Drawing on the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alberto G. Urquidez works to free the fly from the metaphorical bottle by shifting the terms of the debate away from attempts at describing a thing that is not real and toward a normative or prescriptive approach to racism, rather than race, that emphasizes how the concept ought to be defined, as well as deployed, for anti-racist ends. Urquidez refers to this normative pragmatic approach as ‘conventionalism’ and the overarching structure of Defining (...) Racism: A Philosophical Analysis thus describes this position and then emphasizes its normative force. Here, I unpack Urquidez’s dual critique while also emphasizing my anxieties about a linguistic approach to race or racism, which might be framed as a variation of the is/ought problem insofar as it remains unclear to me how Alberto’s framework accounts for the transition from descriptive critique to normative anti-racist action. (shrink)

In the contemporary world, voices are caught up in fundamentally different realms of discourse, practice, and culture: between sounding and nonsounding, material and nonmaterial, literal and metaphorical. In The Voice as Something More, Martha Feldman and Judith T. Zeitlin tackle these paradoxes with a bold and rigorous collection of essays that look at voice as both object of desire and material object. Using Mladen Dolar’s influential A Voice and Nothing More as a reference point, The Voice as (...) Something More reorients Dolar’s psychoanalytic analysis around the material dimensions of voices—their physicality and timbre, the fleshiness of their mechanisms, the veils that hide them, and the devices that enhance and distort them. Throughout, the essays put the body back in voice. Ending with a new essay by Dolar that offers reflections on these vocal aesthetics and paradoxes, this authoritative, multidisciplinary collection, ranging from Europe and the Americas to East Asia, from classics and music to film and literature, will serve as an essential entry point for scholars and students who are thinking toward materiality. (shrink)

This book is divided into two parts, part one examines the brief history of happiness and summarizes the latest information from the areas of brain science as well as the field of positive psychology. Part two proposes that it is not happiness which is the true goal of human living.

It has been suggested that there may exist languages that contain only feature-placing sentences, and hence the conceptual scheme implied by such languages is radically different from the one with which we are more familiar. Contrary to what some philosophers believe, I argue that with such languages, we may not be able to say things having approximately the force of the things we actually say, that is, to express the so-called ordinary matters merely at the expense of simplicity. For (...) one thing, in such languages not only we cannot speak of change in something, e.g., that Theaetetus grows older, but also the sense of change in the expression of change in something cannot be preserved in the feature-placing translation. (shrink)

The question “Are you what you eat?” is ultimately a question about change. When we eat, are the nutrients from the food simply added to the biological complex we call the body or are the nutrients a product of substantial change? The scientific literature on digestion often describes the process in the former manner, which, if it were the only way to describe the data, would prove problematic to an Aristotelian and Thomist philosophy. However, the interpretation of the scientific data (...) is not so simple and can be understood within the framework of a broad range of philosophical perspectives. This paper is an attempt to show how it is possible to reconcile the scientific data of digestion with an Aristotelian-Thomistic natural philosophy. (shrink)

The cases that Doris chronicles of confabulation are similar to perceptual illusions in that, while they show the interstices of our perceptual or cognitive system, they fail to establish that our everyday perception or cognition is not for the most part correct. Doris's account in general lacks the resources to make synchronic assessments of responsibility, partially because it fails to make use of knowledge now available to us about what is happening in the brains of agents.

Dating back to the very beginning of our knowledge of the events that constituted the Holocaust, some historians, social scientists, philosophers, theologians and public intellectuals argue that it was a unique historical, or even trans-historical, event. The aim of this article is to clarify what the uniqueness question should be about and to ascertain whether there are good reasons for judging that the Holocaust is unique. It examines the core meanings of ‘unique’ that feature in the literature and identifies which (...) of these is most apt for considering the possible uniqueness of the Holocaust. It then works out what it would take for the Holocaust to be unique in the appropriately rigorous sense, which is facilitated by inquiring into the nature of genocide. The key question turns on the relation of the Holocaust to genocide: was the Holocaust more than, or different from, genocide? (shrink)

