One way out to avoid this tension is to adopt what legal theorists call a “mixed theory,” which presents the different penal elements as answering to different concerns. For example, one could hold that the justification of the institution of punishment requires a consequentialist answer focussed on various types of deterrence aimed at promoting social well-being, but that the distribution of actual punishments is decided in terms of desert and the degree of moral culpability of the criminal. This (...) is the type of mixed theory A. J. Milne claimed to have found in Green’s Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation. By contrast, Bradley is often interpreted as holding the converse mixed theory, according to which a right to punish is established via some retributive argument but, once this right is established, consequentialist considerations can then be introduced to determine the actual punishments doled out. The passage usually cited includes this sentence: “Having once the right to punish, we may modify the punishment according to the useful and the pleasant.”. (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel’s theory of punishment has been most often thought to fit within a particular penal camp. The most popular interpretation is that this theory is retributivist because criminals should only be punished only where deserved in an effort to “annul” crime. Others believe this theory is a theory of moral education whereby criminals come to understand their crimes as wrongs in an effort to reform their behaviour. These interpretations all fail to acknowledge (...) the novelty of Hegel’s theory of punishment. Hegel’s originality consists in offering the first unified theory of punishment. A unified theory of punishment aspires to offer a single, coherent theory of punishment that brings together retributivist, deterrent, and rehabilitative elements without substantial conflict. We can find similar unified theories of punishment amongst Hegel’s earliest defenders, the British Idealists (or “British Hegelians”), who helped to popularize Hegel’s philosophical contributions in the late nineteenth century. Thus, Hegel’s novel theory of punishment marks the beginning of a new tradition concerning how we might think about punishment. (shrink)

My book, Punishment, has three aims: to provide the most comprehensive and updated examination of the philosophy of punishment available, to advance a new theory—the unified theory of punishment—as a compelling alternative to available theories and to consider the relation of theory to practice. In his recent review article, Mark Tunick raises several concerns with my analysis. I address each of these concerns and argue they rest largely on misinterpretations which I restate and (...) clarify here. (shrink)

Thom Brooks criticizes utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment but argues that utilitarian and retributive goals can be incorporated into a coherent and unified theory of punitive restoration, according to which punishment is a means of reintegrating criminals into society and restoring rights. I point to some difficulties with Brooks’ criticisms of retributive and utilitarian theories, and argue that his theory of punitive restoration is not unified or coherent. I argue further that a (...) class='Hi'>theory attempting to capture the complex set of rules and behaviors that constitute the practice of legal punishment cannot persuasively be unified and coherent: legitimate features of the practice advance goals and promote values that in some cases conflict. (shrink)

In a unified theory of human reciprocity, the strong and weak forms are similar because neither is biologically altruistic and both require normative motivation to support cooperation. However, strong reciprocity is necessary to support cooperation in public goods games. It involves inflicting costs on defectors; and though the costs for punishers are recouped, recouping costs requires complex institutions that would not have emerged if weak reciprocity had been enough.

The most widespread interpretation amongst contemporary theorists of Kant's theory of punishment is that it is retributivist. On the contrary, I will argue there are very different senses in which Kant discusses punishment. He endorses retribution for moral law transgressions and consequentialist considerations for positive law violations. When these standpoints are taken into consideration, Kant's theory of punishment is more coherent and unified than previously thought. This reading uncovers a new problem in Kant's (...) class='Hi'>theory of punishment. By assuming a potential offender's intentional disposition as Kant does without knowing it for certain, we further exacerbate the opportunity for misdiagnosis. (shrink)

Punishment is a topic of increasing importance for citizens and policy-makers. The same can be said for academic researchers and students. Mass imprisonment has reached record high levels while public confidence is often lacking. New thinking is required urgently to address these challenges. Moreover, there have been several key developments in the philosophy of punishment over the last 20 years absent in leading guides including the communicative theory of punishment, restorative justice and my novel unified (...) theory of punishment. -/- My book Punishment is a critical introduction to the philosophy of punishment attempting to offer a new and refreshing approach to benefit scholars and students alike. While the book is primarily philosophical, it brings together relevant insights from law, criminology, criminal justice, politics and sociology. The aim is to provide both a comprehensive overview with new insights on many familiar theories of punishment. (shrink)

This new second edition of Punishment includes a revised and expanded defence of the groundbreaking unified theory of punishment that brings together elements of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation into a new coherent framework. Thom Brooks expands the chapter length case studies from capital punishment, juvenile offending, domestic violence and sex crimes to include new chapters on social media offences and corporate liability addressing some of today's most pressing issues in criminal justice.

