According to Kuhn's speciation analogy, scientific specialisation is fundamentally analogous to biological speciation. In this paper, we extend Kuhn's original language-centred formulation of the speciation analogy, to account for episodes of scientific specialisation centred around methodological differences. Building upon recent views in evolutionary biology about the process of speciation by genetic divergence, we will show how these methodology-centred episodes of scientific specialisation can be understood as cases of specialisation driven by value divergence. We will apply our model (...) of specialisation by value divergence to an episode of methodology-centred scientific specialisation: the emergence of molecular biology. (shrink)

In his mature writings, Kuhn describes the process of specialisation as driven by a form of incommensurability, defined as a conceptual/linguistic barrier which promotes and guarantees the insularity of specialties. In this paper, we reject the idea that the incommensurability among scientific specialties is a linguistic barrier. We argue that the problem with Kuhn’s characterisation of the incommensurability among specialties is that he presupposes a rather abstract theory of semantic incommensurability, which he then tries to apply to his description (...) of the process of specialisation. By contrast, this paper follows a different strategy: after criticising Kuhn’s view, it takes a further look at how new scientific specialties emerge. As a result, a different way of understanding incommensurability among specialties will be proposed. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to re-examine specialization in science. I argue that we need to acknowledge the role that conceptual changes can play in the creation of new specialties. Whereas earlier sociological accounts focus on social and instrumental changes as the cause of the creation of new specialties, I argue that conceptual changes play an important role in the creation of some scientific specialties. Specifically, I argue that conceptual developments played an important role in the creation (...) of both endocrinology and virology. (shrink)

Incommensurability may be regarded as driving specialisation, on the one hand, and as posing some problems to interdisciplinarity, on the other hand. It may be argued, however, that incommensurability plays no role in either specialisation or interdisciplinarity. Scientific specialties could be defined as simply 'different' (that is, about different things), rather than 'incommensurable' (that is, competing for the explanation of the same phenomena). Interdisciplinarity could be viewed as the co- ordinated effort of scientists possessing complemetary and interlocking skills, and (...) not as the overcoming of some sort of incommensurable divide. This article provides a comprehensive evaluative examination of the relations between specialisation, interdisciplinarity, and incommensurability. Its aim is to defend the relevance of incommensurability to both specialisation and interdisciplinarity. At the same time, it aims at correcting the tendency, common among many philosophers, to regard incommensurability in a restrictive manner - such as, for example, as an almost purely semantic issue. (shrink)

To our contemporary eyes, science appears as the most reliable guide to the human enterprise. However, we possess little awareness as to what the proper meaning of scientific specialization is, and this knowledge is indispensable if we are not to proceed mindlessly in our relationship with being. Italian philosopher Emanuele Severino sees in scientific specialization the most coherent consequence of humanity’s most ancestral interpretation of the world, which all human decisions and actions enact. To him, this (...) coherency is what makes the dominance of scientific specialization on our time necessary. By focusing on one of Severino’s major theoretical works (Oltre il linguaggio, 1992), and with reference to other key texts, this essay introduces international readers to a specific facet of Severino’s discourse. In doing so, it translates passages of his works that have never appeared in English. (shrink)

In his late years, Thomas Kuhn became interested in the process of scientific specialization, which does not seem to possess the destructive element that is characteristic of scientific revolutions. It therefore makes sense to investigate whether and how Kuhn’s insights about specialization are consistent with, and actually fit, his model of scientific progress through revolutions. In this paper, I argue that the transition toward a new specialty corresponds to a revolutionary change for the group of (...) scientists involved in such a transition. I will clarify the role of the scientific community in revolutionary changes and characterize the incommensurability across specialties as possessing both semantic and methodological aspects. The discussion of the discovery of the structure of DNA will serve both as an illustration of my main argument and as reply to one criticism raised against Kuhn—namely, that his model cannot capture cases of revolutionary yet non-disruptive episodes of scientific progress. Revisiting Kuhn’s ideas on specialization will shed new light on some often overlooked features of scientific change. (shrink)

The present paper attempts to highlight the strategy of regional specialisation for technological innovation in R&D laboratories. The paper makes a proposition that regional specialisation should be recognised as a strategic initiative for technology development in R&D laboratories. The rationale for this strategic initiative has been substantiated with the help of illustrations from the cases of technology development efforts taken up in different laboratories in the country under the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), India. In this direction, (...) CSIR and other centres of excellence have played a pioneering role in the development of various industrial clusters and artisan concentrations in different parts of the country. The implications of adoption or otherwise of this strategy initiative for technological innovation in R&D laboratories have been discussed. (shrink)

Both in the bibliography and in the citation in the text, Michelle Gibbons’ article below has been mistakenly attributed to “Gibson.” The proper reference to the article should be: Gibbons, M.. Reassessing discovery: Rosalind Franklin, scientific visualization, and the structure of DNA. _Philosophy of Science, 79_, 63–80.

Overcoming disciplinary separation, organizing and conducting successful inter- and transdisciplinary research is a growing trend in contemporary scientific practices, which is viewed as a necessary condition for the progress of scientific knowledge, and therefore requires philosophical reflection. If it is the growing scientific specialization that has been considered as a constant identification of the progress of science since the 19th century, it is a disciplinary separation that has become an obstacle for the study of complex objects (...) since the end of the XX century. As an epistemological platform for overcoming disciplinary separation, one can consider historical epistemology in its French version. The classical approach within historical epistemology, proposed by Gaston Bachelard, considers progress as an integral property of scientific knowledge, arising from the very essence of science. Scientific progress is due to the historicity of which, which means a rejection of the interpretation of scientific truths as timeless, absolute and universal. In this article, I discuss (1) disciplinary separation as a philosophical problem; (2) approaches to the conceptualization of scientific progress; and (3) French historical epistemology as a possible philosophical setting for resolving disciplinary separation. (shrink)

