Recognition theory attempts to conceptualize interpersonal relationships and their normative political implications. British social philosopher Gillian Rose developed her own version of recognition rooted in the work of Georg Hegel. This article applies Rose's theory of recognition to care, arguing that its emphasis on lack of identity, the dynamic process of recognition and the existential risks involved accurately describes the relationship between nurse and patient. Rose's version is compared to both contemporary notions of the (...) interpersonal in healthcare literature, other forms of recognition theory and Emmanuel Levinas's vision of intersubjective relationships, a traditional philosophical basis for nursing care. In each case, I will argue that Rosean recognition is a fuller, more complex and ultimately more satisfying view of the relationships involved. (shrink)

So far, recognition theory has focused its attention on modern capitalism and its formation in richer Western societies and has neglected issues of global poverty. A brief sketch of Axel Honneth's recognition theory precedes an examination of how the theory can contribute to a better understanding of global poverty, and justice in relation to poverty. I wish to highlight five ways in which recognition theory can enrich our inventory of theories dealing with global (...) poverty and justice: It emphasizes the importance of giving victims of poverty due weight in theorizing about poverty. It provides a vocabulary to conceptualize the experiences of suffering by poverty in terms of misrecognition. It highlights the importance of legal recognition and of actually having certain rights in order to be respected. It bases its critique of poverty on a particular idea of justice and how it should unfold. Finally, recognition theory demands that the poor must be involved in decision-making processes and their agency has .. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper attempts to explore the ways through which the discourse on global justice can be expanded beyond the language of redistribution by utilizing the insights from the theory of recognition as proposed by Honneth. It looks into the potential contributions of recognition theory in the normative analysis of global poverty and inequality. Taking off from the argument that the focus on global redistributive justice is misleading, the paper makes three claims: firstly, any global justice discourse (...) must take as its point of departure the experience of suffering of the poor; secondly, suffering poverty, the global poor experience shame or humiliation, thereby, degrading their sense of self-worth and their capacity for independent agency; thirdly, the goal of global justice is not simply the poor’s equal access to resources but self-realization. In the end, the paper argues that the recognition paradigm is a useful tool in analyzing and theorizing global justice. (shrink)

The revival of recognition theory has brought new energy to critical theory. In general terms, recognition theory aims to critically evaluate social structures against a standard of social freedom identified with norms of interaction which are freely recognized by all parties. Until now, attention has primarily focused on the categories and forms of recognition theory. However, the influence of contemporary French theory upon the development of theories of recognition has not yet (...) received the consideration it merits. The book takes up this task. With chapters by internationally recognized authors, the collection outlines the current state of recognition theory, studies the impact of French theory, and uses French thought to identity aspects of the recognitive process which are often overlooked. Exploring French accounts of agonistic identity construction, vulnerability, power, ethical obligation, and reflexive theory construction, this book supports the intentions of critical theory with heightened attentiveness to oppression in all of its forms. (shrink)

Understanding how look-ahead search and pattern recognition interact is one of the important research questions in the study of expert problem solving. This paper examines the implications of the template theory Gobet & Simon, 1996a , a recent theory of expert memory, on the theory of problem solving in chess. Templates are chunks Chase & Simon, 1973 that have evolved into more complex data structures and that possess slots allowing values to be encoded rapidly. Templates may (...) facilitate search in three ways: a by allowing information to be stored into LTM rapidly; b by allowing a search in the template space in addition to a search in the move space; and c by compensating loss in the minds eye due to interference and decay. A computer model implementing the main ideas of the theory is presented, and simulations of its search behaviour are discussed. The template theory accounts for the slight skill difference in average depth of search found in chess players, as well as for other empirical data. (shrink)

