., they are a matter for ontology). Other names, however, convey also how this reality is perceived, measured, and understood by health professionals (...) (i.e., they belong to the domain of epistemology). We analyze terms from several biomedical vocabularies in order to throw light on the interactions between ontological and epistemological components of these terminologies. We identify four cases: 1) terms containing classification criteria, 2) terms reflecting detectability, modality, uncertainty, and vagueness, 3) terms created in order to obtain a complete partition of a given domain, and 4) terms reflecting mere fiat boundaries. We show that epistemology-loaded terms are pervasive in biomedical vocabularies, that the “classes” they name often do not comply with sound classification principles, and that they are therefore likely to cause problems in the evolution and alignment of terminologies and associated ontologies. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate the history of relationalism and its present use in some interpretations of quantum mechanics. In the first part of this article we will provide a conceptual analysis of the relation between substantivalism, relationalism and relativism in the history of both physics and philosophy. In the second part, we will address some relational interpretations of quantum mechanics, namely, Bohr’s relational approach, the modal interpretation by Kochen, the perspectival modal version by Bene and Dieks and the relational (...) interpretation by Rovelli. We will argue that all these interpretations ground their understanding of relations in epistemological terms. By taking into account the analysis on the first part of our work, we intend to highlight the fact that there is a different possibility for understanding quantum mechanics in relational terms which has not been yet considered within the foundational literature. This possibility is to consider relations in ontological terms. We will argue that such an understanding might be capable of providing a novel approach to the problem of representing what quantum mechanics is really talking about. (shrink)

How does Quine fare in the first decades of the twenty-first century? In this paper I examine a cluster of Quinean theses that, I believe, are especially fruitful in meeting some of the current challenges of epistemology and ontology. These theses offer an alternative to the traditional bifurcations of truth and knowledge into factual and conceptual-pragmatic-conventional, the traditional conception of a foundation for knowledge, and traditional realism. To make the most of Quine’s ideas, however, we have to take (...) an active stance: accept some of his ideas and reject others, sort different versions of the relevant ideas, sharpen or revise some of the ideas, connect them with new, non-Quinean ideas, and so on. As a result the paper pits Quine against Quine, in an attempt to identify those Quinean ideas that have a lasting value and sketch potential developments. (shrink)

The article focuses on one important aspect of this debate between Realists and Nominalists in the Late Middle Ages, namely the controversy between William Ockham and Walter Burley about the nature and status of relations and relatives, for the category of ad aliquid is the most intriguing category after substance, and in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages many authors attempted to develop new formulations of the Aristotelian theory of relatives. Burley believed that when two substances are related one to (...) the other, five distinct elements can be singled out: the relation itself (for instance, the form of paternity); the ultimate substrate of that relation (namely, the substance that denominatively receives the name of the relation - the animal which is called ‘father’ because it begot another similar to itself); the fundamentum of the relation (namely the categorial item in virtue of which the relation inheres in its substrate - in our example, the generative power); the antecedent term of the relation (namely the aggregate formed by the substrate in which the relation inheres and the relation itself - in our example, the father); and the consequent term of the relation (namely, the aggregate formed by the substance with which the subiectum is somehow connected and the relation correlated to the first one - in our example, the son). In fact, according to Burley, any relation has its own converse. The foundation is the main component, since it joins the relation to the underlying substances, permits the relation to link the antecedent term to the consequent term, and transmits some of its properties to the relation. Ockham, on the contrary, believed that terms such as ‘relativum’, ‘relatio’, and ‘ad aliquid’ are terms of second intention, since they signify other (vocal, written, mental) terms, when taken in personal supposition. In Ockham’s opinion, Socrates qua father cannot be regarded as a relative; it is the name ‘father’ (and the corresponding intentio) that is a relative. This implies that the abstract terms of the category, namely those terms that in Burley’s view signify relations such as ‘paternitas’, and the concrete terms, namely those terms that in Burley’s view signify relatives such as ‘pater’, are synonymous according to Ockham. He thinks that any abstract term belonging to the category of ad aliquid is semantically equivalent to the definition (in a broad sense) of the correlated concrete term, so that, for instance, ‘paternity’ in a sentence like ‘a father is a father because of paternity’means: a father is a father because he has begotten a son. Such differences between them in their divergent interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of ad aliquid consist in the opposing roles that reality plays in their explanations of human knowledge, and Ockham’s rejection, in favour of a principle of ontological parsimony, of the principle of a close isomorphism between (mental) language and the world. For Burley, extra-mental reality was the model that our knowledge has to adequate and reproduce, whilst Ockham conceived of reality as a simple object of our knowledge, which does concern reality, but is articulated according to inner principles. Burley’s thought was dominated by the object-label scheme, as the basic semantic relation, and by hypostatization, regarded as the practice of replacing logical and epistemological rules by ontological standards and references, as the main device for explaining the semantic function of language. On the contrary, for Ockham reality must consist of as few as possible kinds of being. (shrink)

