The philosophical debate on the freedom of movement focuses almost exclusively on long-term migration, what I call, migration as settlement. The normative justifications defending border controls assume that the movement of people across political borders, independent of its purpose and the length of stay, refers to migration as settlement. “Global mobility,” “international movement,” and “immigration” are oftenused interchangeably. However, global mobility also refers to the movements of people across international borders for a short length of time such as travel, (...) short-term and circular migration. While most scholarly attention has focused on long-term migration, the vast majority of cross-border movement of people (approximately 85% of all cross-border movements in 2019) is short-term. The existing literature offers normative arguments for border controls, which are grounded on states’ right to self-determination, the freedom of (dis)association, the welfare state, the duty to compatriots, and brain drain. In this paper, I argue that these arguments do not justify excluding travelers, short-term and circular migrants from the territory. (shrink)

This article challenges Kieran Oberman’s derivation of a right to immigrate from the right to internal movement, residence, and employment. His argument depends on a cantilever strategy, which finds it illogical to recognize one right without recognizing an analogous second right. This differs from a direct argument, which derives a right directly from an essential human interest, and an instrumental argument, which identifies one right as a means to protecting another right. The strength (...) of a cantilever argument depends on the direct or instrumental foundations of the initial right and the aptness of the analogy between it and the new right that one seeks to establish. Oberman’s argument fails on both accounts. First, his defense of the initial right to internal movement, residence, and employment, although portrayed as a direct argument, actually rests on inapt cantilever analogies with other rights, such as freedom of speech or religion. Second, the overall cantilever argument for deriving the right to immigrate fails, because immigration across fiscally separate states is not analogous to movement, residence, and employment within a single, fiscally unified state. Instead, a right to travel and visit is the proper outcome of Oberman’s argument. (shrink)

This article examines how Hannah Arendt’s idea of a “right to have rights” could travel in the Americas. It offers a reading of the right to have rights that foregrounds the right to land as a basic right. This reading emerges through an attention to contemporary Indigenous social movements and political philosophy. Taken together, this examination and reading ask justice-oriented actors to support land back movements as part of a broader practice of defending human rights (...) and situating those rights within a responsibility to land. (shrink)

In 1538–39 Francisco de Vitoria delivered two relections:De IndisandDe iure belli.This article distills from these writings the topic of free trade as a “human right” in accordance withius gentiumor the “law of peoples.” The right to free trade is rooted in a more fundamental right to communication and association. The rights to travel, to dwell, and to migrate precede the right to trade, which is also closely connected to the rights to preach, to protect converts, (...) and to constitute Christian princes. This has significant repercussions on the field of business ethics: the right to free trade is ultimately founded directly on natural law and indirectly on divine law; trade is not independent of ethics; and trade is presented as an opportunity to develop the virtues of justice and friendship, among other repercussions. Vitoria is portrayed as a defender of private initiative and free markets. (shrink)

It is often claimed that states enjoy, as a consequence of their sovereign status, the right to control the passage of outsiders through their territory and that they have a discretion to admit or to refuse to admit outsiders, whether those outsiders be tourists, business travelers, would-be economic migrants, or even refugees. Or, to be more exact, such limitations on that right to control are derived from the agreement of states to treaties and conventions, agreement which they could (...) have withheld and could yet revoke. As a statement of the legal position this is not completely uncontroversial,1 but my aim in this paper is not to make a contribution to international law or law at all. Rather, my concern is with political philosophy and with the issue of whether.. (shrink)

United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) and UN agencies utilized techniques of power and negotiation to implement radiation exposure regulations. USAEC affiliated scientists’ expertise was cultivated while establishing a radiation protection regime based on classified experiments. World Health Organization (WHO) leadership sought to manifest a human right to health, including a right to protection from radiation contamination. The careers of a few technical experts and interagency UN correspondence shows how American risk models of radiation regulation traveled and ultimately (...) inhibited WHO attempts to frame radiation as a public health threat. The USAEC and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) navigated WHO’s way of perceiving radiation with technical experts and bureaucratic and legislative means. This paper shows the underpinning at the UN of competing models of radiation regulation, one state centric and the other, an individual right to health. This narrative provides insights into the nature of the UN’s current conceptualization of radiation regulation and argues for further research into UN, radiation, and human rights history. (shrink)

In responding to stimulating commentaries by David Owen, Shelley Wilcox, Tyler Paytas, Desiree Lim, and Lukas Schmid I develop my model of migration justice, showing how it has the resources needed not only to deal with these challenges but also to provide a fruitful approach to a full range of contemporary migration problems.

Perry Anderson se charge d’expliciter lui-même le sens de son dernier recueil d’essais, Spectrum : « On peut le considérer comme une sorte de travelling qui, se déplaçant de droite à gauche, éclaircit un paysage intellectuel particulier. […] Voilà le spectre auquel fait allusion le titre. » Il y a toutefois de bonnes raisons de proposer une autre lecture. Étant donné que le grand thème unificateur de ces essais, parus à l’origine entre 1992 et 2005 en différents lieux, est le (...) monde des idées .. (shrink)

Colombia has received the largest influx of Venezuelan refugees and migrants. Since 2015, more than 3 million Venezuelan migrants have entered the country. Those arriving in Cúcuta have several options for entering Colombian territory. One of the main routes involves a difficult and dangerous journey of nearly 200 km to the Metropolitan Area of Bucaramanga, which serves as a key territory for accessing various destinations. Because of its geographical location, this area serves as an important transit city, facilitating travel (...) to other major cities in Colombia, such as Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali; it is also a residence destination for Venezuelan migrants. Among the specific reasons why immigrants choose Bucaramanga over other cities are factors like climate, the existence of various cooperation organizations that provide assistance, and the considerable number of migrant individuals previously settled in this area; thus, many new migrants have family or friendship connections there. Furthermore, for many, it is the safest option or the only place they can go to when the weather turns cold. In this study, we analyze the institutional response and identify barriers that limit the protection of Venezuelan migrants’ right to access to healthcare in this location where Venezuelan citizens have faced economic, legal, bureaucratic, and social barriers. This has profound consequences for migrants’ health and poses a risk to their lives. The article is primarily based on interviews and fieldwork conducted with migrant populations between 2022 and 2023 to identify the barriers and supporting elements they experienced in terms of health care services. Likewise, this study makes a significant contribution by directly examining the experiences of Venezuelan migrants in relation to the right to health in this area. This provides a useful understanding of the social phenomenon at both the academic and institutional levels. (shrink)

