A quantum state represents neither properties of a physical system nor anyone’s knowledge of its properties. The important question is not what quantum states represent but how they are used—as informational bridges. Knowing about some physical situations, an agent may assign a quantum state to form expectations about other possible physical situations. Quantum states are objective: only expectations based on correct state assignments are generally reliable. If a quantum state represents anything, (...) it is the objective probabilistic relations between its backing conditions and its advice conditions. This paper offers an account of quantum states and their function as informational bridges, in quantum teleportation and elsewhere. (shrink)

What is the quantum state of the universe? Although there have been several interesting suggestions, the question remains open. In this paper, I consider a natural choice for the universal quantum state arising from the Past Hypothesis, a boundary condition that accounts for the time-asymmetry of the universe. The natural choice is given not by a wave function but by a density matrix. I begin by classifying quantum theories into two types: theories with a fundamental (...) wave function and theories with a fundamental density matrix. The Past Hypothesis is compatible with infinitely many initial wave functions, none of which seems to be particularly natural. However, once we turn to density matrices, the Past Hypothesis provides a natural choice---the normalized projection onto the Past Hypothesis subspace in the Hilbert space. Nevertheless, the two types of theories can be empirically equivalent. To provide a concrete understanding of the empirical equivalence, I provide a novel subsystem analysis in the context of Bohmian theories. Given the empirical equivalence, it seems empirically underdetermined whether the universe is in a pure state or a mixed state. Finally, I discuss some theoretical payoffs of the density-matrix theories and present some open problems for future research. (Bibliographic note: the thesis was submitted for the Master of Science in mathematics at Rutgers University.). (shrink)

The quantum state of a d-dimensional system can be represented by a probability distribution over the d 2 outcomes of a Symmetric Informationally Complete Positive Operator Valued Measure (SIC-POVM), and then this probability distribution can be represented by a vector of $\mathbb {R}^{d^{2}-1}$ in a (d 2−1)-dimensional simplex, we will call this set of vectors $\mathcal{Q}$ . Other way of represent a d-dimensional system is by the corresponding Bloch vector also in $\mathbb {R}^{d^{2}-1}$ , we will call this (...) set of vectors $\mathcal{B}$ . In this paper it is proved that with the adequate scaling $\mathcal{B}=\mathcal{Q}$ . Also we indicate some features of the shape of $\mathcal{Q}$. (shrink)

Under so-called primitive ontology approaches, in fully describing the history of a quantum system, one thereby attributes interesting properties to regions of spacetime. Primitive ontology approaches, which include some varieties of Bohmian mechanics and spontaneous collapse theories, are interesting in part because they hold out the hope that it should not be too difficult to make a connection between models of quantum mechanics and descriptions of histories of ordinary macroscopic bodies. But such approaches are dualistic, positing a (...) class='Hi'>quantum state as well as ordinary material degrees of freedom. This paper lays out and compares some options that primitive ontologists have for making sense of the quantum state. (shrink)

We introduce a quantum state representation of the information being processed in neuronal structures. The movement of information from one such structure to a second is characterized as a measurement of the first structure by the second. The value of such a measurement is an observable property of matter. The associated collapsed quantum state, a dual encoding of that measurement, is a non-observable property of matter. The quantum measurement collapse process itself is shown to be (...) a form of experience of the measurement process in terms of which a model and explanation of consciousness is formulated. Using model neurons we show how neuronal information processing effects may be given a quantum characterization. The techniques developed are employed to frame a model of qualia. (shrink)

From the Hilbert space formalism we note that five simple conditions are satisfied by the orthogonality relation between the (pure) states of a quantum system. We argue, by proving a mathematical theorem, that they capture the essentials of this relation. Based on this, we investigate the rationale behind these conditions in the form of six physical hypotheses. Along the way, we reveal an implicit theoretical assumption in theories of physics and prove a theorem which formalizes the idea that the (...) Superposition Principle makes quantum physics different from classical physics. The work follows the paradigm of mathematical foundations of quantum theory, which I will argue by methodological reflection that it exemplifies a formal approach to analysing concepts in theories. (shrink)

Quantum state teleportation has focused attention on the role of quantum information. Here we examine quantum teleportation through the Bohm interpretation. This interpretation introduced the notion of active information and we show that it is this information that is exchanged during teleportation. We discuss the relation between our notion of active information and the notion of quantum information introduced by Schumacher.