Humanistic studies cultivate types of conceptual fluency and modes of awareness important to thought concerning values. Not all knowledge is scientific knowledge. There is genuine comprehension of some valuative matters – they are not all to be interpreted in expressive or subjective terms. Education in the humanities can encourage value-relevant types of discernment, awareness, and articulateness in uniquely effective ways. Though important kinds of thought concerning values may lack formal, theoretical elaboration they involve genuine standards of intellectual responsibility. Engagement (...) with the humanities does not ensure development of sound valuative thought and judgment – nothing ensures it – but can have a crucial role in shaping it. Moreover, intellectual and moral imagination should not be constrained by boundaries of academic specialization. Specialization has several merits but it can motivate inappropriately reductionist claims and theoretical over-extension. Often, sound normative understanding is not dependent upon explicit theoretical justification or a specific inquiry’s explanatory idiom. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present and defend an empiricist, neo-Hempelian account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized embedding. The proposal aims to preserve what I take to be the core of Hempel’s empiricist account, by weakening it in some respects and strengthening it in others, introducing two new conditions that solve most of Hempel’s problems without abandoning his empiricist strictures. According to this proposal, to explain a phenomenon is to make it expectable by introducing new conceptual/ontological (...) machinery and using special, and non-ad hoc, non-accidental regularities. The new conditions are elaborated making essential use of two central structuralist ideas, namely T-theoreticity and specialization. I first introduce and qualify the project, then present the new account in detail and assess it vis-à-vis its rivals, and finally discuss some possible objections, concluding that the account fares better than its monistic rivals and well enough to qualify as a promising neo-Hempelian account. Even for those unpersuaded by its monistic goals, it has the merit of calling attention to two new necessary conditions not explicitly emphasized thus far and showing how they serve to answer many of the criticisms addressed against Hempel’s account. (shrink)

Explanations in genetics have intriguing aspects to both biologists and philosophers, and there is no account that satisfactorily elucidates such explanations. The aim of this article is to analyze the kind of explanations usually given in Classical (Transmission) Genetics (CG) and to present in detail the application of an account of explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding to elucidate the such explanations. First, we present explanations in CG in the classical format of inferences with the explanans as the premises and (...) the explanandum as the conclusion and compare them with explanations in other paradigmatic explanatory fields such as Classical Mechanics. Second, we summarize the main aspects discussed in the literature with regard the peculiarities of genetic explanations. Third, we introduce the account of scientific explanation as ampliative, specialized nomological embedding making use of Sneedian structuralism, in particular the notions of theory-net, fundamental law or guiding principle, specialization, and special laws. Finally, we apply this account to the case of CG and show that this analysis sheds light to the intriguing aspects of genetic explanations and remove most of their alleged oddities. (shrink)

This paper concerns Aristotle and Galen’s scientific method and the place of philosophy in their natural scientific endeavors as manifested in their discussions on the role of the heart in the formation of the embryo. I will begin first by discussing Aristotle’s conception of natural sciences and his discussion on the role of the heart in the body and embryo. Following this is Galen’s critique of the role of the heart in the formation of the embryo. Galen had (...) considerably more knowledge about anatomy and the construction of the embryo, yet his scientific method is not radically different from Aristotle’s as he also utilizes both logical arguments and observational data. Nevertheless, he attempts to banish philosophers from discussing anatomical issues, thus opening the path to specialization. (shrink)

I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work (...) provides a research agenda for those who want to study scientific specialization. I briefly discuss some recent studies that promise to provide valuable insight into the social structure of science. (shrink)

Modern societies depend on a growing production of scientific knowledge, which is based on the functional differentiation of science into still more specialised scientific disciplines and subdisciplines. This is the basis for the paradox of scientific expertise: The growth of science leads to a fragmentation of scientific expertise. To resolve this paradox, the present paper investigates three hypotheses: 1) All scientific knowledge is perspectival. 2) The perspectival structure of science leads to specific forms of knowledge (...) asymmetries. 3) Such perspectival knowledge asymmetries must be handled through second order perspectives. We substantiate these hypotheses on the basis of a perspectivist philosophy of science grounded in Peircean semiotics and autopoietic systems theory. Perspectival knowledge asymmetries are an unavoidable and necessary part of the growth of scientific knowledge, and more awareness of this fact can help avoid blind and futile struggles between scientific perspectives, and direct efforts toward more appropriate ways of handling these fundamental knowledge asymmetries. Concretely, we show how different kinds of scientific knowledge, expertise, disagreement and learning can be correlated to the perspectival structure of science, and propose how polyocular communication based on observations of the observations made by specialised perspectives can be used to handle such perspectival knowledge asymmetries. This can help overcome the observed problems in carrying out cross-disciplinary research and in the collective use of different kinds of scientific expertise, and thereby make society better able to solve complex, real-world problems. (shrink)

Communication is a crucial component of scientific activity (as of virtually any other domain of human activity, especially in this "communication age" in which we live). As researchers and as citizens, we should all be concerned with the communication of science as well as with communication within science. In this paper, I will deal with one of the key aspects of this topic ג€“ the question whether scientific communication is or should be ג€�transparentג€�. The view that this is (...) or should be the case is often taken for granted both by scientists and the general public. I will challenge this view and suggest that we should learn to live without the illusion that scientific communication is or should be transparent. This idea is closely related, if not derived from, the traditional epistemological conception according to which scientific method is the privileged tool we have for penetrating beyond appearances and discovering the true ג€�nature of thingsג€�, in terms of which all observable phenomena should be ultimately explained. Applying the scientific method should, thus, yield a fully intelligible representation of the world, which in its turn should be transparently communicable. The trouble with this enticing ideal is that it does not correspond to actual practice. Again and again we experience the fact that the ג€�true picture of the worldג€� remains veiled for everyone but a small group of initiated experts in a narrow domain. Is this only a technical problem having to do with the phenomenon of specialization and with the inevitable complexity of the language(s) of science, as it is often suggested? (shrink)

