본 연구는 현대 사회의 인간성 위기를 주자의 심론에서 고찰하고자 한다. 인간성 위기의 원인을 주자의 이중적 심에서 찾아보았다. 또한 주자 심의 이중성을 후설이 주장한 의식의 이중성과 비교함으로써 현상학적 접근 방식을 시도하였다. 유학적 관점에서 인간성의 위기는 인간이 인욕에 빠져서 감춰진 도심을 망각했기 때문이라고 할 수 있다. 한편 근대 현상학자인 후설은 인간성의 위기를 심리학적 심에 가려진 초월적 심을 망각한 것에 있다고 보았다. 양자는 인간의 심을 이중성으로 규정한다는 측면에서 형식의 유사성을 보인다. 그리고 인간성의 위기를 주자의 도심과 후설의 초월적 심의 망각에서 찾고 있다는 것에서 내용적인 (...) 유사성을 찾을 수 있다.BR 인간의 심은 주자에서 인심과 도심으로, 후설에서는 심리학적 의식과 초월적 의식의 이중적인 것이다. 주자는 도심을 회복하는 방법으로 격물치지를, 후설은 현상학적 판단중지를 통한 환원을 주장한다. 인간성의 위기가 도심의 망각에서 기인한 것이라면 도심을 찾아서 내면으로 회복하는 것은 비인간화를 막는 방안이 될 수 있을 것이다. 이런 방식으로 인간성 위기의 극복은 현실의 인심에서 내재된 도심으로의 환원에 기대를 가질 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

Centralization and over-professionalization can lead to the disappearance of a critical environment capable of linking the human sciences to the "real world." The authors of this volume suggest that the humanities need to operate in a concrete cultural environment able to influence procedures on a hic et nunc basis, and that they should not entirely depend on normative criteria whose function is often to hide ignorance behind a pretentious veil of value-neutral objectivity. In sociology, the growth of scientism has (...) fragmented ethical categories and distorted discourse between our inner and outer selves, while philosophy is suffering from an empty professionalism current in many philosophy departments in industrialized and developing countries where boring, ahistorical, and nonpolitical exercises are justified through appeals to false excellence. In all branches of the humanities, absurd evaluation processes foster similar tendencies as they create a sterile atmosphere and prevent interdisciplinarity and creativity. Technicization of theory plays into the hands of technocrats. The authors offer a broad range of approaches and interpretations, reaching from philosophy of education to the re-evaluation of business models for universities. (shrink)

A symposium on the subject "The Crisis of Bourgeois Democracy and Violation of Human Rights in the Capitalist World" took place in Moscow in December 1976. The symposium was conducted by the Institute of State and Law and the Learned Council of the USSR Academy of Sciences on Problems of Ideological Currents Abroad.

John Henry Newman begins his Idea of a University by claiming that the university “is a place of teaching universal knowledge.”1 But instead of referring to “universal” and all inclusive as Newman suggests, the word university was originally derived from the medieval Latin sense of universitas, meaning “a society, company, corporation, or community regarded collectively.”2 Newman's effacement of the corporate origins of the university in favor of universality reflects a transformation of the university in the course of the 19th century (...) from a corporate body with particularist interests to one with a claim to an autonomous universality transcending all particular…. (shrink)

As the first book to analyze the work of Fanon as an existential-phenomenological of human sciences and liberation philosopher, Gordon deploys Fanon's work to illuminate how the "bad faith" of European science and civilization have philosophically stymied the project of liberation. Fanon's body of work serves as a critique of European science and society, and shows the ways in which the project of "truth" is compromised by Eurocentric artificially narrowed scope of humanity--a circumstance to which he refers as the (...) class='Hi'>crisis of European Man. In his examination of the roots of this crisis, Gordon explores the problems of historical salvation and the dynamics of oppression, the motivation behind contemporary European obstruction of the advancement of a racially just world, the forms of anonymity that pervade racist theorizing and contribute to "seen invisibility," and the reasons behind the impossibility of a nonviolent transition from colonialism and neocolonialism to post colonialism. (shrink)

As forms of employment and migration changed, the financial crisis which began in 2007 affected the human rights of individuals, particularly those in developing countries. How the media reported on these consequences is essential in understanding how and why public and political perceptions of the importance of human rights may have changed since the crisis began. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis of major newspapers in the UK and the USA, this paper seeks to understand the ways in which (...) the media presented the relationship between the negative changes in the economy and human rights. The analysis of the findings uses framing theory to understand how the text in news articles communicates the relevance of human rights to readers before concluding with some further avenues for research. (shrink)

This is a critique of Nietzsche's theory of culture that proposes an alternative paradigm allowing a defense of the humanities against such Nietzschians as Leo Strauss and Derrida.

In this article, I discuss the nature, causes and effects of the crisis of civilization which we can observe for over forty years. This crisis affects social order, with its economic, institutional and demographic dimensions, as well as the culture and the social structure. Here, I am particularly dealing with the question of human person and their relations with others, as well as the humanities. I show globalization, the growth of cancerous mass culture and secularization as a (...) background of the crisis of civilization. In this context, I try to show the importance of Chiara Lubich and her work. (shrink)

Humanities advocates focus on demonstrating the humanities’ value to encourage participation. This advocacy is largely done through institutional means, and rarely taken directly to the public. This article argues that by reframing the theory of Direct Action, humanities advocates can effectively engage the public. The article begins by exploring three different understandings of the humanities: that they develop good citizenship, that they develop understanding, and that they develop critical thought. The article then discusses what Direct Action (...) is and how it works. The article concludes by describing how to reframe Direct Action to suit the needs of the humanities, including potential actions that will achieve those ends. Humanities Direct Action must be seen as a debate and will focus on increasing critical thinking. (shrink)

