Impostors, confidence artists, and artful deceivers seem to have achieved a strange kind of popularity and even prestige in our contemporary political landscape, for reasons that remain elusive, especially given how harmful and socially unwanted such behaviors ostensibly are. Herman Melville’s 1857 novel, The Confidence-Man: His Masquerade, helps us shift our perspective on this seemingly irrational phenomenon because it points out how being susceptible to dupery is linked to the enjoyment of fiction itself. This insight also highlights the importance (...) of epistemological failure in the recent “return to aesthetics” in literary studies, where the positive dimension of unconsciously “willing one’s dupery” directly links aesthetic form to politics. The logic that connects aesthetics to unconscious enjoyment is then elaborated in the work of psychoanalytic thinkers such as Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Helene Deutsch and others to raise particular questions about how and why the enjoyment of being duped has been associated with feminine sexuality. Reading Melville’s novel while considering psychoanalytic concepts such as the “as if” personality, imposture, and interpassivity illuminates how confidence games play upon the ruses of sexuality, which have profound implications for why the public remains in thrall to the workings of known deceivers. (shrink)

In Heidegger's Way of Being, the follow-up to his 2010 book, Engaging Heidegger, Richard Capobianco makes the case clearly and compellingly that the core matter of Heidegger's lifetime of thought was Being as the temporal emergence of all beings and things. Drawing upon a wide variety of texts, many of which have been previously untranslated, Capobianco illuminates the overarching importance of Being as radiant manifestation - "the truth of Being" - and how Heidegger also named and (...) elucidated this fundamental phenomenon as physis, Aletheia, the primordial Logos, and as Ereignis, Lichtung, and Es gibt. Heidegger's Way of Being brings back into full view the originality and distinctiveness of Heidegger's thought and offers an emphatic rejoinder to certain more recent readings, and particularly those that propose a reduction of Being to "sense" or "meaning" and maintain that the core matter is human meaning-making. Capobianco's vivid and often poetic reflections serve to evoke for readers the very experience of Being - or as he prefers to name it, the Being-way - and to invite us to pause and meditate on the manner of our human way in relation to the Being-way. (shrink)

The logic of ‘being informed’ gives a formal analysis of a cognitive state that does not coincide with either belief, or knowledge. To Floridi, who first proposed the formal analysis, the latter is supported by the fact that unlike knowledge or belief, being informed is a factive, but not a reflective state. This paper takes a closer look at the formal analysis itself, provides a pure and an applied semantics for the logic of being informed, and tries (...) to find out to what extent the formal analysis can contribute to an information-based epistemology. (shrink)

Philosophy finds itself "between tradition and another beginning." 1 For this reason it seems necessary to reconsider the foundations of traditional philosophy in the hope that out of these considerations new questions may arise which may lead to a new philosophical foundation. To this end neither the large manual nor the monograph is well suited. What is required, instead, is to take a few steps which lead our thoughts directly into the problems of a given, traditional, philosophical foun dation. In (...) this sense the present work wishes to provide an "introduction" into that philosophical foundation which, until Hegel, had a decisive influence upon traditional philosophy_ Consequently, it does not see its task in providing a survey of this whole complex of problems. Nor does it offer solutions to questions about difficult passages which have been the subject of two thousand years of Aristotelian scholarship_ Instead, it follows a definite path which might bring this Aristotelian science, the theory which seeks to determine being as being, on hei on, closer to the student of philosophy. (shrink)

Plato’s Theaetetus sets the problem of the definition of science; moreover, what there is in question is the problem of the definition in general. Defining means measuring, referring to definite parameters what is initially indefinite. But it is not a case that the dialogue opens with the discussion about the commensurable and incommensurable numbers: the search for what is common to all sciences is the search for their common measure, for the term to which various elements are or can be (...) commensurated. The apories Plato is showing in refuting the Protagorean thesis appear clearly as an objection against the absolute commensurability of all things: each sense is a parameter of a determinate sensible object and then results as quite incommensurable with another sense; a present sensation is incommensurable with a non present one, either past or future; all these facts question the possibility of the definition, for they reduce the knowledge, and the reality, to a set of atomic and quite unrelated elements. In the same way, the other definitions of science are rejected because of their incompleteness. But the negative conclusion of the Theaetetus regarding the definition of science must be assumed in a positive way: every operation of defining constantly presents an excess which belongs to the incommensurability and leaves every definition in a state of incompleteness. Through a comparison with the problem of the commensurable and incommensurable numbers, what is eventually shown is that the Being itself, as a mean between subject and predicate in the proposition, constitutes the diagonal element of every process of definition, irreducible to the elements that come into play. Being is, literally said, the incommensurable. (shrink)