The chapter outlines Nietzsche's view of decadence, its history and effects. The philosopher held decadence to be any condition, deceptively thought good, which limits what something or someone can be. This concept informs his critical and affirmative projects, acting as a versatile tool to identify and overcome his own decadence and to resist the decadence of Western culture. Decadence appears in five major areas of concern to Nietzsche: physiology; psychology; art and artists; politics; and philosophy. Physical and mental phenomena (...) provide the substrate of his understanding, but they manifest in cultural, political, and philosophical forms that, in turn, affect the body and mind. In each of the five areas, the concept of decadence for Nietzsche serves 1) to unmask valued cultural phenomena as corrupt, 2) to name and analyze degenerate effects, and 3) to spur reflection on how to respond. (shrink)

The legacy of Nisbett and Wilson’s classic article, Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes , is mixed. It is perhaps the most cited article in the recent history of consciousness studies, yet no empirical research program currently exists that continues the work presented in the article. To remedy this, we have introduced an experimental paradigm we call choice blindness [Johansson, P., Hall, L., Sikström, S., & Olsson, A. . Failure to detect mismatches between intention (...) and outcome in a simple decision task. Science, 310, 116–119.]. In the choice blindness paradigm participants fail to notice mismatches between their intended choice and the outcome they are presented with, while nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way they did. In this article, we use word-frequency and latent semantic analysis to investigate a corpus of introspective reports collected within the choice blindness paradigm. We contrast the introspective reasons given in non-manipulated vs. manipulated trials, but find very few differences between these two groups of reports. (shrink)

With the development of mobile Internet technology, firms need to complete the entire process of consumer targeting, ad content generation, and ad display in a very short time window. Therefore, computational advertising, such as native ads on social media platforms, has become the mainstream of online advertising with its automation and personalization features. However, computational advertising faces some problems when using artificial intelligence technology to generate content. First, the images should have a significant enough impact on consumers and be easy (...) to adjust to save computational power at the same time; second, the iteration of the computational advertising system relies on consumer behaviors or advertising effectiveness, and firms need to learn the relationship between ad design and consumer behaviors. Under the above two problems, this paper selects visual distance as the main variable, and images can be adjusted by cropping to save computational power. This paper incorporates image design and ad effectiveness metrics into the construal level theory framework, under which the effectiveness metrics can be quickly determined. Following previous studies, we use click-through rate to represent the early stage of the sales funnel and a higher construal level and CVR to represent the later stage of the sales funnel and a lower construal level. Therefore, visually distant images bring distant psychological distance or higher construal level, which can get higher CTR; visually proximate images bring near psychological distance or lower construal level, which can bring higher CVR. These findings suggest that firms can improve the efficiency of their advertising systems and gain more revenue by understanding consumer psychological states. (shrink)

The present narrative review seeks to unravel where we are now, and where we need to go to delineate the active ingredients in psychotherapy delivered by conversational agents (e.g., chatbots). While psychotherapy delivered by conversational agents has shown promising effectiveness for depression, anxiety, and psychological distress across several randomized controlled trials, little emphasis has been placed on the therapeutic processes in these interventions. The theoretical framework of this narrative review is grounded in prominent perspectives on the active ingredients in psychotherapy. (...) Based on search terms derived from various theoretical perspectives, we conducted a systematic literature search of four scientific databases and identified 17 studies. Across the selected studies, three themes emerged: relationship variables, emotional venting, and cognitive factors. While methodological issues compromise the epistemic value of this evidence base, core questions also remain to be answered. Such questions include, but are not limited to, whether humans can form affectionate bonds to inanimate beings and whether these kind of mental health treatments should be understood as psychotherapy or something else. Researchers should therefore be cautious when applying theories of psychotherapy in the realm of conversational agents. We conclude the paper by introducing recommendations for future research, which we hope will help instigate methodologically sound studies in this field. (shrink)

In an important article, Chris Hart makes the case that CDA needs to draw on a wider range of theoretical sources in Cognitive Linguistics and Cognitive Science, giving particular attention to Evolutionary Psychology. While I support Hart’s case for this approach to CDA, and also support his argument, as a corrective to Chilton, that Evolutionary Psychology actually shows the need for something like CDA, this present article advances three further points, aimed to supplement the cognitive approach to CDA. The (...) first is that CDA could fruitfully draw on Cognitive Linguistics in a more detailed way than it has hitherto, and in particular on work that articulates Cognitive Linguistics with Cognitive Psychology of the kind developed by Tomasello. The second is that the insights of Habermas, much mentioned in CDA, need to be better integrated within a linguistic approach to CDA. The third and most important point is that the question of the underlying moral values of the critical stance in CDA now need to be explicated in view of the global context in which CDA operates. I also show, using Hart’s own data, how values are presupposed in many types of utterance. Hart is right to focus on evidentials in his data, as evidence of the critical abilities of human communicators. But there is something important missing for CDA to explore further: the presence of contestable values. (shrink)