BackgroundFollowing the increased presence of the Right-to-Die Movement, improved end-of-life options, and the political and legal status of aid-in-dying around the globe, suicide tourism has become a promising alternative for individuals who wish to end their lives. Yet, little is known about this from the perspective of those who engage in the phenomenon.MethodsThis study applied the qualitative research approach, following the grounded theory tradition. It includes 11 in-depth semi-structured interviews with Israeli members of the Swiss non-profit Dignitas who contemplated (...) traveling to Switzerland for aid-in-dying.ResultsSeven themes emerged from the data analysis, including health and functioning; feelings regarding survivorship and existence; interacting with the health sector; attitudes regarding death and dying; suicide; choosing death; and choosing suicide tourism. A significant portion of the participants had experienced suicidal thoughts and had even previously attempted suicide, some more than once. Most of them referred to chronic illnesses, functional disability, and social isolation. They understand suffering within the subjective dimension, namely only by the person who is actually subjected to the disease, ailments, and disability. Participants regarded aid-in-dying in Switzerland as positive thanks to its guaranteed outcome: "beautiful death", compared to "disadvantaged dying" which places a burden on the participants' loved ones throughout the prolonged dying. Most of them do not necessarily want to have their loved ones beside them when they die, and they see no significant meaning in dying in a foreign country to which they have no emotional or civil attachment.ConclusionThe desirable approval or tragic refusal by Dignitas to participants' requests for suicide tourism enhances the paradox between the perception of aid-in-dying as a mechanism for fulfilling controlled death and its bureaucratic and materialistic characteristics specifically reflected in a paid, formalized approach to aid-in-dying that cultivate dependency and collaboration. (shrink)

This reply offers a detailed refutation of some of the objections raised in Christopher Coope's extended discussion of The Spiritual Dimension. It explains the ‘non-partisan’ strategy of the book, which Coope systematically misunderstands, and exposes some serious problems with Coope's own preference for a harshly exclusivist form of Christianity. Several issues connected with religious belief are then discussed, including emotional involvement versus detachment in the assessment of religious claims; layers of meaning in religious language; human autonomy and divine authority; the (...) problem of evil; apophatic theology and transcendence; divine action in the world; and the doctrine of the afterlife. (shrink)

Kant makes and elaborates upon a distinction between active citizenship and passive citizenship. Active citizens enjoy the right to vote and rights of political participation generally. Passive citizens do not, though they still enjoy the protection of the law as citizens. Kant’s examples have left commentators puzzling over how these distinctions follow from his stated rationale or justification for active citizenship, namely, that active citizens possess a kind of political and economic self-sufficiency. This essay focuses on one subset passive (...) citizenry – that of traveling blacksmiths, barbers, and day laborers in order to examine Kant’s distinctions. I argue that these examples show that Kant’s concerns regarding dependence are, at least in some cases, pragmatic rather than political. (shrink)

Introduction: where do our rights come from? -- Jefferson's masterpiece: the Declaration of Independence -- Get off my land : the right to own property -- Names will never hurt me : the freedom of speech -- I left my rights in San Franscisco : the freedom of association -- You can leave any time you want: the freedom to travel -- You can leave me alone : the right to privacy -- That flesh is mine : (...) you own your body -- Sticks and stones will break my bones : the right to self-defense -- You'll hear from me : the right to petition the government for redress of grievances -- War . . .war . . .what is it good for? : the right to enjoy peace -- When the devil turns round on you : the right to fairness from the government -- A dime isn't worth a penny anymore : the right to sound money -- Theft by any other name : the right to spend your own money -- A ride on Dr. Feinberg's bus : the right to be governed by laws with moral limits -- Disobeying stupidity : the right to ignore the state -- Conclusion. (shrink)

Mary Wollstonecraft was one of the greatest philosophers and writers of the Eighteenth century. During her brief career, she wrote novels, treatises, a travel narrative, a history of the French Revolution, a conduct book, and a children's book. Her most celebrated and widely-read work is _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_. This Guidebook introduces: Wollstonecraft’s life and the background to _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ The ideas and text of _A Vindication of the Rights of Woman_ (...) Wollstonecraft’s enduring influence in philosophy and our contemporary intellectual life It is ideal for anyone coming to Wollstonecraft’s classic text for the first time and anyone interested in the origins of feminist thought. (shrink)

As space travel and intentions to colonise other planets are becoming the norm in public debate and scholarship, we must also confront the technical and survival challenges that emerge from these hostile environments. This paper aims to evaluate the various arguments proposed to meet the challenges of human space travel and extraterrestrial planetary colonisation. In particular, two primary solutions have been present in the literature as the most straightforward solutions to the rigours of extraterrestrial survival and flourishing: (1) (...) geoengineering, where the environment is modified to become hospitable to its inhabitants, and (2) human (bio)enhancement where the genetic heritage of humans is modified to make them more resilient to the difficulties they may encounter as well as to permit them to thrive in non-terrestrial environments. Both positions have strong arguments supporting them but also severe philosophical and practical drawbacks when exposed to different circumstances. This paper aims to show that a principled stance where one position is accepted wholesale necessarily comes at the opportunity cost of the other where the other might be better suited, practically and morally. This paper concludes that case-by-case evaluations of the solutions to space travel and extraterrestrial colonisation are necessary to ensure moral congruency and the survival and flourishing of astronauts now and into the future. (shrink)