The critical remark within the framework of the panel discussion problematizes three provisions of the article proposed for discussion. The first is the dual nature of the concept of “scientific progress”, which is both descriptive and normative. The remark criticizes the descriptive understanding of scientific progress and argues for the adequacy of the description of this concept exclusively in a normative way. The second provision concerns the possibility of accepting “rationality” as a universal criterion for scientific progress. (...) The doubt about the applicability of this criterion to the assessment of the achievements of scientific knowledge in general is asserted and substantiated, at the same time, the application of this criterion to particular sciences seems possible. The third provision is the uniqueness of the historical situation in which science found itself at the end of the XX century, when disciplinary separation becomes an obstacle to the study of complex objects. The uniqueness of this historical situation is disputed, as an alternative view it is argued that the attitude to the phenomenon of specialization of science from the moment of its appearance was ambivalent. Separately, the need to consider the extensive historical experience of creating various epistemological platforms to overcome disciplinary separation is stipulated. A proposal is made to further study and clarification of the possible advantages of French historical epistemology as a platform for the formation of new interdisciplinary areas of research over competing platforms (ANT, STS, strong programme of SSK). (shrink)

This paper concerns Aristotle and Galen’s scientific method and the place of philosophy in their natural scientific endeavors as manifested in their discussions on the role of the heart in the formation of the embryo. I will begin first by discussing Aristotle’s conception of natural sciences and his discussion on the role of the heart in the body and embryo. Following this is Galen’s critique of the role of the heart in the formation of the embryo. Galen had (...) considerably more knowledge about anatomy and the construction of the embryo, yet his scientific method is not radically different from Aristotle’s as he also utilizes both logical arguments and observational data. Nevertheless, he attempts to banish philosophers from discussing anatomical issues, thus opening the path to specialization. (shrink)

In our attempts to track changes in geological practice over time and to isolate the source of these changes, we have found that they are largely connected with the germination of new geologic subdisciplines. We use keyword and title data from articles in 68 geology journals to track the changes in influence of each subdiscipline on geology over all. Geological research has shifted emphasis over the study period, moving away from economic geology and petroleum geology, towards physics- and chemistry-based topics. (...) The Apollo lunar landings had as much influence on the topics and practice of geological research as the much-cited plate-tectonics revolution. These results reflect the barely-tangible effects of the changes in vocabulary and habit of thought that have pervaded the substance of geology. Geological literature has increased in volume and specialization, resulting in a highly fragmentary literature. However, we infer that "big science," characterized by large amounts of funding, collaboration, and large logistical investments, makes use of this specialization and turns "twigging" into a phenomenon that enhances, rather than inhibits, the progress of science. (shrink)

We are currently witnessing a fundamental structural transformation of the scientific public sphere, characterized by processes of specialization, metrification, internationalization, platformization and visibilization. In contrast to explanations of this structural transformation that invoke a technological determinism, we demonstrate its historical contingency by drawing on analytic concepts from organization theory and the case of the Open Access transformation in Germany. The digitization of academic journals has not broadened access to scientific output but narrowed it down even further in (...) the course of the ‘serials crisis’. For a long time, research institutions were not able to convince large academic publishers to adopt less restrictive forms of access to academic journals. It was only through the emergence of new and in part illegal actors (shadow libraries and preprint servers) that the existing path could be broken, and an Open Access path constituted. Following this analysis, we discuss consequences of the Open Access transformation for the public spheres of science and democracy. We conclude that Open Access publishing can only help to transform both communicative spaces towards the normative ideal of a public sphere when complemented by systematic support for non-profit publication infrastructures. (shrink)

On July 14, 1866 Franz Brentano stepped up to the pulpit to defend his thesis that “the true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences”. This thesis bound his first students to him and became the north star of his school, against the complex background of the progress and specialization of the natural sciences as well as the growth and professionalization of universities. I will discuss the project of the renewal of philosophy as science (...) in the School of Brentano and how this aimed to provide a scientific foundation for the humanities independently from the natural sciences, while preserving the unity of science. Through his well-known re-introduction of the concept of intentionality as criterion to distinguish internal and external perception, Brentano was able to supply an empirical foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften. While philosophy would use the method of natural science, its domain would not be nature, but consciousness: a full-blooded science of the mind that did not require a reduction to the physical in order to be scientific. Brentano’s science of consciousness was empirical, but not experimental, and relied on subjective methods, but was not introspective. Brentano’s students Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Edmund Husserl and others came to occupy important chairs in philosophy throughout Europe. While they were certainly not all orthodox followers, they adapted and spread his theories far and wide in the schools and movements they founded and influenced: Gestalt psychology, Prague linguistics, phenomenology, etc.. Moreover, the 19th century idea of scientific research as a collaborative and collective achievement led to a division of labor in Brentano’s school. Each of his students was meant to work out a part of the greater whole: Stumpf, the philosophy of sound and music; Marty, language; Meinong the history of philosophy; Husserl, mathematics; etc. Yet all of them also contributed to the shared project of the renewal of philosophy as science and discussed the (foundational) relation of philosophy to other sciences in programmatic works. Though often forgotten and overlooked due to contingent historical circumstances, the scientific paradigm of the School of Brentano was very fruitful and highly influential in philosophy and the human sciences in general, throughout the second half of the 19th and into the 20th centuries. Yet it is relevant then as now to preserve the independent scientific dignity of the humanities. (shrink)

ArgumentThis article discusses the conditions that lead to the autonomy of scientific disciplines by analyzing the case of zoology in the nineteenth century. The specialization of knowledge and its institutionalization in higher education in the nineteenth century were important processes for the autonomy of scientific disciplines, such as zoology. The article argues that autonomy only arises after social and political power is mobilized by specific groups to acquire appropriate conceptual, physical, and institutional spaces for a discipline. This (...) is illustrated through the case study of the Lisbon Polytechnic School, a higher education establishment that was created in 1837, in Portugal. The case shows that autonomy in zoology can arise before the consolidation of a community of experts in the discipline, which may have been a common feature of the discipline in other countries. (shrink)