One is, however, somewhat puzzled to discover that what Wild considers to be of value in Being and Time is thought less important by Heidegger, while what Heidegger takes to be the key issue of the work, is seen by Wild only to detract from and obscure its real merits. Has Heidegger failed to understand his own earlier work? In that case it must seem doubtful whether he ever understood it in the first place; on this view Heidegger appears (...) somewhat like one of those inspired rhapsodes of Plato, who could not give account of the significance of their words. Or does the later Heidegger wilfully misinterpret his earlier work? Karl Löwith was perhaps the first one to suggest this. Or is Heidegger right when he complains that Being and Time had failed to communicate its central thought effectively? In view of these divergent ways of reading Being and Time, it may be advisable to pause before one proceeds to attack or praise the book, and to raise the question: how is this book to be read? John Wild's comments imply one, and indeed rather common way of reading Being and Time. But can this approach do justice to the work, or is it, as Heidegger suggests, a misreading? (shrink)

Being for Heidegger, Professor Alderman tells us, is like the mountain, it challenges us because it is simply there. In whatever we do, we cannot help "using" Being with a kind of comfortableness. However, there is the challenge to "mention" Being which brings a new and better kind of atunement. Man can think Being because he can be ontological. Man is both questioner and context. Any clarity in our understanding of Heidegger is a step. Professor Alderman (...) helps us take this step. While we might find ourselves returning to dark forest-paths, for a brief moment we will have broken out into the clearing. And after that we will walk the forest-paths differently. (shrink)

For some customers, the corona pandemic has turned e-shopping into a fine alternative to shopping in brick-and-mortar shops. For other customers in quarantine e-shopping is the only alternative. The long-lasting pandemic, however, has reminded us of the importance of social contacts and interactions – even if it’s just to go the supermarket to ‘mingle’. This paper investigates what ‘mingle’ means when shopping in physical self-service shops amongst unacquainted others in Denmark. It describes customers’ practice of doing self-service by organizing interaction (...) to minimize social involvement. It shows how they, as a matter of fact, co-ordinate their conduct in ways that hampers possibilities for engaging in even small ‘ritual’ exchanges of talk. The paper draws upon a corpus of video recordings of customers’ self-service practices in shops in Denmark. In addition, the customers’ gaze was recorded with the mobile Tobii Pro X3 eye tracker. The study falls within the realm of ethnomethodological and conversation analytic studies of multimodal interaction. It concludes that self-service is achieved through co-present customers’ tacit coordination of multimodal actions in social interaction and that their practices work to achieve ‘effortlessly’ and ‘spontaneously’ being, getting, and staying out of the way, which seems to be an ideal for self-service shopping. Talk and moreover having a conversation seems to be an impediment to it. (shrink)

Modes-of-being figure centrally in Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Testimony to this is Heidegger's characterisation of two of his most celebrated enquiries—the Existential analytic and the Zeug analysis—as investigations into the respective modes-of-being of the entities concerned. Yet despite the importance of this concept, commentators disagree widely about what a mode-of-being is. In this paper, I systematically outline and defend a novel and exegetically grounded interpretation of this concept. Strongly opposed to Kantian readings, such as those (...) advocated by Taylor Carman and Cristina Lafont, I interpret a mode-of-being as a universal that defines a district —that is, a natural class of entities that ought to be conceptualised in a special way. As such, every mode-of-being plays an important metaphysical and epistemic role: serving both to unify a natural class of a high degree of generality and as the interpretandum of an act yielding the basic-concepts pertaining to the entities therein. In explicating and arguing for this interpretation, I attribute a characteristically Aristotelian philosophical position to the early Heidegger, encompassing both metaphysical and epistemological realism and a conceptualist theory of universals. (shrink)

Greta Gaard, Tucson, AZ, The University of Arizona Press, 2007, ix +211 pp., paper, $17.95, ISBN: 978-0-8165-2576-8 Roger Paden, Lanham, MD, Lexington Books, 2007, xiii +209 pp., paper, $26.95, ISB...