The idea of doing something for its own sake interests me for two reasons. First, I should like to understand better two opposing reactions that I have felt on coming across the phrase ‘for its own sake’ used in earnest. When told that knowledge is worth pursuing for its own sake and that this is what the study of science at a university ought to be like—not an adjunct to commercially motivated research in a product I design and development (...) team funded by local industry—I, and others, feel that something pure and noble, holy, good and true is being said. On the other hand, I recognize that to some, who would probably describe themselves as more realistic than myself, the claim that knowledge should be, and is being, pursued for its own sake has a hollow ring. Nowadays, academics themselves feel uneasy when they hear this sort of thing being said in public in mixed company. But they do continue to say such things to each other, at least occasionally in private, among consenting adults. Furthermore, I do attach impor- tance to the thought that to do the right thing for its own sake is a shining example of moral goodness. At the same time I acknowledge that the idea of a good deed done for its own sake is less than crystal clear I and that, to many, the person who claims to be doing something for its own sake sounds like someone who smiles at himself in the mirror in the morning in order to find one approving face before setting out to commit his next crime against humanity. I should like to know whether this phrase ‘for its own sake’ will bear the weight I want to place on it or whether a more sceptical attitude is called for. (shrink)

In management research, theory testing confronts a paradox described by Meehl in which designing studies with greater methodological rigor puts theories at less risk of falsification. This paradox exists because most management theories make predictions that are merely directional, such as stating that two variables will be positively or negatively related. As methodological rigor increases, the probability that an estimated effect will differ from zero likewise increases, and the likelihood of finding support for a directional prediction boils down to a (...) coin toss. This paradox can be resolved by developing theories with greater precision, such that their propositions predict something more meaningful than deviations from zero. This article evaluates the precision of theories in management research, offers guidelines for making theories more precise, and discusses ways to overcome barriers to the pursuit of theoretical precision. (shrink)

This chapter concentrates on the nature of the image as it presents itself in experience, with its remarkable capacity to represent within itself people, events, emotions, and many other things, and with its place in art. The Husserlian perspective has many affinities with more recent investigations of images. The physical dimension of image plays an important role in imaging and has been largely neglected by philosophers, though not by artists. The uniqueness of image consciousness rests in its ability to (...) see something in something else. Then, the chapter assesses the differences between image consciousness and symbolic or signitive consciousness. The resemblance in image consciousness must precisely not be perfect; it must be paired with and permeated by difference and even conflict. Images improve experience by folding into themselves the world. (shrink)

Sometimes I dream that I am an astronaut. I land my spaceship on a distant planet. When I tell me children on that planet that on earth school is compulsory and that we have homework every evening, they split their sides laughing. And so I decide to stay with them for a long, long time… Well anyway… until the summer holidays. Each state of the mind is irreducible. The mere act of giving it a name, that is of classifying it, (...) implies a falsification of it. From all this, it would be possible to deduce that there is no science in Tlon, let alone rational thought. The paradox, however, is that sciences exist, in countless number… The metaphysicians of Tlon are not looking for truth, nor even for an approximation of it; they are after a kind of amazement. They consider metaphysics a branch of fantastic literature. They know that a system is nothing more than the subordination of all aspects of the universe to some one of them. Even the phrase ‘all the aspects’ can be rejected, since it presupposes the impossible inclusion of the present moment, and of past moments. (shrink)

What it is to be determinate, to have quality, to be something, hardly appears to be a problem worthy of thought. How could anything be more self-evident or familiar or resistant to questioning? It seems virtually impossible to be unacquainted with the category of something, whether in reality or in thought or speech. To encounter anything real at all is to encounter something, whereas to think or speak any intelligible content is already to refer to (...) class='Hi'>something thought or spoken. Indeed, it is unimaginable how one could fail to understand something, since if one did lack all notion of something there would be nothing determinate to understand or encounter. (shrink)

