H.P. Grice is known principally for his influential contributions to the philosophy of language, but his work also includes treatises on the philosophy of mind, ethics, and metaphysics--much of which is unpublished to date. This collection of original essays by such philosophers as Nancy Cartwright, Donald Davidson, Gilbert Harman, and P.F. Strawson demonstrates the unified and powerful character of Grice's thoughts on being, mind, meaning, and morals. An introductory essay by the editors provides the first overview of Grice's work.

In this chapter, Dino Jakušić investigates Christian Wolff's attempt at developing a scientific metaphysics. According to Wolff, in order for metaphysics (and philosophy in general) to be scientific, it must be formulated as a system of interconnected disciplines modelled after Euclidean geometry and grounded in ontology. Jakušić provides an interpretation of the way in which Wolff understands ontology as the scientific discipline that is supposed to ground metaphysics, as well as science more generally. More specifically, Jakušić focuses on Wolff's (...) attempt at identifying ontology with primary philosophy. -/- This chapter starts with an introduction of Wolff's life and works, followed by a short account of the history of the concepts “ontology”, “primary philosophy”, and “metaphysics”. The context and controversy behind Wolff's identification of the terms “ontology” and “primary philosophy” are explained. Finally, Wolff's attempt at grounding his system on ontology is interpreted by specifying four ways in which ontology, as conceived by Wolf, can be considered the primary philosophical discipline: primacy in cognition, demonstration, architectonics, and in the order of being. (shrink)

This collection addresses two different audiences: 1) historians and philosophers of the life sciences reflecting on collaborations across disciplines, especially as regards defining and addressing Grand Challenges; 2) researchers and other stakeholders involved in cross-disciplinary collaborations aimed at tackling Grand Challenges in the life and medical sciences. The essays collected here offer ideas and resources both for the study and for the practice of goal-driven cross-disciplinary research in the life and medical sciences. We organise this introduction in three sections. The (...) first section provides some background and context. The second motivates our take on this topic and then outlines the central ideas of each paper. The third section highlights the specificity and significance of this approach by considering: a) how this collection departs from existing literature on inter- and trans-disciplinarity, b) what is characteristic about this approach, and c) what role this suggests for the history and philosophy of the life sciences in addressing Grand Challenges. (shrink)

This anthology aims to explore the current Norwegian context of implementation of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR),as well as the challenges and fragilities associated with it. It is grounded in the experience of a networking and learning centre called AFINO (acronym for‘ Ansvarlig Forskning og Innovasjon i NOrge’, or Responsible Research and Innovation in Norway),to which most of the authors of this book are affiliated. Whether the authors are trying to illustrate a fragility or challenge, (...) to understand its origins, or to illustrate how they have been tackled or how things developed in unexpected ways that raise new fragilities and questions, we believe that all chapters contribute to bringing to light the richness of the domains of research, innovation, policy, and business. (shrink)

This book describes in detail the various theories on the shape of the Earth from classical antiquity to the present day and examines how measurements of its form and dimensions have evolved throughout this period. The origins of the notion of the sphericity of the Earth are explained, dating back to Eratosthenes and beyond, and detailed attention is paid to the struggle to establish key discoveries as part of the cultural heritage of humanity. In this context, the roles played by (...) the Catholic Church and the philosophers of the Middle Ages are scrutinized. Later contributions by such luminaries as Richer, Newton, Clairaut, Maupertuis, and Delambre are thoroughly reviewed, with exploration of the importance of mathematics in their geodetic enterprises. The culmination of progress in scientific research is the recognition that the reference figure is not a sphere but rather a geoid and that the earth’s shape is oblate. Today, satellite geodesy permits the solution of geodetic problems by means of precise measurements. Narrating this fascinating story from the very beginning not only casts light on our emerging understanding of the figure of the Earth but also offers profound insights into the broader evolution of human thought. (shrink)

Derrida became increasingly overt in later years in suggesting that his work displays a rigour, and even a “logic.” Further, it is becoming accepted that deconstruction arose in dialogue with Husserl. In support of these views, this article points out that in 1990 Derrida told us that his first work of 1954 revealsa “law” which guides his career, and that some responses had already arisen there. The work of 1954 is examined, and an interrelated “system” developed by which the responses (...) relate to the law, to help find a common, early and systematic base to apply to Derrida’s oeuvre as it develops. Brief examples will be pointed to in closing to show that this basis subsists, at least in part, in later work. (shrink)