This is a review of Kris McDaniel's book, 'The Fragmentation of Being'. In the book McDaniel defends ontological pluralism -- the doctrine that there are multiple 'ways of being' (i.e., multiple modes, or degrees, or orders, or levels, or gradations of existence). In defending ontological pluralism, McDaniel must reject the rival, Quinean position that there is at root just one generic way for a thing to exist: viz., by its falling in the domain of unrestricted quantification. McDaniel argues (...) against Quine by contending that the unrestricted quantifier is really just shorthand for a ‘gruesome’ disjunction of restricted quantifiers. On McDaniel's view, the unrestricted quantifier plays ontological 'second fiddle' to these restricted quantifiers, which are ontologically fundamental, and which each represent one particular mode of being. Against this, I contend that if the disjunction in question was as gruesome as McDaniel makes out then logic would be apt to explode in our faces. If I am right then McDaniel's response to Quine falls flat. (shrink)

The latter quality can be cultivated by the metaphysician through considering the intimate link between signification and being. The impossibility of separating the two is highlighted by the fact that even "non-being" is significant as a sign of the simple negative judgment, x is not. For this sign assuredly is. And a "square circle," mathematically and physically nonexistent, has the "being" of an incompatible conjunction of signs severally significant.

Avicenna's analysis of the definition of substance and accident repeatedly emphasizes two points: one and the same essence cannot be substance in one instance and accident in another; whetherxis extrinsic or intrinsic for an underlying subject,ydoes not tell us anything as to whetherxis substance or not. Both points are development in an argument against certain unnamed people who claimed the opposite. In this article I will show that Avicenna's opponents are to be identified with the mainstream Baghdad Peripatetic School which (...) based itself on the Late Antique rule that “parts of substances are substances”. As for Avicenna's own position, it was developed on the basis of the heterodox position of Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who anticipated Avicenna's first point. This is a further piece of evidence for something that has only recently begun to be appreciated: the influence of Ibn ʿAdī on Avicenna.RésuméL’analyse d’Avicenne portant sur les définitions de la substance et de l’accident met en exergue les deux propositions suivantes: 1) la même essence ne peut être à la fois une substance dans un cas et un accident dans un autre; 2) le fait quexsoit extrinsèque ou intrinsèque à unysous-jacent ne nous permet pas de conclure quexest une substance. Ces deux propositions sont articulées dans un débat avec d’autres personnes ayant un point de vue opposé dont on ne connaît pas l’identité. Dans cet article, nous verrons que ces adversaires font partie de l’école péripatétique de Bagdad, qui elle-même s’appuie sur une proposition datant de l’Antiquité tardive et selon laquelle les parties de substances sont elles-mêmes des substances. La position d’Avicenne fut développée à partir de celle de Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī. Cet article apporte ainsi un argument nouveau qui met en évidence l’influence, remarquée seulement depuis peu, d’Ibn ʿAdī sur Avicenne. (shrink)

This reviews the first of a tripartite symposia series dealing with novel neuroscientific technologies, the nature of consciousness and being, and the questions that arise from such interactions. The event took place on May 8 2009, at Georgetown University, and brought together ten leading figures on fields ranging from Neuroscience and Robotics to Philosophy, that commented on their research and provided ethical, moral and practical insight and perspectives into how these technologies can shape the future of neuroscientific and human (...) development, as well as denoting the potential abuses and the best way to proceed about them. (shrink)

First Published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

How Confucius Changed My Mind invites readers on a path of transformation, narrating how encounters with Confucian thought can bring about a fundamental reshaping of the way we engage with ourselves and the world.