The identification of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive propositions concerning the states of quantum systems is a corner stone of the information-theoretic foundations of quantum statistics; but the set which is conventionally adopted is in fact incomplete, and is customarily deduced from numerous misconceptions of basic quantum mechanical principles. This paper exposes and corrects these common misstatements. It then identifies a new set of quantum state propositions which is truly exhaustive and mutually exclusive, (...) and which is compatible with the foundations of quantum theory. (shrink)

A quantum state represents neither properties of a physical system nor anyone's knowledge of its properties. The important question is not what quantum states represent but how they are used as informational bridges. Knowing about some physical situations, an agent may assign a quantum state to form expectations about other possible physical situations. Quantum states are objective: only expectations based on correct state assignments are generally reliable. If a quantum state represents (...) anything, it is the objective probabilistic relations between its backing conditions and its advice conditions. This paper offers an account of quantum states and their function as informational bridges, in quantum teleportation and elsewhere. (shrink)

There has been considerable recent interest in the consequences of closed timelike curves (CTCs) for the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems. A vast majority of research into this area makes use of the dynamical equations developed by Deutsch, which were developed from a consistency condition that assumes that mixed quantum states uniquely describe the physical state of a system. We criticize this choice of consistency condition from an epistemic perspective, i.e., a perspective in which the quantum (...) state represents a state of knowledge about a system. We demonstrate that directly applying Deutsch’s condition when mixed states are treated as representing an observer’s knowledge of a system can conceal time travel paradoxes from the observer, rather than resolving them. To shed further light on the appropriate dynamics for quantum systems traversing CTCs, we make use of a toy epistemic theory with a strictly classical ontology due to Spekkens and show that, in contrast to the results of Deutsch, many of the traditional paradoxical effects of time travel are present. (shrink)

The paper explains in what sense the GRW matter density theory is a primitive ontology theory of quantum mechanics and why, thus conceived, the standard objections against the GRW formalism do not apply to GRWm. We consider the different options for conceiving the quantum state in GRWm and argue that dispositionalism is the most attractive one.

This paper is about the epistemology of quantum theory. We establish a new result about a limitation to knowledge of its central object---the quantum state of the universe. We show that, if the universal quantum state can be assumed to be a typical unit vector from a high-dimensional subspace of Hilbert space (such as the subspace defined by a low-entropy macro-state as prescribed by the Past Hypothesis), then no observation can determine (or even just (...) narrow down significantly) which vector it is. Typical state vectors, in other words, are observationally indistinguishable from each other. Our argument is based on a typicality theorem from quantum statistical mechanics. We also discuss how theoretical considerations that go beyond the empirical evidence might bear on this fact and on our knowledge of the universal quantum state. (shrink)

The paper discusses objections against non-hidden variable versions of the epistemic conception of quantum states—the view that quantum states do not describe the properties of quantum systems but reflect, in some way to be specified, the epistemic conditions of agents assigning them. In the first half of the paper, the main motivation for the epistemic conception of quantum states is sketched, and a version of it is outlined, which combines ideas from an earlier study of it (...) with elements of Richard Healey's recent pragmatist interpretation of quantum theory. In the second half, various objections against epistemic accounts of quantum states are discussed in detail, which are based on criticisms found in the literature. Possible answers by the version outlined here are compared with answers from the quantum Bayesian point of view, which is at present the most discussed version of the epistemic conception of quantum states. (shrink)

Quantum state targeting is a quantum game which results from combining traditional quantum state estimation with additional classical information. We consider a particular version of the game and show how it can be played with maximally entangled states. The optimal solution of the game is used to derive a Bell inequality for two entangled qutrits. We argue that the nice properties of the inequality are direct consequences of the method of construction.