Translated by Ciaran Cronin. In the midst of the current crisis that is threatening to derail the historical project of European unification, Jürgen Habermas has been one of the most perceptive critics of the ineffectual and evasive responses to the global financial crisis, especially by the German political class. This extended essay on the constitution for Europe represents Habermas’s constructive engagement with the European project at a time when the crisis of the eurozone is threatening the very (...) existence of the European Union. There is a growing realization that the European treaty needs to be revised in order to deal with the structural defects of monetary union, but a clear perspective for the future is missing. Drawing on his analysis of European unification as a process in which international treaties have progressively taken on features of a democratic constitution, Habermas explains why the current proposals to transform the system of European governance into one of executive federalism is a mistake. His central argument is that the European project must realize its democratic potential by evolving from an international into a cosmopolitan community. The opening essay on the role played by the concept of human dignity in the genealogy of human rights in the modern era throws further important light on the philosophical foundations of Habermas’s theory of how democratic political institutions can be extended beyond the level of nation-states. Now that the question of Europe and its future is once again at the centre of public debate, this important intervention by one of the greatest thinkers of our time will be of interest to a wide readership. (shrink)

The author analyzes three waves of the crisis of democracy during the 20th and early 21st centuries. The first crisis of democracy in the early 20th century is caused by the emergence and development of public politics, which challenged the possibility to govern the masses having conflict potential, it balanced the power of the people and universal suffrage with the control of the media in order to maintain the stability of political system. The second wave of the (...) class='Hi'>crisis of democracy (the last third of the 20th century) is associated with the destruction of the conventional world and the weakening of the nation-state; and its markers were: the imbalance between the branches of government, the domination of economics over politics, the predominance of equality over freedom, the problematic implementation of human rights, and, as a consequence, the inability to put into practice the national form of democracy. The third wave of crisis (early the 21st century) is accompanied by the transformation of democracy into post-democracy, in which the power of the people is replaced by the power of global capital, and the illusion of consent is reinforced by the prohibition of alternative points of view and the narrowing of the space of issues allowed for discussion in the name of public security. The crisis of the policy to achieve peace through the transformation of the balance of powers into a balance of interests called into question the principles of democracy. On the contrary, post-democracies justify the use of force to spread democracy around the world, and they take an active part in contemporary military conflicts, which can rightly be defined as hybrid proxy wars. Drawing on J. Habermas’s concept of communicative rationality, the author concludes that to overcome the crisis of democracy it is necessary to accept the very possibility of an alternative to this form of government and allow to discuss these previously marginalized issues as well as to maintain the return of the majority to genuine communication and politics, contribute to its enlightenment. (shrink)

This article argues the main following points. (1) Communism was fatefully dependent upon the action or inaction of its top leaders because of the vulnerability of the hyper-centralized power and hyper-centralized defense of the ruling class and the ruling party. No one was really able to seriously predict the historical contingencies such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin that played a decisive role. The most that social scientists and analysts could safely claim was that communism had become unsuccessful and problematical to such (...) an extent that force alone could maintain it. However, given the overall history of communism, who could have anticipated that such force would not be used. (2) The United States is toiling now in an overwhelmingly difficult and dangerous transition, not only from a ‘superpower’ to ‘merely’ a big power, but from a totalistic and laissez-faire capitalism to a limited and state-regulated capitalism. It is the most efficacious way of production and primary distribution. However, unless capitalism, national and global, becomes regulated and combined with some kind of socialism (solidarism) that is yet to be established, global crises will keep recurring. The best chance for enlightened socialist (solidaristic) humanism lies in secondary distribution based on equality and justice as its fundamental principles. (3) The very term ‘superpower’ suggests a kind of superhuman, almost divine power. The United States does not have such power because (among other things) apocalyptic weapons are at the disposal of some considerably weaker states (in every other respect). (4) The possibility of the self-destruction of humankind has become the over-determination of all other over-determinations in history. It follows that auto-apocalypse must be separated from the categorical and epochal dichotomy between modernity/ modernism and postmodernity/postmodernism and given an absolute priority, both theoretical and practical. This break should be characterized as post-postmodernity and reflection upon it as post-postmodernism. We are in vital need of a total anti-apocalyptic turnaround in overall thought, sensitivity, activity and organization. Unfortunately, it can now safely be predicted that more and more states and societies, even those founded on (internal) freedoms and desirous to maintain them, will become transformed into states and societies focused on the struggle for survival in the face of auto-apocalyptic threats. I believe that confronted more and more with such threats liberalism will actually, and later probably also explicitly, yield the place of the fundamental operative (unlike declarative) view of the world, ideology, imagology, and principle of social organization — to humankind existentialism. We have entered an existentialist ‘end of history’ instead of the proclaimed liberalistic ‘end of history’. (shrink)

Decision makers addressing the ecological crisis face the challenge of considering complex ecosystems in their socioeconomic decisions. Complementary to ecological sciences, other scientific frameworks, grouped under the umbrella term environmental sciences, offer decision makers the opportunity to pursue sustainable paths. Because the environmental sciences are drawn from different branches of science, environmental ethics must go beyond the legacy of ecology and the life sciences to describe the contribution of scientific knowledge to addressing the ecological crisis. In this regard, (...) I analyze and compare three environmental sciences based on their seminal articles: Conservation Biology, Sustainability Science, and Sustainability Economics. My analysis shows that conservation biology and sustainability economics share strong similarities despite their different disciplinary backgrounds (life _versus_ social sciences). Both seek to contrast a biocentric and an anthropocentric perspective. The goal of sustainability is therefore understood as a balance that must be found between these two perspectives. If the issue of balancing human and non-human interests is still relevant to sustainable science, it is more likely to take place in an ecocentric perspective based on alternative ontological and normative prescriptions. Based on this analysis, I distinguish between ‘proscriptive value-based’ scientific work that cannot be used for policy advice but is flexible to different value systems, and ‘prescriptive value-based’ scientific work that can be used for policy advice but is fixed within a given value system. Conflicting recommendations from environmental scientists therefore result from the coexistence of multiple ‘prescriptive value-based’ scientific approaches based on different conceptions of the relationship between humans and nature. (shrink)