Parts of the natural sciences have been deepened to the point where evidence can be brought to bear in a controlled way on problems classified as metaphysical. According to Elizabeth Napper, śūnyatā inheres in “the utter unfindability of objects” owing to their intrinsic emptiness: “If things existed in the palpable, independent way we imagine them to, they would have to be such that they could be found when sought—but they cannot.” She further notes that when objects are subjected to meditative (...) analysis “they disappear altogether,” and “one is left with the absence of what was sought, with a mere vacuity that is emptiness.”2 This definition of śūnyatā originates with Nāgārjuna, who insisted that.. (shrink)

This paper presents Christian Wolff’s claim that philosophy, undertaken on the basis of a proper method, cannot contradict revealed religion. The paper first provides a context of Wolff’s banishment from Halle for holding views in conflict with religious doctrines. Next, it proceeds, on the basis of Wolff’s Discursus præliminaris de philosophia in genere prefixed to his 1728 Latin Logic, to explain the principles of Wolff’s method, and to show how his conception of method enables him to disallow the possibility of (...) a genuine conflict between philosophical and religious dogmas. For Wolff, doctrinal conflicts between philosophy and revealed religion can only occur as a result of terminological disagreements, disagreements between dogmas and hypotheses, or disagreements between dogmas and theological misinterpretations. The actual conflict of dogmas, understood as religious or philosophical truths, Wolff holds to be impossible. (shrink)

This thesis investigates the development of ontology as a philosophical discipline in the German philosophical tradition. It starts from what can be considered the invention of ontology and proceeds to the way it was received in the philosophy of Hegel. It is separated into two parts. The first part argues that what can be called the ‘traditional’ form of ontology is developed by Christian Wolff in his 1730 monograph Philosophia prima sive Ontologia, and it traces both the history of the (...) name ‘ontology’, as well as the history of the conception which led to Wolff’s formulation of it. The history of the name tracks the use of the concept ‘ontology’ from its first occurrence in 1606 up to Wolff. The history of the conception tracks the conceptions of various philosophical disciplines, found in thinkers such as Aristotle, Aquinas, and Spinoza, that ultimately give rise to Wolff’s conception of ontology as a science of an entity qua entity. The second part traces the development of this Wolffian conception through the philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel. The aim of this thesis is to argue that Wolff’s philosophy should be seen as the original formulation of the philosophical discipline of ontology and that the Wolffian conception of ontology is the one shared by subsequent German thinkers up to, and including, Hegel. I refer to this shared understanding of what ontology is as ‘the German ontological tradition’. The title of the thesis, The Possibility of Ontology, refers to the way in which this traditional understanding of what ontology is, is treated throughout the German ontological tradition. Specifically, Kant argues that the traditional conception is effectively impossible, while in Hegel one can find arguments that are intended to show that some aspects of this traditional discipline are in fact possible. Besides focusing on a fairly under-researched topic of the early history of ontology as a philosophical discipline, this thesis attempts to utilise its historical findings in order to provide novel ways in which the systems of the thinkers such as Kant and Hegel can be understood. There is a serious disregard for, or underplaying of, the Wolffian influence on the philosophical thought of Kant and Hegel, and it is my aim to contribute to the rectification of this situation by demonstrating the frequently overlooked dialogue these thinkers had with Wolff’s conception of ontology. (shrink)

We study the bi-embeddability and elementary bi-embeddability relation on graphs under Borel reducibility and investigate the degree spectra realized by these relations. We first give a Borel reduction from embeddability on graphs to elementary embeddability on graphs. As a consequence we obtain that elementary bi-embeddability on graphs is a $\boldsymbol {\Sigma }^1_1$ complete equivalence relation. We then investigate the algorithmic properties of this reduction. We obtain that elementary bi-embeddability on the class of computable graphs is $\Sigma ^1_1$ complete with respect (...) to computable reducibility and show that the elementary bi-embeddability and bi-embeddability spectra realized by graphs are related. (shrink)

Critical Theory: The Key Concepts introduces over 200 widely-used terms, categories and ideas drawing from new historicism, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, Marxism, narratology and other approaches. Entries range from concise definitions to longer explanatory essays and include terms such as :EgoDesireConsumptionHypertextKitschMisogynyQueer StudiesSymbolSuperstructureRaceFeaturing cross-referencing throughout, a substantial bibliography and index, this accessible and easy-to-use guide is an invaluable introduction for anyone studying critical theory.