Kantian moral theory is construed as the paradigm of deontology, where such an approach to ethics is opposed to consequentialism and perfectionism. However, in Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim, Kant understands historical progress in terms of the realisation of our rational capacities, to the extent that such emphasis on capability actualisation amounts to a form of moral perfectionism: wars and incessant periods of armed conflict lead rulers to grasp the value of peace, because war and (...) armed conflict prevent human beings from achieving self-realisation. For Kant, in order to enable self-realisation, states must work together to establish a federal union of republican governments. The aim of this chapter is to (i) articulate and defend a perfectionist dimension of Kantian ethics; and (ii) propose that an insightful way of articulating Kantian Cosmopolitanism can be provided by paying significant attention to recognition theory. Following Honneth’s model of diagnostic social philosophy, I argue that armed conflict is best understood in terms of a particularly complex form of social pathology, where the peaceful resolution of such conflict requires a complex form of diagnosis and therapy. Under such an account, leadership involves taking the lead in diagnosing armed conflict as arising from an especially traumatic asymmetrical recognition order, and in proposing genuinely practical therapeutic solutions to resolving conflict by advocating specific progressive transformations to the current asymmetrical recognition order. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to argue, contra Axel Honneth, that ‘the summons’ ( Aufforderung), the central pillar of Fichte’s transcendentalist account of recognition, is best made sense of not as an ‘invitation’, but rather as a second-personal demand, whose illocutionary content draws attention to the demandingness of responsibilities towards vulnerable agents. Because of this, the summons has good explanatory force in terms of disclosing the phenomenological dynamics of psychosocially and politically significant reactive attitudes. Under my reading, then, (...) Fichte’s position, contra Honneth’s ‘negative’ treatment of it, is anything but an empty formalism that ‘fails to refer to subjects of flesh and blood’. (shrink)

The papers included are divided into five sections: Psychology and Philosophy of Perception and Discovery, Integrations of Experimental Findings, Theoretical Developments, Experimental Results from Neurophysiology and Psychology Pertinent to Model Building, and Computer Simulations of Complex Models. The last of these sections will probably prove most interesting to the contemporary philosopher of mind. Peirce, Cassirer, and Wittgenstein are the philosophers who make the scene in the first section; inclusion of material from the last of these is no mean editorial feat. (...) The volume aims to be comprehensive rather than intensive and while this makes it ideal for the philosopher, the psychologist may find it thin in spots.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This article offers a critical examination of theories that emphasize the importance of governmental provision of self-esteem to citizens. Self-esteem is the feeling that one’s abilities and achievements are positively appraised by the surrounding society, and in some cases the legal system. Such theories are becoming fashionable, following the influence of scholars such as Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser, and others.The author argues that such theories face major challenges, on two accounts. First, trying to provide universal self esteem would imply that (...) people would be under a duty to positively appraise the achievements of any given person, and that might violate the free exercise of judgment. Second, the dominant theories of recognition also emphasize the importance of self-respect. Such theories usually understand self-respect as ‘the relation of a person to herself/himself, that concerns their intrinsic worth’. The ability to positively or negatively appraise the conducts/achievements of other people is an integral part of this ‘intrinsic worth’. The attempt to provide universal positive appraisals means therefore that a simultaneous achievement of self respect and self esteem is not possible as a social goal. Recognition theories face therefore not only an external critique by libertarian and liberal approaches, but also internal problems of consistency between different parts of their own theories. (shrink)

I aim to articulate and develop a consolidated model of Axel Honneth’s Recognition Theory. This paper aims at investigating the relationship of asymmetries of identities and social struggles as a progressive process of recognition in Honneth’s works. My paper is divided into three parts. The first part provides a consolidated outlook on Honneth’s Recognition Theory from the Struggle for Recognition to his more recent work Freedom’s Right. The second part covers the relationship between social (...) struggles, social solidarity, and their effects on regenerating the necessary normative resources for individual selfactualization. The last part is my take on Honneth’s Recognition Theory in the form of understanding social pathologies in the context of investigating deficits of normative resources for self-actualization. (shrink)

This essay proposes recognition theory as a preferred approach to explaining poor women’s puzzling preference for patriarchal subordination even after they have accessed an ostensibly empowering asset: microfinance. Neither the standard account of adaptive preference offered by Martha Nussbaum nor the competing account of constrained rational choice offered by Harriet Baber satisfactorily explains an important variation of what Serene Khader, in discussing microfinance, dubs the self-subordination social recognition paradox. The variation in question involves women who, refusing to (...) reject the combined socio-economic benefits of patriarchal recognition and empowering microfinance, dissemble their subordination to men. In this situation, women experience a genuine form of divided consciousness which recognition theory frames as an identity crisis. Understanding the pathological nature of deceit as a way of life that blurs the boundaries between rational choice and rationalization, recognition theory shows how dissemblance itself is constrained by conflicting recognition orders in ways that prevent women who live such a life from successfully emancipating themselves. In this respect, recognition theory provides an important ---albeit, from the standpoint of recent feminist and intersectional research on identity and autonomy, inadequately qualified---norm of personal integrity and genuine agency requisite for conceptualizing adaptive preferences. (shrink)

