The aim of this study was to evaluate the structure and measurement invariance of the religious identity, religious practice, and religious beliefs across cultures in six world regions (Asia, non-Western Europe, North America, Oceania, South America, and Western Europe) and across Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic regions (WEIRD) and non-WEIRD world regions. Confirmatory factory analysis examined whether the hypothesized measurement model fits the data; several multi-group confirmatory factor analyses were performed to examine measurement invariance through a progressive analytic strategy (...) involving three invariance conditions of configural, metric, and scalar invariance. The results generally supported the adequate fit to the data of the three correlated factors model (religious identity-RII, religious practice-RPI, and religious beliefs—RBI); it was found to be full metric invariance for WEIRD regions (RII), North America (RII and RBI), Western Europe (RII) and Non-Western Europe (RII), and South America (RII and RBI). Finally, for RII, it was found to be full configural invariance in almost all regions, except North America and Oceania; for RPI, it was found to be full configural only in North America and Non-WEIRD regions; and for RBI, it was found to be full configural only in North America, Asia, and South America, being that women scored significantly higher than men in all three indices all over the world; finally, it was found to be configural, but not metric or scalar invariance across WEIRD and non-WEIRD world regions. (shrink)

Este artigo problematiza, sob o ponto de vista teórico da Análise do Discurso francesa, por que, em algumas regiões do Nordeste brasileiro, há quem evite pronunciar a palavra macaco e opte por usar em seu lugar outras palavras, tais como dezessete. A hipótese defendida é a de que essa prática cultural-discursiva, entendida aqui como uma forma de interdição, ocorre basicamente em regiões sertanejas onde a memória do cangaço é ainda marcadamente diluída no cotidiano. A partir da análise de discursos presentes (...) no dia a dia, este artigo pretende contribuir para uma compreensão mais acurada de uma particularidade sociocultural brasileira. (shrink)

I take as my starting point the evident fact that people are capable of modifying their beliefs in response to reasons in the course of deliberation. This fact is sufficient to make notions such as responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness applicable to people with regard to their beliefs. If a state is such, and one is such, that one is capable of determining it through one’s best evaluations of reasons in the course of deliberation, then even if it isn’t under one’s (...) voluntary control, it is attributable to one as something for which one is appropriately held accountable. There is thus conceptual space for the possibility of one’s conducting oneself poorly or well with regard to it, and accordingly for the application of praise or criticism. And there is room for an evaluation of whether one has conducted oneself responsibly or irresponsibly – that is, whether one has proceeded in a way that takes proper account of the considerations which one reasonably could have been expected to take account of, or not. (shrink)

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called "Inferential Internalist" principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...) that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility. (shrink)

We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...) could entirely miss the relevance of this evidence and hold the belief as a result of wishful thinking or for some other bad reason. My topic in this paper is the notion of being justified which precludes beliefs flawed in this way. I will take the notion of something’s telling in favor of the truth of a proposition—that is, the notion of evidential support—for granted. (shrink)

Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.

Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...) contention that the seeds of such arguments lie in our ordinary epistemic practices, so that external world skepticism can arise “from within”. But is this contention correct? I doubt it. Taking skepticism seriously requires that we address this question head on. To do so, I will approach skeptical arguments from a certain vantage point. I will try to stand, as far as possible, with both feet squarely in ordinary life. I will start out with all of our ordinary commitments about what is the case, about what we know or have reason to believe, about when someone knows, is justified, or has good reason to believe something, and about how one should proceed in deciding what to believe. My question, then, will be this. From within that vantage point can I somehow be moved in a reasonable way to accept the conclusion that I know far less about the world around me than I thought, or that epistemically speaking, I really ought not believe much of what I have believed about the world around me? In order for such movement to take place, I will have to find reason from within my ordinary standpoint to discount or reject much of what I ordinarily accept. And of course, that reason will have to come from some.. (shrink)

Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...) the Closure Principle as central in discussions of skepticism. The paper concludes by examining the prospects for a plausible skeptical argument. (shrink)

Se concentrant sur les differences entre la constitution de l'objectivite dans la mecanique classique et dans la mecanique quantique, cet ouvrage explore les interpretations transcendantales de la theorie quantique standard. Patricia Kauark-Leite y examine les changements epistemologiques apportes par la physique quantique pour verifier si la philosophie transcendantale est toujours valide. Elle dresse un bilan des differentes approches transcendantales, montrant les modulations des principes a priori pour expliquer le probleme de l'objectivation en mecanique quantique. En conclusion, l'auteur defend et (...) adopte une interpretation pragmatique transcendantale, dont la tache principale est de donner une justification philosophique a la dimension necessairement intersubjective de l'objectivite quantique. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 208 - 222 Penelope Maddy claims that we can have no evidence that we are not being globally deceived by an evil demon. However, Maddy’s Plain Inquirer holds that she has good evidence for a wide variety of claims about the world and her relation to it. She rejects the broadly Cartesian idea that she can’t be entitled to these claims, or have good evidence for them, or know them, unless she can provide (...) a defense of them that starts from nowhere. She likewise rejects the more limited demand for a defense that makes use only of considerations that do not concern the world outside of her mind. She allows that some considerations about the world can be appealed to perfectly appropriately as fully adequate evidence in favor of other considerations about the world. So why can’t the Plain Inquirer rule out global skeptical hypotheses by producing evidence against them that depends upon other considerations about the world? Is there good reason for singling out global skeptical hypotheses such as _I am not being deceived by an evil demon_ as requiring a different kind of treatment? Considerations about epistemic asymmetry and epistemic circularity, as well as Wittgensteinian considerations about the relation between evidence and the real-world and human background context, all lead to the conclusion that there is not. (shrink)

A catarse é considerada por muitos autores como um “efeito” ligado a um processo que leva à tomada de consciência. Que “efeito” é esse? Por quem foi sistematizado? Quais abordagens foram construídas a partir desse conceito? Qual a sua relação com a educação e com os espaços escolar e expositivo? O artigo em tela pretende refletir, por meio de pesquisa bibliográfica, sobre essas questões ao revisitar o conceito de catarse a partir de autores como Aristóteles, Vigotski, Jauss e, em especial, (...) Lukács. Busca relacionar as ideias desse esteta húngaro ao campo da educação e, principalmente, ao ensino da arte. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to elucidate the evolution of the concept of poverty in Rousseau’s reflections. This will be done through the analysis of three depictions of poverty taken from the philosopher’s texts. The goal is to demonstrate that, beyond the apparent ambiguity in the use of the term ‘poverty,’ Rousseau engages in a semantic play with multiple functions, highlighting the importance of this theme. Finally, it will be proposed how the status of poverty can be seen as (...) relative, showing how the meaning of the term evolves into new senses. (shrink)

“Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...) warrant isn’t enough to avoid certain standard arguments for skepticism about the external world. (shrink)

Prominent authors of new mechanism in cognitive science propose to integrate and unify the field theoretically through the articulation of a mechanistic theory of human cognition. The work of William Bechtel and Gualtiero Piccinini are examples of this proposal. However, an ambitious unification project like this encounters a series of obstacles in cognitive science, traditionally characterized by fragmentation, dispersiveness and theoretical diversity. In this work, I show the substantial differences in the different versions of the theoretical proposals presented on the (...) works of Bechtel and Piccinini. Based on this analysis, I argue that the unification or integration proposals presented by them, based on the mechanistic theory of human cognition, are inadequate, because there is a wide variety of versions of the theory among its own most influential defenders. (shrink)

Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that 'knows' is semantically context-sensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson's suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...) extent to which adherence to the constitutive norm of assertion matters. (shrink)

Self-consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self-knowledge, norms of belief, self-consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self-conscious adherence to epistemic norms (...) requires the ability to self-consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well-supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self-conscious process of changing one's mind. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 175-194.