A common approach to quantum physics is enshrouded in a jargon which treats state vectors as attributes of physical systems and the concept of state preparation as a filtration scheme wherein a process involving measurement selects from a primordial assembly of systems those bearing some prescribed vector of interest. By contrast, the empirical experiences with which quantum theory is actually concerned relate measurement and preparation in quite an opposite manner. Reproducible preparation schemes are logically and temporally (...) anterior to measurement acts. Measurement extracts numbers from systems prepared in a specified manner; these data are then regularized by the theory by means of a state concept which is in turn used to characterize succinctly the given mode of preparation. The present paper offers, in a simple spin model, a method for determining the quantum state that represents any reproducible preparation. (shrink)

Marchildon’s (favorable) assessment (quant-ph/0303170, to appear in Found. Phys.) of the Pondicherry interpretation of quantum mechanics raises several issues, which are addressed. Proceeding from the assumption that quantum mechanics is fundamentally a probability algorithm, this interpretation determines the nature of a world that is irreducibly described by this probability algorithm. Such a world features an objective fuzziness, which implies that its spatiotemporal differentiation does not “go all the way down”. This result is inconsistent with the existence of an (...) evolving instantaneous state, quantum or otherwise. (shrink)

The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states – the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious (...) "collapse of the wave function" by relating it to a sudden change in the epistemic situation of the observer registering a measured result. On the other hand, his remarks on quantum probabilities as "potentia" or "objective tendencies" are difficult to reconcile with such a reading. The accounts that are attributed to Heisenberg by the different possible readings considered are subjected to closer scrutiny; at the same time, their respective virtues and problems are discussed. _German_ Diese Arbeit untersucht mögliche Lesarten von Heisenbergs späten Bemerkungen über die Natur von Quantenzuständen. Insbesondere wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Heisenberg als Vertreter der epistemischen Auffassung von Quantenzuständen gelten kann – der Idee, dass Quantenzustände nicht Beschreibungen der objektiven Eigenschaften von Quantensystemen sind sondern die epistemischen Beziehungen von Beobachtern zu diesen Systemen widerspiegeln. Einerseits erscheint es plausibel, dass Heisenberg dieser Sichtweise zustimmt, wenn man sich ansieht, wie er den berüchtigten,,Kollaps der Wellenfunktion" verteidigt, indem er ihn mit einer plötzlichen Änderung in der Kenntnis des ein Messergebnis registrierenden Beobachters in Zusammenhang bringt. Andererseits sind seine Bemerkungen über quantenmechanische Wahrscheinlichkeiten als,,Potentia" oder,,objektive Tendenzen" mit einer solchen Lesart nur schwer in Einklang zu bringen. Die Positionen, die Heisenberg den verschiedenen möglichen Lesarten zufolge vertritt, werden eingehenden Untersuchungen unterzogen; gleichzeitig werden ihre jeweiligen Vorzüge und Probleme diskutiert. (shrink)

Although there is a complete consensus among working physicists with respect to the practical and operational meanings of quantum states, and also a rather loosely formulated general philosophic view called the Copenhagen interpretation, a great deal of confusion and divergence of opinions exist as to the details of the measurement process and its effects upon quantum states. This paper reviews the current expositions of the measurement problem, limiting itself for lack of space primarily to the writings of physicists; (...) it calls attention to inconsistencies and proposes resolutions. Except for a summary of the properties of statistical matrices which are needed in Part II, the first part is non-mathematical and deals largely with two kinds of probability, reducible and irreducible probabilities, which need to be distinguished for a proper understanding of the measurement act. (shrink)

Lewis et al. recently demonstrated that additional assumptions such as preparation independence are always necessary to rule out a psi-epistemic model, in which the quantum state is not uniquely determined by the underlying physical state. Here we point out that these authors ignored the important work of Aharonov, Anandan and Vaidman on protective measurements, and their conclusion, which is based only on an analysis of conventional projective measurements, is not true.