Network Analysis is considered as a new method that challenges Latent Variable models in inferring psychological attributes. With Network Analysis, psychological attributes are derived from a complex system of components without the need to call on any latent variables. But the ontological status of psychological attributes is not adequately defined with Network Analysis, because a psychological attribute is both a complex system and a property emerging from this complex system. The aim of this article is to reappraise the legitimacy of (...) latent variable models by engaging in an ontological and epistemological discussion on psychological attributes. Psychological attributes relate to the mental equilibrium of individuals embedded in their social interactions, as robust attractors within complex dynamic processes with emergent properties, distinct from physical entities located in precise areas of the brain. Latent variables thus possess legitimacy, because the emergent properties can be conceptualized and analyzed on the sole basis of their manifestations, without exploring the upstream complex system. However, in opposition with the usual Latent Variable models, this article is in favor of the integration of a dynamic system of manifestations. Latent Variables models and Network Analysis thus appear as complementary approaches. New approaches combining Latent Network Models and Network Residuals are certainly a promising new way to infer psychological attributes, placing psychological attributes in an inter-subjective dynamic approach. Pragmatism-realism appears as the epistemological framework required if we are to use latent variables as representations of psychological attributes. (shrink)

Context: In the literature concerning the theory of social systems, interest in epistemological and ontological questions has increased in recent years. The controversies regarding a realist vs. constructivist interpretation of Luhmann’s theory, as well as the concept of many realities that correspond to many ontologies, deserve attention. Problem: The paper discusses interrelated ontological and epistemological problems in Luhmann’s systems theory, such as ontology and de-ontologization, realism vs. constructivism, contingency and its limits and one vs. many realities. Method: The paper (...) proposes an interpretation, according to which systems theory is based on an epistemology - radical operative constructivism. Results: Luhmann is not a realist. The last word belongs to radical operative constructivism, and naïve realism with reference to social systems has only a preliminary, methodological significance. However, taking a position in the dispute between realism and constructivism inevitably involves an ontological “vocabulary,” that is, usage of the reality/construction distinction. Furthermore, operative constructivism formulates the necessary conditions of the possibility of cognition, which limit the contingency of the theory and constitute one reality that is a construction of systems theory. Luhmann rejects ontology, but he does not renounce epistemology, and consequently the project of de-ontologization remains incomplete. Implications: The paper offers a new, coherent interpretation of ontological and epistemological questions in Luhmann’s theory, and also throws light on some problems of radical constructivism in general, such as the ontological implications of epistemology or the constructivist self-reference of theories. Key words: Radical operative constructivism, social systems, Luhmann, ontology, reality, contingency. (shrink)

The epistemology of essence is a topic that has received relatively little attention, although there are signs that this is changing. The lack of literature engaging directly with the topic is probably partly due to the mystery surrounding the notion of essence itself, and partly due to the sheer difficulty of developing a plausible epistemology. The need for such an account is clear especially for those, like E.J. Lowe, who are committed to a broadly Aristotelian conception of essence, (...) whereby essence plays an important theoretical role. In this chapter, our epistemic access to essence is examined in terms of the a posteriori vs. a priori distinction. The two main accounts to be contrasted are those of David S. Oderberg and E.J. Lowe. (shrink)

Archimedes of Syracuse has long provided a touchstone for considering how we make and acquire knowledge. Since the early Roman chroniclers of Archimedes’ life, and especially intensively since Descartes, scholars have described, sought, or derided the Archimedean point, defining and redefining its epistemic role. “Knowledge,” at least within modernity, is rhetorically tied to the figure of the Archimedean point, a place somewhere outside a regular and constrained world of experience. If this figure still leads to useful ways of thinking about (...) knowing, we are left with the question of how different modes of making knowledge approach their “Archimedean” points. The question is especially important today as a renewed .. (shrink)

This paper has three main objectives: (a) Discuss the formal analogy between some important symmetry-invariance arguments used in physics, probability and statistics. Specifically, we will focus on Noether’s theorem in physics, the maximum entropy principle in probability theory, and de Finetti-type theorems in Bayesian statistics; (b) Discuss the epistemological and ontological implications of these theorems, as they are interpreted in physics and statistics. Specifically, we will focus on the positivist (in physics) or subjective (in statistics) interpretations vs. objective interpretations that (...) are suggested by symmetry and invariance arguments; (c) Introduce the cognitive constructivism epistemological framework as a solution that overcomes the realism-subjectivism dilemma and its pitfalls. The work of the physicist and philosopher Max Born will be particularly important in our discussion. (shrink)