In this essay, I provide a reconstruction of the history of and surrounding the bust of Kant, together with its plaque, which jointly compose the monument created in honor of the sage of Königsberg at the Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences (FAFICH) of the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil. In so doing, I have the following aims: first, to examine the relationship between the monument and the ideas that guided the creation of the Faculty (...) of Philosophy of Minas Gerais by one of its founders, Prof. Arthur Versiani Velloso; second, to highlight and register the authorship of this work by the plastic artist Frederico Bracher Júnior, as an important part of Kant’s international and indeed truly cosmopolitan iconography. (shrink)

Neste artigo, tratamos de um desafio lançado inicialmente por Derek Parfit contra a teoria da justiça de Rawls, que diz respeito ao problema da identidade pessoal e como isso pode se relacionar com os princípios distributivos da justiça. Acreditamos, como indicado por Paul Weithman, que tal problema desempenha um papel relevante na guinada política de Rawls – movimento pelo qual designamos as transformações em sua teoria do período de Uma Teoria da Justiça para o da publicação de Political Liberalism. O (...) próprio Weithman já forneceu uma análise acurada de como essa objeção, a qual daqui em diante nos referimos como a objeção do self parfitiano, minou a primeira tentativa de Rawls de mostrar como sua concepção de justiça seria estável. É provável, no entanto, que seja fácil perder o rumo desse debate, que foi de certa forma mediado por Samuel Scheffler. É por isso que fornecemos uma exposição cronológica desse debate na seção 1. Depois disso, na seção 2, reafirmamos o relato de Weithman de como o self parfitiano mina a estabilidade da concepção de justiça de Rawls em Uma Teoria da Justiça. Por fim, na seção 3, examinamos se essa dificuldade é devidamente tratada em Political Liberalism. Assim, sobretudo com este último passo, esperamos que esta abordagem possa acompanhar e complementar as contribuições anteriores de Weithman. (shrink)

ResumoAlguns leitores de Nietzsche podem admitir certa dificuldade em reconhecer os limites entre a crítica, a genealogia e o filosofar com o martelo. Tais limites existem e podem ser delineados se buscarmos o elemento no qual cada uma dessas investidas atua. Este artigo procura elaborar a ideia de que a noção nietzschiana de crítica envolve o desprezo afirmativo, o riso e a zombaria. Ligada, portanto, a uma condição valorativa, a crítica é mais ofensiva, exigente e assumidamente tendenciosa do que se (...) poderia conceber a partir da tradição kantiana.AbstractSome readers of Nietzsche may admit some difficulty in recognizing the boundaries between criticism, genealogy, and philosophizing with the hammer. However, such limits exist if one seek the element that produces each one. This article tries to elaborate the idea that the affirmative contempt, laughter, mockery, for Nietzsche, defines the critic. Related, therefore, to an evaluative (and physiological) condition, criticism is more virulent, offensive, demanding and biased than one might think from a Kantian tradition. (shrink)

O AVANÇO DA NEUROCIÊNCIA, A QUEBRA DA DOGMÁTICA DO LIVRE-ARBÍTRIO E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES NA SEARA PENAL.

In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the purposes of (...) current inquiry and action. Fallibilism, so construed, was given its most influential formulation – and its name – by C. S. Peirce, though it was advocated by earlier philosophers as well, particularly the later ancient skeptic Philo of Larissa and perhaps also Hume. Contemporary epistemologists almost universally agree in endorsing this intellectual stance; it is part of the undisputed framework within which contemporary epistemological theorizing takes place. (shrink)