RRI is a broad concept that is subject to different interpretations. This chapter focuses on the view of RRI as a transformative ideal for reforming the research and innovation system in the service of public interest. This is the normatively strong view of RRI that has attracted many policy-makers and young researchers but left cold many senior researchers and innovators. The transformative vision of RRI has failed to materialise, and RRI remains a marginal reality, even in Norway, where arguably the (...) conditions were more propitious than elsewhere. I attempt to explain the failed transformation, focusing on two key objectives of RRI: the ambition of aligning R&I with societal values and the aspiration to steer R&I through generating a shared responsibility for the future (a prospective joint responsibility in technical terms). Alignment proved very hard to achieve because valuing is steeped in well-established practices, habits, and cognitive-emotional frameworks. These cannot be changed at will. Besides, the ambition to make researchers and innovators more responsive to a wider constituency and additional social responsibilities stumbled against what I call moral saturation, namely the lack of capacity and resources to take on additional moral tasks. Furthermore, modern societies are characterised by a pluralism of values and conceptions of the good life, compounded by the lack of methods for composing value conflicts. These problems come back when we look at what it takes to create expanded shared responsibilities: joint intentions and joint commitments. A formal analysis of how these can be generated shows that they need pre-conditions that are seldom obtaining in the real world of R&I. So, the transformative ambition went against the inertia and entrenched habits of the R&I ecosystem and yet very often the task of promoting the change was given to junior researchers: the most vulnerable and less powerful actors. I conclude that RRI ambition to transform the R&I system is unrealistic. What can be attempted is to develop small-scale experiments outside the mainstream, where institutional barriers and perverse incentives are partially removed or corrected. (shrink)

The paper is about the relationship between Scotus’s notion of ‘natura communis,’ for an examination of the main features that Scotus ascribes to ‘common natures’ can shed substantial light on the nature of metaphysics in itself. Some preliminary observations on historiography are also deemed to be in order.

Thomas Reid (1710–1796) presented a two-dimensional geometry of the visual field in his Inquiry into the human mind (1764), whose axioms are different from those of Euclidean plane geometry. Reid’s ‘geometry of visibles’ is the same as the geometry of the surface of the sphere, described without reference to points and lines outside the surface itself. Interpreters of Reid seem to be divided in evaluating the significance of his geometry of visibles in the history of the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries. (...) The question will be reexamined with particular attention given to his unpublished manuscripts. These include comments on Saccheri’s work and Reid’s repeated attempts to derive Euclid’s parallel postulate from the axioms of incidence. (shrink)

Attempts to steer research, innovation and business in desirable directions have failed to meet expectations. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and responsible research and innovation (RRI) seem to be losing ground, while the challenges they sought to address remain. Despite their shortcomings, these concepts remind us of the need to take responsibility for what we as researchers and entrepreneurs bring into the world, and to keep questioning the given framework. -/- Drawing from the experience of the AFINO project, a unique attempt (...) to bring together RRI and CSR and to promote networks, learning and skills building in Norway, this book contextualises and explores the practical challenges of actualising responsible practices even in the propitious Norwegian context. Readers interested in RRI, CSR, transdisciplinarity, and in the governance of research and innovation will find extensive information and insights about the challenges of steering research and business practices towards desirable ends and how to address them. -/- This book is unique in bringing together the perspectives of Responsible Research and Innovation and Corporate Social Responsibility. Draws from the unique experience of the AFINO research centre and network. (shrink)