This book is the first comprehensive study of the meaning and measure of enforceability. While we have long debated what restraints should govern the conduct of our social life, we have paid relatively little attention to the question of what it means to make a restraint enforceable. Focusing on the enforceability of legal rights but also addressing the enforceability of moral rights and social conventions, Mark Reiff explains how we use punishment and compensation to make restraints operative in the (...) world. After describing the various means by which restraints may be enforced, Reiff explains how the sufficiency of enforcement can be measured, and he presents a unified theory of deterrence, retribution, and compensation that shows how these aspects of enforceability are interconnected. Reiff then applies his theory of enforceability to illuminate a variety of real-world problem situations. (shrink)

In this essay, I address one methodological aspect of Victor Tadros's The Ends of Harm-­-­namely, the moral character of the theory of criminal punishment it defends. First, I offer a brief reconstruction of this dimension of the argument, highlighting some of its distinctive strengths while drawing attention to particular inconsistencies. I then argue that Tadros ought to refrain from developing this approach in terms of an overly narrow understanding of the morality of harming as fully unified and (...) reconciled under the lone heading of justice. In a final and most critical section, I offer arguments for why this reconciliatory commitment, further constrained by a misplaced emphasis on corrective justice, generates major problems for his general deterrence account of the core justification of criminal punishment. (shrink)

In Playing Fair, Richard Dagger provides a unified theory of political obligation and the justification of punishment that takes its bearings from the principle of fair play. Dagger argues that members of a just polity have an obligation to obey its laws because they have an obligation of reciprocity or fair play to one another.

The punishment of criminals is a topic of long-standing philosophical interest since the ancient Greeks. This interest has focused on several considerations, including the justification of punishment, who should be permitted to punish, and how we might best set punishments for crimes. This entry focuses on the most important contributions in this field. The focus will be on specific theoretical approaches to punishment including both traditional theories of punishment (retributivism, deterrence, rehabilitation) and more contemporary alternatives (expressivism, (...) restorative justice, hybrid theories, unified theories) with an additional section on capital punishment, perhaps the particular form of punishment that has received the most sustained philosophical attention. These theories of punishment address two important questions: first, who should be permitted to punish and, secondly, who should be permitted to be punished. These questions then concern the justification of punishment and its distribution. While the majority today often identifies their theories as retributivist, there is a great diversity of theories defended. This entry will highlight the leading work for each view. (shrink)

Adam Smith's theory of punishment is rarely explored. This article examines his understanding of punishment in light of his theory of moral sentiments. My aim is to show how he is neither a retributivist or deterrence advocate, but instead defends a more unified theory of punishment bringing different penal goals together in a new framework.

I am very grateful to the contributors for this symposium for their essays on my Punishment book. Each focuses with different elements of my work. Antony Duff examines the definition of punishment in my first few pages. Michelle Madden Dempsey analyses the importance given to coherence in my account and critique of expressivist theories of punishment. Richard Lippke considers my statements about negative retributivism in an important new defence of that approach. I examine each of these in (...) turn below. While I do not change my position, they draw attention to certain features in my overall argument worth reflecting on at greater length. So I welcome this opportunity to address and clarify these now and grateful for their helping me to rethink my original arguments. (shrink)

Punishment is a topic of increasing importance for citizens and policy makers. Why should we punish criminals? Which theory of punishment is most compelling? Is the death penalty ever justified? These questions and many others are addressed in this highly engaging guide. Punishment is a critical introduction to the philosophy of punishment offering a new and refreshing approach that will benefit readers of all backgrounds and interests. This is the first critical guide to examine all (...) leading contemporary theories of punishment, including the communicative theory of punishment, restorative justice, and the unified theory of punishment. There are also several case studies examined in detail including capital punishment, juvenile offending, and domestic abuse. -/- Punishment highlights the problems and prospects of different approaches in order to argue for a more pluralistic and compelling perspective that is novel and groundbreaking. -/- Introduction; Retributivism; Deterrence; Rehabilitation; Restorative Justice; Rawls, Hart, and "mixed" theories; Expressivism; The Unified Theory; Capital Punishment; Juvenile Offending; Domestic Abuse; Sexual Crimes; Conclusion; Index. (shrink)