Solitary Travelers takes its place alongside other revisionary works that assess the contribution of women writers to nineteenth‐century fields of study and disciplines of learning identified as male and associated with science. Lila Harper foregrounds the role of travel narratives in her analysis, arguing that they facilitated access to a scientific vocation for women writers and, indeed, that some women gravitated to travel writing “in a common quest for the professional recognition which seemed to be promised within a (...) territory marked ‘natural philosophy,’ ‘natural history,’ and, finally, ‘science’” . In an interesting and well‐written introduction to her subject, Harper demonstrates her sensitivity to basic historical issues of what constituted “science” in nineteenth‐century England and makes appropriate distinctions not just between the amateur and the professional but also between science as practice, hobby, vocation, and mode of observation.Harper is interested specifically in natural history travel narratives, her introduction tells us, and she chooses for her subjects Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Martineau, Isabella Bird Bishop, and Mary Kingsley. In separate chapters studying each of these key figures, she uses biographical data to undergird her analyses of the rhetorical strategies that each woman invoked in her travel writing. Her thorough examination of Wollstonecraft's Short Residence in Sweden adds much‐needed dimension to a writer known mainly for her Vindication of the Rights of Man and Vindication of the Rights of Woman . Locating within Wollstonecraft's text evidence of her interest in the Scandanavian landscape and wilderness, Harper stresses her close observation of the natural world and her apparent commitment to natural history. The subsequent attention in this chapter to Wollstonecraft's relationship with Gilbert Imiay, however necessary it may be to understanding her motivations for travel and need for authority, short‐circuits the analysis of Wollstonecraft's contributions to natural history at the turn of the century.Harper's chapter on Harriet Martineau examines her “ability to shape travel writing into an investigative tool for scientific observation while substantiating her influence on others and her intellectual stature” and to this end is geared also to basic issues of rhetorical strategy and authoritative voice, particularly as they surface in Society in America , Retrospect of Western Travel , and Eastern Life, Present and Past . Martineau is arguably the most written about of the women studied in Solitary Travelers, and consequently much of the material and perspective that Harper presents will be familiar to her readers.The chapter on Isabella Bird Bishop takes note of a crucial shift in the audience of this famous traveler, who began by writing for ladies' magazines but eventually addressed an audience of geographers, explorers, and members of colonial government. Harper sees Isabella Bird Bishop and Mary Kingsley, her final subject, as driven by the ambition to gain access into “the scientific community” , but her analysis is nevertheless far more focused on the content of their respective travel books than on any more tangible activity linked to professionalized science. Harper finds in Kingsley's prose, as in that of her other subjects, evidence of her manipulation of “a feminine discourse” and a corollary concern with “masculine scientific discourse” ; more provocative to my mind is her claim that Kingsley adopted the role of “martyr … both for scientific endeavors and for the future of developing colonial Africa” .This book's chief virtue is its readability. With each of her subjects, Harper provides a comprehensive and yet relatively succinct overview of the ways they used travel to undertake work construed, however loosely, as “science.” Although she claims that Kingsley's travel writing represents the culmination of a tradition of “women's naturalist travel writing,” I found myself somewhat suspicious of the term and yearning for more nuanced investigations of generalized categories such as “masculine scientific discourse.” Although each of the women Harper studies undertook travel writing and incorporated descriptions of the natural environments she encountered into her accounts, does it necessarily follow that they were working within, even helping to construct, a tradition of “naturalist travel writing”? Kingsley would probably have been the only one of these four to identify herself as a naturalist. The introduction to Solitary Travelers seems to promise a study of women using travel to work in natural history, but the book itself looks far more broadly at the rhetoric of authority and the appeal of “science” to these women. (shrink)

Reproductive technologies produce new babies and new bioethical concerns. This article analyzes how Danish infertile couples negotiate traveling to Spain for egg donation. Fertility travel is situated in light of Danish bioethical discourses, while feminist cultural analysis is used to understand how Spanish clinical discourses choreograph egg donation to involve an intimate and affective exchange between two like-minded women. The Danish travelers employ love and desire to naturalize transnational egg donation as well as anger and disappointment to invoke notions (...) of reproductive rights. The article concludes that empirical research on fertility travel opens up for discussion bioethical perspectives, such as those involving fair trade and reciprocity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.2 (2000) 241-261 [Access article in PDF] Should We All Be More English? Liang Qichao, Rudolf von Jhering, and Rights Stephen C. Angle [T]he Celestial Empire, with its bamboo, the rod for its adult children, and its hundreds of millions of inhabitants, will never attain, in the eyes of foreign nations, the respected position of little Switzerland. The natural disposition of the Swiss (...) in the matter of art and poetry is anything but ideal. It is sober and practical, like that of the Romans. But, in the sense in which I have thus far used the expression "ideal," in its relation to rights, it is just as applicable to the Swiss as to the Englishman. 1Rudolf von Jhering (1818-92) published Der Kampf ums Recht (The Struggle for Law) in 1872. He was already regarded as one of Germany's most important legal philosophers, and Der Kampf helped to ensure a world-wide reputation. His argument that people should be less like the "adult children" of China and more like the English found audiences everywhere, including China, where Der Kampf was translated between 1900 and 1901. Jhering's doctrines stimulated Liang Qichao (1873-1929), one of China's leading thinkers, to publish "Lun Quanli Sixiang (On Rights Consciousness)," in 1902 as part of his manifesto On the New People. Liang tells us that the "essential points" of his essay, which is among the earliest and most sustained treatments of the concept of rights to appear in Chinese, are mostly taken from Der Kampf. 2 We will see that there are indeed certain similarities that make Liang's "quanli" 3 (the standard Chinese translation of "rights") resonate with Jhering's notion of "Recht," and these similarities--chief among which is a kind of individual assertiveness--help to explain [End Page 241] Liang's interest in Jhering. My discussion of the two thinkers will offer at least the beginnings of an explanation of why German conceptions of law and rights were so attractive to Chinese intellectuals.As is often the case with cross-cultural comparisons, we will also see that these similarities mask some less obvious but deeply important differences. For Jhering the relation between following the procedures of the law and exercising one's Recht is crucial; for Liang, in contrast, quanli are deeply related to ethical concerns. This difference in turn colors their respective notions of assertiveness, which thus turn out not to resemble one another as closely as first appeared. When we see Recht and quanli as separate concepts emerging from separate discourse contexts, these differences will make sense.In "On Quanli Consciousness" Liang regularly quotes Jhering, often at some length. One important passage reads as follows: In ancient times, Lin Xiangru scolded the King of Qin saying: "Smash both my head and the jade disk!" 4 Now given the size of the state of Zhao, how could such love be expressed for a tiny thing like a jade disk? He was saying that Qin could smash the disk, kill him, invade his territory, endanger his state, and still he would not surrender. Ah! This was nothing other than "quanli"! Jhering has also said: "If an Englishman traveling to the European continent is one day asked to pay an irrational charge by the hotel's carriage driver, in every case he will resolutely scold [the driver]. If the driver won't heed his scolding, the Englishman will struggle for justice without tiring, always preferring to extend his stay; even if his traveling expenses were to increase as much as ten-fold, he would not cease. Unknowing people all laugh at this great fool, but none of them understand that this person's struggle over a few shillings is in fact a vital part of what allows the nation of England to stand tall by itself in the world. This abundance of quanli consciousness and sharpness of feelings of quanli are the great reasons behind the ability of the English to establish their state. Now let... (shrink)

Your digital camera is the perfect travel companion. You don't need to pack extra film, worry about airport scanners, budget for processing costs, or wait until you get home to learn whether you got that once-in-a-lifetime shot. Tuck this book in beside your Frommer's travel guide and you'll have everything you need for fantastic photos-how to watch for the right opportunity, compose the picture, work with lighting-even how to edit and upload from the road. * Learn what (...) you must take along and which accessories are nice to have * Capture the soul of a city, its people, and its sights * Include fellow travelers without shooting stereotypes * Take great shots even where flash is prohibited or your light sources are limited * Explore scenarios and expert tips for photographing scenery, wildlife, events, exhibits, and much more * Post your photos on the Web before you get home. (shrink)

In this article, we examine the relationship between the World Health Organization International Health Regulations (IHR) and human rights and its implications for IHR reform, considering the evolution of human rights in the 2005 IHR, the role of human rights in IHR reforms and the implications of these reforms in key domains including equity and solidarity, medical countermeasures, core capacities, travel restrictions, vaccine certificates, social measures, accountability, and financing.