: Michael Gazzaniga, a prominent cognitive neuroscientist, has argued against reductionist accounts of cognition. Instead, Gazzaniga defends a form of non-reductive physicalism: epistemological neuro-cognitive non-reductionism and ontological monist physicalism. His position is motivated by the theses that: cognitive phenomena can be realized by multiple neural systems; many outcomes of these systems are unpredictable; and multi-level explanations are required. Epistemological neuro-cognitive non-reductionism is presented as the most appropriate stance to account for the way in which phenomena should be explained in cognitive (...) neuroscience. In this paper, I argue, however, that a recent form of neuro-cognitive reductionism, namely neo-mechanistic reductionism accounts for the arguments presented by Gazzaniga. Thus, the theory offers a more consistent and well-articulated view of the relationship between cognitive and neural phenomena that is specifically compatible with the explanatory strategies and aims of contemporary cognitive neuroscience. Keywords: Neo-mechanistic Philosophy; Michael Gazzaniga; Non-reductionism; Reductionism; Philosophy of Cognitive Neuroscience L’antiriduzionismo neurocognitivo di Michael Gazzaniga e la sfida della riduzione neomeccanicista Riassunto: Uno dei più importanti neuroscienziati dei nostri tempi, Michael Gazzaniga, si è schierato contro una concezione riduzionista della cognizione. Al contrario Gazzaniga difende una forma di fisicalismo non-riduzionistico che risulta dalla combinazione, sul piano epistemologico, di un anti-riduzionismo cognitivo e, sul piano ontologico, di un monismo fisicalista. La sua posizione è motivata dalla tesi per cui i fenomeni cognitivi possono essere realizzati da molteplici sistemi neurali; molti esiti di tali sistemi non si possono prevedere; e sono pertanto necessarie spiegazioni a livelli plurimi. La concezione presentata come più adeguata per dare conto sul piano epistemologico di come i fenomeni dovrebbero essere spiegati all’interno delle neuroscienze cognitive è una forma di anti-riduzionismo neuro-cognitivo. In questo articolo si sostiene tuttavia che una recente forma di riduzionismo neuro-cognitivo può dare conto degli argomenti presentati da Gazzaniga. Si tratta di una teoria che offre una interpretazione maggiormente coerente ed articolata della relazione fra fenomeni cognitivi e neurali e che offre un modello di spiegazione compatibile con gli scopi esplicativi delle neuroscienze cognitive contemporanee. Parole chiave: Filosofia neomeccanicista; Michael Gazzaniga; Nonriduzionismo; Riduzionismo; Filosofia della neuroscienza cognitiva. (shrink)

RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é examinar o que entendemos ser uma prova original da existência de Deus na obra de Pierre Duhem. Cremos que a originalidade dessa prova consiste especialmente nas premissas usadas pelo filósofo. Quanto à forma, a mesma assemelha-se ao conhecido argumento do desígnio, mas a sua versão se caracteriza por buscar na história das teorias físicas a matéria da qual a existência de uma Providência é derivada. É a complexa evolução das teorias e, a despeito dela, (...) a sua espantosa progressividade em direção a estágios sempre mais perfeitos que servem de premissa para a via duhemiana de acesso a Deus. Tudo se passa como se houvesse uma suposta pré-ordenação divina do curso das teorias, uma finalidade intrínseca a ele.ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to examine what we believe to be an original proof of the existence of God in the work of Pierre Duhem. We think that the originality of this proof consists especially in the assumptions used by the French philosopher in his argumentation. Regarding the form, it resembles the well-known design argument, but his version is characterized by seeking in the history of physical theories the matter from which the existence of a Providence is derived. It is the complex evolution of theories and, despite it, its amazing progress towards ever more perfect theories that serves as the premise for Duhem's way of access to God. Everything goes as if it had been a divine preordainment and an intrinsic goal ruling the evolution of theories. (shrink)