This dissertation studies modern European philosophy's reflection the historical appearance of the human sciences, under the spell of either positivist ideology or historicism, while also making their scientific character a philosophical issue. The work thus hopes to situate the human sciences in an historical context out of which they become unintelligible: the philosophical reflection that, throughout late modernity, has registered their progressive appearance as disciplines of an uncertain and often questioned degree of scientificity. In this way, it challenges a standard (...) practice of 20th c. philosophy of science---to start with the tradition inherited from logical positivism, as though the genre began ex-nihilo around the time, or with, Popper's Logik der Forschung. ;The historical itinerary reconstructed begins with the antinomy nature/freedom in modern philosophy, particularly as it appears in the Kantian corpus. This is followed by an analysis of the dissolution of system philosophy against the background of the movements that constitute the historical matrix of the human sciences: positivism and historicism. Then the work considers the "return to Kant" in Dilthey and the neo-Kantians, which is a conscious attempt to reenact philosophical theories that may serve as scientific meta-language. Finally, the dissertation traces the reception of this Fragestellung in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, particularly in the latter's turn from a destruction of metaphysics to a critique of science and technology. ;At the same time, the historical appearance of the sciences of man is considered together with the crisis of philosophy as epistemology or general theory of knowledge. This is done without disregard to the irreversible character of the epochal differend between science and philosophy, evidenced by the crisis of epistemology as scientific meta-language and the rise of an autonomous self-reflection of sciences that constitutes their own "philosophy of science." Thus the work's conclusion attempts to find the epistemological site of a reflection on man that may go beyond the empirical in the discursive space that opens up between natural science and the retreat of philosophy as theory of knowledge. (shrink)

In "The Crisis of Meaning and the Life-World, " Lubica Ucnik examines the existential conflict that formed the focus of Edmund Husserl s final work, which she argues is very much with us today: how to reconcile scientific rationality with the meaning of human existence. To investigate this conundrum, she places Husserl in dialogue with three of his most important successors: Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, and Jan Patocka. For Husserl, 1930s Europe was characterized by a growing irrationalism that threatened (...) to undermine its legacy of rational inquiry. Technological advancement in the sciences, Husserl argued, had led science to forget its own foundations in the primary life-world: the world of lived experience. Renewing Husserl s concerns in today s context, Ucnik first provides an original and compelling reading of his oeuvre through the lens of the formalization of the sciences, then traces the unfolding of this problem through the work of Heidegger, Arendt, and Patocka. Although many scholars have written on Arendt, none until now has connected her philosophical thought with that of Czech phenomenologist Jan Patocka. Ucnik provides invaluable access to the work of the latter, who remains understudied in the English language. She shows that together, these four thinkers offer new challenges to the way we approach key issues confronting us today, providing us with ways to reconsider truth, freedom, and human responsibility in the face of the postmodern critique of metanarratives and a growing philosophical interest in new forms of materialism.". (shrink)

Social life across the African continent is largely threatened by intolerance, injustice, lack of equal opportunity, inequity in resource distribution, lack of compassion, unfair treatment and disrespect for others’ rights, as well as compromising intrusion of ethnicity, corruption, terrorism and religion into affairs of the state. So, Africans largely struggle with the political problem of building and sustaining societies and institutions that can be civil and compliant to the rule of law. There exists an African problem of political justice and (...) social justice. Disorder and parochialism in a sociopolitical system are mainly instigated by inefficiency and over-politicization of major developmental institutions. We recommend some human values of Ubuntu such as mutual respect, cooperation for the common good and the pursuit of reconciliation as pillars for stable and viable political and social order across most parts of Africa. (shrink)

The topic of this paper is an examination of the practical dimension of contemporary philosophical culture, both in relation to the idea of wisdom in traditional philosophy and in relation to psychoanalytical practice. In the first part of the paper, we determine what philosophical culture is, primarily by emphasizing the differences between that culture and the scientific-technological culture. In the second part of the paper, we show that such a philosophical culture has fallen into a crisis. In the third (...) part of paper, we offer a way out of that crisis, in the form of psychoanalysis, which criticizes the primacy that philosophical culture accords to consciousness, logic, diachronic and linear ways of thinking. In the fourth and last part of the paper, we present the shortcomings of this psychoanalytical model. As a solution, we offer a new model of philosophical culture, created by the synthesis of philosophy, psychoanalysis, but also other discipline of human thought, which has similarities with Nietzsche?s anticipation of Gay Science, as well as with Jasper?s idea of transcendence. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the current international refugee crisis and the ways in which it is leading to sharp symbolic and physical violence through the process of “othering.” Based on Hannah Arendt’s discussion of statelessness and the question of the right to have rights, and Giorgio Agamben’s discussion of Homo Sacer, as well as drawing on other key authors such as Judith Butler, we argue that conditions of extreme human vulnerability and dangers of totalitarianism are being radically worsened by (...) the ethnicized and racialized denial of the other, that is, of human rights. Rather than advocating an abstract cosmopolitanism, however, without strong purchase in contemporary social life, the paper concludes by noting the need to place oneself in a position of discomfort, in order to confront the tension between particularistic attachments and universalist aspirations, between the multiplicity of laws and the ideal of a rational order common to all polities, between belief in the unity of humankind and the healthy antagonisms and tensions generated by human diversity. (shrink)

The author shows that the search for new, non-classical forms of rationality is a symptom of the crisis of systematicity in human existence. Rationalism is a worldview correspondence to systemic human existence, and the limits of rationalism coincide with the limits of systematicity. Referring to postmodern philosophy, the author proves that human existence is not limited to systematicity. The scientific scope of the general, the ratio, is inferior to other horizons – aesthetic, moral, mystical, etc. culture-building existence has now (...) declared itself as the only truly human, supersystemic being-in-freedom, whose logic is not limited to rationality. The crisis of rationality has led to an understanding of man as not needing any guidance, and the highest manifestation of his unlimited freedom is his own uncaused self-restraint. (shrink)

