We provide two alternative characterizations of the Nash bargaining solution. We introduce new simple axioms, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. First, we prove that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale invariance, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and strong undominatedness by the disagreement point. Second, we replace the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom with the sandwich axiom and egalitarian Pareto optimality. We then demonstrate that the Nash solution is characterized by symmetry, scale (...) invariance, strong undominatedness by the disagreement point, the sandwich axiom, and egalitarian Pareto optimality. (shrink)

In this study we introduce two new properties, the Midpoint Outcome on a Linear Frontier (MOLF) and Balanced Focal Point (BFP) properties, to replace the Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Symmetry (SYM) and Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations (IEUR) properties in the axiomatic characterizations of the two most prominent solution concepts, namely the Nash and Kalai/Smorodinsky solutions, respectively.

Voters satisfy maximin or maximax in their choices between sets of alternatives and secure a Pareto improvement by all voting strategically under simple majority voting for particular sincere preferences. Thus the assumption that strategic voting is a bad thing is challenged and the idea that we should reject voting because of the possibility of misrepresentation dismissed.

In searching for an appropriate utility function in the expected utility framework, we formulate four properties that we want the utility function to satisfy. We conduct a search for such a function, and we identify Pareto utility as a function satisfying all four desired properties. Pareto utility is a flexible yet simple and parsimonious two-parameter family. It exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and increasing but bounded relative risk aversion. It is applicable irrespective of the probability distribution relevant (...) to the prospect to be evaluated. Pareto utility is therefore particularly suited for catastrophic risk analysis. A new and related class of generalized exponential (gexpo) utility functions is also studied. This class is particularly relevant in situations where absolute risk tolerance is thought to be concave rather than linear. (shrink)

In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separable” preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a single (...) object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness. (shrink)

It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners’ Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of complete information and common knowledge has at least one Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) in pure strategies, which we define and illustrate. The outcome it gives, which depends on where play starts, may or may not coincide with that given by a Nash (...) equilibrium. We use some simple examples to illustrate properties of NMEs—for instance, that NME outcomes are usually, though not always, maximin—and seem likely to foster cooperation in many games. Other approaches for analyzing farsighted strategic behavior in games are compared with the NME analysis. (shrink)

A simple Weberian agglomeration is developed and then extended as an innovative fixed-charged, colocation model over a large set of locational possibilities. The model is applied to cases in which external economies (EE) arise due to colocation alone and also cases in which EE arise due to city size. Solutions to the model are interpreted in the context of contemporary equilibrium analysis, which allows Weberian agglomeration to be interpreted in a more general way than in previous analyses. Within that (...) context, the Nash points and Pareto efficient points in the location patterns derived in the model are shown to rarely coincide. The applications consider agglomeration from two perspectives: one is the colocation behavior of producers as the agents of agglomeration and the other is the interaction between government and those agents in the interest of agglomeration policy. Extending the analysis to games, potential Pareto efficiency and Hicks optimality are considered with respect to side payments between producers and with respect to appropriate government incentives toward agglomeration. (shrink)

We develop a utilitarian framework to assess different decision rules for the European Council of Ministers. The proposals to be decided on are conceptualized as utility vectors and a probability distribution is assumed over the utilities. We first show what decision rules yield the highest expected utilities for different means of the probability distri- bution. For proposals with high mean utility, simple bench- mark rules (such as majority voting with proportional weights) tend to outperform rules that have been proposed (...) in the political arena. For proposals with low mean utility, it is the other way round. We then compare the expected utilities for smaller and larger countries and look for Pareto- dominance relations. Finally, we provide an extension of the model, discuss its restrictions, and compare our approach with assessments of decision rules that are based on the Penrose measure of voting power. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes an index ordering and a social ordering function as a simple way to formalize the indexing problem in the social choice framework. Two main conclusions are derived. First, the alleged dilemma between welfarism and perfectionism is shown to involve a third possibility, exemplified by the fairness approach to social choice. Second, the idea that an individual is better off than another whenever he has more (goods, functionings, etc.) in all dimensions, which is known to enter in (...) conflict with the Pareto principle, can be partly salvaged by adopting the fairness approach. (shrink)