In this chapter, I present some philosophical reflections on the theme of the imagination. The main inspiration for these reflections comes from two writers, both of whom are mentioned in Alain de Botton’s (2003) The Art of Travel: Joris-Karl Huysmans and Xavier de Maistre. De Botton uses both of these writers in his book as ‘guides’, people whose work prompts his own ruminations, Huysmans in the first chapter and de Maistre in the last. Speculatively, I infer from this structure (...) that de Botton has identified a similarity in the two writers’ attitudes to the relationship between travel and the imagination such that he regards it as appropriate to begin with one and to end with the other. There is a sense, I speculate, in which the wheel is meant to come full circle in de Botton’s book. Both Huysmans and de Maistre seem to be of the opinion that the nature of the imagination is such that it makes travel possible anywhere, notably and counter intuitively, in the place where travel typically both begins and ends: in the traveller’s own home. As I shall shortly suggest in more detail, Huysmans and de Maistre seem to agree that travelling in the imagination alone is preferable in certain ways to the real thing. Whether or not I am right in my speculative attribution of this observation to de Botton, I want, in this chapter, to extend it. I want to suggest that, although Huysmans and de Maistre do indeed draw similar conclusions about travel, they do so for very different reasons. I argue that Huysmans and de Maistre have radically opposing views of the nature of the relationship between the world of the imagination and the real world and therefore of the relationship between travel and the imagination. Using this contrast as a point of departure, I examine the role of the imagination in de Maistre’s travel literature and draw out its philosophical significance, articulating some philosophical insights de Maistre provides about the nature of the imagination per se and its role in human life. (shrink)

Amid Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, the human rights community has understandably focused its attention on human rights violations committed by the Russian state. This has, however, left the human rights implications of the martial law Ukraine has put in place for civilians largely unexamined. This essay highlights the ways Ukraine's travel restriction on “battle-aged” civilian men has harmed three overlapping groups—civilian men, the families of the men (including women and children), and trans and nonbinary individuals—and shows that the (...) restriction runs counter to important principles in international human rights and humanitarian law. It then considers the ethical dilemmas faced by the international human rights community in addressing such harms, and the political psychology of rights advocacy that may explain the tendency to underplay this particular set of human rights issues. Nonetheless, the essay ultimately argues that advocates should hold actors—including and perhaps especially those with which they may sympathize—accountable to the human rights standards to which they have pledged. (shrink)

This volume is a lively, wide-ranging introduction to ethics. It provides accessible coverage of the main ethical theories which offer the basis for an exploration of key issues and recent developments in applied ethics. The author's approach differs from other recent introductions, eschewing the utilitarian approach in favor of a rights and virtue ethics alternative.

This article examines the ways that state sexual regimes intersect with migration controls to re-make exclusionary nation-states and geopolitical hierarchies among women. I focus on two important Irish Supreme Court rulings: the X case (1992) and the O case (2002), respectively. X was a raped, pregnant, 14-year-old who sought an abortion in Britain. While the Supreme Court ultimately permitted her to procure an abortion, women's right to travel across international borders without government inquiry into their reproductive status came (...) into question. The O case concerned a Nigerian asylum seeker who invoked the fact that she was pregnant in an effort to avoid deportation. The Supreme Court, however, affirmed that she could be deported, despite the Irish Constitution's pledge to protect the ‘right to life of the unborn.’ Considered together, these cases reveal how overlapping sexual/migration control regimes both reinscribe hierarchies among women based on geopolitical location, and rebound the exclusionary nation-state despite growing transnationalism. (shrink)

Bergson's open and closed society concepts are examined in relation to war. Lots of fun facts about Bergson mixed in this insights from the author's travel.

This book argues that moral philosophy should be based on seven scientific principles of theory selection. It then argues that a new moral theory—Rightness as Fairness—satisfies those principles more successfully than existing theories. Chapter 1 explicates the seven principles of theory-selection, arguing that moral philosophy must conform to them to be truth-apt. Chapter 2 argues those principles jointly support founding moral philosophy in known facts of empirical moral psychology: specifically, our capacities for mental time-travel and modal imagination. Chapter 2 (...) then shows that these capacities present human decisionmakers with a problem of diachronic rationality that includes but generalizes beyond, L.A. Paul’s problem of transformative experience: a problem that I call “the problem of possible future selves.” Chapter 3 then argues that a new principle of rationality—the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative—is the only rational solution to this problem, as it requires our present and future selves to forge and uphold a recursive, bi-directional contract with each another given mutual recognition of the problem. Chapter 4 then shows that the Categorical-Instrumental Imperative has three identical formulations analogous but superior to Immanuel Kant’s various formulations of his ‘categorical imperative.’ Chapter 5 shows that these unified formulas jointly entail a particular test of moral principles: a Moral Original Position similar to John Rawls’ famous ‘original position’, but which avoids a variety of problems with Rawls' model. Chapter 6 then shows that the Moral Original Position generates Four Principles of Fairness, which can then be combined into a single principle of moral rightness: Rightness as Fairness. This new conception of rightness is shown to reconcile four dominant moral frameworks (deontology, consequentialism, virtue ethics, and contractualism), as well as entail a new method of moral decisionmaking for applied ethics: a method of “principled fair negotiation” according to which applied ethical issues cannot be wholly resolved through principled debate, but must instead be resolved by actual negotiation and compromise. This method is then argued to generate novel, nuanced analyses of a variety of applied moral issues, including trolley cases, torture, and the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals. Chapter 7 then shows that Rightness as Fairness reconciles three leading political frameworks—libertarianism, egalitarianism, and communitarianism—showing how all three embody legitimate moral ideals that can, and should, be fairly negotiated against each other to settle the scope, and nature, of domestic, international, and global justice on an ongoing, iterated basis. Finally, Chapter 8 argues that Rightness as Fairness satisfies all seven of the principles of theory-selected defended in Chapter 1 more successfully than rival theories. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:It’s a Human Rights Issue!Daniela TrufferI was born in 1965 in Switzerland with a severe heart defect and ambiguous genitalia. The doctors couldn‘t tell if I was a girl or a boy. First they diagnosed me with CAH and an enlarged clitoris, and cut me between my legs looking for a vagina.Because of my heart condition, the doctors assumed I would die soon. After an emergency baptism, I stayed (...) in the hospital for three months. My mother would travel to the city as often as possible, though she was only allowed to see me through a glass window.When I was two months old, and still in the hospital, doctors opened my abdomen and found healthy testes, which they threw in the garbage bin. According to my medical records, my parents had not provided consent. Further tests showed I am chromosomally male.Later the “castration” was declared a “mistake”: one doctor said I was a boy with hypospadias. As they had already removed the testes, however, they would have “to continue this way and the small patient must be made a girl.”After three months, my parents were finally allowed to take me home.During my childhood, I spent a lot of time in doctor’s offices and hospitals, suffering countless examinations of my genitals and urethral opening. When I was two, our family doctor stuck his finger into my urethral opening; I was screaming very loud, my father says. My mother had to put me into warm water because every time I had to pee I screamed in pain. Later I was hurried to the hospital with a bad infection. Still today my urethra often hurts after going to the toilet.I knew early in my life that I was different.I learned fragments of the truth only after decades of ignorance and denial. I was lucky to obtain my medical records. The hospital initially told me they no longer existed. When I insisted, they eventually sent me some recent files pertaining only to care I received after I was an adult. I kept calling. Once I was put through directly to the archive, where I was told that indeed there were “lots of files on microfilm.” However, it was only when I threatened to return with a lawyer that the hospital sent me a large pile of printouts.Finally I had it in black and white: The doctors had systematically lied to my parents, instructing them to “raise me as a girl” and never talk to me or to anyone else about “the gender issue.” Asked if I could have children, the doctors told them it was “doubtful.” At seven, the doctors still claimed it had been necessary to “remove the ovaries,” and at fourteen told me that I didn‘t menstruate because my “uterus was very small.”Because of the castration, my bone growth was reduced. To this day, I have to deal with health problems like a ruined metabolism, recurring fatigue and vertigo, and osteopenia.I would eventually grow older than doctors had originally predicted. At seven, they decided to operate on my heart septum and valve. I went to the hospital for preparatory cardiac catheterization. However, because of an infection, doctors put off the procedure. Since I had already been admitted, they decided to “use the opportunity to conduct the genital correction already planned in 1965,” and shortened my micropenis to the size of a “very small clitoris,” allegedly with my consent.Fortunately they didn‘t amputate the glans, and I still have sexual feelings left. But I remember the pain and unease, and how I often ran home from [End Page 111] school crying. Today I have a lot of scar tissue, which often hurts and itches.After a few days I was brought back to the cardiologist for the catheterization, and a few months later heart surgery. The doctors saved my life and destroyed it in the same year.I spent my childhood in fear, isolation, and shame. When I had to see a doctor, I was always scared stiff, but I never cried, and endured everything without any protest. I felt sick days in advance, and in... (shrink)