The crisis of our times is science in a world without wisdom. The immense intellectual success of modern science and technology have given some of us unprecedented powers to act, which has led to all the great benefits of the modern world, and to the grave global crises we now face. Before modern science, we lacked the power to do too much damage to ourselves or the planet; now we have science, wisdom has become, not a private luxury but (...) a public necessity. Unless we learn to become a bit wiser, sooner or later we will destroy ourselves. But how can we learn to become wiser? We can learn from the last place many would look - namely science! We can learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards a wiser world. This is in fact an old idea. It goes back to the 18th century French Enlightenment. But, in developing the idea, the philosophes of the Enlightenment made three gross blunders. They failed to capture correctly the nature of the progress-achieving methods of science; they failed to generalize these methods properly; and, most disastrously of all, they applied their misconstrued scientific method, not to the social world directly, not to the task of making social progress towards an enlightened world, but instead to the task of improving knowledge of social phenomena, to the task of developing social science. This botched version of the profound Enlightenment idea was developed throughout the 19th century, and built into universities in the early 20th century with the creation of disciplines of social science. As a result, academic inquiry today is a botched version of what we need. Instead of giving priority to problems of living, and devoting itself to helping humanity acquire a bit more wisdom, academia today devotes itself to the pursuit of knowledge. That is the key disaster of our times. Our institutions of learning seek knowledge, but fail disastrously to devote themselves to helping humanity acquire a bit more wisdom. If the world is to acquire global wisdom, it needs institutions of learning rationally devoted to the task. As a matter of supreme urgency, we need to bring about a revolution in academia so that the basic task becomes, not just to acquire knowledge, but to seek and promote social wisdom. (shrink)

The paper investigates the crisis of Portugese agriculture and the challenges connected with Portugal's integration into the European Economic Community (EEC). An historical overview of the economic and social development of the agricultural sector since the 1950s is provided. Additionally, a discussion of the principal differences between the Portugese agricultural crisis and that of other advanced European countries and the U.S. is carried out. In this portion of the paper it is argued that agriculture in Portugal is characterized (...) by low levels of productivity and production which contrast with the high levels of productivity and overproduction of other European and North American countries. Finally, an analysis of the possible future consequences of Portugal's further integration into the EEC is provided. (shrink)

In The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl expands his philosophical horizon to include the question about the genuine meaning of human existence. Understanding the crisis of the European sciences as a symptom of the crisis of European philosophy and as an expression of the life-crisis of European humanity, and interpreting European science, philosophy, and humanity as representative of their global-historical counterparts, Husserl argues that the life-crisis of European humanity is reflective of (...) the critical condition of global-historical humanity. The crisis of “European” life emerges as a crisis of human existence, and Husserl’s phenomenology unfolds as a search for an answer to the question not only about the sense of the life-world but also about the meaning of human life. Thus phenomenology, as care for humanity, shares with existentialism, as a humanism in the broadest sense, the conviction that human beings live in a world not in which life makes sense, but in which they must make sense of life. Accordingly, the genuine essence of human existence is not passively “given” but actively “taken,” since it involves an entelechy that constitutes itself in an evolutionary achievement, and it is the evidentiary result of an existential struggle for meaning against annihilating forms of meaninglessness, namely, irrationalism, positivism, and skepticism. This paper examines Husserl’s hermeneutical-historical approach to the question about the meaning of human existence and suggests an understanding of phenomenology as a form of humanism, and perhaps even as a unique kind of “existentialism,” that is, an ethical philosophy that takes absolute moral responsibility for the presuppositionless application of reason to life.En La crisis e las ciencias europeas y la fenomenología trascendental, Husserl expande su horizonte filosófico a fin de incluir en él la pregunta por el auténtico sentido de la existencia humana. Al entender la crisis de las ciencias europeas como un síntoma de la crisis de la filosofía europea y como una expresión de la crisis vital de la humanidad europea, y al interpretar la ciencia, la filosofía y la humanidad europeas como representativas de sus contrapartes históricas y globales, Husserl argumenta que la crisis vital de la humanidad europea refleja la condición crítica en que se encuentra la humanidad en perspectiva histórica global. La crisis de la vida “europea” emerge como una crisis de la existencia humana, y la fenomenología de Husserl se despliega como la búsqueda de una respuesta a la cuestión no sólo del sentido del mundo de la vida, sino también del significado de la vida humana. La fe-nomenología, como cuidado de la humanidad, comparte con el existencialismo, entendido como un humanismo en el sentido más amplio, la convicción de que los seres humanos viven en un mundo en el cual no es que la vida tenga sentido sino que ellos deben dar sentido a la vida. En consonancia, la auténtica esencia de la existencia humana no está pasivamente “dada” sino que es activamente “tomada”, ya que ella envuelve una entelequia que se constituye en una realización evolutiva, y que es el resultado evidenciador de un combate existencial por el significado contra las formas de sinsentido que son aniquiladoras, a saber: irracionalismo, positivismo y escepticismo. Este ensayo examina la aproximación histórico-hermenéutica de Husserl a la cuestión del significado de la existencia humana, y sugiere una comprensión de la fenomenología como una forma de humanismo, y quizá incluso como un tipo único de existencialismo; esto es, como una filosofía ética que asume una responsabilidad moral absoluta en la aplicación sin presupuestos de la razón a la vida. (shrink)

Neuroscientific evidence requires a monistic understanding of brain/mind. Truly appropriating what this means confronts us with the vulnerability of the human condition. Ca‐muss absurd and Tillich's despair are extreme expressions of a similar confrontation. This crisis demands a type of courage that is consistent with scientific truth and does not undermine the spiritual dimension of life. That dimension is not a separate substance but the process by which brain/mind meaningfully wrestles with its crisis through aesthetic symbols, religious faith, (...) and ethical affirmation. The validity of these activities does not depend upon human autonomy but instead upon the fact that they exist. Furthermore, they constitute the self, which Dennett calls a “center of narrative gravity.”. (shrink)