Frege puzzles exploit cognitive differences between co-referential terms. Traditionally, they were handled by some version of Frege’s distinction between sense and reference, which avoided disruptive consequences for epistemology. However, the Fregean programme did not live up to its original promise, and was undermined by the development of theories of direct reference; for semantic purposes, its prospects now look dim. In particular, well-known analogues of Frege puzzles concern pairs of uncontentious synonyms; attempts to deal with them by distinguishing idiolects or postulating (...) ‘narrow contents’ or elaborate forms of context-sensitivity are inadequate or semantically implausible. Although ascriptions of knowledge, belief, and other attitudes are ubiquitous in epistemology, epistemologists have not properly come to terms with the surprising consequences of anti-Fregean semantic accounts of attitude ascriptions. In ‘A Puzzle about Belief ’, Saul Kripke shows that natural-seeming disquotational principles for ascribing belief lead to apparently unacceptable consequences, including outright contradictions, in problem cases. Such disquotation principles, I argue, are best regarded not as conceptual connections but just as heuristics in the psychological sense, quick and easy ways of assessing belief ascriptions, usually accurate under normal conditions but far from 100% reliable. I discuss similar heuristics for ascribing knowledge and other attitudes. That the principles have a merely heuristic status need not be pre-theoretically manifest to their users. This view vindicates Kripke’s conclusion that it would be wrong-headed to draw semantic conclusions from Frege puzzles. I discuss the epistemological consequences of an anti-Fregean approach to Frege puzzles, including for Kripke’s cases of the contingent a priori and the necessary a posteriori, but also for evidence, for epistemic modalities, and for epistemic and subjective conceptions of probability. Anna Mahtani’s recent identification of Frege puzzles for the ex ante Pareto Principle as used in welfare economics provides an interesting example. I suggest a model-building methodology as the most promising way of handling at least some of the difficulties. A final issue is the choice between different anti-Fregean approaches to semantics, from very coarse-grained intensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible worlds to truth-values to more fine-grained hyperintensional approaches on which sentences express functions from possible or impossible worlds to truth-values or else Russellian structured propositions. Some of the hyperintensional theories violate semantic compositionality. More generally, since our attitude ascriptions rely on heuristics, they should be expected to exhibit some level of error; although hyperintensional approaches may be able slightly to reduce the level of postulated error, they do so at the cost of vastly increased theoretical complexity, and so have weak explanatory power. Methodologically, a simple intensional approach does better. (shrink)

Various potential strategic interactions between a “strong” Artificial intelligence and humans are analyzed using simple 2 × 2 order games, drawing on the New Periodic Table of those games developed by Robinson and Goforth. Strong risk aversion on the part of the human player leads to shutting down the AI research program, but alternative preference orderings by the human and the AI result in Nash equilibria with interesting properties. Some of the AI-Human games have multiple equilibria, and in other (...) cases Pareto-improvement over the Nash equilibrium could be attained if the AI’s behavior towards humans could be guaranteed to be benign. The preferences of a superintelligent AI cannot be known in advance, but speculation is possible as to its ranking of alternative states of the world, and how it might assimilate the accumulated wisdom of humanity. (shrink)

Suppose you found that the universe around you was infinite—that it extended infinitely far in space or in time and, as a result, contained infinitely many persons. How should this change your moral decision-making? Radically, it seems, according to some philosophers. According to various recent arguments, any moral theory that is ’minimally aggregative’ will deliver absurd judgements in practice if the universe is (even remotely likely to be) infinite. This seems like sound justification for abandoning any such theory. -/- My (...) goal in this thesis is simple: to demonstrate that we need not abandon minimally aggregative theories, even if we happen to live in an infinite universe. I develop and motivate an extension of such theories, which delivers plausible judgements in a range of realistic cases. I show that this extended theory can overcome key objections—both old and new—and that it succeeds where other proposals do not. With this proposal in hand, we can indeed retain minimally aggregative theories and continue to make moral decisions based on what will promote the good. (shrink)

Two agents endowed with different categorisations engage in bargaining to reach an understanding and agree on a common categorisation. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually associate a region with the same category end up rebranding it under a (...) different category. Finally, we show that this last equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction; that is, the unique equilibrium agreement may be inefficient. (shrink)