The notion of recognition is an ethically potent resource for understanding human relational needs; and its negative counterpart, misrecognition, an equally potent resource for critique. Axel Honneth’s rich account focuses our attention on recognition’s role in securing basic self-confidence, moral self-respect, and self-esteem. With these loci of recognition in place, we are enabled to raise the intriguing question whether each of these may be extended to apply specifically to the epistemic dimension of our agency and selfhood. Might (...) we talk intelligibly—while staying in tune with Honneth’s concepts and their Hegelian key—of a generic idea of epistemic recognition? Such an idea might itself be seen to apply at the same three levels to indicate: first, basic epistemic self-confidence; second, our status as epistemically responsible; and third, a certain epistemic self-esteem that reflects the epistemic esteem we receive from others. The papers in this volume surely sound a chord in the affirmative, and together they steer us towards a multifaceted conception of how epistemic injustice is related to epistemic misrecognition, and indeed how we might construe a positive relation of epistemic recognition. (shrink)

This paper starts from the premise that Western states are connected to some of the harms refugees suffer from. It specifically focuses on the harm of acts of misrecognition and its relation to epistemic injustice that refugees suffer from in refugee camps, in detention centers, and during their desperate attempts to find refuge. The paper discusses the relation between hermeneutical injustice and acts of misrecognition, showing that these two phenomena are interconnected and that acts of misrecognition are particularly damaging when (...) they stretch over different contexts, leaving us without or with very few safe spaces, and they dislocate us, leaving us without a community to turn to. The paper then considers the ways in which refugees experience acts of misrecognition and suffer from hermeneutical injustice, using the case of unaccompanied children at the well-known and overcrowded camp Moria in Greece, the case of unsafe detention centers in Libya, and the case of the denial to assistance on the Mediterranean and the resulting pushbacks from international waters to Libya as well as the preventable drowning of refugees in the Mediterranean to illustrate the arguments. Finally, the paper argues for specific duties toward refugees that result from the prior arguments on misrecognition and hermeneutical injustice. (shrink)

Beginning with Margaret Somers and Christopher Roberts’ review of the sociology of human rights and Bryan Turner and Malcolm Waters’ debate therein, the author presents some of the questions which have been so far been the focus of this sociological sub-discipline. This review raises the question of ‘rights’ as a subject of study, and the normative consequences therein. From here, the author introduces recognition theory as a potential participant in these discussions around human rights. The author traces (...) class='Hi'>recognition theory from its Hegelian origins to the work of Axel Honneth, and the critiques of Nancy Fraser, Frantz Fanon, and Glen Sean Coulthard. Despite Fanon and Coulthard’s critical accounts, they reinforce the value of recognition within any sociology of human rights. Lastly, the author briefly engages with Alasdair MacIntyre as both a dialogical participant, and a means towards dialogue in the first place between recognition theory and human rights. Concluding, the author argues that the normative and descriptive nature of recognition theory offers a useful tool to aid in sociological theorizations of human nature and rights, while addressing some of the problems raised by early theorists of the sub-discipline and preventing siloing of the sub-discipline within a universalist or particularist vein. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to combine Pettit’s account(s) of freedom, both his work on discursive control and on non-domination, with Pippin’s and Brandom’s reinterpretation of Hegelian rational agency and the role of recognition theory within it. The benefits of combining these two theories lie, as the article hopes to show, in three findings: first, re-examining Hegelian agency in the spirit of Brandom and Pippin in combination with Pettit’s views on freedom shows clearly why and in which (...) way a Hegelian account of rational agency can ground an attractive socio-political account of freedom; second, the reconciling of discursive control and non-domination with Hegelian agency shows how the force and scope of recognition become finally tangible, without either falling into the trap of overburdening the concept, or merely reducing it to the idea of simple respect; third, the arguments from this article also highlight the importance of freedom as non-domination and how this notion is, indeed, as Pettit himself claims, an agency-freedom which aims at successfully securing the social, political, economic and even (some) psychological conditions for free and autonomous agency. (shrink)