The paper “Crisis of the consumer society: searching for a new ideology” studies the ideology of the consumer society and its main tendencies such as values substitution, human self-isolation and loneliness and the dehumanization of the world. Based on the analysis of contemporary mass art and advertisements the author traces the growing gap between the real life of people and the dominating consumerist model of society. The author evaluates different radical movements (nationalist, racial, religious) as people’s attempt to discover (...) their identity, to find genuine feelings and experiences in the consumerist society. This results in the increase of xenophobia and intolerance in the intertwined and fragile modern world. The paper also states the possible solution to this problem – ajoint effort of the philosophers of the world to create a new, nonconsumerism ideology that would be able to overcome the existing detachment among people. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Renaissance Crisis of ExemplarityFrançois Rigolot“Every example is lame” (Tout exemple cloche), acknowledged Montaigne in the last chapter of his Essais. 1 Was this the moaning of a lone, disillusioned skeptic or the idiosyncratic formulation of a widely shared attitude of mistrust at the end of the sixteenth century? To answer this question one must first examine the epistemological status of examples at the end of the period (...) we still conventionally call the “Renaissance”; and this is the purpose of this group of papers. 2In his work on the notion of exemplum in early modern France and Italy John D. Lyons helped restore the concept of exemplarity to its central place in the history of rhetoric. 3 From Aristotle’s paradeigmata—simple case stories at the orator’s disposal (Rhetoric 1.2. 1356b)—to Montaigne’s “lame” exemples—contingent instances unfit for demonstrative purposes (Essais III, 13, 1070)—the rhetorical impulse has followed strangely circuitous ways. Part of the confusion is probably due to the transformation of technical language under the pressure of common usage. Throughout the early modern period, while the Latin word exemplum continued to refer to rhetorical practice (an illustrative anecdote with a moral point), its vernacular derivatives (esempio, ejemplo, exemple, etc.) generally had a broader, looser, and less didactic meaning, as the emphasis was displaced to the “narrative” aspect of instances, regardless of their intentionality. In other words, although examples were often used to illustrate a didactic point, they differed from exempla inasmuch as they were not always meant to serve a demonstrative purpose.Of course, to the extent that choosing an example necessarily involves some form of selective process from a larger quantity of material, every instance is [End Page 557] bound to entertain a metonymic relation with a greater whole. But, etymologically, an example (essample, in Old French spelling) is a sample, one thing merely alleged to resemble another one, not a demonstrative tool. Yet in his Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues (London, 1611), Randle Cotgrave gave polysemous English equivalents for exemple and exemplaire:Exemple: 1) An example, sample, patterne, or president [sic] to follow; 2) a copie, or counterpane of a writing; 3) one thing alledged to prove, or inforce another that resembles it.Exemplaire: 1) A patterne, sample, or sampler; 2) an example, president [sic] or precedent, for others to follow, or to take heed by; 3) also, the copie, or counterpane of a writing. 4There is an odd mixture of demonstrative and non-demonstrative connotations. The two seemingly interchangeable words receive tripartite definitions, with the three meanings of exemple corresponding to the three of exemplaire.In Renaissance humanistic oratory the evocation of examples was often a simple matter of style. For better elocutory purposes public speakers were encouraged to use graphic case stories to make their speeches more appealing and enjoyable, but orators also used what they called exemplars (Latin exemplaria) to provide their audience with models of conduct to imitate. Worthiness was the ultimate criterion for exemplarity. Cato and Socrates were living symbols of moral determination and courage. They became powerful exemplars of ancient “virtue,” or moral fortitude (Latin virtus; Italian virtù). In the selective process of arguments (inventio), they were chosen because they exemplified a specific attitude or line of conduct: they were, by definition, exemplary examples. 5In the Renaissance the uplifting reading of ancient exemplars was closely related to the doctrine of imitatio, the sacrosanct recourse to inherited cultural models. At the same time the appeal of mimesis, characterized by the actual experience of the real world in reaction to scholastic insularity, greatly problematized the reception of ancient models. Whereas a long-held reverence for the imitative power of traditional exempla offered compelling patterns of moral conduct, the new attractiveness of a more “natural” mimetic discourse [End Page 558] tended to turn the study of models away from duplication. 6 In the face of the inexhaustible diversity and unpredictability of human actions, how can we choose a proper model after which to pattern our own behavior? This is one of the many questions raised by the humanist’s disenchantment with imitative symbols of moral conduct.In recent years the concept... (shrink)

The crisis of contemporary art is a paradigmatic example of the crisis of spiritual values in today's world. The main cause of this crisis, it is argued, lies in the spirit of modern sciences. These do not find their object as a ready given, but rather determine it themselves, from their own standpoint, and thus basically produce it. Due to enormous technological development, modern civilization has turned the whole world into the Eleatic One. In materializing the uniform (...) spirit of technology in our world the role of the new audio-visual media: cinema, radio, television, video and the internet, has been crucial. Technology has become a powerful instrument of modern power: it has enabled a concentration of power in the hands of technical, cultural and political administration, as well as automatically expanding mass production and consumption, and finally subordination of people to methodic education, control and manipulation. These are main features of the spirit of the contemporary technical civilization where technology is not understood as something technical but rather as a mode of existence, connected with science and industry. By changing the way in which human life is lived, and the way in which human community is ordered, the purpose and perception of the work of art has also changed. Beauty is not taken to be a result of subjective experience and something belonging to the object as such. The sphere of the aesthetic has become the ground for manifesting relativism and subjectivism in various forms. With the development of knowledge and human power, the contemporary world has begun to sink into nihilism, losing a sense for anything bearing the stamp of individuality. In such a world, everything, including the sphere of spiritual values, is reduced merely to what is useful and efficient.. Kriza savremene umetnosti predstavlja paradigmatican primer krize duhovnih vrednosti u savremenom svetu. Glavni uzrok te krize autor vidi u duhu modernih nauka za koje je karakteristicno da svoj predmet ne nalaze kao gotovu datost, vec ga same odredjuju sa svog stanovista i tako ga iz osnova proizvode. Zahvaljujuci ogromnom razvitku tehnike moderna civilizacija je ceo svet pretvorila u elejsko jedno. Kljucnu ulogu u realizaciji uniformnog duha tehnike u nasoj savremenosti imali su novi audio vizuelni mediji: film, radio, televizija, video i Internet. Tehnika je postala mocan instrument moderne vlasti: ona je omogucila koncentraciju moci u rukama tehnicke, kulturne i politicke uprave, masovnu proizvodnju i potrosnju koje se automatski sire, podcinjavanje ljudi metodskom skolovanju, kontroli i manipulaciji. To su najvaznija obelezja duha savremene tehnicke civilizacije u kojoj se tehnika ne shvata kao nesto tehnicko vec kao jedan nacin egzistencije povezan s naukom i industrijom. Promenom nacina vodjenja ljudskog zivota, nacina uredjenja ljudske zajednice, promenjena je svrha i percepcija umetnickog dela. Lepota se shvata kao plod subjektivnog dozivljaja i ne pripada predmetu kao takvom. Sfera estetskog postala je najsire podrucje za razlicite vrste ispoljavanja relativizma i subjektivizma. Razvojem saznanja i ljudske moci, savremeni svet poceo je da tone u no? nihilizma i da gubi smisao za sve sto ima pecat individualnosti. U takvom svetu sve se, pa i sfera duhovnih vrednosti, svodi samo na ono sto je korisno i delotvorno. (shrink)