Todos los días se prueban nuevos psicofármacos, tratamientos para el VIH/SIDA o el cáncer, entre otras enfermedades. Algunos de esos tratamientos son lo suficientemente exitosos como para cronificar enfermedades antes consideradas mortales, como los antirretrovirales para el VIH/SIDA o el imatinib para la leucemia mieloide a principios del 2000. No obstante, antes de que puedan ser comercializados o estar disponibles en los sistemas de salud pública, deben pasar por una serie de rigurosas pruebas de calidad, seguridad y eficacia. Estas pruebas (...) implican el testeo de las drogas en animales y su estudio en seres humanos, sanos o enfermos. Estrictas normas de buenas prácticas científicas y éticas regulan todo el proceso de las investigaciones biomédicas. El problema de mi tesis se centra en el momento de la finalización de los estudios en seres humanos. Alguien podría preguntarse qué pasa con las personas si se benefician clínicamente del tratamiento experimental durante el estudio cuando este finaliza. La interrupción abrupta de un tratamiento beneficioso podría poner en peligro la salud de los sujetos. Y en el caso de sujetos de investigación afectados por enfermedades crónicas, es probable que deban continuar con el tratamiento beneficioso u otra atención adecuada por el resto de sus vidas. Un sujeto de investigación estadounidense sin seguro de salud que participó en un estudio de largo plazo de diabetes resume estas preocupaciones: "de repente cortan la cuerda, y uno está solo por su cuenta ... O conseguís trescientos o cuatrocientos dólares por mes para seguir con esto o simplemente seguís adelante y morís". Este tipo de casos me llevaron a preguntar si existe alguna obligación moral de proveer el tratamiento beneficioso a un sujeto de investigación que no puede pagárselo. Muchas personas podrían pensar que interrumpir el tratamiento beneficioso al sujeto de investigación que padece de diabetes y no tiene seguro para cubrir un tratamiento es incorrecto, porque nadie debería morir de una enfermedad o dedicar todos los recursos disponibles para sobrevivir, especialmente cuando se contribuyó a encontrar una cura o a obtener la evidencia científica necesaria para desarrollar un mejor tratamiento que el existente. Otras personas podrían pensar que lo correcto es ofrecer el tratamiento a un "precio justo", y si la persona no puede pagar por la continuidad de tratamiento es su responsabilidad. Mi intuición es que una sociedad democrática justa tiene una obligación moral de establecer un sistema de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso para los sujetos de investigación. En esta tesis intento justificar filosóficamente esta última intuición básica utilizando el marco teórico de la teoría de la justicia de Rawls. Elijo utilizar la teoría rawlsiana, porque esta teoría me permite ubicar los problemas morales con respecto a la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso en su contexto social adecuado y en el contexto de la búsqueda general de una sociedad más justa. En particular, la encuentro especialmente adecuada para explicar fenómenos complejos de responsabilidad social como los que creo que subyacen en el problema de la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación. Como mostraré más adelante, es imposible tener en cuenta los aspectos morales de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso aislada de la sociedad en la que se realizan los estudios con seres humanos. En el capítulo 1 presento una introducción general al tema de la ética de la investigación y al problema de la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso. En el capítulo 2 intento determinar el campo de estudio de la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación. Para eso, mi estrategia es la siguiente. Primero, busco identificar los casos de estudios clínicos donde se daría la obligación de continuidad beneficiosa hacia los sujetos de investigación. Segundo, presento el problema de la justificación moral de la obligación de continuidad y la necesidad de discutir las justificaciones basadas en la idea de justicia como reciprocidad. Para esto, en la sección 2, identifico la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento a través de una selección de sus casos paradigmáticos en la literatura. Comienzo con el caso de los estudios clínicos con antirretrovirales llevados a cabo en Sudáfrica en personas con VIH/SIDA. Luego, introduzco el concepto teórico de sistema de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso. Este concepto me permite evaluar y comparar teóricamente cómo diferentes sociedades hacen frente al problema de proveer la continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso a los sujetos de investigación. Por último, rastreo los casos ejemplares de obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos en países desarrollados, con énfasis especial en los Estados Unidos. En la sección 3, analizo algunos problemas de confusión o ambigüedad más importantes en torno a la obligación. Primero, analizo el nombre de la obligación. Luego, trato de distinguir la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento hacia los sujetos de investigación de la obligación de disponibilidad razonable, una confusión muy común en la literatura de la ética de la investigación. Finalmente, me detengo a analizar una posible ambigüedad en el concepto de "tratamiento beneficioso" y utilizo algunos de