This article examines the notion of the `scientist as a moral person' in the light of the early stages of the commodification of science and the transformation of research into a big enterprise, operating on the principle of the division of labour. These processes were set in train at the end of the 19th century. The article focuses on the concomitant changes in the public persona and the habitus of scientific entrepreneurs. I begin by showing the significance of the (...) professional networks that were built up and maintained to further a group's research ideas and the careers of its members, thus demonstrating one condition on which depended their practice of science and their ability to earn a living. This leads to a characterization of the changing styles of work, thought and life, and to a consideration of public perceptions and of the ways in which a new self-image of scholarship and science was fashioned. A critical discussion of the public role of these mandarin scientists follows in order to highlight the strains created by the commodification of science at a time of international tensions and conflicts, when shared beliefs in scholarly cosmopolitanism were subverted by appeals to science and scholarship to work in the service of one's own nation as its `courtiers'. Various considerations of peculiar analogies between national styles of research and the style of social organization are then noted. In the final section, the article queries the long-term impact of these developments on the ideal of the scientist as a `moral person'. Taking a cue from Max Weber and pursuing reflections by Zygmunt Bauman on `science moralized', I argue that the emergence of a type of `specialists without spirit' was an unintended but fatal consequence of the changes in research practices promoted by scientific entrepreneurs such as Du Bois-Reymond. I conclude that the temptation to sever the ties to a general ethos of civil virtues lay in the rationalization, specialization and potential de-humanization of the objectifying scientific outlook once advocated for its efficiency. (shrink)

An obvious feature of the development of the philosophy of science during the past decades is an increasing specialization and fragmentation that have led to reduced impact of philosophy of science outside the sphere of its own discipline. It seems that philosophy of science and scientific research are moving away from each other. The major question of this article is how can reconnect these two?To answer this question I will try to highlight some events especially in the fields (...) of social sciences that researchers are involved in discussions, generally related to philosophy of science, not in an abstract and isolated way, but in a way that is completely intertwined in their research practices. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has not been properly considered by philosophers of science and has remained more as a subject in the field of social sciences, specifically research methodology. It seems that if philosophy of science enters into dialogue with social sciences, we can expect the revival of the philosophy of general science. In this article, I try to show the signs of this phenomenon in cognitive psychology. I will first turn to one of the most influential theories in the cognitive sciences, expertise theory. After reviewing the important theories of expertise and their differences, in the next step I will discuss the seemingly opposing theories in this field and their efforts to find common ground. Then I will review the current movement in cognitive psychology, which I call the “integration model” stream. After a critical review and categorization of these models, I will show that in a broader view in social science, we can realize the meta-theoretical issues that are a good room for a dialogue between philosophy of science and scientific research. In the end, I will point out the horizons that this view opens to the revival of philosophy of general science. (shrink)

Al-Mu'jam Al-muḫtaṣ of Murtadā Al-Zabīdī (d. 1205/1791) in which a scholar recorded his teachers, the books that he obtained the right to narrate during his education life and the chain of transmission from his teachers to the author, is one of the important representatives of the mu'jam genres in 12th/18th century. It can be said that the mu'jam that Zabīdī wrote to record the important people in his life, goes beyond the standard mu'jam with its compilation style, sources, diversity of (...) biographers and anecdotes about the writing activity of the period. Based on Zabīdī's teachers, students and contemporaries, their origins, specialization and profession, the dates of their deaths, the dates of his encounters with them, the extent of his friendships, the dated rihle route, the lecture places and the books he taught, a panorama about the mu'jam will be drawn. The mu’jam, which includes 635 biographies, has a wide range of written and oral sources, especially ijazat and samā sources. Zabīdī's correspondence with scholars from different regions, taqrīz/appreciation written for his famous books and poems belonging to scholars of the period are among these sources. Numerous taqrīzs on his Tāj al-ʿArūs and Sharḥ Al-Iḥyā's point to their fame at that time, while Mu’jam, which has the appearance of an independent poetry anthology due to the poems that reach tens of pages, reveals his unknown poetic side. On the other hand, some couplets recorded in Persian and Turkish show his knowledge of these languages. Zabīdī is a versatile personality who lived in different geographies such as India, Yemen and Egypt and met many scholars there. Rihles in different regions of Yemen such as Zabid, Moravıa and Mocha, as well as inside Egypt, including Damietta, Raşıt, Fuwwah and Asyut, show that Zabīdī traveled frequently for the sake of knowledge. Egypt, where he went in 1167 (1753) with the advice of his teacher al-Aydarūs and spent thirty-eight years of his life, has an important place in his scientific adventure. Recording sufis, merchants and janitors as well as famous people from different fields such as poets, jurists and muhaddis in biographies reflects Zabīdī's extensive contact reaching various segments of society through the aforementioned rihles. While Zabīdī was obtaining knowledge through both these journeys and ijazat, he also gave ratification/ijazat to the students who came to him. While he prefers ijazat of al-musalsal bil awwaliyyah and Al-Awail Ṣaḥīḥ/al-Kutub al-Sittah for those who come to him for short periods of time on the occasion of pilgrimage, but on the other hand he gaves ijazat of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhari, Shamail Tirmidhi, Sharḥ Al-Iḥyā and Al-Amali for his long-term students. Lessons, both open to the public in mosques and with more private groups at home, were held in informal rather than systematic/formal style like in the madrasah. The books that Zabīdī received the right to transmit through his rihles are listed below under the "textbooks" heading. When a book is mentioned in whichever biography, it can be implicitly considered the person has the elevated chain of transmission of the book. Similarly, it can be revealed in which region and by whom tranmits the short chain of a book. This reveals the unknown aspects of regional and temporal writing style. On the other hand, it is possible to find other traces of the background of writing and representation/taqrir through the mu'jam. For instance, a book was sometimes typed as a result of the students' compilation of lecture notes of their masters, sometimes when a person obtained a book he needed and he abbreviated important parts and copied a special copy for himself or a student could only get permission for giving lectures after he had written a book. The mu’jam includes besides of Zabīdī's books, the books written by the biographers in the form of "he has many books" or by mentioning the name directly. Even the recording of details such as the reason for writing, date and content information reveals the unknown aspects of the book writing style of the period. Ultimately, the importance of mu’jam, which was written as the result of a life spent with learning, although it is not well known in terms of genre; is to mention the biographical information collected from many different secondary sources, compiled as a result of long effort, such as history and tabaqat-tarajim about the scientific life of the author together with their evidences. Therefore, these kinds of books, that are mostly written by the author himself or his close student, in which the teacher constitutes its main element, is a primary source in the determination of the biographical information of the author, as well as the book and isnad, deserve to be examined separately because of their potential to shed light on the unknown aspects of the hadith history and literature of the later period. (shrink)