The contemporary crisis in AmericanEducation that has resulted in Bush sponsoredfederal legislation for accountability andstandardized testing is the setting for anessay introducing the work of Frenchphilosopher, Julia Kristeva. The comparison isbetween an ``educated subject'' that might wellcome to be constituted in schooling at presentand a ``subject-in-process.'' In a strikinglydifferent vision of human potential, the latterindividual, with open-ended, non-perfectdevelopment, entails the possibility ofpersonal, societal and educational change.Kristeva's theory, based greatly in areinterpretation of Freud, and incorporatingthe semiotic, abjection and love, and (...) revolt iscentral. (shrink)

This paper places Husserl’s mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with – and critique of – experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology – due to its naturalism – as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide (...) an analysis of Husserl’s views about naturalism and scientific philosophy. Some central themes of the Crisis are traced back to Husserl’s earlier work and to his relationship with his teacher, Franz Brentano, with whom he disagreed about the status of “inner perception” as the proper scientific method for a phenomenological analysis. The paper then shows that Husserl was well aware of at least one publication about the crisis of psychology (Bühler’s 1927 book), and it teases out some aspects of the complicated relationship between Husserl and members of the Würzburg School of thought psychology: The latter had drawn on Husserl’s writings, but Husserl felt that they had misunderstood his central thesis. I conclude by placing Husserl’s work in the wider context of scientific, cultural, and political crisis-discourses at the time. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Crisis of Meaning in Sartor Resartus—Thomas Carlyle's Pioneering Work in Articulating and Addressing the Existential ConfrontationFrank Martelawhat i call an "existential confrontation" is the encounter with the possibility that human life is absurd: created for no purpose and devoid of any lasting value or meaning. It is "the hour of terror at the world's vast meaningless grinding" that William James (Will to Believe 173) examines, described by Todd (...) May (xi) as "the confrontation of our need for meaning with the unwillingness of the Universe to yield it to us." This confrontation with the existential void and the potential absurdity of human existence is often not just an intellectual dilemma, but felt as a deep personal crisis accompanied by melancholia, angst, nausea, or even suicidal thoughts. Young William James confessed in a letter to a friend that "all last winter" he "was on the continual verge of suicide" (quoted in Gunnarsson), writing later that "too much questioning" leads "to the edge of the slope" wherein lies "nightmare or suicidal view of life" (James, "Is Life Worth Living?" 6). Similarly, Leo Tolstoy (54) reports how his inability to identify a lasting meaning of life drove him to a "state of lunacy" where "the best I could do was to hang myself."Despite a few earlier allusions—most famously the Book of Ecclesiastes proclaiming that "all is vanity and a striving after wind," and Shakespeare's Macbeth lamenting that life is "a tale told by an idiot … signifying nothing"—the existential confrontation is predominantly a modern phenomenon (Martela, A Wonderful Life). The modern history of descriptions of existential confrontations start at the turn of the nineteenth century, and includes Søren Kierkegaard's Sickness Unto Death, Leo Tolstoy's A Confession, Fyodor Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground, Camus's Outsider, Sartre's Nausea, and T. S.Eliot's The Waste Land.There are many responses that the confrontation with the existential void has generated. Sartre embraced the lack of values imposed from outside and [End Page 80] emphasized human freedom. Human beings are "cast into this world … condemned to be free" without any "luminous realm of values" providing "justification or excuse," as Sartre famously summarized in "Existentialism Is a Humanism" (29). Other responses range from Søren Kierkegaard's leap of faith and William James's will to believe to Albert Camus's happiness from absurdity.While some of the responses end up finding a new way of connecting with God and faith, and others are explicitly atheistic, embracing the "death of God," a common thread in most responses is an acknowledgment of the situatedness of human experience and an emphasis placed on human subjectivity and the opportunity to live one's life more authentically. While existentialism, broadly conceived, is often seen as the central philosophical tradition dealing with the existential void, the confrontation was very much alive in the United States as well, visible in both literature and philosophy. As already alluded, William James had an existential confrontation in his youth, writing about the topic in "Is Life Worth Living" and other essays in Will to Believe. There has also been much back-and-forth between Europe and the United States around these themes, with the influences crossing the Atlantic on many occasions. For example, William James cites Thomas Carlyle in Will to Believe, while Sartre cites William James in Nausea, when discussing themes related to the existential confrontation. Similarly, Emerson inspired Nietzsche who inspired Josiah Royce. Typically, the histories tracing the early encounters with the existential confrontation acknowledge Friedrich Nietzsche, Søren Kierkegaard, and Fyodor Dostoevsky as key nineteenth-century predecessors to Existentialism, as all faced directly the question of the meaning of life and the dreadful possibility that life might not have any meaning or value to it.However, there is a key author usually not mentioned in these histories, despite the fact that he played a pivotal role in introducing existentialist themes to the English-speaking audience, coining the phrase "meaning of life" in the English language. Thus, in writing the prehistory of Existentialism, we need to examine Thomas Carlyle and his Sartor Resartus, which has been described by literary historians as "one of... (shrink)

The ArgumentThe paper offers a reconstruction of one aspect of Bakhtin's philosophy, focusing on a deep-seated ambivalence that has been largely overlooked in studies based on his late works. Bakhtin's early work, 1920–23, is set within a distinctly metaphysical framework, an outlook that seems diametrically opposite to what has become known as the Bakhtinian conception of culture. That ideological rift is manifest in the different treatment of Dostoevsky's works in these two phases.Extrapolating Bakhtin's perspective onto Dostoevsky's work, the paper briefly (...) outlines a theory of modernism as a “crisis of authority,” with particular emphasis on the role of closure — i.e., retrospective framing, both literary and existential — in the absence of metaphysical grounding.Finally, the paper offers a comment on Bakhtin's wholesale assimilation into the postmodernist canon, in an attempt to problematize it and to reformulate some relevant and persistent questions on the significance of narrativity in human existence. (shrink)