Information modeling (also known as conceptual modeling or semantic data modeling) may be characterized as the formulation of a model in which information aspects of objective and subjective reality are presented (the application), independent of datasets and processes by which they may be realized (the system).A methodology for information modeling should incorporate a number of concepts which have appeared in the literature, but should also be formulated in terms of constructs which are understandable to and expressible by the system user (...) as well as the system developer. This is particularly desirable in connection with certain intimate relationships, such as being the same as or being a part of. (shrink)

In this brief paper, starting from recent works, we analyze from conceptual point of view this basic question: can be the nature of quantum entangled states interpreted ontologically or epistemologically? According some works, the degrees of freedom of quantum systems permit us to establish a possible classification between factorizables and entangled states. We suggest, that the "choice" of degree of freedom, even if mathematically justified introduces epistemic element, not only in the systems but also in their classification. We retain, instead, (...) that there are not two classes of quantum states, entangled and factorizables, but only a single classes of states: the entangled states. In fact, the factorizable states become entangled for a different choice of their degrees of freedom. In the same way, there are not partitions of quantum system which have an ontological superior status with respect to any other. For all these reasons, both mathematical tools utilized are responsible of improper classification of quantum systems. Finally, we argue that we cannot speak about a classification of quantum systems: all the quantum states exhibit a unique objective nature, they are all entangled states. (shrink)

In the present article, I introduce Husserl’s analyses of ‘natural causality’ and ‘volitional causality’, which are collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins. My aim is to show that Husserl’s insight into these phenomena enables us to understand more clearly both the specificity of, and the relation between, the motivational nexus belonging to the sphere of the will in contrast with the causal laws of nature. In light of this understanding, in (...) the last part of the article I reflect on whether and to what extent there is, in fact, an ontological and epistemological compatibility between volitional causality and natural causality. (shrink)

Two kinds of individuals are distinguished: abstract and concrete. Whereas abstract individuals belong to our conceptual sphere, concrete individuals (i.e. particulars) individuate the world of matter. A subject inquiring the external world projects abstract individuals onto the concrete ones (i.e. pieces of matter). Our theory offers a solution to various ontological and epistemological puzzles concerned with individuals, e.g., the Ship of Theseus, Polish Logician, problems with reidentification, or proper names.

In this paper I discuss the commentaries and the criticism that my friends and colleagues have made to the theory of social objects that I put forward in my book Documentalità. Perché è necessario lasciar tracce. In particular, I have articulated my responses along the following main lines: realism; truth (and falsity); ontology vs. epistemology and facts vs. interpretations; textualism and writing; politics; intentionality; consciousness.

The paper outlines the understanding of emergence in Ontic Structural Realism of James Ladyman (and his co-author Ross). First, the notion of emergence is explored, surveying the various distinctions associated with it (ontological vs. epistemological, diachronic vs. synchronic, weak vs. strong). It turns out that Ross and Ladyman’s notion of emergence is that of weak epistemological emergence compatible with ontic reduction. Particular notions of emergence are associated with the objection embodied in the Generalized Causal Exclusion Argument. The latter is sketched (...) and the solution of Ross and Ladyman is presented: first, in general, the notion of weak emergence is not threatened by this objection. Causal reduction associated with it ensures that there are no competing causal explanations, so no overdetermination arises. Second, there is a peculiar feature of Ross and Ladyman’s theory; namely, there is no causation on the fundamental level, only pattern dynamism. Causation emerges only on higher levels of special sciences. Hence, there is no problem of causal overdetermination. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution toward the clarification of the meaning and evolution of liberalism. Liberal values are distinguished from liberal social philosophy. Liberal values, specifically individuality, government by consent of the governed, and private property in a capitalist economy are modern despite their clear classical and medieval origins. Liberal social philosophy consists of ontological realism, epistemological individualism, and axiological teleology. Liberal social philosophy is classical, and it reflects an attempt to rationalize modern values with a classical philosophy. I argue (...) that liberal social philosophy is seriously flawed, and when it is modified for modern contexts it is inimical to liberal values. Liberal values are better understood and more defensible, as well as more compatible with nonliberal values, when divorced from liberal social philosophy. (shrink)