los casos paradigmáticos identificados para argumentar a favor de mi interpretación. Atacado el primer problema, en la sección 4 y 5 me vuelco a relevar el problema de la justificación moral de la obligación de continuidad. En la sección 4, reconstruyo lo que llamo la "versión simple" del concepto de obligación a partir de la discusión sobre las fuentes de la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso. Luego, planteo la necesidad de investigar las justificaciones basadas en la idea de justicia como reciprocidad debido a las ambigüedades y la falta de un marco teórico claro dentro del campo de la ética de la investigación en seres humanos. Finalmente, en la sección 5, introduzco algunas distinciones clásicas con el fin de complejizar el marco teórico de las obligaciones, el cual será utilizado en la discusión de los próximos dos capítulos. En el capítulo 3 discuto la justificación de la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento que da el modelo económico de Alan Wertheimer. En la sección 1 del capítulo, debido a lo específico del tema y lo poco conocido del autor, introduzco a la persona y el contexto institucional de su obra. En la sección 2 del capítulo, distingo tres interpretaciones del concepto de justicia como reciprocidad e intento mostrar que Wertheimer utiliza una interpretación caracterizada por el uso mutuo y el intercambio de beneficios, a la cual llamo "reciprocidad de mercado". En la sección 3, presento el marco teórico del modelo económico. La pregunta fundamental de Wertheimer es la siguiente: ¿tienen los investigadores o patrocinadores una obligación supercontractual de proporcionar la continuidad de tratamiento u otros beneficios a los sujetos de investigación? Según el autor, el consenso en ética de la investigación responde de manera afirmativa a esta pregunta y como fundamento de esta obligación se encontraría lo que Wertheimer llama "el principio de interacción". Analizo este principio y presento las críticas que hace Wertheimer al mismo. En la sección 4, presento la respuesta a la pregunta fundamental que da Wertheimer mediante su "argumento estratégico". En la sección 5 analizo la solución dada por Wertheimer e intento explicar algunos de los supuestos principales del modelo, a saber, (i) la lógica del argumento estratégico, (ii) la fuerza moral de los conceptos de Pareto y (iii) el compromiso del modelo económico con la restricción de la información. Por último, en la sección 6 presento mis críticas al modelo económico. En el capítulo 4 presento el modelo de reciprocidad democrática, inspirado en la teoría de la justicia de Rawls. Este modelo se presenta como un marco teórico y una interpretación de la justicia como reciprocidad alternativos al modelo económico presentado en el capítulo anterior. En la sección 2 del presente capítulo, explicito los problemas del marco teórico relacionados con el concepto de justicia como reciprocidad que subyacen a la discusión sobre la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación. Para esto, me centro en tres puntos: (i) la relación del principio de justicia como reciprocidad y el concepto de obligación; (ii) el problema del alcance del principio de reciprocidad, y (iii) la relación entre el principio de reciprocidad y el concepto de equidad, o lo que llamo "el problema de la medida de la reciprocidad". En la sección 3, defino con mayor claridad el enfoque rawlsiano de la justicia distributiva y expongo una crítica a los argumentos antirrawlsianos esgrimidos por los defensores del modelo económico que afirman que los principios de justicia política de Rawls no se aplican a los individuos. Si mi respuesta a los defensores del modelo económico es correcta, los principios de justicia política se aplican a los individuos de manera indirecta, mediante la asignación de obligaciones posicionales por parte de la estructura básica de instituciones de una sociedad democrática, y permiten garantizar igual justicia a todos los miembros de la sociedad. En la sección 4, presento mi propuesta original de cómo entender la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación. Esta sería una obligación posicional perfecta correlativa con el derecho a la salud en sociedades democráticas justas o moderadamente injustas. En la sección 5, muestro de manera detallada el mecanismo apropiado para extender los principios de justicia política al caso de la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento beneficioso hacia los sujetos de investigación. Con este objetivo, introduzco la idea de secuencia en cuatro etapas, que permite evaluar y diseñar nuevos esquemas institucionales para dar contenido a la obligación de continuidad de tratamiento. Y presento los principios de obligaciones y deberes individuales, que cierran el sistema rawlsiano brindando razones morales a los individuos para extender los esquemas institucionales justos a nuevas situaciones, reformar los existentes y cumplir con las obligaciones posicionales asignadas por estos nuevos esquemas. Por último, en la sección 6, discuto las objeciones más importantes al modelo de justificación de reciprocidad democrática. Por último, en la conclusión general, hago un intento de aplicación del marco teórico del modelo de reciprocidad democrática al análisis de los sistemas de continuidad de tratamiento para países como Argentina o Brasil y presento las líneas más importantes para la investigación futura. (shrink)