This article argues that the dynamics behind the generation of social pathologies in modern society also undermine the social-relational framework for recognition. It therefore claims that the theory of recognition is impotent in face of the kinds of normative power exerted by social hierarchies. The article begins by discussing the particular forms of social pathology and their relation to hierarchical forms of social structure that are based on domination, control and subordination and then shows how the internalization (...) of the norms that shape and hold together hierarchical social formations causes pathologies within the self. As a result of these processes, the recognitive aspects of social action that the theory of recognition posits are unable to overcome and in fact reproduce and in many instances reinforce the pathologies themselves. (shrink)

In his recent book, Recognition: A Chapter in the History of European ideas (2021), Honneth has explained how he understands the French concept of recognition. This article places Honneth's latest interpretation in the context of his long-standing and evolving engagement with French theory over several decades. Honneth acknowledges his significant debt to a French tendency to view recognition as a problem for self-realisation (and not an opportunity). Bourdieu's and Boltanski's account of how ambitions become limited by (...) the availability of capital and the internalisation of class was a major breakthrough in Honneth's intellectual development. Other formative French influences included the articulation of denigration in existentialist phenomenology, and the idea of regulative power in Foucault, with “deconstructive” asymmetrical care presented as productive but comparatively less important. The discussion also reveals why Honneth presents the “German” concept of recognition as having basic explanatory force (as an opportunity for self-realisation), and why he resists what he views as a French-influenced tendency (also present in some contemporary German critical theory) to depict recognition as ambivalent. The discussion reveals, on one hand, how working across perceived divides can be immensely productive, and, on the other hand, why a French-German divide remains entrenched in contemporary thinking. (shrink)

피히테와 헤겔에 따르면 모든 인정의 관계는 양측의 동일성을 전제로 한다. 상호 인정의 관계를 이루며 결속된 두 주체는 자신의 고유성을 지닌 자립적 존재로 간주되어야 마땅하다. 양육의 인정 관계에서도 사정은 같다. 아이가 설령 ‘현상적’으로는 엄마에게 전적으로 의존하는 비대칭성 관계에 있는 듯 보일지라도, ‘개념적으로는’ 아이 역시 한 명의 자립적인 주체로서 간주되는 한에서만, 엄마와 아이 사이의 양육 관계는 기형적인 지배관계의 위험을 피할 수 있다. 그러나 호네트는 엄마와 아이 사이의 강한 의존성 관계와 정서적 합일을 중시하기 때문에 아이가 발생초기부터 한 명의 자립적인 주체로서 간주되어야 마땅하다는 개념적 (...) 차원을 필요한 만큼 강조하지 않는다. 호네트의 이런 접근법은 물론 도널드 위니컷의 양육론을 참조한 데서 유래한 것이지만, 과연 이것이 충실한 위니컷 전유로 간주될 수 있을지는 회의적이다. 위니컷은 아이를 그저 미력하고 불완전한 의존적 존재로만이 아니라 처음부터 자기 안에 실재하는 자기추구적 ‘욕망’에 힘입어 스스로의 성장을 주도해가는 ‘주체’로도 간주하기 때문이다. 태어나는 순간부터 아이가 지니는 “인간의 신체” 그 자체에 우리를 강제하는 규범적 힘이 있다는 피히테의 통찰, “자기의식은 여하간 욕망”이라는 헤겔의 선언도 이와 일맥 상통한다. 모든 아이들은 설혹 미력한 동물처럼 보일지라도 이미 처음부터 ‘한 명의 고유한 자립적 주체가 될 존재로서의 자격과 권한’을 자기 안에 지닌 채로 우리 곁에 온다. 좋은 양육의 이론과 실천은 이 사실에 마땅한 주의를 기울일 때라야 비로소 시작될 수 있다. (shrink)

‘Recognition’ is a normative concept denoting the ascription of positive status to a group or an individual by (an) other(s). In its larger meaning, it carries the implication that when a group or an individual can justifiably expect such a positive status-ascription, its denial (misrecognition) is unjustified and unethical. I discuss the role that the concept of recognition can play at the intersection of two philosophies, pragmatism and contemporary critical theory. My perspective is one that embraces the (...) ‘pragmatic turn’ in critical theory and sees the possibility of reciprocal benefit for pragmatism in how critical theory handles issues of material culture, alienation and networks of power. I argue that a critical social theory incorporating pragmatist presuppositions ought to bring the concept of recognition to bear in how it isolates and treats the ‘real interests’ of groups and individuals who have suffered and continue to suffer from broad social ascriptions of negative status, or who, through lack of voice and access to the public sphere, remain paralysed to participation in a thriving liberal democracy. In doing so, I do not construe recognition primarily as ‘positive tolerance’ or understanding of cultural, ethnic, or gender identity, but as a minimally substantive tool for understanding, and potentially correcting, how misrecognition impacts the collective and individual agency of the historically oppressed. (shrink)