Abstract This paper argues that there are good reasons to adopt a non-reductive account of states when it comes to quantum mechanics. That is to say, it is argued that there are advantages to thinking about states as sui generis, as reducible to classes of values of quantities, when it comes to the quantum domain. One reason for holding this view is that it seems to improve the prospects for explanation. In more detail, it is argued that there (...) is an 'explanatory shortfall' in the quantum domain owing to the failure of value definiteness. To remedy this situation, two proposals are put forward about the nature of the quantum state: Proposal A, that the quantum state is the only first-order property of quantum systems, Proposal B, that the quantum state is one first-order property among many. These proposals seem equally good. (shrink)

The ontological model framework provides a rigorous approach to address the question of whether the quantum state is ontic or epistemic. When considering only conventional projective measurements, auxiliary assumptions are always needed to prove the reality of the quantum state in the framework. For example, the Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph theorem is based on an additional preparation independence assumption. In this paper, we give a new proof of psi-ontology in terms of protective measurements in the ontological model framework. It (...) is argued that the proof needs not rely on auxiliary assumptions, and also applies to deterministic theories such as the de Broglie-Bohm theory. In addition, we give a simpler argument for psi-ontology beyond the framework, which is only based on protective measurements and a weaker criterion of reality. The argument may be also appealing for those people who favor an anti-realist view of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In a previous article it was shown that in general quantum states represent perspectives on the potentialities of quantum systems, rather than the potentialities themselves. In the present paper the following questions are investigated in the context of this result: (1) How do quantum states which undergo collapse transform under pure translations? (2) Under what conditions do quantum states represent the potentialities themselves? Two alternatives are presented in response to the first question: (1) Quantum states (...) are scalars under translations. (2) The collapse of a quantum state propagates between frames of reference at the speed of light. The advantages and disadvantages of the two alternatives are discussed. The response to the second question is shown to depend on the chosen alternative. In addition, the second alternative is shown to lead to a consistent view of quantum states as “potential perspectives on potentialities.”. (shrink)

In this work, we discuss the failure of the principle of truth functionality in the quantum formalism. By exploiting this failure, we import the formalism of N-matrix theory and non-deterministic semantics to the foundations of quantum mechanics. This is done by describing quantum states as particular valuations associated with infinite non-deterministic truth tables. This allows us to introduce a natural interpretation of quantum states in terms of a non-deterministic semantics. We also provide a similar construction for (...) arbitrary probabilistic theories based in orthomodular lattices, allowing to study post-quantum models using logical techniques. (shrink)

It is usually assumed that the quantum state is sufficient for deducing all probabilities for a system. This may be true when there is a single observer, but it is not true in a universe large enough that there are many copies of an observer. Then the probability of an observation cannot be deduced simply from the quantum state (say as the expectation value of the projection operator for the observation, as in traditional quantum theory). (...) One needs additional rules to get the probabilities. What these rules are is not logically deducible from the quantum state, so the quantum state itself is insufficient for deducing observational probabilities. (shrink)

This is the second, mathematically more detailed part of a paper consisting of two articles, the first having appeared in the immediately preceding issue of this Journal. It shows that a measurement converts a pure case into a mixture with reducible probabilities. The measurement as such permits no inference whatever as to the state of the physical system subjected to measurement after the measurement has been performed. But because the probabilities after the act are classical and therefore reducible, it (...) is often possible to adjust them so that Von Neumann's projection postulate is true. Among the more specific features dealt with in Part II is the occurrence of negative joint probabilities for the measurement of non-commuting operators in certain (not all!) quantum states. The general conclusions reached are stated at the end of the article. (shrink)

Recently Lewis et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 150404 ] demonstrated that additional assumptions such as preparation independence are always necessary to rule out a psi-epistemic model, in which the quantum state is not uniquely determined by the underlying physical state. Their conclusion is based on an analysis of conventional projective measurements. Here we demonstrate that protective measurements, which are distinct from projective measurements, already shows that distinct quantum states cannot be compatible with a single (...) class='Hi'>state of reality. This improves the interesting result obtained by Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph [Nature Phys. 8, 475 ]. (shrink)

Recently the geometry of quantum states has been under considerable development. Every good geometry deserves, if possible, an accompanying trigonometry. I will here introduce such a trigonometry to accompany the geometry of quantum states.