This paper asks whether phenomenal intentionality (intentionality that arises from phenomenal consciousness alone) has a relational structure of the sort envisaged in Russell’s theory of acquaintance. I put forward three arguments in favor of a relation view: one phenomenological, one linguistic, and one based on the view’s ability to account for the truth conditions of phenomenally intentional states. I then consider several objections to the relation view. The chief objection to the relation view takes the form of a dilemma between (...) Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of the properties constitutive of the contents of phenomenally intentional states on this view: the Aristotelian view seems unable to account for all the apparent contents of phenomenally intentional states, but the Platonic view seems to be ontologically unacceptable. I also consider other objections from physicalism, phenomenology, and epistemology. (shrink)

Our world has been and still is plagued by oppressive social and political systems. Why do these systems persist or why did they persist for as long as they did? Initially developed by Karl Marx, ideology explanations point to distorted beliefs among the oppressed. Favored by social scientists, collective action explanations point to an inability among the oppressed to coordinate resistance. This paper is about how to resolve the debate. Several philosophers look for a conclusive resolution, trying to show that (...) one of the hypotheses is fatally flawed, so the alternative must be embraced. These resolutions fail, I argue. Instead, we should decide which hypothesis best explains persistent oppression on a case-by-case basis through empirical investigation. I call this piecemeal resolution. After introducing and defending the piecemeal approach, I sketch an empirical strategy. (shrink)

Using Riemann’s Rearrangement Theorem, Øystein Linnebo (2020) argues that, if it were possible to apply an infinite positive weight and an infinite negative weight to a working scale, the resulting net weight could end up being any real number, depending on the procedure by which these weights are applied. Appealing to the First Postulate of Archimedes’ treatise on balance, I argue instead that the scale would always read 0 kg. Along the way, we stop to consider an infinitely jittery flea, (...) an infinitely protracted border conflict, and an infinitely electric glass rod. (shrink)

In his influential paper “Grasping the Third Realm,” John Bengson raises the question of how we can non-accidentally grasp abstract facts. What distinguishes successful intuition from hallucinatory intuition? Bengson answers his “non-accidental relation question” by arguing for a constitutive relationship: The intuited object is a literal constituent of the respective intuition. Now, the problem my contribution centers around is that Bengson’s answer cannot be the end of the story. This is because, as Bar Luzon and Preston Werner have recently pointed (...) out, this answer leads to the follow-up question of why certain intuitional experiences are constituted by the facts, but others are not. My objective is to answer this question by specifying precisely what is epistemically defective about intellectual hallucinations. My result is that, in stark contrast to perception, intellectual hallucinations are epistemically defective in the sense that something is overlooked. In successful intuition, by contrast, all relevant possibilities/scenarios are considered/imagined. This has crucial epistemological implications. In particular, I argue that intuitions exhibiting a certain phenomenology cannot fail to successfully grasp abstract facts. I call this the non-accidental correctness thesis, which constitutes the main thesis of this paper. (shrink)

The holism-reductionism debate, one of the classic subjects of study in the philosopy of science, is currently at the heart of epistemological concerns in ecology. Yet the division between holism and reductionism does not always stand out clearly in this field. In particular, almost all work in ecosystem ecology and landscape ecology presents itself as holistic and emergentist. Nonetheless, the operational approaches used rely on conventional reductionist methodology.From an emergentist epistemological perspective, a set of general 'transactional' principles inspired by the (...) work of J. Dewey and J.K. Feibleman are proposed in an effort to develop a coherent ontological and methodological semantics. (shrink)

The collapse of quantum states is analyzed in terms of a breakdown into two generic phases: Phase I, in which the field of potentialities that the quantum state represents undergoes a discontinuous and unpredictable change into one of the base states which corresponds to the measurement performed, and phase II, in which a transition from the level of potentialities to the level of actualities takes place. Phase I is discussed in relation to a comment about collapse, made by Dirac in (...) conversation with the author, “Nature makes a choice.” An analysis of phase II leads to the suggestion that it occurs only through and as an act of experience. This postulate is shown to elucidate basic questions regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics, such as the elusive demarcation line between the classical and quantum domains, and the controversy of the ontological vs. epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The theory of living beings as machines of nature and the conception of composite substances endowed with conjoined souls, entelechies, or monads, as well as that of organic bodies, were solidified over the course of the transformations of Leibniz's thought that issued in the New System of Nature. On this basis, the monadological versions of a system of nature centered upon the integrated organization ad infinitum of living beings were gradually articulated. Leibniz aimed to spell out a science, or physiology (...) of vital processes, that would be, as much as possible, in agreement with the epistemological exigencies of the complex metaphysical model that he had elaborated. On the one hand, Leibniz offers a critical evaluation of the methodological options that divide the allegiances of the physicians and naturalists who are his contemporaries; what is more, he determines the profile of the analyses and explications that are to be promoted. For This double preoccupation translates into the scientific exchanges and correspondences that accompany the construction of the theory of organic bodies as constituents of machines of nature. The author focuses on the particular case of the propositions concerning the science of the living that stem from his reaction to the work of Georg Ernst Stahl. (shrink)