In the 1940s and 1950s _The Review of Politics_, under the dynamic leadership of Waldemar Gurian, emerged as one of the leading journals of political and social theory in the United States. This volume celebrates that legacy by bringing together classic essays by a remarkable group of American and European émigré intellectuals, among them Jacques Maritain, Hannah Arendt, Josef Pieper, Eric Voegelin, and Yves Simon. For these writers, the emergence of new dictatorial regimes in Germany and Russia and the looming (...) threat of another, even more devastating, European war demanded that one rethink the reigning philosophical perspectives of the time. In their view, the western world had lost sight of its founding principles. Individually and collectively, they maintained that the West could be saved only if its leaders embraced the idea that society should be governed by moral standards and a commitment to human dignity. Since the first issue appeared in 1939, _The Review of Politics_ has influenced generations of political theorists. To complement these essays A. James McAdams has written an introduction that discusses the history of the journal and reflects on the contributions of these influential figures. He underscores the continuing relevance of these essays in assessing contemporary issues. “The essays contained in this volume demonstrate why the _Review of Politics_ is a national treasure. From Jacques Maritain and Yves Simon to Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, it has consistently attracted writers of the highest quality to think about the deepest problems of politics and the twentieth century. The themes covered in this collection range from totalitarianism and nihilism to the value of education and the dignity of the individual. Their probity and intelligence show why the _Review of Politics _has remained the premier journal for serious students of political philosophy.” —_Steven B. Smith, Alfred Cowles Professor of Political Science, Yale University _ _ _ “The _Review of Politics_ has been essential reading for students of political philosophy and politics for more than two generations, including among its contributors internationally renowned scholars whose works are both enormously influential and increasingly look to be contemporary expressions of perennial wisdom. To make seminal essays of this remarkable journal easily accessible, with more to come in future volumes, is a great service to students of political science at every level.” —_Timothy Fuller, Lloyd E. Worner Distinguished Service Professor, Colorado College_ _ _. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK R]]JVIEWS room for different theories and new developments. He does not try to tie up every loose end. Furthermore, he avoids the rut of the specialist by willingly and capably addressing questions of biblical exegesis, philosophy, psychology, science, and popular culture with even-handed competence. Space does not permit me to discuss his fascinating analysis of the psychology of near-death experiences or specific rejoinders to important objections (e.g., the (...) Bible depicts the dead as bodily beings, not immaterial spirits; dualism is a result of the Fall; dualism implies that the whole person does not die; at death we pass out of time, and, hence, there is no intermediate state). But I can assure you that his account is cogent and illuminating. Lenoir-Rhyne College Hickory, North Carolina PHILIP BLOSSER: The Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective. Edited by KENNETH L DEUTSCH AND WALTER SOFFER. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Pp. ix+ 304. $54.50 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). For Leo Strauss, the superiority of classical political philosophy over modern social science (and political theory based on social science) lies in at least four principles. First, it treats political matters as they actually appear to man qua philosopher and, in a qualified way, to the good citizen. Because Strauss claims that social science (and much post-classical political philosophy) abstracts from his canon of intelligibility, he thinks that it cannot lead to a humane, rational politics. (See "What is Political Philosophy?", in What is Political Philosophy? [Westport: Greenwood], pp. 27-28, and "Distinction between Facts and Values" in Natural Right and History [Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1953], pp. 78-80.) Second, Plato and Aristotle believed that only the good man properly judges politics. This belief attracts Strauss, because it identifies virtue as the best claimant to political rule. ("What is Political Philosophy? ", pp. 36-38.) A third principle is derived immediately from this second: politics ought to be organized hierarchically. In the hierarchy, either the truly virtuous or gentlemen should rule, and those having a passive, obediential form of virtue should be the ruled. Fourth, this arrangement is rational and humane. For although the virtues of the ruler and the ruled are complementary in justice and necessary to it, still they are different and, in fact, require the stratification just mentioned. ("Classic Natural Right" in Natural Right and History, pp. 130-44.) BOOK REVIEWS 527 Because of the controversial nature of these principles and Strauss's eminence in political philosophy, one welcomes the present collection of essays by his disciples. They believe that in liberal democracies people confuse liberty with the uses to which liberty can and ought to be put. Doing so, people undermine that regime's foundations. Strauss and his disciples believe that modern natural right makes the clash between liberty and natural right inevitable, because its principal founders, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, conceived man as non-political. They conceived individuals as gaining certain advantages from governments hut as gaining no good in the exercise of politics itself. Classic natural right, by contrast, bases itself on the assumption that man is radically political. Moreover, it conceives politics as an arena for liberating, ennobling activities. Hobbes and Locke viewed the individual as independent of politics, which they placed at the low end of the range of human activity, along with everyday concerns and popular morality, rather than at the high end, as Strauss would. Thus for Strauss, liberal democracy is founded on modern principles, which are either apolitical and liberal (Locke) or apolitical and illiberal (Hobbes). Consequently, it cannot withstand the individualist and collectivist onslaughts that we have seen in this century. What, then, have Strauss's disciples to say about liberal democracy and the prospect of classic natural right in a Western world which is more or less permanently Hobbesian-Lockean? This can be answered by describing first the hook's divisions and then its diagnoses and prescriptions. In part one the contributors appraise the work of Strauss itself; in part two they define issues in liberalism ; and in part three they discuss liberalism in American political life. In the first part, Michael Platt outlines how Strauss's thought... (shrink)

Environmental problems compel examination of three contrasting patterns of moral reasoning concerning the human relationship to nature: the currently implemented Progress Ethic, and the proposed alternatives of a Stewardship Ethic and Connection Ethic. But none of these deliver all they promise, whether in theory or practice or both, because all dubiously presume that moral reason is commensurate with nature, and that the value of natural entities is an intrinsic property. Matthew R. Foster argues that resolution of this crisis requires (...) reaching beyond the limit of reason, and acknowledging value to be not a noun, but a verb about the incomparable relation of two entities. (shrink)