Partial lying denotes the cases where we partially believe something to be false but nevertheless assert it with the intent to deceive the addressee. We investigate how the severity of partial lying may be determined and how partial lies can be classified. We also study how much epistemic damage an agent suffers depending on the level of trust that she invests in the liar and the severity of the lies she is told. Our analysis is based on the results (...) from exploratory computer simulations of an arguably rational Bayesian agent who is trying to determine how biased a coin is while observing the coin tosses and listening to a liar’s misleading predictions about the outcomes. Our results provide an interesting testable hypothesis at the intersection of epistemology and ethics, namely that in the longer term partial lies lead to more epistemic damage than outright lies. (shrink)

Sherbourne Le Souef, a director of Sydney's Taronga Zoological Park during the first part of the twentieth century, utilized his observations of nonhuman animals living in captivity to write on the "actions, reactions and traits common to [humans] and animals" . Le Souef's writings reflect his search beyond the human will for "the genesis of man's actions and reactions" and his appreciation of evolutionary theory where the idea of hierarchy was maintained. Similar to William T. Hornaday, a director of the (...) zoological gardens in New York, Le Souef sought the moral improvement of zoo audiences through encouraging observation of nonhuman animals. More broadly, he argued for the relevance of his own observations to the general progress of the peoples of the new world. This paper identifies how notions of animal behavior were understood to indicate social, cultural, spiritual, and species hierarchies. (shrink)

The demon is, in the thinker,s words, "supremely powerful and clever", and it is only the combination of these two traits with the demon's incessant deception that empowers Descartes to stage the radical doubt that will terminate in his attempted proofs of God and the material world. The reason the demon is necessary is that the thinker cannot prove that it would be wrong for God to allow us to be deceived occasionally. Thus, Descartes needed, methodologically and rhetorically, something (...) more than just an imperfect God or a lack of God altogether; he needed a being with exactly as much power as God but without God's goodness. In short, one should utilize philosophy for the everyday analogue to lucid dreaming. For those unfamiliar with the phenomenon, lucid dreaming involves training oneself, by a simple concentration exercise performed before falling asleep, to be able to become conscious of being in a dream while still in it and without thereby ending it. (shrink)

Although Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory has been influential across many disciplines, little research has tested the psychological reality of conceptual metaphors using established experimental memory paradigms. Here we employ an episodic memory task based on the Deese-Roediger-McDermott false memory paradigm to explore this possibility. We find that after reading lists of sentences based on underlying conceptual metaphors that participants are more likely to falsely remember the nonpresented conceptual metaphors themselves as well as new sentences consistent with the (...) CM mapping than control items that do not share this mapping. This finding provides experimental support for conceptual metaphors and highlights the utility of using episodic tasks to explore the assumptions of this theory. (shrink)

This paper studies consumers’ reactions and resistance to being responsibilized for making climate-friendly food choices. While resistance to consumer responsibilization has been studied from an individual experiential perspective, we examine its collective characteristics. We do this by tracing the controversial marketing campaign of a Swedish poultry producer, encouraging consumers to “do something simple for the climate” by eating chicken rather than beef. In our analysis of social media comments and formal complaints to the consumer protection authority, we mobilize Foucault’s (...) notion of counter-conduct to analyse subtle forms of resistance to consumer responsibilization. We identified four interrelated yet distinct forms of consumer counter-conduct: _challenging truth claims, demanding ‘more,’ constructing ‘the misled consumer,’_ and _rejecting vilification._ By theorizing these counter-conducts, we demonstrate how consumers collectively contested both the means and ends of responsibilization—but not the underlying premise of individualized responsibility. Thus, our study helps to explain how consumers’ resistance reproduces, rather than undermines, responsibilization. (shrink)