Theories of epistemic justification are usually described as belonging to either deontological or nondeontological categories of justification with the former construing the concept of justification as involving the fulfillment of epistemic duty. Despite being the dominant view among traditional epistemologists, the deontological conception has been subjected to severe criticisms in the current literature for failing, among others, to do justice to the (alleged) truth-conducive character of epistemic justification. In this paper I set out to show that there is something deeply (...) unsatisfying about the way these different conceptions of justification are usually introduced and contrasted with each other leaving it unclear just what it is that renders a particular conception deontological. In particular I look at Alston's treatment of the issue, and show that his reasons for rejecting the deontological conception involve question-begging assumptions demonstrating, at best, the possibility of its divergence from truth-conductive justification. Far from being able to settle the issue one way or another, the arguments, I shall suggest actually seem to show some sort of tolerant pluralism in justification theory to be a live option. (shrink)

The article seeks to instantiate the distinctive features and basic research strategies in legal ontology as they are presented in the early works by the famous Oxford philosopher of law Herbert Hart, published before his major book The Concept of Law. The author tries to isolate the most salient aspects of the analytical legal tradition applicable to Russian legal theory, which can bridge the existing gap between these approaches despite considerable difference both in their background and methodology.

It is argued that a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is possible and useful. Current interpretations, from “Copenhagen” to “many worlds” are critically revisited. The difficulties for intuitive models of quantum physics are pointed out and possible solutions proposed. In particular the existence of discrete states, the quantum jumps, the alleged lack of objective properties, measurement theory, the probabilistic character of quantum physics, the wave–particle duality and the Bell inequalities are analyzed. The sketch of a realistic picture of the quantum (...) world is presented. It rests upon the assumption that quantum mechanics is a stochastic theory whose randomness derives from the existence of vacuum fields. They correspond to the vacuum fluctuations of quantum field theory, but taken as real rather than virtual. (shrink)

Engineering science is a scientific discipline that from the point of view of epistemology and the philosophy of science has been somewhat neglected. When engineering science was under philosophical scrutiny it often just involved the question of whether engineering is a spin-off of pure and applied science and their methods. We, however, hold that engineering is a science governed by its own epistemology, methodology and ontology. This point is systematically argued by comparing the different sciences with respect (...) to a particular set of characterization criteria. (shrink)

It is widely held that reflexivity is the defining feature of selfhood: the ability of the self to stand in a certain relation to itself. The question of how exactly to theorize this self-relation, however, has been the source of ongoing debate. In recent years, Kantian and post-Kantian approaches such as Christine Korsgaard’s constitutivism and Richard Moran’s commitment view, have attempted to establish the priority of the agential over the epistemic self-relation, thereby re-orientating the debate away from metaphysics and (...) class='Hi'>epistemology towards ethics and moral psychology. Despite the important progress they make towards a de-alienated and reified understanding of the self-relation, however, I argue that the Kantian paradigm is ultimately inadequate because its methodological individualism makes it incapable of accounting for the irreducibly social dimension of the self-relation and, therefore, of successfully making the transition from ethics to social and political philosophy. In other words, an adequate ontology of the self-relation is possible only as a social ontology. In order to motivate this thesis, I appeal to two examples that expose the “social deficit” of the Kantian approach: Frantz Fanon’s phenomenology of race/racism in “The Lived Experience of the Black” and the phenomenon of cultural collapse in Jonathan Lear’sRadical Hope. I then go on to provide a sketch of an alternative approach based on the notion of “self-appropriation”, distinguishing it from Rahel Jaeggi’s use of the term in her recent critique of alienation, in the process. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of ontological and epistemological models of the transcendent and transcendental in ancient philosophy, which allows us to understand the genesis and foundations of the main variants of metaphysics in classical thought. In general, constructions of ancient Greek thought are characterized by the understanding of the transcendent as "other" being, the higher sphere of the "cosmos of nature", which has specific spatio-temporal properties, which is outside the immanent world of man. Ontological terms, the Cosmos (...) was subdivided into earthly being, in which a man lives, and being "beyond", inaccessible to a man because of his bodily and vital limitations. In epistemological terms the transcendent was considered incomprehensible for sensory cognition, but accessible for cognition of the speculative, although not in full. The metaphysical model of the transcendental created by antiquity did not provide for the existence of an independent "human cosmos" isolated from the external world. The main task of the transcendental method was to determine the conditions by which it is possible to think of the data of empirical observations. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the reappraisal of Husserl’s ontology and epistemology, sketched in book one of Ideen. The main issue is Husserl’s theory of essence and essential insight. I present the fundamental distinction between facts and essences, and, over and above it, Husserl’s defense of an a priori knowledge based on essential insight as well as his partition of the whole realm of a priori knowledge into a formal set of material, regional ontologies. I will show how (...) the theory of essential insight presented in Ideen gives rise to several criticisms, namely those made by Neo-Kantians, like Rickert and Natorp. In the last part, I will show how the mathematical concept of an invariant under a group of variations was the leading case for Husserl’s mature notion of eidetic insight. (shrink)