This article explores a view nearly absent from modern political theory, that there is a duty to create and secure government which imposes on some a duty to govern. This duty is grounded in philosophers as disparate as Aquinas, Locke, Hobbes and Finnis. To fail one's duty to govern, especially over the range of goods that can only be secured by government, is to have committed a wrong against another. If there is an obligation to govern that is rooted in (...) the common good, then one might believe there is an obligation to maintain a government which pursues the common good. After disentangling the duty to govern from political duties which are much better explored, I focus on the more subtle question of how political legitimacy and the obligation to obey the law may clash with a duty to govern. Again, it is surprising that this claim can be located in scholars as disparate as Kant, Hobbes and Finnis. Yet in each example these thinkers give us, we are troubled by the tension between the duty to maintain a government and its conceptual fellow travelers, legitimate government and the obligation to obey. Nor is this question one restricted to abstract political philosophy. Particularly troubling are scenarios in which a threat to governance might lead to a reasonable belief that the government must maintain itself by taking actions which appear illegitimate. A scenario where a government must racially profile or violate civil liberties to guard against threats to the ability to govern brings the problem to life. Difficult moments of American history — the interment of the Japanese during World War II, racial profiling after September 11th and the use of torture by the United States government were surely mistakes. But they make live the perceived and potential clash between a duty to maintain a government, legitimate government and our duty to obey the law. (shrink)

Documents, in particular identity cards, mediate relationships between individuals and institutions. Their materiality matters and actively impacts how states govern populations and their movements. In this paper, I examine one such object, the Romanian identity card. Focusing on its temporality and agency, I explore how objects and technological procedures enact race. In Romania, people without an address or proof of residence—many of them members of segregated Roma communities living in deep poverty—can only receive a temporary identity card, the Carte de (...) Idenititate Provizorie (CIP). CIP holders do not enjoy full citizenship and are deprived of various rights, such as the right to travel without a passport within the European Union. They are also exposed to heightened surveillance as they must apply annually for a new CIP. Starting from the material object of the CIP, I explore how race comes into being as a relation at the intersection of various temporalities that are folded into the rules and bureaucratic practice entailed in its issue. I offer the concept of “permanent temporality” to analyze how racialization occurs in practices of governing people and their movement in Europe. (shrink)

This article examines tafsir (interpretation of the Qurʾān) - translation relationship in the example of the translation of verse 184 of the Surat al-Baqara into Turkish. Undoubtedly, when the verses are translated into another language, it is necessary to reflect to translate what the first interlocutors understood from them. The fact that the rules (hukm) in some verses were repealed (naskh) or allocated (takhsis) later does not change this requirement. In verse 184 of surat al-Baqara, those who can afford to (...) fast but choose not to fast are ordered to pay ransom (fidya) for every day, that is, to pay the daily amount to feed a poor person. According to the detailed information and rumors in the tafsir literature; this rule was applied when the fast was made obligatory (fard) for the first time, and then it was abrogated. However, this practice, which was canceled for healthy and unexcused people, remained as a permission (rukhṣa) for those who were too old and sick to fast. Both the narrations conveyed from the companions (sahaba) and the general opinions of the mufassirs confirm the abrogation of this rule and that it remains a rukhṣa. The fact that the situation is described as naskh or takhsis does not make a difference in terms of transferring the verse to Turkish or another language. The verses on the subject were examined in the light of the most basic tafsir sources. To give an example that reflects the general opinion; It is stated in the thirty-five narrations reported by Tabari from the companions and tābiʿūn that the 184th verse expresses the option (takhyir) of not fasting in return for fidya for those who can fast. This option has been canceled in the next verse but it has remained for, -some people with special conditions-, as the elderly who cannot afford to fast, pregnant women and breastfeeding women who worry about harm to themselves or their childrens. According to the qirāʾa that is "وعلى الذين يُطوَّقونه", it is said that the verse is not abrogated, it is meant for old men and women. But as emphasized by Abū Ḥayyān, it is understood that this qirāʾa is not actually a qirāʾa but a kind of interpretation of the expression "وَعَلَى الَّذِينَ يُطِيقُونَهُ" in terms of rukhṣa. Therefore, the claim that it has not been repealed is probably due to the continued practice of fiqh. On the other hand, also rational evidence shows that the right to choose (takhyir), which was given initially, was later repealed. For example, in verse 184, it is stated that those who are sick and travelers should perform fasting on other days with the expression "فَمَنْ كَانَ مِنْكُمْ مَرِيضًا أَوْ عَلَى سَفَرٍ فَعِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَيَّامٍ أُخَرَ"; The same issue is stated in verse 185 with the expression "وَمَنْ كَانَ مَرِيضًا أَوْ عَلَى سَفَرٍ فَعِدَّةٌ مِنْ أَيَّامٍ أُخَرَ". The repetition in question shows that the two verses were sent not together but at different times. This state of affairs confirms that the second verse has repealed the right of choosing (takhyir) in first one. In addition, as Imam Māturīdi's determined by hit, if those who cannot endure fasting were meant in verse 184, it would be unwise to call these people at the end of the verse as "However, that you fast is better for you, if you only knew!" In the overwhelming majority of Turkish translations of the Qurʾān, it is seen that there is no emphasis on the meaning of the verse when it was first sent. Even the expression “Upon those who are able to fast...” in the verse is translated as “Upon those who aren’t able to fast...”. Whereas it is more consistent and appropriate to reflect the literal meaning of the verse in the translation and explain the situation with additional notes. In this way, it will be understood that two verses that contain the same words and come one after another are sent different times and about different things, hence the reader will be given accurate information. In the nearly thirty examples of translations in the article, it is seen that the translations belonging to Mehmet Akif and Süleyman Tevfik and the translation of the delegation chaired by Hüseyin Kazım are in full harmony with the data in tafsir literature and the general opinion of mufassirs. Rifat Börekçi, the first president of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, has criticized the translation committee headed by Hüseyin Kazım extremely harshly. Then, with the choice made by Elmalılı Hamdi, almost the direction of the wind changed and the translators could not surpass it. Although there have been some translations in line with the text of the verse, the relevant explanations of these authors reveal that they did not understand the issue in detail and did not make a conscious translation. Meantime the analysis made in the aforementioned verse example shows that reliable translations cannot be made without referring to detailed tafsir information and therefore a correct Qurʾān translation is often not possible without tafsir. (shrink)