Mitate is the name used to describe a typically Japanese visual trope, in which one object is meant to be seen as something else. While mitate is a defining element of Edo period haikai and ukiyo-e, a this kind of overlapping meanings can be found in much earlier sources. Its aesthetic effects are often smile, laughter, and parody, but mitate can also bestow a hidden depth to the commonplace and the contemporary through explicit and implicit connections to more (...) noble and remote cultural antecedents. In this paper I examine mitate and mitate-like configurations throughout the history of Japanese aesthetics, and conclude by asking whether mitate is indeed a uniquely Japanese phenomenon and by analysing whether and how it can be relevant to some philosophical discussions (Husserl's and Wittgenstein’s) concerned with the phenomenological and ontological status of images. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:China and Contemporary Millenarianism—Something New under the SunBenjamin I. SchwartzOne of the most obvious remarks one can make about contemporary China is that China has no reason to be excited about contemporary Western millenarianism. If by "millenarianism" one refers to an apocalyptic transformation of the entire human condition based on the Christian calendar, then there is no reason for Chinese, Jews, and Moslems, who have their own historic (...) visions, to find any significance in the history of the last millennium. At the end of the first millennium or the beginning of the second, China was at a high point in its civilization. To the extent that apocalyptic tendencies could be found in either its high or its popular culture, these tendencies were the focus of Buddhism or religious Daoism. They were not tied to specific calendars, and in an Indian spirit they spoke in terms of "kalpas," which might last for hundreds of millions of years—or might occur next week.In addition, it should be noted—as has been pointed out by Professor Landes and others—that the notion that there was an all-consuming preoccupation with an impending apocalypse in the year A.D. 1000 is highly debatable. Among the more scholarly members of the clergy in medieval times there were already modes of thinking that, under the influence of Islamic and Jewish philosophers, were pointing in the direction of a non-apocalyptic scholastic philosophy.In all cultures down through the ages, an apocalyptic vision of deliverance has promised relief from the vast burden of human suffering and despair—a vision that would be recognized as such even by those who sought no apocalyptic solutions and who continued to believe that our this-worldly life still promised compensatory satisfactions, limited as these might be. They would not accept the Theravada/ Hinayana Buddhist belief that even what we call our individual pleasures are a function of our individual sufferings. According to that belief, our love of our children or our wives is poisoned by our acute awareness of the transient nature of their existence. Release from the world of samsara can be attained only by escaping the world of individuated samsara into the ineffable world of Nirvana.Turning to the book of Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament, we find that the author, who represents an amalgam of Greek and Hebrew wisdom, is not an apocalyptist and still hopes that we will garner certain satisfactions from our lives as individuals in this mundane existence. Yet his disappointment, suffering, and exasperation over human vanities and duplicities often correspond to the catalogue of sufferings in the Theravada scriptures. But, like the Theravada Buddhists, he believes that in this world of ignorance (avidya) there is also "nothing new under the sun." In the endless generations of individual human lives, every mode of human ignorance and suffering has certainly existed in the endless cycle of samsara. It is nevertheless true that in the total attention on every aspect of human life from the techno-economic side, [End Page 193] we find a totally new way of neutralizing the age-old causes of human suffering. Gautama Buddha regarded our ordinary individual pleasures as poisoned by suffering, by the realization that individual pleasures soon fade away. Yet Prozac seems to continue to work without producing anxiety. Here, indeed, we have something new under the sun!In fact, the new technological-economic millenarianism does indeed represent something different from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century technological and economic transformations that seemed to offer the possibility of a steady amelioration of the human condition. Nineteenth-century technological and economic meliorism could be related to older forms of what might be called "materialistic" improvement. Yet nineteenth-century materialistic progressivism continued to be linked to other ethical concerns not only by Christian beliefs but also by many of the secular ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe. There were entire ideologies of socialism, liberalism, anarchism, romanticism, nationalism, et cetera, which continued to be deeply distressed by the non-"materialistic," ethical consequences of techno-economic progress. Techno-economic progress has not, after all, prevented the Holocaust, the Gulag, and the horrors of two world wars. On the contrary, it has raised... (shrink)

This article argues that Agamben's “paradigmatic method” leads to particular choices in his depiction of the figure of the homo sacer. Reviewing this project also suggests that there's more to history—the example given is the story of homo sacer—than Agamben's method would ever leave us to say. In other words, there are still resources in the tradition for something new, and thus there is much more left to say about its legacies.

Against the forces of modal ersatzism Lewis launches a variety of attacks, some of which are clearly compelling, others of which are less so. I argue that pictorial ersatzism cannot clearly be distinguished from magical ersatzism, and--more interestingly--that 'genuine' modal realism is subject to precisely the criticisms so fatal for the magical ersatzers.