도시가 이방인들의 상호작용 공간이라면, 도시민을 위한 윤리는 서로를 인정하는 규범을 모색하는 데서 시작해야할 것이다. 이에 필자는 동일성이 아니라 자신과 타자의 타자성과 한계를 인정하는 윤리야말로 이방인들의 상호작용을 위한 규범이어야 함을 주장한다. 이를 위해 필자는 우선 헤겔에서 나타나는 인정 이론의 단초에 주목하고, 이를 통해 왜 인정은 타자의 인정을 필요로 하는지, 왜 인정은 상호인정일 수밖에 없는지를 설명한다. 나아가 필자는 헤겔로부터 발전시킨 호네트의 인정윤리를 본격적으로 살펴보는 가운데 현대 도시민들이 일상 안에서 세 가지 자기관계가 훼손되는 경험을 하고 있으며, 이러한 도덕적 훼손을 막기 위해서는 세 가지 (...) 인정 형식이 필요함을 보여주고자 한다. 그러나 호네트의 인정 이론은 여전히 자아의 확실성을 향한 실천이론이고 따라서 이를 실천하는 과정에서 자아와 타자의 타자성을 배제시키는 동일화의 폭력을 가할 수 있다. 따라서 필자는 마지막으로 버틀러의 포스트-헤겔주의적 인정이론을 통해 호네트의 인정윤리를 비판적으로 검토하는 가운데 도시민을 위한 인정윤리는 자신을 확인하기 위한 인정이 아니라 자신의 타자성과 한계를 인정하는 방향으로 나아가야하며, 이럴 때 비로소 도시민은 판단중지를 통해 타자성에 귀 기울일 수 있음을 주장하고자 한다. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to combine Pettit’s account(s) of freedom, both his work on discursive control and on non-domination, with Pippin’s and Brandom’s reinterpretation of Hegelian rational agency and the role of recognition theory within it. The benefits of combining these two theories lie, as the article hopes to show, in three findings: first, re-examining Hegelian agency in the spirit of Brandom and Pippin in combination with Pettit’s views on freedom shows clearly why and in which (...) way a Hegelian account of rational agency can ground an attractive socio-political account of freedom; second, the reconciling of discursive control and non-domination with Hegelian agency shows how the force and scope of recognition become finally tangible, without either falling into the trap of overburdening the concept, or merely reducing it to the idea of simple respect; third, the arguments from this article also highlight the importance of freedom as non-domination and how this notion is, indeed, as Pettit himself claims, an agency-freedom which aims at successfully securing the social, political, economic and even (some) psychological conditions for free and autonomous agency. (shrink)

In dialogue with his interlocutor, Axel Honneth summarizes the way his work on recognition has unfolded over the past two decades. While he has retained his principal insights, some important parts of his theory have changed. He comments that if he were to rewrite The Struggle for Recognition today, he would focus more on institutions and the historicization of recognition patterns. He clarifies his stance on some contemporary controversial issues, including the crisis of capitalism, gay marriage, (...) and his quarrel with Peter Sloterdijk. Finally, he sheds some light on topics much discussed within Critical Theory, such as the relation between theory and praxis and the possibility of politicizing recognition, and on lesser-known aspects of his theory, namely, the relationship between his work and literature. (shrink)

In considering what makes epistemic injustice and epistemologies of ignorance wrongful, Matthew Congdon has recently argued that they involve forms of epistemic misrecognition in involving epistemic disrespect, disesteem, and neglect. Following Congdon’s remarks that both epistemic injustice and epistemologies of ignorance involve such misrecognition, this chapter considers whether and how ignorance may not involve the same types of misrecognition as epistemic injustice. In fact, there may be, as of yet, unexplored and surprising ways in which ignorance and recognition work (...) in concert. In this chapter, I contend that some cases of genuine ignorance do not involve misrecognition, but a kind of recognition: sometimes ignorance is not about being insufficiently responsive to some normatively relevant features in another, but being too responsive to them. I then argue that we can see this sort of ‘paradox of ignorance’ in Charles Mills’s discussion of white ignorance and ideal theory. (shrink)