The continuity thesis of the Poznań school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued - using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example - that the continuity thesis does not hold. A distinction between 'a historical and a systematic point of view' is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes (...) the systematic point of view. However, looking at matters from the systematic point of view need not yield the original theory, looked at from the historical point of view. Applied to the case of Van der Waals/Boyle-Mariotte laws, it turns out that the latter law is not a true idealizing special case of the former, contrary to the continuity thesis. The structuralist analysis of the example indicates that Boyle-Mariotte's law is a false factual law from the historical point of view. However, viewed from the systematic point of view, Boyle-Mariotte's law turns out to be a law which is expandable, adding the relevant new concepts, to an idealized version of Van der Waals' law. This idealizing version of Van der Waal's law in turn is a structuralist specialization of the (general) Van der Waals' law. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is a classic text in the history and philosophy of science. It is one of the best known works in the field outside this area of academic specialization. One need only mention the term ‘paradigm’ to register the extent to which Kuhn’s ideas have entered the vernacular. Traditionally, philosophers of science have tended to focus on questions about the nature of scientific method. Kuhn brought a historical orientation to bear (...) on such questions. Structure opens with the words, ‘History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed’ (p.1). Kuhn proposed a model of scientific change that emphasizes historical development. As Kuhn foresaw, reflection on its history has transformed our image of science. Science is now seen as a developing process, practised by humans in a variety of shifting historical and social circumstances. (shrink)

Today’s critical state of philosophy is examined by considering two of its aspects: the way in which philosophy presently is ever more typically practised and the new challenges it has to face to keep up with the changed scientific, and more generally cultural and social context. The essay outlines some prospects of progress in the light of those which still now can be considered the proper tasks of philosophical inquiry. Such tasks are singled out through an historical survey of (...) the original characters of philosophy and an appraisal of its theoretical motivations. The importance of the history of philosophy and the necessity of achieving a virtuous relation among the various philosophical disciplines are stressed to contrast the dangers of excess specialisation and professionalism. (shrink)

Based on archival documents and published sources, the article attempts to identify and evaluate the main features of the process of establishing applied research institutes and organising their activities in Vilnius during the first two postwar decades. This period marked the formation of the institutes’ organisational structure and formulation of the main directions of their activities. The developments of this period in the history of the research institutes can be attributed primarily to the efforts of the academic community in Vilnius (...) to mobilise the scientific potential that had survived the postwar years and to plan research that was more relevant to the Lithuanian context at a time of strict Soviet ideologisation and regulation of activities. In postwar Vilnius, applied research and studies were first initiated at the institutes of the then Health Commissariat. The postwar situation also meant that the research institutes established in Vilnius under the Academy of Sciences focused on applied and natural sciences. The structure and specialisation of these institutions was based on the organisational model of the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. However, the aim in Lithuania was to align research as much as possible to the needs of the region and to upgrade the qualifications of young Lithuanian scientists. The sources and published data discussed in this article reveal that the further specialisation of the main applied and theoretical research areas, pursued at the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, took place between 1956 and 1965. (shrink)

Leiden University was founded in 1575, not only in the midst of great political turmoil, but also in a time that experimented intensely with new forms of higher education. In due course Leiden was to choose an eclectic attitude, remaining loyal on the one hand to late medieval, scholastic traditions, but on the other hand emancipating the arts faculty in agreement with humanist ideas. The thesis this article wants to examine is that the curriculum of Leiden University during the first (...) 75 years of its existence was characterised by a high level of pre-university, Latin schooling, and, linked up with this, a differentiation and specialisation of the arts faculty. These developments, however, had social rather than scientific goals. The arts courses did not prepare the way for a well-defined profession, but served as an initiation into a cultural élite. (shrink)

Two groups of scientists have just announced what is being described as a leap forward in human stem cell research.1–3 Both have found ways of producing what are being called “induced pluripotent cells” , stem cells that they hope will demonstrate the same key properties of regeneration and unrestricted differentiation that human embryonic stem cells possess, but which are derived from skin cells not from embryos. In simple terms, these scientists have succeeded in reprogramming skin cells to behave like hESCs.Stem (...) cell research has been hailed as one of the most important and exciting areas of science, because it is believed that these types of cells will not only play an important part in regenerative medicine, but also yield valuable scientific information. These latest developments in cell reprogramming represent a milestone for stem cell science. No longer does the paradigm of irreversible cell specialisation hold true; instead, almost any type of cell might have the potential to become any other.The advent of techniques for producing these iPCs has also been hailed as an ethical breakthrough. Up until now, the production of hESCs has required a process which involves the destruction of embryos. Many of these embryos are available as by-products of IVF; but in addition, the process of somatic cell nuclear transfer to produce cloned embryonic stem cells requires a supply of human oocytes, which must currently be harvested from female donors at no insignificant cost. In a nutshell, iPCs seem to enable us to produce “embryo-free” human pluripotent stem cells, and in a “gender-neutral” way—that is, without the need for human oocytes.The response from the scientific community, ethical commentators and the public has, however, reflected an inherent confusion over the ethical significance of this research. The anti-embryo …. (shrink)