Landscapes are paradigm cases for a theory of atmospheres like that of Hermann Schmitz since there are several atmospheres which can be experienced in landscapes. Though, landscape is rather seldomly picked out explicitly as a central theme in Schmitz’s work. An exception, however, is his article Landscape as a Mode of Perception, in which he argues that something becomes a landscape not by belonging to so-called nature, but by a specific mode of perception. I will critically analyze his conception (...) of landscape and argue that landscape is more than a mode of perception: the aspect of naturalness must also be given. Corporeal communication with vastness and, that is, excorporation (Ausleibung), is not enough to understand what is specificity of the landscape. The inclusion of the dimension of naturalness allows us furthermore to better understand one of the most important functions of landscape, namely recovery, and the often-associated transcendence of the subject-object-dichotomy. (shrink)

This work is a revision of the False Dilemma Fallacy (FDF). The formalized model (FM)of this fallacy has as its centerpiece a valid disjunctive syllogism, but the disjunctive premise is presumed to be false, thus making the argument unsound. Our revised model (FM2.0) focuses on the formal structure by comparing the given vs. the real argument, which is unsound because of its invalidity. This approach we believe is more pedagogically useful and a better explanation of the fallacious nature of (...) the FDF. It extends the identity of “formal fallacy” to the FDF. The abstract is formatted in two columns. The English abstract goes on this side. (shrink)

This paper is centred around a debate taking place among environmental scientists. One camp argues that proof of a causal connection between a chemical and a biological anomaly must be demonstrated in the laboratory. The other contends that actual damage is underestimated in the lab, and that it is therefore necessary to conduct supplemental ecoepidemiological research in order to determine the full impact of toxic chemicals. Members of the former contingent – claiming to be defending scientific rigour – sometimes accuse (...) their peers of practising an inferior science. This paper argues that this contention is supported by a philosophical tradition tending to favour abstract and formal analysis over the close examination of material detail. To the extent that this preference has been adopted by the media, industry, policy analysts, and regulatory bodies, more is at stake than an intellectual squabble. The paper provides a brief overview of the history of the formalist tendency in philosophy, followed by an illustration of the ways in which advocates of a strict laboratory methodology implicitly rely on this foundation. The work and ideas of contemporary ecoepidemiologists are then compared to this imposing edifice of traditional science. (shrink)

This essay first traces change in, roughly, the epistemology of the humanities from the 1950s to the 21st century. The second section looks at how the meaning and options in moral philosophy altered in more or less the same period. The last and easily most speculative section examines how these changes permeated American culture, and how professional philosophers responded to the challenges of the new political world they inhabited.

This article engages with Alan White’s discussion of the relationship between rights and claims and the literature provoked by it, particularly the response of Neil MacCormick. A further challenge is brought against White’s position of maintaining that there is but one kind of right, and that a right to something does not imply (nor is implied by) a claim to that thing. The analysis offered here insists on acknowledging different meanings of claim and different strengths to claims. A core (...) distinction between claim as assertion and claim as justified requirement is advanced, together with an accompaying distinction between making a claim and holding a claim. It is then possible to identify four different claims relating to a particular right as follows. ClaimA: A claims he ought to have the right that B pay him £x ClaimB: A claims he has the right that B pay him £x Right : A has the right that B pay him £x ClaimC: A claims that B pay him £x ClaimD: A claims a remedy for B failing to pay him £x In the relationship between ClaimC and the Right an equivalence can be discerned, without reaching the conclusion that the respective ideas expressed by them are the same. More broadly, this study suggests the importance for any fruitful discussion of rights, of providing a framework within which the different meanings, perspectives, and associated ideas can be approached in an orderly fashion. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s remark in section 304 of the _Investigations_ that a sensation “is not a something, but not a nothing either” has often been connected with his critique of the “picture of an inner process”, and there is a temptation to read “something” as meaning “something private”. I argue that his remark should be taken more at face value, and that we can understand its purport via a consideration of the notion of _consisting in_. I explore this (...) multi-faceted notion and its connection with the Context Principle, beginning with the case of certain “propositional attitudes” and moving on to sensations. Wittgenstein was right to think it a philosophical prejudice to say that X’s being in pain, say, must consist in, be constituted by, something. (shrink)