Moralism is an often-cited feature of populist politics; yet, as a concept, it remains under-theorised in current literature. This paper posits that to understand the threat that populism poses to democracy, it is necessary to develop this key feature of populism. Essential to discerning what moralism is is the difference between moralism, or moralistic blame, and moral criticism. While moral criticism is a restrained and thoughtful method of holding persons accountable for their actions, moralism amounts to a distinctly punitive form (...) of exclusion: it seeks to undermine the equal moral status of the target of criticism. As a key feature of populism, then, moralism enables a political actor to solidify a conception of the ‘morally-pure‘ while normalising hate and disrespect for particular persons and groups in society. Populism – shaped by the features of anti-pluralism and moralism – therefore presents a clear threat to democracy, especially if we consider pluralism and recognition-respect as two basic principles underpinning democracy itself. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe recognition of emotional facial expressions is often subject to contextual influence, particularly when the face and the context convey similar emotions. We investigated whether spontaneous, incidental affective theory of mind inferences made while reading vignettes describing social situations would produce context effects on the identification of same-valenced emotions as well as differently-valenced emotions conveyed by subsequently presented faces. Crucially, we found an effect of context on reaction times in both experiments while, in line with previous work, we (...) found evidence for a context effect on accuracy only in Experiment 1. This demonstrates that affective theory of mind inferences made at the pragmatic level of a text can automatically, contextually influence the perceptual processing of emotional facial expressions in a separate task even when those emotions are of a distinctive valence. Thus, our novel findings suggest that language acts as a contex... (shrink)

Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition has recently been criticised on the grounds that it conceives of the relationship between recognition and power in terms of an opposition. According to Honneth’s critics, this is too simple because recognition and power are often intertwined. My aim in this article is twofold: On the one hand, I seek to understand why Honneth conceives of recognition and power as opposed. As I will argue, this is not the result of (...) bad theorising; rather, there are important methodological considerations that account for this conception – specifically, the idea that one can develop an immanent critique of power in line with the tradition of the Frankfurt School only by adopting the participant perspective. On the other hand, I agree with the gist of what Honneth’s critics say and want to make a systematic proposal as to why opposing recognition and power is too simple. This proposal will build on the argument developed in the first part and will consist in the claim that to treat recognition and power as opposed is to consider recognition relations exclusively from the participant perspective in contrast to the observer perspective. As a result, the potential entanglement of recognition with problematic social arrangements cannot come into view. (shrink)

This book offers an original account of a distinctly republican theory of social and global justice. The book starts by exploring the nature and value of Hegelian recognition theory. It shows the importance of that theory for grounding a normative account of free and autonomous agency. It is this normative account of free agency which provides the groundwork for a republican conception of social and global justice, based on the core-ideas of freedom as non-domination and autonomy (...) as non-alienation. As the author argues, republicans should endorse a sufficientarian account of social justice, which focuses on the nature of social relationships and their effects on people's ability to act freely and realize their fundamental interests. On the global level, the book argues for the cosmopolitan extension of the republican principles of non-domination and non-alienation within a multi-level democratic system. In so doing, the book addresses a major gap in the existing literature, presenting an original theory of justice, which combines Hegelian recognition theory and republican ideas of freedom, and applying this hybrid theory to the global domain. Fabian Schuppert creates a grand synthesis uniting neo-republican insights on freedom with Hegelian recognition theory. The result is an account of agency that arises from the idea of non-domination whose aim it is to safeguard individual freedom. When combined with Hegelian recognition theory a social focus also emerges. This amalgam comments on many of the major disputes concerning global justice from a cosmopolitan perspective. Because of the broad scope and the many contemporary discussions engaged this book will be of keen interest to scholars as well as a welcome addition to the classroom. (shrink)

The topic of recognition has come to occupy a central place in debates in social and political theory. Developed by George Herbert Mead and Charles Taylor, it has been given expression in the program for Critical Theory developed by Axel Honneth in his book The Struggle for Recognition. Honneth's research program offers an empirically insightful way of reflecting on emancipatory struggles for greater justice and a powerful theoretical tool for generating a conception of justice and the (...) good that enables the normative evaluation of such struggles. This 2007 volume offers a critical clarification and evaluation of this research program, particularly its relationship to the other major development in critical social and political theory; namely, the focus on power as formative of practical identities proposed by Michel Foucault and developed by theorists such as Judith Butler, James Tully, and Iris Marion Young. (shrink)