Lying in Early Modern English Culture is a major study of ideas of truth and falsehood in early modern England from the advent of the Reformation to the aftermath of the failed Gunpowder Plot. The period is characterised by panic and chaos when few had any idea how religious, cultural, and social life would develop after the traumatic division of Christendom. While many saw the need for a secular power to define the truth others declared that their allegiances belonged elsewhere. (...) Accordingly there was a constant battle between competing authorities for the right to declare what was the truth and so label opponents as liars. Issues of truth and lying were, therefore, a constant feature of everyday life and determined ideas of individual identity, politics, speech, sex, marriage, and social behaviour, as well as philosophy and religion. This book is a cultural history of truth and lying from the 1530s to the 1610s, showing how lying needs to be understood in action as well as in theory. Unlike most histories of lying, it concentrates on a series of particular events reading them in terms of academic theories and more popular notions of lying. The book covers a wide range of material such as the trials of Ann Boleyn and Thomas More, the divorce of Frances Howard, and the murder of Anthony James by Annis and George Dell; works of literature such as Othello, The Faerie Queene, A Mirror for Magistrates, and The Unfortunate Traveller; works of popular culture such as the herring pamphlet of 1597; and major writings by Castiglione, Montaigne, Erasmus, Luther, and Tyndale. (shrink)

In the wake of the Dobbs decision withdrawing federal constitutional protection for reproductive rights, the United States is in the throes of federalist conflicts. Some states are enacting draconian prohibitions of abortion or gender-affirming care, whereas other states are attempting to shield providers and their patients seeking care. This article explores standard arguments supporting federalism, including that it allows for cultural differences to remain along with a structure that provides for the advantages of common security and commerce, that it provides (...) a laboratory for confined experiments, that it is government closer to the people and thus more informed about local needs and preferences, and that it creates layers of government that can constrain one another and thus doubly protect rights. We contend that these arguments do not justify significant differences among states with respect to the recognition of important aspects of well-being; significant injustices among subnational units cannot be justified by federalism. However, as nonideal theorists, we also observe that federalism presents the possibility of some states protecting rights that others do not. Assuming that movement among subnational units is protected, those who are fortunate enough to be able to travel will be able to access rights they cannot access at home. Nonetheless, movement may not be readily available to minors, people without documentation, people with disabilities, people who lack economic resources, or people who have responsibilities that preclude travel. Only rights protection at the federal level will suffice in such cases. (shrink)

The Consequence argument is an argument from plausible premises–our lack of causal power over the laws and past–to an implausible conclusion: that if determinism is true, we are equally powerless with respect to the future. What the compatibilist needs is a theory of counterfactuals that preserves the links between counterfactuals, causation, and the natural laws in a way that supports our commonsense belief that we have the power to make a causal difference to the future but no such power with (...) respect to the past. Lewis’s critique of the Consequence argument was based on his theory of counterfactuals and his analysis of causation as a counterfactual relation between particular events. He argued that, at a world that is deterministic in the way that ours might be, counterfactuals are temporally asymmetric in a way that matches the contingent temporal asymmetry of cauation. So it is not surprising, but only to be expected, that the past is causally closed while the future is causally open. If this worked, it would be just what the compatibilist needs. But it doesn’t work. There is an argument, due to Tooley and recently endorsed by Wasserman, that a fundamental feature of Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals is inconsistent with the metaphysical possibility of time travel and backwards causation. If this is right, then Lewis’s response to the Consequence argument fails. I endorse this conclusion, but argue that there is a better theory of counterfactuals–a theory that leaves open the metaphysical possibility of time travel to the past and backwards causation. (shrink)

In recent years the quantum foundations community has seen increasing interest in the possibility of using retrocausality as a route to rejecting the conclusions of Bell’s theorem and restoring locality to quantum physics. On the other hand, it has also been argued that accepting nonlocality leads to a form of retrocausality. In this article we seek to elucidate the relationship between retrocausality and locality. We begin by providing a brief schema of the various ways in which violations of Bell’s inequalities (...) might lead us to consider some form of retrocausality. We then consider some possible motivations for using retrocausality to rescue locality, arguing that none of these motivations is sufficient to show that local retrocausal theories should always be preferred to nonlocal retrocausal theories, and therefore there is no clear reason to focus research efforts entirely on seeking local retrocausal models. Next, we examine several different conceptions of retrocausality, concluding that ‘all-at-once’ retrocausality is more coherent than the alternative dynamical picture. We then argue that since the ‘all-at-once’ approach requires probabilities to be assigned to entire histories, locality is not playing any crucial role within this picture. Thus we conclude that using retrocausality as a way to rescue locality may not be the right route to retrocausality. Finally, we demonstrate that accepting the existence of nonlocality and insisting on the nonexistence of preferred reference frames leads naturally to the acceptance of a form of retrocausality, albeit one which is not mediated by physical systems travelling backwards in time. We argue that this is the more natural way to motivate retrocausal models of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The business and human rights movement shares several goals with the Benefit Corporation movement: corporations respecting human rights; maintaining a “wide aperture” so that all impacts of a company on people and communities are addressed; and creating rigorous standards of conduct and means of accountability. This paper argues that nonetheless the movements are traveling along parallel tracks and thus missing an opportunity for mutual learning that can improve their effectiveness. The BHR movement can look to B Corps for concrete examples (...) of viable companies that value human rights intrinsically and not just where there is a “business case” to do so. The B Impact Assessment, the B Corp certification tool, can better ensure that B Corps are in fact respecting human rights by adopting BHR standards. And both movements must give greater consideration to the potential contradiction between unlimited scaling—a key goal of B Corps—and the ability of large multinational corporations to respect human rights. (shrink)