A characterization of a property of binary relations is of finite type if it is stated in terms of ordered T-tuples of alternatives for some positive integer T. The concept was introduced informally by Knoblauch (2005). We give a clear, complete definition below. We prove that a characterization of finite type can be used to determine in polynomial time whether a binary relation over a finite set has the property characterized. We also prove a simple but useful nonexistence theorem (...) and apply it to three examples. (shrink)

Minimum wages are usually assumed to be inefficient as they prevent the full exploitation of mutual gains from trade. Yet advocates of wage regulation policies have repeatedly claimed that this loss in market efficiency can be justified by the pursuit of ethical goals. Policy makers, it is argued, should not focus on efficiency alone. Rather, they should try to find an adequate balance between efficiency and equity targets. This idea is based on a two-worlds-paradigm that sees ethics and economics as (...) two inherently conflicting ways of thinking. We, however, believe that this view of the relationship between ethics and economics is fundamentally flawed and blurs our understanding of how an ethically responsible regulation of the labour market should be conducted. In drawing on an economic-ethical approach that resolves the antinomy between efficiency and equity, we show that ethics and economics are, in fact, two sides of the same coin and that minimum wage legislation can only be ethically responsible, if it is at the same time economically efficient. In other words, we can have our cake and eat it too. On the basis of our approach, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an economic-ethical viewpoint. We suggest that under the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets a tax-funded wage subsidy is preferable over minimum wages, as it makes everyone better off. If, however, employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process, the minimum wage is justifiable under certain conditions. (shrink)

Is the minimum wage ethically justifiable? In this chapter, we attempt to answer this question from an order-ethical perspective. To this end, we develop two simple game theoretical models for different types of labour markets and derive policy implications from an order-ethical viewpoint. Our investigation yields a twofold conclusion. Firstly, order ethicists should prefer a tax-funded wage subsidy over minimum wages, if they assume that labour markets are perfectly competitive. Secondly, order ethics suggests that the minimum wage can be (...) ethically justified if employers have monopsony power in the wage setting process. As it turns out, then, order ethics neither favours nor disfavours the minimum wage. Rather, it implies conditions under which this form of labour market regulation is justified and, hence, allows empirical science to play a great role in answering the ethical questions that arise in the context of the minimum wage debate. This illustrates one of order ethics’ strengths, viz. the fact that it tends to de-ideologize the debate about ethical issues. (shrink)

Vilfredo Pareto's Manual of Political Economy is a 'classic' study in the history of economic thought. It is not only one of the leading works in the Lausanne tradition of economics, which centres on the theory of general equilibrium, it is one of the most important books in the history of neoclassical economics. This 'critical edition' of Pareto's Manual of Political Economy is a very significant work for two main reasons. First, it is the only variorum translation of (...) the 1906 Italian language Manuale di Economia Politica and the 1909 French language Manuel d'Économie Politique. Second, it includes extensive contributions by the editors, all of whom are authorities on the work of Pareto. It total, the editorial contribution are around two hundred pages and range from brief annotations, to extended editors' notes and detailed notes on the 1909 mathematical appendix. (shrink)

v. 1. Lo sviluppo del capitalismo (1872-1895).--v. 2. Reazione, liberta, fascismo (1896-1923).

