This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

The arguments presented in this discussion point to some problems in the theory of communicative action considered as a starting point for a sociological theory with both normative and explanatory aspirations. It is argued that Habermas's notion of consensus is not sufficiently developed to constitute a foundation of the ethics of public debates; that both social action and communicative action are grounded in social actors' references to the same three worlds, which makes the coordination of actions by (...) means of understanding achieved in speech possible; that the criteria of rationality underlying use of language in the communicative action are ultimately those that are made explicit and consciously worked out in science; and that, finally, it is Parsons' solution to the Hobbesian problem and his concept of social action that provide a possible foundation for universalistic ethics. (shrink)

Habermas's analysis of rational action is the fulcrum for his broader theoretical project. If that analysis is faulty his larger project is jeopardized. I explore the role Habermas assigns to strategic action in order to scrutinize his central concept of communicative action. Using basic game theoretic concepts as a counterpoint I argue that he both misconstrues stategic action and fails to adequately explain the mechanism underlying communicative action. I conclude by sketching several ways that Habermas might seek (...) to rectify deficiencies in his analysis of rational action. (shrink)

A rare systematic thinker, Habermas has furthered our understanding of modernity, social interaction and linguistic practice, societal institutions, rationality, morality, the law, globalization, and the role of religion in multicultural societies. He has helped shape discussions of truth, objectivity, normativity, and the relationship between the human and the natural sciences. This volume provides an accessible and comprehensive conceptual map of Habermas' theoretical framework and its key concepts, including the theory of communicative action, discourse ethics, his social-political philosophy and (...) their applications to contemporary issues. It will be an invaluable resource for both novice readers of Habermas and those interested in a more refined understanding of particular aspects of his work. (shrink)

Here, for the first time in English, is volume one of Jurgen Habermas's long-awaited magnum opus: The Theory of Communicative Action. This pathbreaking work is guided by three interrelated concerns: to develop a concept of communicative rationality that is no longer tied to the subjective and individualistic premises of modern social and political theory; to construct a two-level concept of society that integrates the 'lifeworld' and 'system' paradigms; and to sketch out a critical theory of modernity (...) that explains its sociopathologies in a new way. Habermas approaches these tasks through a combination of conceptual analyses, systematic reflections, and critical reconstructions of such predecessors as Marx and Weber, Durkheim and Mead, Horkheimer and Adorno, Schutz and Parsons. Reason and the Rationalization of Society develops a sociological theory of action that stresses not its means-ends or teleological aspect, but the need to coordinate action socially via communication. In the introductory chapter Habermas sets out a powerful series of arguments on such foundational issues as cultural and historical relativism, the methodology of Verstehen, the inseparabilty of interpretation from critique. In addition to clarifying the normative foundations of critical social inquiry, this sets the stage for a systematic appropriation of Weber's theory of rationalization and its Marxist reception by Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno. This is an important book for degree students of philosophy, sociology and related subjects. (shrink)

The idea of rational understanding lays very close to the heart of Professor Janusz Kuczyński, an advocate of universalism as well as dialogue between diverse philosophical schools and worldviews, and doctoral advisor to the present paper’s author. This idea’s theoretical conceptualisation—a conceptualisation that has proven to be convincing and adequate to the conditions of the modern world—was developed by Professor Jürgen Habermas, whose ideas and theories were also the subject of a doctoral thesis written by this paper’s author in the (...) latter half of the 1970s under Professor Kuczyński’s tutelage. The author shares some grateful memories of his doctoral tutor, and also sets his one-time attempts to apply the theory of communicative action to two experiences of the real socialism era in Poland against his efforts to analyse contemporary Polish realities through the prism of the communicative rationality conception. This comparison shows that the application of a conception of rationality funded by communicative action to the turbulent transformations under real socialism was to a certain extent naïve—though not devoid of critical significance—and also reveals the preconditions for the implementation of the rules of communicative rationality in social and political reality.The paper is in part dedicated to the memory of Professor Kuczyński, therefore it contains a somewhat extensive account of the circumstances which led the author to study the thought of Habermas under Kuczyński’s tutelage, as well as the consequences of this choice, which proved of considerable significance for his further life. However, the main themes are, first, the validity of applying a conception of rationality funded by communicative action to two significant experiences of the real socialism era, and, secondly, the need—revealed by diagnosing contemporary Polish reality with the help of the communicative rationality conception—for certain preconditions enabling the implementation of this type of rationality in social and political reality. One such precondition is the transition of sufficiently broad parts of society from thinking in terms of worldviews to post-metaphysical thinking in terms of the “lifeworld”. (shrink)