Weight systems on chord diagrams play a central role in knot theory and Chern-Simons theory; and more recently in stringy quantum gravity. We highlight that the noncommutative algebra of horizontal chord diagrams is canonically a star-algebra, and ask which weight systems are positive with respect to this structure; hence we ask: Which weight systems are quantum states, if horizontal chord diagrams are quantum observables? We observe that the fundamental gl(n)-weight systems on horizontal chord diagrams with N strands (...) may be identified with the Cayley distance kernel at inverse temperature beta=ln(n) on the symmetric group on N elements. In contrast to related kernels like the Mallows kernel, the positivity of the Cayley distance kernel had remained open. We characterize its phases of indefinite, semi-definite and definite positivity, in dependence of the inverse temperature beta; and we prove that the Cayley distance kernel is positive (semi-)definite at beta=ln(n) for all n=1,2,3,... In particular, this proves that all fundamental gl(n)-weight systems are quantum states, and hence so are all their convex combinations. We close with briefly recalling how, under our "Hypothesis H", this result impacts on the identification of bound states of multiple M5-branes. (shrink)

There is a longstanding debate on the metaphysical relation between quantum states and the systems they describe. A series of relatively recent ψ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\psi$$\end{document}-ontology theorems have been taken to show that, provided one accepts certain assumptions, “quantum states are real”. In this paper I investigate the question of what that claim might be taken to mean in light of these theorems. It is argued that, even if one accepts the framework (...) and assumptions employed by such theorems, such a conclusion is not warranted. Specifically, I argue that when a so-called ontic state is taken to describe the properties of a system, the relation between this state and some quantum state as established by ψ\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\psi$$\end{document}-ontology theorems, is not of the kind that would warrant counting the quantum state among these properties in any way. (shrink)

This paper examines the statistical properties of random quantum states, for four different kinds of random state:(1) a pure state chosen at random with respect to the uniform measure on the unit sphere in a finite-dimensional Hilbert space;(2) a random pure state in a real space;(3) a pure state chosen at random except that a certain expectation value is fixed;(4) a random mixed state with fixed eigenvalues. For the first two of these, we give (...) examples of simple states of a model system, the kicked top, which have the statistical properties of random states. Interestingly, examples of both kinds of randomness can be found in the same system. In studying the last two kinds of random state, we obtain new results concerning the application of information theory to quantum systems. (shrink)

In quantum mechanics, the state of an individual particle (or system) is unobservable, i.e., it cannot be determined experimentally, even in principle. However, the notion of “measuring a state” is meaningful if it refers to anensemble of similarly prepared particles, i.e., the question may be addressed: Is it possible to determine experimentally the state operator (density matrix) into which a given preparation procedure puts particles. After reviewing the previous work on this problem, we give simple procedures, (...) in the line of Lamb's operational interpretation of quantum mechanics, for measuring a translational state operator (whether pure or mixed), via its Wigner function. These procedures closely parallel methods that might be used in classical mechanics to determine a true phase space probability distribution; thus, the Wigner function simulates such a distribution not only formally, but operationally also. There is no way to determine what the wave function (or state vector) of a system is—if arbitrarily given, there is no way to “measure” its wave function. Clearly, such a measurement would have to result in afunction of several variables, not in a relatively small set ofnumbers .... In order to verify the [quantum] theory in its generality, at least a succession of two measurements are needed. There is in general no way to determine the original state of the system, but having produced a definite state by a first measurement, the probabilities of the outcomes of a second measurement are then given by the theory.E. P. Wigner(1). (shrink)

We present a toy theory that is based on a simple principle: the number of questions about the physical state of a system that are answered must always be equal to the number that are unanswered in a state of maximal knowledge. Many quantum phenomena are found to have analogues within this toy theory. These include the noncommutativity of measurements, interference, the multiplicity of convex decompositions of a mixed state, the impossibility of discriminating nonorthogonal states, the (...) impossibility of a universal state inverter, the distinction between bipartite and tripartite entanglement, the monogamy of pure entanglement, no cloning, no broadcasting, remote steering, teleportation, entanglement swapping, dense coding, mutually unbiased bases, and many others. The diversity and quality of these analogies is taken as evidence for the view that quantum states are states of incomplete knowledge rather than states of reality. A consideration of the phenomena that the toy theory fails to reproduce, notably, violations of Bell inequalities and the existence of a Kochen-Specker theorem, provides clues for how to proceed with this research program. (shrink)