The famous gulf between the arts and the sciences comes from the current pervasiveness of scientific illiteracy. The resultant increased fragmentation of science threatens scientific research; the resultant increase of the portion of the population of the advanced world that shows general ignorance of science threatens Western culture and democracy, and thus science itself. Historians and popularizers of science can help reduce this gulf. Introducing science historically can help solve many acute social and political problems. Historians of science (...) can try to bring this about. Discussions of the social role of intellectuals require a great deal of a sense of proportion, since most people are still barely educated, hardly familiar with science, much less with its history. Science nonetheless influences lives. Current increased inaccessibility of science boosts the prevailing excessive scientific specialization that scientific and technological progress have imposed. Consequently, the search diminishes severely for comprehensive overviews of the world and even of specific parts of it, leading to disorientation that imperils even the normal functioning of science. There is then a vital need for a search for remedy. Philosophers and historians and popularizers of science can help develop the tools necessary for this vital search. (shrink)

On souligne couramment la pluralité des sciences et la diversité de ses méthodes. Devons-nous pour autant nous résigner à cette situation de fait ? Il s’agit d’interroger, à partir de l’oeuvre meyersonienne, la tension entre la spécialisation sans cesse accrue et la nécessaire coordination des faits. Cette oeuvre fournit l’exemple d’un projet encyclopédique souple, dans lequel l’épistémologie permet de transcender les cloisonnements disciplinaires.Today, the burden of proof appears to rest on those who defend the unity of the sciences. Yet, in (...) scientific research, concepts and methods are transposed from one field to another, and interdisciplinary approaches flourish. Meyerson provides the opportunity to take up this issue once again. His work offers the example of a moderate unitary conception of science. It is encyclopedic but not reductionist. (shrink)

In a world that peers over the brink of disaster more often than not it is difficult to find specific assignments for the scholarly community. One speaks of peace and brotherhood only to realize that for many the only real hope of making a contribution may seem to be in a field of scientific specialization seemingly irrelevant to social causes and problems. Yet the history of man since the beginnings of science in the days of the Greeks does (...) not support this gloomy thesis. Time and again we have seen science precipitate social trends or changes in the humanistic beliefs that have a significant effect on the scientific community. Not infrequently the theoretical scientist, triggered by society's changing goals and understandings, finds ultimate satisfaction in the work of his colleagues in engineering and the other applied fields. Thus the major debate in mid-nineteenth century in which the evidence of natural history and geology at variance with the Biblical feats provided not only courage to a timid Darwin but the kind of audience that was needed to fit his theories into the broad public dialogue on these topics. The impact of "Darwinism" was felt far beyond the scientific community. It affected social thought, upset religious certainties and greatly affected the teaching of science. (shrink)

A look at history showed that theology always has to face contemporary demands in terms of its scientific character. At present, processes of pluralisation and secularisation challenge the existence of theology at universities not only against the background of religious studies, which are independent of the churches, but also, for example, in relation to innovative life sciences or cognitive sciences. In this context, an essential point to consider was that theology – like social systems in general and science in (...) particular – is characterised by an increasing differentiation. This differentiation of science implied an increasing specialisation of research, which could also be observed in the field of theology and its sub-disciplines. This article accordingly addressed the question of how, in the face of increasingly specialised research studies, the unity of theology can be justified beyond abstract and sweeping determinations. The present contribution suggested that in this respect a model of research designs developed in religious didactics might prove useful. This model of research design could essentially be understood as consisting of three research dimensions that define a research space, in which the research study on the didactics of religion can be located in the three-dimensional space by the research goal as a formatting factor. The three dimensions of this model, including the research goal, seemed to be broad enough to be tested in other sub-disciplines of theology as well to see whether their research can be more closely defined with them.Contribution: Accordingly, the contribution of this article was to raise the question, in view of an increasing specialisation of theological research, to what extent a model of research designs developed in the didactics of religion could be transferred to other sub-disciplines of theology. Should this succeed a new approach to justifying the unity of theology could become available, which is able to take into account the current differentiation of theology. (shrink)

Development of the New Zealand nursing workforce has been shaped by social, political, scientific and interprofessional forces. The unregulated, independent and often untrained nurses of the early colonial period were succeeded in the early 1900s by registered nurses, with hospital‐based training, working in a subordinate role to medical practitioners. In the mid/late 1900s, greater specialisation within an expanding workforce, restructuring of nursing education, health sector reform, and changing social and political expectations again reshaped nursing practice. Nursing now has areas (...) of increasing autonomy, expanding opportunities for postgraduate education and leadership roles, and a relationship with medicine, which is more collaborative than in the past. Three current challenges are identified for nursing in New Zealand's rapidly evolving health sector; development of a nursing‐focused knowledge culture, strengthening of research capacity, and dissemination of new nursing knowledge. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the debate between the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis in light of the concept of incommensurability developed by Thomas Kuhn. In order to do so, first we briefly present both the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis. Then, we clarify the meaning and interpretations of incommensurability throughout Kuhn’s works, concluding that the version of this concept deployed in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is the best suited to the analysis of (...) class='Hi'>scientific disputes. After discussing incommensurability in Kuhn’s works, we address the question of whether the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis can be considered semantically, methodologically, and ontologically incommensurable, concluding that they can. Finally, we discuss three problems that arise from such a conclusion: firstly, what are the consequences of incommensurability; secondly, which mode of scientific change better explains this current dispute in evolutionary biology; and thirdly, whether rational theory comparison is possible given incommensurability. We suggest that the main consequence of incommensurability is profound disagreement, that the kind of scientific change that better explains the current dispute between the MS and the EES may be scientific specialization, and that incommensurability does not preclude rational theory comparison. (shrink)