This article explores critiques and reformulations of Habermas’s concept of communicative action as presented by feminist authors. Numerous articles considering communicative action as developed by Habermas from a feminist perspective have been published, but no systematic analysis of these arguments exists. This article aims to fill the gap by providing an examination of various readings of communicative action from a feminist standpoint. If, on one hand, the article collects the dispersed feminist critique of communicative action (...) and offers insight into feminist argumentation, its aim is, on the other hand, to reflect the critique itself. Therefore, attention is devoted both to feminist readings of communicative action, as well as to the potential shortcomings of these readings that are detected by a closer examination of Habermas’s own works. The article’s aim is also to show how feminist critics, in their interpretations and reformulations of communicative action, focus on an explication of the inclusive elements of communicative action. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive introduction to, and selection from, Jrgen Habermas's writings from the early 1960s to the present. The book is divided into seven sections, covering the principal areas of Habermas's work. Each section includes an introduction and a selection of substantial extracts from relevant books.In the general introduction, Outhwaite outlines the central themes of Habermas's work and analyses the development of his views over the years. Subsequent sections are organized thematically and chronologically, so that (...) the book will be easy to use by students.There are extracts from all of Habermas's major works, including his early work on the public sphere and on science and technology; his writings on the methodology and epistemology of the social sciences; his work on evolution and legitimation; his theory of communication and discourse ethics; his analysis of modernity and his critique of postmodernism; and his most recent work on law and the state.By bringing these wide-ranging contributions together in a single volume, The Habermas Reader is an ideal teaching text. It will also be of interest to anyone who wishes to gain an overview of the work of one of the most important social thinkers of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This article takes issue with the formalism problem arguably pertaining to Habermas's conception of communicative rationality and discursive justification. Beginning with the Hegelian premises of Habermas's theory of mutual understanding and communicative rationality, the article proceeds to make Kant's doctrine of reflective judgement fruitful for a critique of Habermas's restriction of reasons to discursively articulated endorsements, the 'force of the better reasons'. The argument consists in showing that discursive justification must rely upon (...) endorsements of particulars exhibited in right judgements, and that such endorsements must be expressed or articulated to yield public manifestations of discursive orientations and commitments, constituting what is referred to as 'communicative experience'. On the account presented here, the rational significance of particulars is revealed in the expressive attitude that allows or admits non-discursive constraints to the conception of rational justification. The promise of such an account - as premised upon Kant's insights in his third Critique - consists in its capability to avoid the one-sided formalism of discursive rationality, incorporating ethical, expressive and aesthetic dimensions to our rational self-conception. Key Words: aesthetic experience • communicative experience • concrete other • discourse-ethics • ethical life • feminism • Habermas • Hegel • Kant • morality • rational justification • reflective judgement • world-disclosure. (shrink)

In this book Joseph Heath brings Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as (...) a specific type.In the second part of the book Heath discusses the more philosophical dimension of Habermas's conception of practical rationality. He criticizes Habermas's attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishing between moral and ethical problems. Heath offers an alternative account of the level of convergence exhibited by moral argumentation, drawing on game-theoretic models to specify the burden of proof that the theory of communicative action and discourse must assume. (shrink)