It has long been accepted that one of Levinas’ major concerns is to establish an ethics of responsibility for the ‘other.’ Yet it has been deemed for decades, even by Levinasians, that his approach to that concern is ‘unsystematic’ and ‘not consistent.’ That situation arose because Levinas’ four terms for ‘other’ are difficult to translate, so his terms were first addressed by adopting English conventions. Such conventions have furthered Levinas scholarship, but our aim is to consider Levinas’ consistency: Hence we (...) undertake the first English-language assessment of the rigour of Levinas’ approach in 1961 to the ‘other’ by means of all four terms. To do so, we follow a ‘formal structure’ that Levinas develops from the tradition of phenomenological logic—mostly Husserl’s. We hope the result will palliate worries about Levinas’ rigor, and allow new ways to engage with his work. (shrink)

This article examines Paul Guyer’s claim that we should attempt to ground the principle of religious freedom on the basis of Kant’s arguments for religious liberty. I problematise Guyer’s suggestion by investigating a hypothetical ‘dogmatic conflict’ between a scientifically and a religiously grounded belief. I further suggest that considering Christian Wolff’s philosophy might provide us with an approach which shares the benefits that Guyer identifies in Kant, while at the same time avoiding the issues Kant might run into that result (...) from the occurrence of the dogmatic conflict. I start by providing a background to Wolff’s philosophy and explaining the notion of the dogmatic conflict. Then I present a potential contemporary case of the dogmatic conflict and try to see how it would be dealt with based on Guyer’s proposal. Finally, I consider what a Wolffian solution would look like, arguing that Guyer’s project might benefit from considering Wolff. (shrink)

This essay considers the tradition of criticism against Athenian democracy, in both ancient and modern times. Often this critical tradition has been seen to adduce greater interest than the very democratic experience from which it arose; in this it has been aided, in part, by the asserted absence of an ancient theory of democracy. Yet there are significant traces of a democratic theory in the ancient sources, which ought to serve both as a theoretical and ideological riposte to the critics. (...) Some of the modern objections to classical Athenian democracy take up the argument of the ancient critics and display an anti-democratic orientation. Others, however, are motivated by a certain sensibility, grown out of liberalism and the legal state, as well as the emancipation of women and the abolition of slavery. Nevertheless, these objections are sometimes lacking in historical perspective. If we reassess Athenian democracy, it may yet be seen to constitute a useful point of reference, at a time when the current model of democracy finds its legitimacy questioned.2. (shrink)

The origin of the genetic code has been attributed in part to an accidental assignment of codons to amino acids. Although several lines of evidence indicate the subsequent expansion and improvement of the genetic code, the hypothesis of Francis Crick concerning a frozen accident occurring at the early stage of genetic code evolution is still widely accepted. Considering Crick’s hypothesis, mathematical descriptions of hypothetical scenarios involving a huge number of possible coexisting random genetic codes could be very important to explain (...) the origin and evolution of a selected genetic code. This work aims to contribute in this regard, that is, it provides a theoretical framework in which statistical parameters of error functions are calculated. Given a genetic code and an amino acid property, the functional code robustness is estimated by means of a known error function. In this work, using analytical calculations, general expressions for the average and standard deviation of the error function distributions of completely random codes with standard stop codons were obtained. As a possible biological application of these results, any set of amino acids and any pure or mixed amino acid properties can be used in the calculations, such that, in case of having to select a set of amino acids to create a genetic code, possible advantages of natural selection of the genetic codes could be discussed. (shrink)

In preference aggregation a set of individuals express preferences over a set of alternatives, and these preferences have to be aggregated into a collective preference. When preferences are represented as orders, aggregation procedures are called social welfare functions. Classical results in social choice theory state that it is impossible to aggregate the preferences of a set of individuals under different natural sets of axiomatic conditions. We define a first-order language for social welfare functions and we give a complete axiomatisation for (...) this class, without having the number of individuals or alternatives specified in the language. We are able to express classical axiomatic requirements in our first-order language, giving formal axioms for three classical theorems of preference aggregation by Arrow, by Sen, and by Kirman and Sondermann. We explore to what extent such theorems can be formally derived from our axiomatisations, obtaining positive results for Sen’s Theorem and the Kirman-Sondermann Theorem. For the case of Arrow’s Theorem, which does not apply in the case of infinite societies, we have to resort to fixing the number of individuals with an additional axiom. In the long run, we hope that our approach to formalisation can serve as the basis for a fully automated proof of classical and new theorems in social choice theory. (shrink)