Punishment is fundamental to the evolution of cooperative norms in teams, organizations, and societies. Based on findings that people are faster when punishing others (relative to when withholding punishment), dual-process theories of punishment assert that humans have an intuitive tendency to punish, which requires effortful deliberation to overcome. Here, we propose an alternative single-process theory that models punishment decisions as a sequential sampling process. We provide supporting evidence for this theory using a public goods (...) game experiment that experimentally manipulates the cost–benefit tradeoff across the game. We show that people are not systematically faster when punishing (versus withholding) across tradeoffs. We also find an inverted-U-shaped relationship between response times and the strength of preferences for punishing, and a negative association between punishment rates and the relative speed of punishment across individuals. Further computational analysis using the drift–diffusion model (DDM) reveals that, on average, people exhibit a pre-disposition to withhold punishment. Our study provides a unified single-process framework for studying the micro-foundations of punishment and integrating process measures to better describe and predict behavior. (shrink)

Hegel's Philosophy of Right presents a collection of new essays by leading international philosophers and Hegel scholars that analyze and explore Hegel's key contributions in the areas of ethics, politics, and the law. The most comprehensive collection on Hegel's Philosophy of Right available Features new essays by leading international Hegel interpreters divided in sections of ethics, politics, and law Presents significant new research on Hegel's Philosophy of Right that will set a new standard for future work on the topic Introduction (...) (Pages: 1-6) Thom Brooks Summary PDF References Request permissions Part I : Ethics CHAPTER 1 Consequentialism and Deontology in the Philosophy of Right (Pages: 7-42) Dean Moyar Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 2 The Empty Formalism Objection Revisited: §135R and Recent Kantian Responses (Pages: 43-72) Fabian Freyenhagen Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 3 On Hegel's Critique of Kant's Ethics: Beyond the Empty Formalism Objection (Pages: 73-99) Robert Stern Summary PDF References Request permissions Part II : Politics CHAPTER 4 Hegel and the Unified Theory of Punishment (Pages: 101-123) Thom Brooks Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 5 Hard Work: Hegel and the Meaning of the State in his Philosophy of Right (Pages: 124-142) Kimberly Hutchings Summary PDF References Request permissions Part II : Politics CHAPTER 6 Gender, the Family, and the Organic State in Hegel's Political Thought (Pages: 143-164) Alison Stone Summary PDF References Request permissions Part III : Law CHAPTER 7 Natural Law Internalism (Pages: 165-179) Thom Brooks Summary PDF References Request permissions CHAPTER 8 Hegel on the Relation between Law and Justice (Pages: 180-208) Alan Brudner Summary PDF References Request permissions. (shrink)

In a paper published in 2006, I argued that the best way of defending something like our current practices of punishing war criminals would be to base the justification of this practice on an expressive theory of punishment. I considered two forms that such a justification could take—a ‘denunciatory’ account, on which the purpose of punishment is supposed to communicate a commitment to certain kinds of standard to individuals other than the criminal and a ‘communicative’ account, on (...) which the purpose of the punishment is to communicate with the perpetrator, and argued for a denunciatory account which I developed at some length. In this paper I would like to reconsider the plausibility of a communicative account. One difficulty that such accounts face is that the punishment of war criminals often involves the inflicting of harsh treatment on them by individuals who are members of states other than their own. On a communicative account this is problematic: on such an account—or at least on the version of it proposed by Duff (2000)—it is essential that those who are punish and those who punish them belong to a single community. When this requirement is not satisfied harsh treatment does not constitute punishment. Duff has argued that the problem can be solved by regarding all human beings as members of a single moral community: here I argue that this suggestion is unsatisfactory and propose an alternative. One consequence of my account is that if it is correct there may limitations on the range of kinds of war criminal that can legitimately be punished by international tribunals. (shrink)

This chapter begins with three sections dedicated to the three main fields of knowledge about the psychology of reward and punishment. The findings of common sense, behaviorism, and neuroscience are surveyed in turn, and found to have much in common. Then, these commonalities are used to produce a more unified theory of the nature of reward. A wide variety of organisms, including both rats and people, appear capable of constituting some things as rewards and others as punishments, (...) in a sense that is perfectly unified, and perfectly compatible with common sense. Uncovering this common core of reward is this chapter's task. Moreover, the theories of reward and punishment are examined. (shrink)