Person Centred Medicine is a substantial and contentious view of healthcare that carries both ontological and epistemological presuppositions. This chapter examines two key aspects: that the person is a central, basic irreducible element in ontology and that person-level knowledge is both important and possible. Some reasons for holding both of these are sketched.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy by Myles F. BurnyeatAllison Piñeros Glasscock and Elizabeth C. Shaw and Staff*BURNYEAT, Myles F. Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy, vol. 4. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. xii + 395 pp. Cloth, $120.00The eleven essays in this collection were originally published while Burnyeat was at All Souls College, Oxford (1996–2006) and during his subsequent retirement. Like volume 3 of the same series, (...) the collection was published posthumously, with editorial work undertaken by Carol Atack, Malcolm Schofield, and David Sedley. Part I contains seven essays on topics in ontology and epistemology; part II contains four essays on physics and optics. The figures examined include the usual suspects—Plato and Aristotle (plus an appearance by Aquinas)—but Burnyeat also draws our attention to some less appreciated accomplices to the ancient philosophical project: the Platonist commentator Numenius of Apamea, the Pythagorean Archytas of Tarentum, and Anaxarchus of Abdera, a follower of Democritus. The result is a collection that showcases one of Burnyeat's greatest strengths: his ability to identify the clues left for us in ancient texts and to produce from them compelling and exquisitely detailed accounts of what ancient philosophers were thinking and why.One of the final papers of the volume illustrates Burnyeat's detective acumen. "Archytas and optics" starts from the following question: Why is optics absent from the mathematical curriculum Plato sketches in the Republic? Burnyeat hypothesizes that if mathematical optics existed when the Republic was written, Plato likely excised it from the curriculum on the grounds that the discipline would lead the student to focus on visible things and their appearances. The bulk of the paper is devoted to establishing the antecedent of this conditional. Burnyeat argues that mathematical optics did exist at the time of the Republic's writing, and he posits the noncanonical Pythagorean Archytas as its founder. To recognize the significance of this lacuna in the Republic's curriculum and to provide a persuasive identification of the founder of an entire discipline is already to make a substantial contribution to scholarship. But how Burnyeat arrives at his central conclusion is equally impressive. He takes the reader on a tour of Aristotle, Plato, and Iamblichus, fragment 4 of Archytas, and the Apologia of Apuleius (whom readers might better recognize as the novelist responsible for The Golden [End Page 345] Ass). The result is not only an answer to the paper's central question, but a deeper understanding of the broader intellectual network in which canonical figures like Plato and Aristotle operated.No fragment is too small to catch Burnyeat's notice, nor is any line in a manuscript too faint. Part I of the collection includes Burnyeat's famous paper "Kinēsis vs. energeia: a much-read passage in (but not of) Aristotle's Metaphysics." The central argument is that Metaphysics 9.6.1048b18–35 is out of place. It was written by Aristotle for a different context and should not be printed in book 9. Because this article is so well known, I will not dwell on the details of the argument, but once again Burnyeat's methodology is worthy of comment. The first part of the paper offers a careful examination of the Metaphysics's manuscript tradition that attends both to what is present and to what is absent. For example, we learn that the focus passage is missing from an entire branch of the tradition, which Burnyeat suggests is the result of a learned excision. Later, Burnyeat develops a psychological sketch of the scribe of manuscript Ab beginning from the observation that a faint line is drawn through part of the focus passage. He argues that the scribe's motivation is not disapproval of the passage's contents but a desire to keep his text and commentary in sync. Observations like these provide the foundation for Burnyeat's thesis about the philosophical import of the focus passage, and they demonstrate that the physical record can be just as vital to reconstructions of ancient philosophy as the words that the record preserves.Occasionally, Burnyeat offers more direct admonitions to his readers about how to approach ancient philosophy. A key lesson... (shrink)

In this article I critically engage with Robert Craig’s constitutive metamodel of communication theory from the vantage point of an integrational semiology, as developed by Oxford Professor Roy Harris in his book Signs, Language and Communication (1996). I argue that Harris’ dichotomy of a ‘segregational’ vs. an ‘integrational’ tradition of theorizing language and communication makes the metamodel redundant on the grounds that Craig’s communicational perspective on social reality is replaced by two semiologies sponsoring mutually exclusive ontologies and epistemologies.