This essay isolates and critically assesses the motivation behind the current backlash against the broadly culturalist and historicist paradigm that has structured research in the interpretative humanities since the 1980s. That motivation, it argues, has less to do with the noble desire to rescue the humanities from the alleged absurdities of the postmodernists than it has with a reluctance to face up fully to the secularism that many of the humanities’ contemporary critics profess. If historicism and constructivism (...) are under attack today, it is not merely because they offend certain entrenched epistemological or metaethical views. Rather, and more pointedly, it is because these secularist thought styles foreclose traditional sources of spiritual consolation, which many of us intimately rely upon. To make this case, the essay stages a confrontation between William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience and Sigmund Freud’s “On Transience”, two texts that take a long hard look at the prospect of extinction and then diverge in their reactions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Three Moments in the Crisis of Exemplarity: Boccaccio-Petrarch, Montaigne, and CervantesKarlheinz StierleIn his recent book History as Topic Peter von Moos denies that there was any crisis for the exemplum in the Renaissance. 1 He strongly argues against my essay on “History as exemplum,” where I pointed out that in Montaigne, as earlier in Boccaccio, the pragmatic form of exemplum is put into question. 2 My main (...) interest in this essay, however, was not to mark a break between Middle Ages and Renaissance but to understand the way in which the correlation between sententia and exemplum was transformed into a more complex relation between moral reflection and particular case. Undoubtedly, since Valerius Maximus and his Factorum et dictorum memorabilium libri, there has always been, as in John of Salisbury’s Policratius, the possibility of questioning the exemplary truth of the exemplum by opposing it to a never-ending wealth of counter-examples. This, however, never puts into question the idea of exemplarity itself. The validity of the exemplum as a rhetorical form of narration that tends towards its own conceptual or ideological structure has an anthropological basis. It presupposes that over time, there is more analogy in human experience than diversity, or that in all situations of civil and political life the pole of equality is stronger than that of difference.Boccaccio’s novella is precisely the narrative form that puts this anthropological basis into question. Each novella in the Decameron is essentially a [End Page 581] particular variant of a more general conceptual scheme. The stress of narration, however, is not on the scheme itself but on the autonomy of the variant. Basically the novella is a form of rewriting in the mode of retelling, thus bringing an elementary narration to higher complexity. 3 Each of the “vari casi,” mostly of love-affairs, is a confrontation of exemplarity and contingency. It is the power of contingency or fortuna that brings forth the specific particularity of each novella. The art of the writer Boccaccio, whose primary fiction is oral story-telling, consists in giving aesthetic evidence to this particularity. Reading, not listening, is the form of reception that corresponds to this structure. That Boccaccio adds the other title “Il Prencipe Galeotto” to the Decameron is an allusion to Dante’s Divine Commedy where in the famous episode of Paolo and Francesca (Inf. V), Galeotto becomes the personification of the allegory of reading and its seduction.Contingency, or, in Boccaccio’s own medieval terms, fortuna, is the real poet of the novella. That is why the most important scenes of the novellas are those where the power of contingency comes to light: at the sea and in the city. The particular shape of novella, which results from a balance between contingency and significant configuration, emerges from contingency itself. Its configuration is a particular case of contingency, one that by its immanent structural elegance is aesthetically gratifying. It nevertheless leaves open the question whether there might not be a power of a superior kind behind contingency. Because there is an ambiguity between contingency and sense, the exemplary status of each story is, ironically, placed in question. Contingency overcomes exemplarity; however, it never triumphs definitely. The impact on the exemplum by contingency not only gives to each narrative case its difference or even autonomy, it also opens up a new temporal dimension. The exemplum seems to move in an essential time where all time-aspects are controlled and functionalized by a dominating conceptual structure. In the novella time becomes a primary structure. “Or avviene che” is the narrative formula for this new quality of narrative time, becoming a time of disruption and instability where things and situations may change in a moment for the better or for the worse.I would like to illustrate the structure of the Boccaccian novella by at least one exemplary case. Almost in the middle of the book—which means in the middle of its temporal space of ten days—we find the novella of Federigo degli Alberighi, considered to be one of Boccaccio’s finest (V, 9). Federigo, in a world of merchants and trade, is the perfect nobleman who ruins himself by his... (shrink)

Michel de Certeau has analysed the historical context of the debated 'new devotion to Saint Joseph' among the young generation of Jesuits in the first decades of the seventeenth century. This devotion appears to have been of great symbolic value since, in a hidden way, it refers to the contemplative, mystical life. One of the protagonists of the debate, the French Jesuit mystic Jean-Joseph Surin , offers his own analysis of the crisis of mysticism in the Jesuit Order. In (...) his view, some members of the Order fundamentally misunderstand the content of the mystical experience. Seen in a broader perspective, these miscomprehensions can be explained by the incapability to understand the idea of the ‘indwelling’ of Christ in the human person, erroneously understood as a merging of both. The nominalistic concept of the human person as an individual is probably responsible for this intellectual incapacity. (shrink)

Theorists of the Russian conservatism have made a considerable contribution to the development of axiology, the philosophy of history and comparativistics. In their studies of the local civilisations existing at different times and at different places they have focused on the dynamics of their origin, development, collapse or transformation into new civilisational forms. The best known slavophiles such as A. Khomyakov, K. Axakov, I. Kireyevskiy saw the mission of the Russian civilisation in synthesising Europe and Russia which has preserved the (...) true Christianity – the Orthodoxy. According to N. Danilevskiy, the founder of the culturohistorical school of thought, Europe has an irreconcilable hostility towards Russia. He proves that Europe and Russia are two different culturohistoricaltypes (local civilisations). He understood Russia’s mission as that of unification of Slavic peoples. K. Leontiev develops the so-called theory of Byzantism, according to which the West is doomed and Russia will be saved thanks to its Orthodoxy and the oriental despotism underlying its statehood. He advocates a merger between Russian and oriental traditions. From the point of view of the proponents of the Eurasian theory such as P. Savitskiy, N. Trubetskoy, etc., the merger has already occurred, so Russians should be viewed as Eurasians and Russia as a Eurasian civilisation. Russian thinkers were criticising the so-called Eurocentrism in their efforts to prove that progress should be measured not only by the accumulation of material wealth, but also by the development of various spiritual aspects of human beings. The anthroposociogenesis does not have any predetermined patterns, its development is of co-evolutionary, often broken, discrete nature. (shrink)