Mixed theories of legal punishment treat both crime reduction and retributive concerns as irreducibly important and so worthy of inclusion in a single justificatory framework. Yet crime reduction and retributive approaches employ different assumptions about the necessary characteristics of those liable to punishment. Retributive accounts of legal punishment require offenders to be more responsive to moral considerations than do crime reduction accounts. The tensions these different assumptions create are explored in the mixed theories of John Rawls, H. (...) L. A. Hart, and Andrew von Hirsch. It is argued that none of these theories successfully resolve the tensions. The prospects for resolving them are then discussed. (shrink)

Spells out in more detail Davidson's Unified Theory of thought, meaning, and action the implications of which have been the focal point of the preceding chapters. The main task is to illuminate the conditions under which an understanding of the norms for our theories of intensional attribution is possible. What makes the task practicable at all, according to the author, is the structure the normative character of thought, desire, speech, and action imposes on correct attributions of attitudes to (...) others, and hence on interpretations of their speech and explanations of their actions. Improving our understanding of the understanding of such norms requires improvement of the grasp of the standards of rationality implicit in all interpretation of thought and action. (shrink)

The sentences employed in semantic paradoxes display a wide range of semantic behaviours. However, the main theories of truth currently available either fail to provide a theory of paradox altogether, or can only account for some paradoxical phenomena by resorting to multiple interpretations of the language. In this paper, I explore the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and I develop a unified theory of truth and paradox, that is a theory of truth (...) that also provides a unified account of paradoxical sentences. The theory I propose here yields a threefold classification of paradoxical sentences – liar-like sentences, truth-teller-like sentences, and revenge sentences. Unlike existing treatments of semantic paradox, the theory put forward in this paper yields a way of interpreting all three kinds of paradoxical sentences, as well as unparadoxical sentences, within a single model. (shrink)

Scholars writing on theories of punishment generally try to answer two main questions: what human behaviour should be punished and why? Only cursorily do they concern themselves with the question as to how confident in the occurrence of criminal behaviour we must be prior to punishing—i.e., the question of the criminal standard of proof. Theories of punishment are ultimately theories about choices of action—in particular, about how to treat individuals. If this is correct, it seems that they should (...) not overlook one of the fundamental variables governing human decision-making: the uncertainty about the facts relevant to our acting. Now, the question as to whether existing theories of punishment require a standard of proof as high as ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ is gaining increasing attention in the scholarship. However, scholars working on theories of punishment give little attention to a particular way in which human decision-making handles the problem of uncertainty. In our everyday lives, we often decide in a many-valued, rather than a binary, fashion. Instead of having a single evidential threshold, the satisfaction of which determines whether we act or stay put, we tend to adjust our actions to our degree of confidence in certain states of affairs. In other words, we decide based on a ladder of evidential thresholds: the features of our actions vary according to the evidential threshold that we have satisfied. Notably, criminal trials do not follow this structure and theorists generally take this departure for granted. Why shouldn’t trials work as ‘ex post facto bets,’ whereby the response that the state is willing to ‘wager’ correlates with the fact finder’s confidence in the defendant’s guilt? The paper explores this question; in particular, it assesses whether the main theories of punishment necessarily deliver a binary system of verdicts. The work is part of a long-term research project on the comparison between the binary and the many-valued models of the system of criminal verdicts. (shrink)

A new theory that naturalizes biological function is explained and compared with earlier etiological and causal role theories. Etiological theories explain functions from how they are caused over their evolutionary history. Causal role theories analyze how functional mechanisms serve the current capacities of their containing system. The new proposal unifies the key notions of both kinds of theories, but goes beyond them by explaining how functions in an organism can exist as factors with autonomous causal efficacy. The goal-directedness and (...) normativity of functions exist in this strict sense as well. The theory depends on an internal physiological or neural process that mimics an organism’s fitness, and modulates the organism’s variability accordingly. The structure of the internal process can be subdivided into subprocesses that monitor specific functions in an organism. The theory matches well with each intuition on a previously published list of intuited ideas about biological functions, including intuitions that have posed difficulties for other theories. (shrink)