For more than a century, methodological diversity within the social sciences has been the source of recurrent paradigm wars, and no obvious winner seems to be in sight. The aim of this article is to explore the contingencies underlying this diversity. It is argued that the shared condition of complexity forces us to adopt a pragmatic perspective from which even relevant ontological and epistemological assumptions should be thought of as contextual rather than absolute. In particular, the extent to which social (...) causality is perceived as stable and universal vs. dynamic and contextual and the extent to which research-related reflexivity is an issue appear to set apart the different approaches. Towards the end of the article examples of methodological fit and misfit are provided to illustrate the relevancy of the “contingent eclecticism” observed in practice. (shrink)

It seems that the distinction goes even further. The philosophical historians look at the sum total of occurrences in time as exemplifying an underlying absolute substance in the Hegelian sense, or a basic human activity like economic production as an autonomous creation of human life. Against this view of history, Weiss takes the position that history has to be understood first through universal ontological distinctions. Whatever is characteristic of being in general is characteristic of history. Thus history is not looked (...) at from the point of view of a basic content, or as carried by a basic act; history is integrated into the universal structure of the world, and whatever pertains to the universe at large pertains to history. (shrink)

This study presents the way in which Proclus structures some aspects of his Epistemology on the basis of his metaphysical Ontology. All those that we discuss – relying on his comments on Parmenides (Εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Παρμενίδην) (816.11– 819.29) –, take into account the following: a) his theory on the universal Intellect and the individual intellects, b) his theory on the universal Soul and the individual souls, c) some approaches of his in Plato’s theory of Ideas. Combining the (...) above, our purpose is also to show in what way some specific manifestations of the metaphysical world are connected with the natural world. The Neoplatonist philosopher explains the relevant theories by following a clearly defined method and that is why his analyses compose a cohesive system or a coherent Epistemology. He follows the principles that he has established on the basis of a clear ontological realism, which is based on his views about how the similarities and the differences between the two worlds appear. By elaborating these principles, we come to the conclusion that the methodological tools used by him are the principle of analogy, analytical thinking and hypothetical syllogisms. (shrink)

The debates on the scientificity of social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, are recurring. From the original methodenstreitat the end the 19th Century to the contemporary controversy on the legitimacy of “regional epistemologies”, a same set of interrogations reappears. Are social sciences really scientific? And if so, are they sciences like other sciences? How should we conceive “research programs” Lakatos (1978) or “research traditions” for Laudan (1977) able to produce advancement of knowledge in the field of social and (...) human phenomena? Is the progress of knowledge in social sciences similar to the one generally observed in natural sciences? Is it possible to evaluate the relative merits of each one of these research programs? -/- These debates are important vectors of social and intellectual polarization. The historical divide between the positivist and the hermeneutics poles precedes the structure of the contemporary debate around the epistemic space of social sciences, It is not only a question of renewing the opposition between a monist view of sciences (e.g. McIntyre, 1996) and a dualistic one (e.g. Geertz, 1973) or even a trialist view of sciences (e.g. Lepenies, 1985). It is also a question of asserting dichotomies transformed into framework (including when it is a question of exceeding them): nature-culture, nomothetic-idiographic, models-narrative, structure-history, cause-reason, explanation-comprehension. -/- In this short introduction, we provide, in section 2, a first overview of this epistemological debate in social science. Section 3 proposes a different standpoint on the same questions, by introducing both ontological and methodological aspects in this basic epistemological debate. Namely, following (Hollis, 1994) oppositions of the explanation - understanding, causes - meaning, etc., types discussed in the firsts ection are comparatively examined together with oppositions of the structure - action, holism - individualism types. This allows us to discus show multi-agent design, by integrating various dimensions and standpoints in the same framework (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapters 1, 5, 14) can help us to shift these boundaries, and to bypass these oppositions. As model building and ontology design are at the core of this process (Phan, Amblard, 2007, Chapter 12), Section4 discusses various issues of the art of modelling, starting both from economists’ and sociologists’ current standpoints. (shrink)