Arguments from authority and critical thinking. Side notes toLogic and Argumentation by Andrzej KisielewiczThe article focuses on the role of arguments from authority — or, more precisely, arguments from expert opinion – in rational argumentation and reasoning, in the contemporary context of specialisation of the sciences on the one hand, and the abundance of information on the other. The pretext for this is provided by Andrzej Kisielewicz’s new book: Logika i argumentacja. Praktyczny kurs krytycznego myślenia Logic and Argumentation. A Practical (...) Course In Critical Thinking. I point out that, although Kisielewicz’s book is a valuable contribution to the Polish market of textbooks on argumentation, practical logic and critical thinking, it understates the importance of teaching the ways of proper assessment of arguments from authority, credibility of experts and information sources. I argue that arguments from authority should not be by definition dismissed as fallacies; on the contrary, appealing to authority to expert opinion is an unavoidable element of rational argumentation – at least whenever the discussion requires one to refer to contemporary scientific knowledge. However, relying on experts’ opinions involves genuine risks to the rationality of the debate, many of them having to do with the abundance of pseudoexperts and irresponsibility on the side of some scientists an extensive example is provided by the presentation of statements on GMO’s made by a certain Polish body of scientists. Therefore, the ability to distinguish correct appeals to authority from faulty ones including the ability to tell actual experts from pseudoexperst and reliable sources of information from unreliable ones should be considered a crucial competence which critical thinking courses should teach. (shrink)

Was Silvanus Phillips Thompson primarily a physicist, electrical engineer, biographer, or teacher? His obituarists could not agree. I argue Thompson was in fact a polymathic generalist who, as a philanthropic Quaker, worked not to promote his own expertise but rather to ensure the public was swiftly informed of the most important techno-scientific research and applications of his contemporaries. I illustrate this in a comparison of Thompson and his longer-lived friend Oliver Lodge: working in closely-related areas, they had contrasting profiles (...) and commitments. After inspecting Thompson's work as textbook author and bibliophile, I resolve his apparently paradoxical status as both radical critic and figurehead of multiple institutions. Finally, to flesh out his friends' representation of him as a “many-sided crystal,” I analyse Thompson's multi-facetted posthumous reputation, especially in reviews of the Life and Letters written by his widow Jane and daughter Helen exactly 100 years ago. (shrink)

The plurality and complexity of modern science and technology require the research institutions in universities, government and even the private sector to engage in a plurality of activities, from basic to applied science, from graduate education to extension work and teacher-training. They should also be stimulated to diversify their sources of funds, from government to private companies, non-profit foundations and paying clients and students. Specialisation will take place, is necessary, and should grow through a combination of external incentives and internal (...) drive. Scientific research and development, to remain alive, should take place in a highly internationalised and competitive environment for resources, prestige and recognition. And the leading scientists should be also entrepreneurs of this enterprise for the promotion of the growth of knowledge. (shrink)

The incommensurability of two theories seems to problematize theory comparisons, which allow for the selection of the better of the two theories. If so, it becomes puzzling how the quality of theories can improve with time, i.e. how science can progress across changes in incommensurable theories. I argue that in papers published in the 1990s, Kuhn provided a novel way to resolve this apparent tension between incommensurability and scientific progress. He put forward an account of their compatibility which worked (...) not by downplaying the negative consequences of incommensurability but instead by allowing them to reach their natural end: a process of specialisation. This development in Kuhn’s thought has yet to be properly recorded but it is also interesting in its own right. It shows how a robust version of incommensurability—one which really does have severe negative consequences for scientists’ capacity to perform comparative evaluations of incommensurable theories—need make no puzzle of the progress of science. (shrink)

The first decisive steps of medicine towards becoming a science in its present shape happen to coincide with “the rise of the novel” in the eighteenth century. Before this well known and in our days still growing scientific specialization of medicine, the connections between literature and medicine were both many and close. By reading and analyzing a contemporary novel, The Death of a Beekeeper by the Swedish author Lars Gustafsson (1978), this article is an attempt to explore to (...) which extent a fictional narrative about a unique case of cancer may illuminate challenges associated with the experience of serious illness. Our claim is that medicine might draw wisdom from literature, its ability to create connections through narrative, to illuminate the complexity of ethical dilemmas, and to intertwine symptoms, life stories, and contexts. We argue that by being in the company of literary narratives and philosophical questions, physicians as well as other health care professionals may acquire clinically relevant skills which help them reach the ethically defined goals of their profession. (shrink)

Moj rad u vezi s Vicovom misli polazi od stajališta da sveukupna zapadna filozofska misao – kao uostalom i religija i moderna znanost – predstavlja proizvod čovjekovog obrambenog mehanizma protiv straha od smrti kao sveopćeg ništavila, odnosno kao obrana od evidentnosti da stvari izlaze iz ničega u kojem se, na kraju egzistencijalnog ciklusa, neminovno i vraćaju. Riječ je o evidentnosti koju je starogrčka filozofija prva evocirala i prikazala.U sklopu tog općeg filozofskog obrambenog mehanizma i Vicova »Nova znanost« promatrana je kao (...) još jedan pokušaj da se u kaotičnost još neuređenih društvenih činjenica uvede određeni epistemski red, tako da se fenomenološka zbilja obuhvati u jednom racionalnom totalitetu koji će ljudskom biću pružati sigurnost.U tom smislu, Vicova filozofija, a posebice njegovo glavno djelo Načela nove znanosti, zauzima posebno mjesto unutar zapadne filozofske tradicije, jer u sebi sadržava i ujedinjuje dvije važne komponente europske misli koje će se u moderno doba razvijati u različitim pravcima. Misli se, s jedne strane, na filozofsku misao koja će svoj vrhunac dostići u Hegelovoj sistematizaciji zapadne filozofske misli i, s druge strane, na modernu znanost koja će, u svojoj sve većoj specijalizaciji u sve partikularnije znanstvene discipline i parcijalizaciji same stvarnosti, istinu identificirati s djelotvornošću proučavanih činjenica, ostavljajući po strani apstraktnu, epistemsku istinu filozofije.My report on G. B. Vico’s thought moves from the assumption that all Western philosophy – just as religion and modern science – represents the product of the defence mechanism human beings use against the fear of death seen as absolute nothingness, that is defence from the evidence that things come from the nothingness to which, at the end of their existence, they imminently return. It is the obviousness that Greek philosophy has evoked and showed first.Within this general philosophical defence mechanism Vico’s “New Science” is also seen as an attempt to introduce a kind of epistemic order in the chaos of social facts not yet systemised according to reason, trying in this way to understand the phenomenological reality inside a rational whole capable of granting security to human beings.In this sense Vico’s philosophy and especially his main work, Modern Science, holds an important position in the Western philosophical tradition, as it contains and combines two important constituents of Western thought which in the modern age will develop in various directions. We are referring to the philosophical thought which will reach its climax in Hegel’s systematisation of Western philosophy and on the other hand, to the modern science that, considered its ever increasing specialisation into always more detailed scientific disciplines and the fragmentation of reality itself, will identify truth with the fulfilling efficacy of tested facts, leaving behind the abstract epistemic truth of philosophy. (shrink)