An influential strain in the literature on state punishment analyzes the permissibility of punishment in exclusively deontological terms, whether in terms of an individual’s rights, the state’s obligation to vindicate the law, or both. I argue that we should reject a deontological theory of punishment because it cannot explain what is unjust about mass incarceration, although mass incarceration is widely considered—including by proponents of deontological theories—to be unjust. The failure of deontological theories suggests a minimum criterion (...) of adequacy for a theory of punishment: it must take aggregation sufficiently seriously that it returns plausible results when scaled up from individual cases to large public institutions. In this vein, I briefly sketch a prioritarian metric for evaluating the use of custodial sanctions as a means of creating and allocating social advantage. (shrink)

This article proposes a unified theory of the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP). The theory provides a framework for rationalizing the various and contradictory findings in past empirical research. The theory is based on the parallels between the business and CSR domains, and thus draws on models from economics.

Most philosophers reject what we might call "penal pluralism": the idea that punishment can and should encompass multiple penal goals or principles. This is rejected because it is often held that different penal goals or principles will conflict: the goal of punishing an offender to the degree deserved may differ and even undermine the goal of enabling deterrence or rehabilitation. For this reason, most philosophers argue that we must make a choice, such as choosing between retribution and its alternatives. (...) In "Some Remarks on Punishment," F. H. Bradley re-examines the justification of punishment in light of a critique of Darwinism's importance for ethics. My primary focus is on how Bradley's substantive discussion of punishment only because it is here that this article's arguments have most relevance for us today. (shrink)

Repression has become an empirical fact that is at once obvious and problematic. Fragmented clinical and laboratory traditions and disputed terminology have resulted in a Babel of misunderstandings in which false distinctions are imposed (e.g., between repression and suppression) and necessary distinctions not drawn (e.g., between the mechanism and the use to which it is put, defense being just one). “Repression” was introduced by Herbart to designate the (nondefensive) inhibition of ideas by other ideas in their struggle for consciousness. Freud (...) adapted repression to the defensive inhibition of “unbearable” mental contents. Substantial experimental literatures on attentional biases, thought avoidance, interference, and intentional forgetting exist, the oldest prototype being the work of Ebbinghaus, who showed that intentional avoidance of memories results in their progressive forgetting over time. It has now become clear, as clinicians had claimed, that the inaccessible materials are often available and emerge indirectly (e.g., procedurally, implicitly). It is also now established that the Ebbinghaus retention function can be partly reversed, with resulting increases of conscious memory over time (hypermnesia). Freud's clinical experience revealed early on that exclusion from consciousness was effected not just by simple repression (inhibition) but also by a variety of distorting techniques, some deployed to degrade latent contents (denial), all eventually subsumed under the rubric of defense mechanisms (“repression in the widest sense”). Freudian and Bartlettian distortions are essentially the same, even in name, except for motive (cognitive vs. emotional), and experimentally induced false memories and other “memory illusions” are laboratory analogs of self-induced distortions. Key Words: avoidance; Bartlett; defense; denial; distortion; Ebbinghaus; false-memories; Freud; inhibition; repression; suppression. (shrink)

A distinctive theory of punishment plays a central role in Smith's moral and legal theory. According to this theory, we regard the punishment of a crime as deserved only to the extent that an impartial spectator would go along with the actual or supposed resentment of the victim. The first part of this paper argues that Smith's theory deserves serious consideration and relates it to other theories such as utilitarianism and more orthodox forms of (...) retributivism. The second part considers the objection that, because Smith's theory implies that punishment is justified only when there is some person or persons who is the victim of the crime, it cannot explain the many cases where punishment is imposed purely for the public good. It is argued that Smith's theory could be extended to cover such cases. The third part defends Smith's theory against the objection that, because it relies on our natural feelings, it cannot provide an adequate moral justification of punishment. (shrink)

This paper considers the applicability of expressive theories of punishment to the punishment of corporate entities. The author argues that although arguments which suggest that the denunciatory account is superior to a communicative account in paradigmatic cases of punishment cannot be transferred straightforwardly to cover this kind of case, there are other reasons, connected with the different attitudes we have to regret and remorse in individual and collective cases, for preferring a communicative to a denunciatory account here.