This book explores the prospects of rivaling ontological and epistemic interpretations of quantum mechanics (QM). It concludes with a suggestion for how to interpret QM from an epistemological point of view and with a Kantian touch. It thus refines, extends, and combines existing approaches in a similar direction. -/- The author first looks at current, hotly debated ontological interpretations. These include hidden variables-approaches, Bohmian mechanics, collapse interpretations, and the many worlds interpretation. He demonstrates why none of these ontological interpretations can (...) claim to be the clear winner amongst its rivals. Next, coverage explores the possibility of interpreting QM in terms of knowledge but without the assumption of hidden variables. It examines QBism as well as Healey’s pragmatist view. The author finds both interpretations or programs wanting in certain respects. As a result, he then goes on to advance a genuine proposal as to how to interpret QM from the perspective of an internal realism in the sense of Putnam and Kant. -/- The book also includes two philosophical interludes. One details the notions of probability and realism. The other highlights the connections between the notions of locality, causality, and reality in the context of violations of Bell-type inequalities. (shrink)

At the end of the nineteenth century, Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir Solovyov presented two diametrically opposed modes of thinking and reasoning. The question of which of these two figures emerged as the greatest thinker of the time remains an existential one, with significant ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical implications. This opposition is evident in their differing attitudes towards key topics such as political reality, violence, and morality. While Tolstoy’s philosophical contributions are often underestimated and Solovyov is generally regarded as the “winner” (...) of this intellectual rivalry, this paper seeks to reevaluate Tolstoy’s legacy and his role as a philosopher in the latter half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

What is the nature of moral judgments? This question can be asked in a more specific way: When one sincerely utters a moral judgment, what does one express? A belief the content of which represents moral facts or properties, and is truth-apt, or a non-cognitive attitude the content of which does not represent moral facts or properties, and is not truth-apt? If moral judgments assert moral facts or properties, what are moral facts or properties? If moral judgments express beliefs, how (...) can they be motivational? ;Philosophers give different answers to the above questions. Expressivism and descriptivism are two main views about the nature of moral judgments. This dissertation addresses not only the debate between expressivism and descriptivism, but also the debate between naturalism and non-naturalism about moral properties and the epistemological source of moral judgments, and the debate between rationalism and anti-rationalism about the practical source of moral judgments. ;One of main objections to descriptivism is that expressivism can do better in explaining the metaphysics of moral features, say why it is a conceptual truth that moral properties supervene on natural properties. Another main objection to descriptivism, is that expressivism better explains the practical source of moral judgments. According to expressivism, moral judgments express some motivational non-cognitive attitudes, say desires. There are two approaches to defending descriptivism: the naturalistic and the non-naturalistic. ;This dissertation develops a non-naturalistic realist, cognitivist, and rationalist view of the nature of moral properties and moral judgments. My overall point is that the expressivist attacks on descriptivism are unsuccessful. A realist non-naturalism can explain the ontological data, e.g. supervenience, the epistemological data, e.g. non-inferential justification, and the data of moral psychology, especially the motivational power of moral judgments. My conclusion is that when one sincerely utters a true moral judgment, one expresses a belief the content of which represents normative facts. (shrink)

Foucault characterizes ethics as “the reflexive practice of freedom”. He does not have the ambitions of the usual moral philosopher. Foucault develops a robust conceptual apparatus appropriate to the ethical domain, but he does not seek an exhaustive stipulation of its invariant features. Instead, he explores and elucidates the problematics of the reflexive practice of freedom that genealogically connect an extended family of ethical systems. His exploration is increasingly confined within the boundaries of what the author identifies as an analytical (...) triangle that connects self‐care, the governance of others, and parrhesia. The triangle coalesces first in the third volume of The History of Sexuality and specifically in Foucault's treatment of gnothi seauton – the Pythian imperative to “know thyself.” It is the most effective frame through which to assess both the content and the limits of what with qualification can be cast as Foucault's ontology and epistemology of ethics. (shrink)

Including the perspectives of scientists about the nature and process of science is important for an authentic and nuanced portrayal of science in science education. The small number of studies that have explored scientists’ worldviews about science has thus far generated contradictory findings, with recent studies claiming that scientists simultaneously hold contradictory sophisticated and naïve views. This article reports on an exploratory study that uses the framework of Bhaskar’s critical realism to elicit and separately analyse academic scientists’ ontological and epistemological (...) views about science in semi-structured interviews. When the views of scientists are analysed through the lens of critical realism, it is clear that it is possible to hold a realist ontological commitment about what knowledge is of, simultaneously with a fallibilist epistemological commitment about knowledge itself. The apparent incongruence of scientists’ so-called naïve and sophisticated views about science is resolved when analysed using a critical realist framework. Critical realism offers a simple and coherent framework for science educators that avoids many of the problems of positivism and social constructivism by finding a middle ground between them. The three pillars of critical realism: ontological realism, epistemological fallibilism and judgmental rationality help to make sense of how socially constructed scientific knowledge can be anchored in an independent reality. (shrink)