The purpose of the article is to demonstrate how Heidegger's statement, "Language is the House of Being," claims to represent the essence of all Western European philosophy, namely, as an outline of the unity of indirect identities - being, form and name. The author raises a number of questions in his research. Can we identify "beginning" and "consequence" by exploring the phenomenon of language? Is there anything in the language between beginning and effect? What is a language? And (...) why does Heidegger call language home? Is it possible to identify philosophically what makes language possible regardless of cultural contexts and historical eras? Does the question "What is language?" at the same time lead us to the question "What is a person?" and then "What does it mean to be?" The article focuses on the connection of Heidegger's philosophy with Plato's philosophy, and therefore on the constancy of fundamental philosophical problems, which finds different ways of expression (mythological, metaphysical, phenomenological...). The second part of the article is devoted to the actual analysis of the concept of "house of being" through the comprehension of the speech (communicative) dimension of one's being. The author also explores the concept of Heidegger's philosophy of openness, distance, speech: existence is Dasein's relation to being, that is, to one's own making; speech (Rede) as a mode of openness (Dasein) is an existential phenomenon; language (Sprache) is an implementation of self-projecting (entwerfen) speech (Rede) into the "world". Given that a language contains a plurality of certain elements and relationships, the essential unity of the language should be sought at the discontinuity. The gap means openness and freedom of speech. That is, the existential condition of the possibility of language, called in the early Heidegger openness, in his later work appears as a gap, but here and there it is the essential language, which is at the same time the essence of man. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the theological-academic ontological doctrine of the three types of being formulated within the framework of the Russian theological-academic philosophy of the 19th century. The study of this problem in the context of the general analysis of the phenomenon of theological-academic philosophy allows expanding our understanding of the genesis of Russian philosophy and its religious-philosophical component. The main aim of the article is the historical-philosophical analysis (on the material of philosophical courses of (...) Russian theological academies and original works of professors of academies) of the doctrine about three types of being, which was developed within the framework of the theological-academic philosophy in Russia in the 19th century. The set goal is achieved by means of textual and religious analysis methods, as well as historical-functional, historical-genetic, and comparative research methods. The authors conclude that the specificity of theological-academic philosophizing was determined by confessional affiliation and consisted in its theistic form: the transversal theme of all theological-academic interpretations was the problem of being. Thus, theological-academic ontology took the form of the doctrine of God as an absolute being and the world as its derivative. The theological-academic doctrine of the three types of being and the synthesizing function of the absolute in relation to theological and material being cannot be characterized as quite logical and consistent. The notion of God as an absolute being is conditioned by the aspiration of theological-academic philosophers not to go beyond traditional orthodoxy and is one of the main specific features of theological-academic philosophical interpretations of religious consciousness. At the same time, the historical and philosophical analysis of the works of professors from Russian theological academies allows tracing how the powerful ideological and theoretical potential accumulated in Russian theological academies after their reforms in the 19th century contributed to the development of professional philosophy in Russia, the development of a philosophical categorical apparatus and the systematic formation of Russian philosophical thought. The development of this theme responds to the urgent research tasks of the history of philosophy. Further, this topic is very interesting not only for historians of philosophy but also for historians of religion, historians of orthodoxy, and culturologists. (shrink)

The article presents a reading of Badiou’s trilogy, L’Être et l’événement (1988), Logiques des mondes (2006), and L’Immanence des vérités (2018), and points out the mathematical connections with the works of Cohen, Grothendieck, and large cardinal specialists. A synthetic rendering of these connections is first offered, following precise passages in Badiou’s work, then a category-theoretic and Peircean perspective is explored in order to specify the many dialectics in the trilogy, and, finally, some open problems are proposed.

Nolan, Ann MC In the past fifty years there has been a stream of commentary on the documents of Vatican II. Have we not had so much commentary, so much interpretation, that further commentary is unnecessary? Fifty years on, one might ponder how to interpret the sixteen documents for the church of our times, indeed to wonder whether they continue to have any relevance at all. Faced with this thought, we could turn to one scholar whose works span almost the (...) whole of this fifty-year period, yet whose thought in relation to the documents has not remained static: the renaissance historian John O'Malley SJ. (shrink)

Marcel is concerned with human existence or, better, with the quality of human life which we usually recognize more or less clearly under the concepts of freedom and responsibility. Such humanity is a de jure rather than a strictly de facto notion. We are always in danger of losing, caricaturing, or forfeiting our humanity and thus the adjective subhuman assumes a genuine significance, at least as indicating a limiting concept that stands as a warning before those "techniques of degradation," the (...) modern systems of mass propaganda and thought control. (shrink)

The provocative title of this book is deliberately and challengingly universalist, matching the theoretically experimental essays, where contributors try different ideas to answer distinct concerns regarding cosmopolitanism. Leading anthropologists explore what cosmopolitanism means in the context of everyday life, variously viewing it as an aspect of kindness and empathy, as tolerance, hospitality and openness, and as a defining feature of pan-human individuality. The chapters thus advance an existential critique of abstract globalization discourse. The book enriches interdisciplinary debates about hitherto neglected (...) aspects of contemporary cosmopolitanism as a political and moral project, examining the form of its lived effects and offering new ideas and case studies to work with. (shrink)

Sulla base del ms. Vat. Borg. 39 viene edita la quaestio I del Quodlibet IV. Nell'introduzione l'A. ricorda le posizioni espresse da Enrico di Gand, Duns Scoto, Gerardo da Bologna e Erveo Natale sul tema in questione. La posizione di Guido sull'analogia dell'essere, per quanto originale, si costituisce come una valida alternativa alla opinio communis rappresentata da Gerardo da Bologna, Erveo Natale e da molti altri autori attivi tra la fine del XIII sec. e gli inizi del XIV.