Saul Smilansky holds that there is a widespread intuition to the effect that pre-punishment – the practice of punishing individuals for crimes which they have not committed, but which we are in a position to know that they are going to commit – is morally objectionable. Smilanksy has argued that this intuition can be explained by our recognition of the importance of respecting the autonomy of potential criminals. (Smilansky, 1994) More recently he has suggested that this account of the (...) intuition only vindicates it if determinism is false, and argues that this presents a problem for compatibilists, who, he says, are committed to thinking that the truth of determinism makes no moral difference (Smilansky, 2007).In this paper I argue that the intuitions Smilansky refers to can be explained and vindicated as consequences of the truth of a communicative conception of punishment. Since the viability of the communicative conception does not depend on the falsity of determinism, our intuitions about pre-punishment do not clash with (what Smilanksy calls) compatibilism. And if the communicative theory of punishment is – as Duff (2001) suggests – a form of retributivism, the account also meets New's (1992) challenge to retributivists to explain what is wrong with pre-punishment. (shrink)

Expressivist theories of punishment received largely favorable treatment in the 1980s and 1990s. Perhaps predictably, the 2000s saw a slew of critical rejections of the view. It is now becoming evident that, while several objections to expressivism have found their way into print, three concerns are proving particularly popular. So the time is right for a big picture assessment. What follows is an attempt to show that these three dominant objections are not decisive reasons to give up the most (...) plausible forms of the view. Moreover, in addition to the three common objections, expressivism has an acknowledged question mark concerning whether the value of punitive expression outweighs its drawbacks. Here I also map out some promising avenues that the expressivist can take to answer this question. (shrink)

In this book, Newell makes the case for unified theories by setting forth a candidate.

To discover a unifying theory of biology, it is necessary first to believe in its existence and second to seek its elements. Such a theory would explain the regulation of the cell cycle, differentiation and the origin of life. Some elements of the theory may be obtained by considering both eukaryotic and prokaryotic cell cycles. These elements include cytoskeletal proteins, calcium, cyclins, protein kinase C, phosphorylation, transcriptional sensing, autocatalytic gene expression and the physical properties of lipids. Other (...) more exotic candidate elements include the dynamic enzoskeleton, ATP generation, mechanotransduction, the piezoelectric effect and resonance. Bringing these disparate elements together — and discovering others — will require extensive collaborations between specialists from different sciences. This can only be achieved within the context of an integrated approach to biology. (shrink)

In this paper a unified theory of models and thought experiments is proposed by considering them as fictions, la Vaihinger. In order to reach this aim, the Hertzian and Botzmannian interpretation of theories as Bilder is reconsidered.

The Retributivist approach to punishment attempts to address the challenges posed by utilitarian conception that punitive actions should strictly be associated with a costeffective means to certain independently identifiable goods at the expense of justice. Justice proffers how the guilty deserve to be punished and no moral consideration relevant to punishment outweighs an offender’s criminal desert. However, this just desert provokes difficulty in discerning proportionality between the moral gravity of each offence and the specific penalties attached. This consequently (...) degenerates to another form of ‘lex talionis’ (revenge) in punitive justice. (shrink)

This research adopted the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology to emphasize the use of the PX Pay mobile payment app for PX Mart, the most popular supermarket in Taiwan, and examine the degree of involvement as a moderator. The influence of factors related to PX Mart’s target customer groups on their shopping intentions and usage behaviors were discussed, with subsequent benefits and optimization directions. This study indicated the following results. First, performance expectations, ease-of-use expectations, and (...) social impact enhance consumers’ behavioral intention and behavioral intention significantly influence usage behavior. Second, gender has no significant moderating effect on the proposed model. Third, age has a moderating effect from performance expectations and ease-of-use expectations, social influence on behavioral intention. Fourth, use is more significantly affected by perceived stakeholders for customers over age 50 than for those age 30–39. Fifth, the degree of involvement significantly affects the relationship between behavioral intention and usage behavior in terms of social influence and facilitating conditions effects. Finally, we provided academic and practical implications and make contributions to both the online payment industry and academia. (shrink)

ABSTRACTI argue that the degree to which a criminal should be punished is determined by three elements: a baseline amount that proportionally compensates the victim and an additional penalty that, first, reforms the criminal and, second, deters others from becoming unjust. My interpretation provides a solution to the interpretive puzzle that has most vexed commentators: the alleged tension between Plato's philosophical theory of punishment and the content of his penal code. I defend a two-step solution to the puzzle. (...) First, on my interpretation, because of the broad role that deterrence must play, this alleged tension is—to a degree—merely apparent. Second, the actual tension can be explained by Plato's commitment to the rule of law, given the epistemic limitations of actual people. (shrink)