Contemporary ethics is currently ramifying into different sub-ethics specific to each type of technology. Although this trend has been very timely and rightly called into question by Sætra and Danaher, both these authors and their critics Llorca Albareda and Rueda leave the matter unsolved from a discipline point of view. In this commentary, we clarify the statute of the ethics of technology, which corresponds to that of a subsidiary applied ethics, and show how it is precisely that, what renders the (...) creation of an ethics for each technology inappropriate. We thus provide a disciplinary reason to support Sætra and Danaher’s concern on tech ethics proliferation and to refute Llorca Albareda and Rueda’s relativization of it. In turn, we conclude by drawing some guidelines for tech ethics in practice. (shrink)

Social robotics has a high disruptive potential, for it expands the field of application of intelligent technology to practical contexts of a relational nature. Due to their capacity to “intersubjectively” interact with people, social robots can take over new roles in our daily activities, multiplying the ethical implications of intelligent robotics. In this paper, we offer some preliminary considerations for the ethical reflection on social robotics, so that to clarify how to correctly orient the critical-normative thinking in this arduous task. (...) We defend the ‘being perspective’ and its linked categories of ‘teleology’ and ‘interest’ as the ones from which to articulate the reflection. We argue that attending primarily to the ‘being’, before the ‘doing’, of robots allow us to correctly approach the core phenomenon of all ethical concerns on social robotics, avoiding the reductionisms in the ethical gaze to which the latter may lead. (shrink)

Some ways of defending inequality against the charge that it is unjust require premises that egalitarians find easy to dismiss—statements, for example, about the contrasting deserts and/or entitlements of unequally placed people. But a defense of inequality suggested by John Rawls and elaborated by Brian Barry has often proved irresistible even to people of egalitarian outlook. The persuasive power of this defense of inequality has helped to drive authentic egalitarianism, of an old-fashioned, uncompromising kind, out of contemporary political philosophy. The (...) present essay is part of an attempt to bring it back in. (shrink)

Policy-makers must sometimes choose between an alternative which has somewhat lower expected value for each person, but which will substantially improve the outcomes of the worst off, or an alternative which has somewhat higher expected value for each person, but which will leave those who end up worst off substantially less well off. The popular ex ante Pareto principle requires the choice of the alternative with higher expected utility for each. We argue that ex ante Pareto ought to (...) be rejected because it conflicts with the requirement that, when possible, one ought to decide as one would with full information. We apply our argument in an analysis of US policy on screening for breast cancer. -/- . (shrink)

In economic analysis, it is usually assumed that each individuals well-being (mental welfare) depends on her or his own resources (material welfare). A typology is provided of the ways in which one persons well-being may depend on the material resources of other persons. When such dependencies are taken into account, standard Paretian analysis of welfare needs to be modified. Pareto efficiency on the level of material resources need not coincide with Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being. A (...) change in economic conditions that is Pareto efficient in the standard sense, i.e., with respect to material resources, may nevertheless sacrifice one persons well-being to that of another. It is shown that under plausible assumptions, Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being may require the reduction of inequality on the level of material resources. (shrink)

Prioritarianism is a variant of utilitarianism. It differs from utilitarianism in that benefiting individuals matters more the worse off these individuals are. On this view, there are two standard ways of handling risky prospects: Ex-Post Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off in final outcomes and then values prospects by the expectation of the sum total of those adjusted values, whereas Ex-Ante Prioritarianism adjusts for prioritizing the worse off on each individual's expectation and then values prospects by the sum total (...) of those adjusted expectations. A standard objection to Ex-Post Prioritarianism is that it violates Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. In this article, I argue that Ex-Ante Prioritarianism suffers from much the same problem: it violates a sequential version of Ex-Ante Pareto, that is, it prescribes sequences of choices that worsen the expectations for everyone. (shrink)

Anna Mahtani describes a puzzle meant to show that the Ex Ante Pareto Principle is incomplete as it stands and, since it cannot be completed in a satisfactory manner, decades of debate in welfare economics and ethics are undermined. In this paper, we provide a better solution to the puzzle which saves the Ex Ante Pareto Principle from this challenge. We also explain how the plausibility of our solution is reinforced by its similarity to a standard solution to (...) an analogous puzzle in quantified epistemic logic. We also show that even if the puzzle were to remain unsolved, its impact on welfare economics and ethics would be limited. (shrink)