It is said an attempt to reconcile Heidegger's ontology with the position of deep ecology finds the going rugged. Yet, I believe it is worth hiking this path once again to reexamine the connections between deep ecology and the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Significantly, we will see the importance of Heidegger's critique of the idea of the great chain of being.Taking the perspective of deep ecology requires us to consider whether Heidegger's being-centered approach can indeed justify “the equality (...) of right to live and blossom.” Heidegger's philosophy strongly supports such an egalitarian concept since he rejects the idea of the great chain of being and shows that being does not have.. (shrink)

Black women do not want to become white women because they know that this is impossible. Yet, some black women straighten and curl their naturally kinky hair, or wear hair extensions, weaves and wigs that resemble Caucasian hair. Still, they recognize that hair is only one attribute of their Being and that even if they choose to wear non-African hairstyles, they can concurrently embrace other aspects of their black identity. So, is this a matter of cultural assimilation or integration, (...) or is there a deeper ontological problematic underlying these cross-racial hair styling choices? I interrogate three arguments that black women usually advance for their hairstyling choices – the survival strategy argument, the protective styling argument, and the options-choice argument. I use Mabogo Percy More’s interpretation of Jean-Paul Sartre’s concepts of “the Look,” “facticity,” and “bad faith” to analyze Black women’s hair consciousness through the lens of his “Politics of Being” concept. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 165-167 [Access article in PDF] Christianity in the Crucible of East-West Dialogue: A Critical Lookat Catholic Participation; And God, Zen, and the Intuition Of Being. By James Arraj. Chiloquin, Ore: Inner Growth Books, 2001. 335 pp. This book combines an original book-length essay, Critical Look at the Catholic Participation in the East-West Dialogue, and a new edition of the 1988 work God, Zen, and (...) the Intuition of Being. In the first part of the volume, Arraj discusses the approaches of a large variety of individuals and institutions who have been involved in the Christian dialogue with Buddhism (Habito, Enomiya-Lasalle, Jaeger, MacInnes, Hawk, Kennedy, Corless, etc.) and in the dialogue with Hinduism (Abhishiktananda, Grant, de Mello, Griffiths, Teasdale, etc.). The main perspective from which he discusses each of these authors is that of their conception of the relationship between Christian contemplation and enlightenment or realization. Arraj finds most of the existing approaches to the East-West dialogue wanting insofar as they all consider the Christian experience of contemplation from the perspective of the Hindu or Buddhist view of nonduality. As he puts it: "But what does this kind of nondualist imperialism do to Christianity? It eliminates its distinctive nature. Let me be clear about this. Used in this way, Zen awakening, which could be a wonderful gift for Christians, becomes destructive of Christianity" (31). Arraj sees this as but one expression of what he calls reactionary theology or "theology without a net," which has been developing since the Second Vatican Council. As opposed to this form of dialogue, which compromises the essence of Christian faith, Arraj discusses the approaches of Jacques Dupuis and the document Dominus Iesus, which he understands as two different versions of a proper Catholic position. After discussing a number of unsatisfactory approaches to the question of religious pluralism, he introduces the distinction between an existentialist approach, which focuses on the universality of the salvific will of God, and an essentialist approach, which emphasizes the uniqueness of Jesus as the mediator of salvation. This distinction between existence and essence forms one of the dominant themes of the book.Arraj offers an overview and critique of most of the existing approaches to the East-West dialogue, and then moves on to offering alternative proposals for the dialogue. While many are in the process of "overcoming" the metaphysical tradition of Christianity, Arraj sees precisely in this tradition a promising starting point for the dialogue with Zen Buddhism. After analyzing the particularly Thomistic manner of distinguishing essence and existence and some study of references to the experiences of loss of self in the ultimate realization, Arraj comes to the conclusion that what Thomistic metaphysics thinks of as "intuition of being" and what Asian traditions describe as the experience of Enlightenment "are both deeply metaphysical experiences of the same reality, but by different paths, and so they express themselves in different ways" (206). This, then, provides the necessary basis for the two traditions [End Page 165] to retain their respective identities while nonetheless learning from the other. In God, Zen, and the Intuition of Being Arraj offers some thoughts on how this might proceed. The clearest of these thoughts appear to lie on the side of what a discussion with Zen might do for Christianity. This is a matter, first of all, of rekindling an interest in Thomistic metaphysics through an introduction of categories and spiritual techniques that are part of the Zen tradition. At minimum, this would open a way beyond, or perhaps behind, the scholasticism of the manuals that have covered the true profundity of Christian Thomistic metaphysics. Whatever the philosophical stakes of this recovery, Arraj is especially interested in its spiritual promise, in the possibility of inviting certain aspects of Zen meditation—the use of koans, increased attention to nature—to help Christianity in developing a new form of acquired contemplation. Arraj has somewhat less to say about what or how much this sort of dialogue might offer Zen... (shrink)