A familiar form of scepticism supposes that knowledge requires infallibility. Although that requirement plays no role in our ordinary epistemic practices, Barry Stroud has argued that this is not a good reason for rejecting a sceptical argument: our ordinary practices do not correctly reflect the requirements for knowledge because the appropriateness-conditions for knowledge attribution are pragmatic. Recent fashion in contextualist semantics for 'knowledge' agrees with this view of our practice, but incorrectly. Ordinary epistemic evaluations are guided by our conception of (...) a person's standing with regard to the reasons that there are for and against the truth of a belief. Thus the objection from our ordinary practices is sound: fallibility is not an epistemological shortcoming, and a convincing sceptical argument must use only requirements which figure in ordinary epistemic practice. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully (...) consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism, an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.RESUMO No debate atual entre realismo científico e empirismo, ambos os lados parecem abraçar algum tipo de estruturalismo como um componente importante de suas descrições sobre a ciência. O realismo estrutural é geralmente apresentado em duas versões: uma ôntica e outra epistêmica. Tem-se argumentado que o realismo estrutural epistêmico, por sua vez, é próximo, se não idêntico, a uma abordagem kantiana. Nosso objetivo neste artigo é mostrar que esse não é o caso. Sendo o ESR fundamentalmente uma posição realista, queremos defender que ele não pode ser totalmente compatível com uma abordagem transcendental. Uma posição kantiana mais coerente é aqui defendida sob o nome de estruturalismo transcendental. Neste artigo, partiremos da interpretação de Henry Allison do idealismo transcendental para estabelecer as devidas distinções entre ESR e TS. (shrink)

Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...) contention that the seeds of such arguments lie in our ordinary epistemic practices, so that external world skepticism can arise “from within”. But is this contention correct? I doubt it. Taking skepticism seriously requires that we address this question head on. To do so, I will approach skeptical arguments from a certain vantage point. I will try to stand, as far as possible, with both feet squarely in ordinary life. I will start out with all of our ordinary commitments about what is the case, about what we know or have reason to believe, about when someone knows, is justified, or has good reason to believe something, and about how one should proceed in deciding what to believe. My question, then, will be this. From within that vantage point can I somehow be moved in a reasonable way to accept the conclusion that I know far less about the world around me than I thought, or that epistemically speaking, I really ought not believe much of what I have believed about the world around me? In order for such movement to take place, I will have to find reason from within my ordinary standpoint to discount or reject much of what I ordinarily accept. And of course, that reason will have to come from some.. (shrink)

Philosophers traditionally recognize two main features of mental states: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. To a first approximation, intentionality is the aboutness of mental states, and phenomenal consciousness is the felt, experiential, qualitative, or "what it's like" aspect of mental states. In the past few decades, these features have been widely assumed to be distinct and independent. But several philosophers have recently challenged this assumption, arguing that intentionality and consciousness are importantly related. This article overviews the key views on the relationship (...) between consciousness and intentionality and describes our favored view, which is a version of the phenomenal intentionality theory, roughly the view that the most fundamental kind of intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

O experimento de pensamento das Terras Gêmeas é usado como um dos fortes argumentos a favor da tese de que significados não estão na cabeça, cérebro ou mente. Neste artigo este argumento será considerado, e será criticado a partir de uma análise de exemplos nos quais a referência de um termo no mundo não possui essência fixa e as definições são imprecisas. Em contraste, será argumentado que o significado está ligado a representações internas prototípicas individuais.

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of socially responsible funds in Sweden by assessing fund managers' abilities and performances across different market states. These issues are analyzed at the aggregate and individual fund levels. The paper also presents several new statistical tests that allow more precise inferences about differences in performance and the variability in fund returns arising from different benchmarks. In general, SR and conventional funds perform similarly to the market. At the aggregate level, SR funds investing in Sweden (...) and Europe perform similarly to conventional funds, while those investing globally tend to underperform. This underperformance seems to be linked with poor selectivity abilities of global SR fund managers. For individual funds, the performance of both types of funds is more similar. Most funds perform similarly in crisis periods compared to non-crisis periods. Overall, our results are consistent with a mature market for SR investing and support the view that the similar performance of SR and conventional funds is associated with the mainstreaming of SR investment in Sweden. These findings encourage SR investing both by socially conscious investors, who wish to align their social values with their investment decisions, as well as by conventional investors, who will not be penalized by investing in these funds. We also call attention to the difficulties investors face when trying to identify funds with high social standards, considering that there is scarce information on the extent to which each fund holds stocks that comply with ethical and social criteria. (shrink)

Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...) generis affective properties, which happen to be uninstantiated, and at least some moods represent affective properties not bound to any objects. (shrink)

This book argues that external world skepticism is false for straightforward reasons. To make this case it develops and defends a neglected methodological approach involving a distinctive process of first-person reflection. We begin within the practices, procedures, and commitments of ordinary life and science. We then seek some reason to think skepticism true, carefully scrutinizing all the most important arguments. Finding no reason to think it true and decisive reasons to think it false, we reject it. As the book shows, (...) this is a fully satisfactory refutation. No epistemological theorizing is needed. The book begins by exploring and defending this method in seminal works of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. Turning to contemporary epistemology, it asks why we shouldn't appeal to considerations about the world when responding to skeptical argumentation. No good reason is found, despite exploration of a wide range of central issues in recent epistemology. To the contrary, perfectly ordinary examples indicate that it is correct to reject the skeptical scenarios - the dreaming worry, Descartes' evil demon, the brain-in-a-vat - by appealing to things we know about the world. Likewise, considerations about sensory perception do not provide any reason to think our evidence excludes considerations about the world. Along the way, methodological lessons are drawn from consideration of the most important skeptical arguments in the contemporary literature. The book concludes by defending the satisfactoriness of its approach. What emerges is a new understanding of what philosophical illumination might look like in relation to core epistemological issues. (shrink)

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.

No estudo da racionalidade há um projeto normativo, o qual busca compreender o que significa raciocinar corretamente ou ser racional. O foco deste projeto é encontrar regras que ditem um padrão para o raciocínio ser avaliado. Há também um projeto descritivo, praticado por cientistas da cognição com abordagem empirista. Estes buscam descobrir de que forma as pessoas de fato raciocinam e descrever os mecanismos e processos responsáveis pelos padrões de raciocínio observado. Este artigo pretende expor alguns aspectos históricos de ambos (...) os projetos e apresentar brevemente uma corrente teórica vinda do projeto descritivo com poder de propor uma nova forma de compreensão para aspectos normativos, as teorias de duplo processo. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

When formulating the concept of the impulse-image, Deleuze never tires of asserting that these images are saturated with death and obsessed by degradation. They stand at a curious intersection in the taxonomy of images, a constitutively in-between space: they are formally inserted between affection-image and action-image in The Movement-Image, but produce a direct passage to the time-image. However, they do not reach the time-image due to obsession by the negative effects of time. This article introduces the concept of the impulse-image (...) in Deleuze's work on the impulse and death instinct, in his fundamental texts of the 1960s and 1970s, including his collaboration with Félix Guattari. The death instinct in the late 1960s was a transcendental principle that acquired the form of the groundless or crack-up essential for the production of difference. It is at this time that Deleuze publishes Zola and the Crack-up, an embryonic essay for what would later become the impulse-image. In the 1970s, Deleuze, along with Guattari, fought the need to include a groundless force in the mould of the death instinct. Speaking of cinema in the 1980s, which is when he returns to the impulse theme, one finds characteristics of both preceding periods, especially the structure conceived in the 1960s, associated with the criticism of the 1970s. However, Deleuze now stands apart, recognising a naturalistic image and admiring a practice of symptomatology, but pointing out that his own understanding of the world does not lie in it. With the impulse-images, Deleuze also plays a relevant role in studies of film naturalism, shaping a powerful concept for studies of contemporary naturalistic symptomatologies that emerge in situations of misery of civilisation. (shrink)

Two kinds of justification logics are studied. Then, this article shows how the notion of quasi-truth can be defined in these systems.

This paper analyzes the problem of implication and attempts to characterize conditionals by a criterion of adequacy. A definition of implication based on the notion of limit of an infinite sequence is proposed.