Any attempt to construct a realist interpretation of quantum theory founders on the Kochen-Specker theorem, which asserts the impossibility of assigning values to quantum quantities in a way that preserves functional relations between them. We construct a new type of valuation which is defined on all operators, and which respects an appropriate version of the functional composition principle. The truth-values assigned to propositions are (i) contextual; and (ii) multi-valued, where the space of contexts and the multi-valued logic for (...) each context come naturally from the topos theory of presheaves. The first step in our theory is to demonstrate that the Kochen-Specker theorem is equivalent to the statement that a certain presheaf defined on the category of self-adjoint operators has no global elements. We then show how the use of ideas drawn from the theory of presheaves leads to the definition of a generalised valuation in quantum theory whose values are sieves of operators. In particular, we show how each quantum state leads to such a generalised valuation. A key ingredient throughout is the idea that, in a situation where no normal truth-value can be given to a proposition asserting that the value of a physical quantity A lies in a set D of real numbers , it is nevertheless possible to ascribe a partial truth-value which is determined by the set of all coarse-grained propositions that assert that some function f(A) lies in f(D), and that are true in a normal sense. The set of all such coarse-grainings forms a sieve on the category of self-adjoint operators, and is hence fundamentally related to the theory of presheave. (shrink)

It is pointed out that the Diosi-Penrose ansatz for gravity-induced quantum state reduction can be tested by observing oscillations in the flavor ratios of neutrinos originated at cosmological distances. Since such a test would be almost free of environmental decoherence, testing the ansatz by means of a next generation neutrino detector such as IceCube would be much cleaner than by experiments proposed so far involving superpositions of macroscopic systems. The proposed microscopic test would also examine the universality of (...) superposition principle at unprecedented cosmological scales. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Found Phys 54:14, 2024), Carcassi, Oldofredi and Aidala concluded that the \(\psi\) -ontic models defined by Harrigan and Spekkens cannot be consistent with quantum mechanics, since the information entropy of a mixture of non-orthogonal states are different in these two theories according to their information theoretic analysis. In this paper, I argue that this no-go theorem for \(\psi\) -ontic models is false by explaining the physical origin of the von Neumann entropy in quantum mechanics.

In the quantum-Bayesian approach to quantum foundations, a quantum state is viewed as an expression of an agent’s personalist Bayesian degrees of belief, or probabilities, concerning the results of measurements. These probabilities obey the usual probability rules as required by Dutch-book coherence, but quantum mechanics imposes additional constraints upon them. In this paper, we explore the question of deriving the structure of quantum-state space from a set of assumptions in the spirit of (...) class='Hi'>quantum Bayesianism. The starting point is the representation of quantum states induced by a symmetric informationally complete measurement or SIC. In this representation, the Born rule takes the form of a particularly simple modification of the law of total probability. We show how to derive key features of quantum-state space from (i) the requirement that the Born rule arises as a simple modification of the law of total probability and (ii) a limited number of additional assumptions of a strong Bayesian flavor. (shrink)

The collapse of quantum states is analyzed in terms of a breakdown into two generic phases: Phase I, in which the field of potentialities that the quantum state represents undergoes a discontinuous and unpredictable change into one of the base states which corresponds to the measurement performed, and phase II, in which a transition from the level of potentialities to the level of actualities takes place. Phase I is discussed in relation to a comment about collapse, made (...) by Dirac in conversation with the author, “Nature makes a choice.” An analysis of phase II leads to the suggestion that it occurs only through and as an act of experience. This postulate is shown to elucidate basic questions regarding the interpretation of quantum mechanics, such as the elusive demarcation line between the classical and quantum domains, and the controversy of the ontological vs. epistemological interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, we postulate a low-entropy boundary condition to account for the temporal asymmetry. In this paper, I show that the Past Hypothesis also contains enough information to simplify the quantum ontology and define a unique initial condition in such a world. First, I introduce Density Matrix Realism, the thesis that the quantum universe is described by a fundamental density matrix that represents something objective. This stands in sharp contrast (...) to Wave Function Realism, the thesis that the quantum universe is described by a wave function that represents something objective. Second, I suggest that the Past Hypothesis is sufficient to determine a unique and simple density matrix. This is achieved by what I call the Initial Projection Hypothesis: the initial density matrix of the universe is the normalized projection onto the special low-dimensional Hilbert space. Third, because the initial quantum state is unique and simple, we have a strong case for the \emph{Nomological Thesis}: the initial quantum state of the universe is on a par with laws of nature. This new package of ideas has several interesting implications, including on the harmony between statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics, the dynamic unity of the universe and the subsystems, and the alleged conflict between Humean supervenience and quantum entanglement. (shrink)