This review article takes up certain key issues that are at stake in the valuable collection of essays edited by Lovell. It considers critically the argument that the adoption of Fraser's perspectival dualism implies regression to a base—superstructure theory of the social. It assesses the advantages of extending the dualism of redistribution and recognition to include also the need for participatory parity in the post-Westphalian political order. It raises again the question of whether Honneth is sociologically more forceful (...) than Fraser in arguing that material inequality is merely a facet of a more profound disrespect (lack of recognition). Lovell's assessment of Honneth's `recognition monism' is commended in that it resurrects an earlier critique of structural-functionalism to make a helpful distinction between social integration and (non-normative) system integration. She addresses these issues in terms of a wider critical realism concerned with disaggregating those social relations which are more causally generative from others: an approach which permits illuminating debates over the degree to which patriarchy and heteronormativity are contingent or necessary to late capitalism. Lovell also introduces Bourdieu into the debate, and especially his conceptions of misrecognition and symbolic violence. Finally, Sayer's vigorous arguments about the moral significance of distribution and class are considered as contributing to the current ethical turn. The article ends with an attempt to defend Bourdieu, whom Sayer sees both as a profound sociologist of class but also a theorist oriented too exclusively to agents' egoistic search for strategic advantage. The author concludes that although Fraser's perspectival trinity (or dualism) approach seems preferable to Honneth's monism, this should not obscure the empirical interweaving of deficiencies of distribution and of recognition in social reality. Indeed, new studies show the far-reaching consequences of this. In those societies where maldistribution is most marked, exposure to certain psychosocial risks such as low status (recognition) and low social capital literally incorporate stress, via biological pathways. Hence unequal health outcomes of a surprising range can also be detected. (shrink)

In the words of Catharine MacKinnon, "a woman is not yet a name for a way of being human." In other words, women are still excluded, as authors and agents, from identifying what it is to be human and what therefore violates the dignity and integrity of humans. Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights is written in response to that failure. This collection of essays by prominent feminist thinkers advances the positive feminist project of remapping the moral landscape by developing (...) class='Hi'>theory that acknowledges the diversity of women. (shrink)

Theory and Practice in the Politics of Recognition and Misrecognition Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11158-012-9181-7 Authors Wendy Martineau, School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, 34 Tyndalls Park Road, Clifton, Bristol BS8 1TY, UK Nasar Meer, School of Arts and Social Sciences, Northumbria University, Lipman Building, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST UK Simon Thompson, Department of Arts, University of the West of England, Frenchay, Bristol BS16 1QY, UK Journal Res Publica Online ISSN (...) 1572-8692 Print ISSN 1356-4765 Journal Volume Volume 18 Journal Issue Volume 18, Number 1. (shrink)

Recognition, Work, Politics includes a range of essays in contemporary French critical theory around politics, recognition, and work, and their philosophical articulations. These issues are addressed from directions that include post-structuralism, the paradigm of the gift, recognition theory, and post-marxism.

본 연구는 혐오표현의 발생과 그에 대한 대항의 과정을 악셀 호네트의 인정이론으로 분석하고 자 했다. 호네트의 인정이론은 사회적 인정 관계를 중심으로 정체성의 형성을 설명한다. 각 개인 은 원초적 관계에서 신체적 욕구와 정서의 본능을 충족하고, 권리관계 속에서 도덕적 판단 능력 을 형성하며, 자신이 속한 가치 공동체 속에서 연대의 가치를 수용하고 자기 가치를 형성한다. 그 렇기에 한 개인의 정체성은 타자적 관점을 받아들이면서 자기 관계를 성립하고 또 사회적 가치의 구조를 확장하고자 하는 방향으로 전개된다고 말할 수 있다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 인정 관계의 구 조를 (...) 차용해서 혐오표현의 발생과 대항이 전개되는 과정을 설명하고자 했다. 혐오표현을 둘러싼 입장을 혐오표현을 하는 자, 혐오표현에 대항하는 자, 자신을 향한 혐오가 아님에도 대항하는 자 로 각각 나누어서 분석했다. 이 각각의 입장이 인정 질서 안에서 어떻게 발생하고 전개되는가를 고찰하고 각 입장이 사회적 인정의 어떤 방식에 해당하며, 어떤 실천적 자기 관계를 맺고 있는지 등에 관해서 파악하고자 했다. 호네트의 인정이론에서 자신을 향한 혐오표현에 저항하게 되는 계 기는 인정의 무시, 즉 한 개인의 권리관계 및 가치공동체 속의 연대의 파괴로 설명된다. 자신을 향한 혐오가 아님에도 대항하는 자는 혐오표현이 겨냥하는 소수자를 개별적이고 개성 있는 정체 성을 가지는 하나의 실존인 주체로 직면하기에 그들에 대한 물화에 저항하고자 한다. 반면에 혐 오표현을 하는 자의 입장은 내집단 안에서의 인정이 동등한 권리관계의 실현을 도외시하면서 일 어나는 경우에 해당한다고 볼 수 있다. 이와 같은 시도는 타자를 향한 물화의 시도로 나타나며, 실천적 자기관계의 정립 실패로 이어지기에 자아를 향한 물화로 이어지게 된다. (shrink)