In 1892, near Trinil on the island of Java, laborers under the direction of the expatriate Dutch physician‐anatomist Eugène Dubois uncovered fossil bones that, Dubois believed, belonged to a single member of a hitherto‐undiscovered species. Dubois named the species Pithecanthropus erectus , a reflection of his steadfast belief in its transitional role in human evolution. The fossil, popularly known as “Java Man,” is now classified as Homo erectus—a species not fully human but far closer to us than Dubois envisioned.Dubois and (...) Pithecanthropus have been covered before: briefly in Carl Swisher, Garniss Curtis, and Roger Lewin's Java Man and at length in Bert Theunissen's Eugene Dubois and the Ape‐Man from Java . Pat Shipman's interests are more strictly biographical: Dubois as a family man, as a European in Southeast Asia, and as a scientist struggling to establish a career and a reputation. The Man Who Found the Missing Link weaves together the multiple threads of a complex life: extensive travels, eclectic scientific interests, tempestuous relations with colleagues, and a slowly disintegrating marriage. It vividly conveys Dubois's near‐obsession with the Pithecanthropus erectus fossils and his tenacity in defending their significance. Shipman tells the story almost exclusively from Dubois's point of view and almost exclusively in the present tense, sacrificing authorial distance for immediacy. The book often reads, therefore, as if it were Dubois's own memoir, “as told to” Shipman.Lavishly produced by a major trade publisher, Shipman's book is clearly aimed at readers who have enjoyed the work of Dava Sobel, Bella Bathurst, and Simon Winchester. Taken on those terms, it succeeds admirably. Like Sobel's Longitude and Winchester's The Map That Changed the World , it is a vigorous tale of an embattled scientific maverick who triumphs despite repeated setbacks. Like them, it succeeds both as literature and as a character study.Historians interested in the book for professional reasons will find it less satisfying. It is full of recounted conversations and descriptions of unvoiced thoughts and feelings—these elements are the heart of the book's literary style and essential to its characterization of Dubois. The sparse and sketchy endnotes make it impossible, however, to determine the sources of this material or to draw clear lines between contemporary accounts, after‐the‐fact recollections, the author's inferences, and outright speculations. Shipman writes, in one alarming example, that “Dubois is something else, something extraordinary, the coolies conclude. He is a chosen man. Clearly he has been given a special role or dharma through a divine revelation: that is the only possible explanation” . With no endnote to explain the source of this insight into the coolies' thoughts, readers are left to wonder if it is Dubois's own imperialist fantasy, reported as if it were fact.Shipman also does little to relate Dubois to the scientific world of his day. Coverage of the culture of colonial science, Dutch scientific institutions, and turn‐of‐the‐century debates over human evolution is scant. Scientists like Henry Fairfield Osborn, Ales Hrdlicka, and Ralph Von Koenigswald are introduced with only vague indications of their interests, status, or intellectual commitments. Hominid fossils other than Pithecanthropus erectus receive little more attention; even the Neanderthals, on whom Shipman has coauthored an authoritative book, are accorded only a handful of pages. All of this makes it difficult to assess whether Dubois's experiences were typical of the times, places, and fields in which he worked. It also undercuts Shipman's claim that Dubois, by his dogged insistence on the “missing link” status of Pithecanthropus erectus, forced his fellow scientists to confront the reality of human evolution. (shrink)

This article examines preventive constraints on suspected terrorists that can lead to restrictions on liberty similar to imprisonment and disrespect the target’s autonomy. In particular, it focuses on two examples: travel bans and asset freezes. It seeks to develop guidelines for setting appropriate limits on their future use. Preventive constraints do not generate legal protections as constraints in response to conduct do. In addition, these constraints are often seen as a permissible alternative to imprisonment. Still, preventive de facto detentions, (...) or what I term “exprisonments”, imperil the free and autonomous life of the targeted person. With the recognition that such constraints can infringe on one’s ability to lead a free and autonomous life, this article argues that some of these constraints require similar protections as their counterparts that put persons under lock and key. (shrink)

Australia and Thailand have made great progress in partnering with NGOs to respond to HIV/AIDS through the protection of human rights. Unquestionably, the Australian experience is more advanced. However, it is important to note that Australia’s political institutions and traditions were able to empower and accept an NGO movement of this nature almost from the start of disease identification.Thailand did not have this advantage, having only moved toward political institutions that are open to public opinion and civil society’s input within (...) the last 15 years.In spite of their varied histories, both countries eventually traveled down similar paths. In Australia, HIV/AIDS NGOs moved rapidly forward from being standard-setting, fact-finding, and advocacy organizations to becoming capable of creating new HIV/AIDS umbrella organizations and influencing existing governmental organizations on HIV/AIDS human rights issues. Indeed, by the close of the 1980s, NGOs had established themselves firmly in all of these roles. The fact that Australia still struggles with addressing an emerging epidemic among indigenous people is more a sign that the movement has thus far been incomplete than that it is faltering or ineffective. Additionally, now that NGOs are actively working through AFAO on behalf of indigenous peoples, it is likely that there will finally be more movement on human rights and H1V/AIDS issues for this group. However, sex tourism and the illegal trafficking of women and children for purposes of prostitution continue to require ongoing proactive management by the partnership before they become a serious epidemic threat.Thailand’s situation is somewhat different from that of Australia. The HIV/AIDS NGO community has grown since the epidemic exploded in the 1990s, but the organizations themselves continue to have limited power, While they have been an important voice in human rights standard-setting, fact-finding and advocacy regarding HIV/AIDS, they remain unable to fully influence the governmental organizations that ultimately make and implement human rights policies in these areas. As the NGO experience in general is new to Thai politics, continuing human rights abuses are a sign of the miles left to travel on this road rather than an indicator that the road needs to be abandoned.Regardless of their differing experiences with creating HIV/AIDS partnerships, it is impossible to say that either effort has failed to use this mechanism successfully to at least begin seriously addressing HIV/AIDS human rights issues. What can be said is that each partnership can be placed at a differing point on a continuum of effectiveness that ultimately concludes with a fully integrated partnership capable of fundamentally influencing a country’s HIV/AIDS human rights policies on an ongoing basis. (shrink)