The original development of the formalism of quantum mechanics involved the study of isolated quantum systems in pure states. Such systems fail to capture important aspects of the warm, wet, and noisy physical world which can better be modelled by quantum statistical mechanics and local quantum field theory using mixed states of continuous systems. In this context, we need to be able to compute quantum probabilities given only partial information. Specifically, suppose that B is a (...) set of operators. This set need not be a von Neumann algebra. Simple axioms are proposed which allow us to identify a function which can be interpreted as the probability, per unit trial of the information specified by B, of observing the (mixed) state of the world restricted to B to be σ when we are given ρ – the restriction to B of a prior state. This probability generalizes the idea of a mixed state (ρ) as being a sum of terms (σ) weighted by probabilities. The unique function satisfying the axioms can be defined in terms of the relative entropy. The analogous inference problem in classical probability would be a situation where we have some information about the prior distribution, but not enough to determine it uniquely. In such a situation in quantum theory, because only what we observe should be taken to be specified, it is not appropriate to assume the existence of a fixed, definite, unknown prior state, beyond the set B about which we have information. The theory was developed for the purposes of a fairly radical attack on the interpretation of quantum theory, involving many-worlds ideas and the abstract characterization of observers as finite information-processing structures, but deals with quantum inference problems of broad generality. (shrink)

The paper investigates the epistemic conception of quantum states---the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the assigning agents' epistemic relations to the systems. This idea, which can be found already in the works of Copenhagen adherents Heisenberg and Peierls, has received increasing attention in recent years because it promises an understanding of quantum theory in which neither the measurement problem nor a conflict between quantum non-locality and relativity theory (...) arises. Here it is argued that the main challenge for proponents of this idea is to make sense of the notion of a state assignment being performed correctly without thereby acknowledging the notion of a true state of a quantum system---a state it is in. An account based on the epistemic conception of states is proposed that fulfills this requirement by interpreting the rules governing state assignment as constitutive rules in the sense of John Searle. (shrink)

Here I shall call elements (1)-(3) the quantum state (or the “state”), since they give the quantum state of the universe that obeys the dynamical laws and is written in terms of the kinematic variables, and I shall call elements (4)-(6) the probability rules (or the “rules”), since they specify what it is that has probabilities (here taken to be the results of observations, Oj, or “observations” for short), the rules for extracting these observational probabilities (...) from the quantum state, and the meaning of the probabilities. What I shall write below is largely independent of the meaning of the probabilities, though personally I view them in a rather Everettian way as objective measures for the set of observations with positive probabilities. Usually it is implicitly believed that the observational probabilities depend strongly upon the quantum state. (Sometimes the Everett interpretation [2] is taken to mean that all of physical reality is determined purely by the quantum state, without the need for any additional rules to extract probabilities, but this extreme view seems untenable [4] and will not be adopted here. Instead, I shall discuss the opposite view, that the probabilities are independent of the quantum state.) However, some advocates of inflation[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] often claim that our observations do not depend upon the quantum state at all, but rather that inflation acts as an attractor to give the same statistical distribution of observations from any state. In this note, I shall use the framework of state plus rules to discuss this possibility that observational probabilities might be independent of the quantum state. I shall show that this indeed is logically possible, but apparently only if the probability rules are rather ad hoc. If indeed the rules are this ad hoc, so that the probabilities of our observations do not depend upon a quantum state at all, it would seem to leave it mysterious why many of our observations can be simply interpreted as if our universe really were quantum.. (shrink)

Often it is assumed that a quantum state or a phase-space distribution must be normalizable. Here it is shown that even if it is not normalizable, one may be able to extract normalized observational probabilities from it.