Economics has developed into one of the most specialised social sciences. Yet at the same time, it shares its subject matter with other social sciences and humanities and its method of analysis has developed in close correspondence with the natural and life sciences. This book offers an up to date assessment of economics in relation to other disciplines. -/- This edited collection explores fields as diverse as mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, sociology, architecture, and literature, drawing from selected contributions to the (...) 2005 Annual Conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought (ESHET). There is currently much discussion at the leading edges of modern economics about openness to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology. But what we see here is that economics has drawn on (as well as contributed to) other disciplines throughout its history. In this sense, in spite of the increasing specialisation within all disciplines, economics has always been an open discipline and the chapters in this volume provide a vivid illustration for this. -/- Open Economics is a testament to the intellectual vibrancy of historical research in economics. It presents the reader with a historical introduction to the disciplinary context of economics that is the first of its kind, and will appeal to practising economists and students of the discipline alike, as well as to anybody interested in economics and its position in the scientific and social scientific landscape. -/- Table of Contents -/- Introduction: Economics in relation to other disciplines Richard Arena, Sheila Dow and Matthias Klaes Part I. Economics in relation to the humanities and social sciences 1. The social science of economics Brian J. Loasby 2. Economics and literature Bruna Ingrao 3. Happiness: what Kahneman could have learnt from Pietro Verri Pier Luigi Porta Part II. Economics in relation to the life and natural sciences 4. Newtonian physics, experimental moral philosophy and the shaping of political economy Sergio Cremaschi 5. Evolutionary biology and economic behaviour: re-visiting Veblen's instinct of workmanship Mark Harrison 6. Medicine and economics in pre-classical economics Alain Clément and Ludovic Desmedt Part III. Economics and mathematics 7. Mathematics as the role model for neoclassical economics Nicola Giocoli 8. The role of econometric method in economic analysis: A reassessment of the Keynes-Tinbergen debate, 1938-43 Giovanna Garrone and Roberto Marchionatti IV. Economics and architecture 9. Economics and architecture Maurice Lagueux 10. Economic policies and urban development in Latin America Michele Alacevich and Andrea Costa V. Economics and geography 11. ‘Space’ in economic thought Giovanna Vertova 12. Economics, geography and colonialism in the writings of William Petty Hugh Goodacre Part VI. Economics and sociology 13. Economics and sociology: Gustav Schmoller and Werner Sombart on social differentiation Joachim Zweynert 14. Is Homo Oeconomicus a 'bad guy'? Isabelle This Saint-Jean -/- . (shrink)

In its forty years of existence, Artificial Intelligence has suffered both from the exaggerated claims of those who saw it as the definitive solution of an ancestral dream — that of constructing an intelligent machine-and from its detractors, who described it as the latest fad worthy of quacks. Yet AI is still alive, well and blossoming, and has left a legacy of tools and applications almost unequalled by any other field-probably because, as the heir of Renaissance thought, it represents a (...) possible bridge between the humanities and the natural sciences, philosophy and neurophysiology, psychology and integrated circuits-including systems that today are taken for granted, such as the computer interface with mouse pointer and windows. This writing describes a few results of AI that have modified the scientific world, as well as the way a layman sees computers: thetechnology of programming languages, such asLISP-witness the unique excellence of academic departments that have contributed to them-thecomputing workstations-of which our modern PC is but a vulgarised descendant-theapplications to the educational field-e.g., the realisation of some ideas of genetic epistemology-and tointerdisciplinary philosophy-such as Hofstadter's associations between the arts and mathematics-and the use ofAI techniques in music and musicology. All this has led to a generalisation of AI towards Negrotti's overallTheory of the Artificial, which encompasses further specialisation such asartificial reality, artificial life, and applications ofneural networks among others. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) is widely considered as one of the most important philosophers of science of the 20th century, while his The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (SSR) is regarded as one of the most influential works in the philosophy ofscience. At the same time, however, his place within philosophy of science remains ambiguous. On the one hand, despite the popularity of SSR, there is no proper ‘Kuhnian school of thought’ in HPS. On the other hand, the interest towards Kuhn (...) does not seem to fade away and the number of publications about his work does not seem to decrease. We suggest that there are at least three different ways to go ‘beyond SSR’: (i) by scrutinising the development of Kuhn’s thought, from his pre- to his post-SSR writings; (ii) by contextualising Kuhn in the philosophical milieu of his time, thus interpreting his view as emerging from the intellectual exchanges he had with contemporary philosophers; (iii) by reinterpreting and developing some of his most known ideas, in ways that perhaps Kuhn himself was not able to contemplate. (shrink)

The book addresses the climate change crisis through scientific, historical and spiritual lenses. Using Lonergan's functional specialization method,it analyzes data to rebut the claims of climate change deniers. It seeks to motivate and coordinate needed action by persons, groups and nations. Lonergan's method helps us study the past with a view to change the future.