Drawing upon Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory, the paper argues that the legal claims of homeless appellants before and during the COVID-19 pandemic illustrate our universal vulnerability which stems from the essential, life-sustaining activities flowing from the ontological status of the human body. By recognizing that housing availability has constitutional significance because it provides for life-sustaining activities such as sleeping, eating and lying down, I argue that the legal rationale reviewed in the paper underscores the empirical, ontological reality of the body (...) as the basis for a jurisprudence of universal vulnerability. By tracing the constitutional basis of this jurisprudence from Right to Travel to Eighth Amendment grounds during COVID-19, the paper outlines a distinct legal paradigm for understanding vulnerability in its universal, constant and essential form – one of the central premises of vulnerability theory. (shrink)

We report on the case of a 2-year-old female, the youngest person ever to undergo ovarian tissue cryopreservation (OTC). This patient was diagnosed with a rare form of sickle cell disease, which required a bone-marrow transplant, and late effects included high risk of future infertility or complete sterility. Ethical concerns are raised, as the patient's mother made the decision for OTC on the patient's behalf with the intention that this would secure the option of biological childbearing in the future. Based (...) on Beauchamp and Childress's principlism approach of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, pursing OTC was ethically justified. (shrink)

Since approval of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2016, it has been widely and repeatedly claimed that the GDPR will legally mandate a ‘right to explanation’ of all decisions made by automated or artificially intelligent algorithmic systems. This right to explanation is viewed as an ideal mechanism to enhance the accountability and transparency of automated decision-making. However, there are several reasons to doubt both the legal existence and the feasibility of such a right. In (...) contrast to the right to explanation of specific automated decisions claimed elsewhere, the GDPR only mandates that data subjects receive meaningful, but properly limited, information (Articles 13-15) about the logic involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of automated decision-making systems, what we term a ‘right to be informed’. Further, the ambiguity and limited scope of the ‘right not to be subject to automated decision-making’ contained in Article 22 (from which the alleged ‘right to explanation’ stems) raises questions over the protection actually afforded to data subjects. These problems show that the GDPR lacks precise language as well as explicit and well-defined rights and safeguards against automated decision-making, and therefore runs the risk of being toothless. We propose a number of legislative and policy steps that, if taken, may improve the transparency and accountability of automated decision-making when the GDPR comes into force in 2018. (shrink)

Grievance landscapes form in rapidly industrialising contexts where social and environmental impacts are inevitable. This paper focuses on the complex operational and organisational settings in which grievances arise and the industrial pathologies that form around resource development projects. The arguments draw on classic and contemporary literature on “grievance”, “right” and “entitlement”, and the authors’ own sustained engagement with global mining companies and local communities. Our contention is that the grievance landscape is far more critical to understanding environmental, human rights, (...) and mining interactions than the managerial systems that companies construct to signal compliance with voluntary international norms. These managerial systems, or operational-level grievance mechanisms, map the procedural contours of how a local grievance would travel once it is made visible to the company. In practice, however, it is fiction, illegibility and invisibility that dominate. Across the pathologies, the common denominator is the corporate propensity to avoid recognising the legitimacy of a local grievance and the source of its cause. (shrink)

Completing the translation of Derrida’s monumental work Right to Philosophy (the first part of which has already appeared under the title of Who’s Afraid of Philosophy?), Eyes of the University brings together many of the philosopher’s most important texts on the university and, more broadly, on the languages and institutions of philosophy. In addition to considerations of the implications for literature and philosophy of French becoming a state language, of Descartes’ writing of the Discourse on Method in French, and (...) of Kant’s and Schelling’s philosophies of the university, the volume reflects on the current state of research and teaching in philosophy and on the question of what Derrida calls a “university responsibility.” Examining the political and institutional conditions of philosophy, the essays collected here question the growing tendency to orient research and teaching towards a programmable and profitable end. The volume is therefore invaluable for the light it throws upon an underappreciated aspect of Derrida’s own engagement, both philosophical and political, in struggles against the stifling of philosophical research and teaching. As a founding member of the Research Group on the Teaching of Philosophy and as one of the conveners of the Estates General of Philosophy, Derrida was at the forefront of the struggle to preserve and extend the teaching of philosophy as a distinct discipline, in secondary education and beyond, in the face of conservative government education reforms in France. As one of the founders of the Collège International de Philosophie, he worked to provide a space for research in and around philosophy that was not accepted or legitimated in other institutions. Documenting and reflecting upon these engagements, Eyes of the University brings together some of the most important and incisive of Derrida’s works. (shrink)

There are times when two essential human rights may appear to be in conflict, or need to be balanced against one another. This paper examines the right of a party, such as officials, a group of people or an individual, to ‘privacy and confidentiality’ when others may have a conflicting ‘right to know’ about them. Although similar conflicts have been studied by other researchers, there is still controversy over the rightful balance in situations driven by new information and (...) communication technologies. I conducted a survey on the attitude of college students to the privacy right versus the right to know using an actual case at the university. First, I asked the students if they believed protecting the privacy of a married teacher who had fathered a child with a student was more important than the right of the school to know. Second, I asked if they believed a child born to a single mother in such a relationship has the right to know about his father, or the single mother has the right to keep that information confidential. Third, I asked the students if they believed in general that the ‘right to privacy and confidentiality’ was more important or the ‘right to know’. This paper reports on the results of this survey on 222 students at an international university in Japan. (shrink)

A plausible thought is that we should evaluate counterfactuals in the actual world by holding the present ‘fixed’; the state of the counterfactual world at the time of the antecedent, outside the area of the antecedent, is required to match that of the actual world. When used to evaluate counterfactuals in the actual world, this requirement may produce reasonable results. However, the requirement is deeply problematic when used in the context of explaining causal asymmetry. The requirement plays a crucial role (...) in certain statistical mechanical explanations of the temporal asymmetry of causation. I will use a case of backwards time travel to show how the requirement enforces certain features of counterfactual structure a priori. For this reason, the requirement cannot be part of a completely general method of evaluating counterfactuals. More importantly, the way the requirement enforces features of counterfactual structure prevents counterfactual structure being derived from more fundamental physical structure—as explanations of causal asymmetry demand. Therefore, the requirement cannot be used when explaining causal asymmetry. To explain causal asymmetry, we need more temporally neutral methods for evaluating counterfactuals—those that produce the right results in cases involving backwards time travel, as well as in the actual world. (shrink)