ABSTRACT According to Max Horkheimer, a critical theory of society has to fulfil two tasks: the elimination of social injustice and the critical reflection of its own conceptual means. Based on this definition, I argue that Axel Honneth’s critical theory of recognition is at risk of losing sight of the ambivalence of recognition which limits the scope of his analysis of social pathologies. By drawing on the concept of misrecognising recognition it can be shown that (...) recognition itself is an ambivalent concept which can not only serve the purpose of self-realisation but also the purpose of self-subjection. Following the lead of Jean-Paul Sartre in this article I will unfold the concept of misrecognising recognition and put it at work to show how a variety of social pathologies of self-subjection can only be addressed if the ambivalence of recognition is taken into account. (shrink)

While inanimate objects can neither experience nor express emotions, in principle they can be expressive of emotions. In particular, music is a paradigmatic example of something expressive of emotions that surely cannot feel anything at all. The Contour theory accounts for music expressiveness in terms of those resemblances that hold between its external and perceivable properties and the typical contour of human emotional behavior. Provided that some critical aspects are emended – notably, the stress on the perception of similarity (...) instead of the more plausible hypothesis that the listener perceives manifestations that are similar – we are inclined to endorse contour theory. In particular, we share its basic idea that expressive properties are perceived. Although other kinds of processes – high-level conceptual inferences, imagination – sometimes characterize our encounters with music, still perception constitutes the standard process underlying the detection of expressiveness. Moreover, we propose to extend contour theory to visual arts. Taking into consideration, as a case study, depicted landscapes, we observe that they frequently cannot but express emotions such as joy, sadness, liveliness or melancholy. The fact that pictures, unlike music, lack any temporal dimension is a prima facie reason for doubting the extendibility of contour theory’s conceptual arsenal to them. Nevertheless, while being obviously unable to behave somehow, we claim that depicted landscapes can perfectly convey dynamic information. If this is the case, the extension of the notion of contour to visuals art via the stress on the notion of dynamism would represent a second interesting revision of contour theory. (shrink)

Axel Honneth makes initial and promising steps towards what could be called a two-level account of recognition, according to which the normatively substantial forms of recognition represent various manners in which the primordial acquaintedness with others is expressed. It will be argued that Honneth's promising approach must be revised in regard to the issue of intentionality, which may be achieved by reference to earlier critical theorists such as Adorno and Arendt. With such a foundation, critical theory can (...) enter into new fruitful interdisciplinary dialogue. (shrink)

From the perspective of Marek J. Siemek’s theory of modernity, one of the most important problem is to include conflicts into institutional framework of the modern society. He reinterprets Hegel’s dialectics of the struggle for recognition by conceptual tools of Hobbes and Marx in order to uncover hidden assumptions and conditions of possibility of the social rationality. For Siemek, law as purely formal, autopoetic social system or social subject, which produces individual subjects, is the first of the conditions (...) of possibility of modernity. The second one is the convergence of formal and material presuppositions of law—or, speaking generally—the convergence of form and content of the social reason. Form and content, facticity and normativity, instrumentality and communicativity are aspects of the process of rationalization andof the only one reason, self-generating in the history. So for Siemek, the Hegelian model of the struggle for recognition gains its theoretical power only when it is interpreted from the perspective of economical, technical and legal rationalization of modernity. Only such perspective is able to construct “the transcendental social philosophy” which starts from critique of “the non-instrumental reason”. (shrink)