This work is a sustained re-examination of philosophy's conception of "rationality" in general and "philosophic rationality" in particular. The history of Western philosophy is strongly marked by an objectivist conception of reason. Plato, Aristotle and Descartes believed that absolute and eternal Truth is accessible, and through their influence on Hume, Kant and Hegel among others, the history of modern European philosophy became one long quest for absolute certainty, total knowledge and "scientific" philosophy. ;Critical Modernism wants to (...) construct a "chastened" idea of reason, while maintaining that the emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment can be invigorated by addressing its weaknesses and defending its strengths. The theory of "communicative rationality," which is meant to fulfill this goal, claims to be comprehensive, fallible, criticizable, revisable and yet lays claim to objectivity. In contrast to critical modernism, however, is a Wittgenstein-inspired relativist trend which proposes a "language-game" theory of rationality . Under this conception, what is "rational" or "irrational" is held to be intersubjectively constituted within irreducible and variable contexts of "languages." ;This work does not take a position for or against objectivism or relativism, Habermas or Winch, but seeks to transcend both oppositions through an indirect critique that puts into question the very framing of the problem. The work establishes not only an alternative conception of rationality but also an idea of philosophical pluralism that allows for a revision of the framing of the question. This is accomplished through entering into the traditions of African philosophy and deriving from them a model of a metaphysical and epistemological framework that grounds itself outside of the objectivism-relativism problematic in its current strictural frame. This model, derived from the Ifa tradition, maintains dialogue with the Western traditions, but exposes the objectivism-relativism debate as falsely framed and provides from its own resources epistemological categories that place the problematic in a fresh context, within a larger, wider, pluralist, rational and philosophic worldview. (shrink)

This article provides a critical assessment of Habermas’s recent work on religion and its role in the public sphere by comparing it to Kant’s phi-losophy of religion on the one hand and that of Kierkegaard on the other. It is argued that although Habermas is in many ways a Kantian, he diverges from Kant when it comes to religion, by taking a position which comes closer to the Kierkegaardian view that religiousness belongs to private faith rather than philosophy. This has (...) implications not just for the conception of religion but also for the very roles of communication, validity, rationality, and philosophy. (shrink)

Background: The tension between care-based and technology-based rationalities motivates studies concerning how technology can be used in the care sector to support the relational foundation of care. Objectives: This study interprets values related to care and technologies connected to the practice of good care. Research design: This research study was part of a development project aimed at developing innovative work practices through information and communication technology. Participants and research context: All staff (n = 18) working at two wards in a (...) care facility for older people were asked to participate in interviews, and 12 accepted. We analysed the data using latent content analysis in combination with normative analysis. Ethical considerations: The caregivers were informed that participation was voluntary and that they could drop out at any time without providing any explanation. Findings: Four values were identified: ‘presence’, ‘appreciation’, ‘competence’ and ‘trust’. Caregivers wanted to focus on care receivers as unique persons, a view that they thought was compromised by time-consuming and beeping electronic devices. Appraising from next-of-kin and been seen as someone who can contribute together with knowledge to handle different situations were other desires. The caregivers also desired positive feedback from next-of-kin, as they wanted to be seen as professionals who have the knowledge and skills to handle difficult situations. In addition, the caregivers wanted their employer to trust them, and they wanted to work in a calm environment. Discussion: Caregivers’ desire for disturbance-free interactions, being valued for their skills and working in a trustful working environment were interpreted as their base for providing good care. The caregivers’ arguments are based on caring rationality, and sometimes they felt the technological rationality interfered with their main mission, providing quality care. Conclusion: Introducing new technology in caring should support the caring relationship. Although society’s overall technology-based approach may have gained popularity as a problem solver, technology-based rationality may compromise a care-based rationality. A shift in attitudes towards care as a concept on all societal levels is needed. (shrink)

Special Relativity and the Early Quantum Theory were created within the same programme of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics and maxwellian electrodynamics reconciliation. I shall try to explain why classical mechanics and classical electrodynamics were “refuted” almost simultaneously or, in more suitable for the present congress terms, why did quantum revolution and the relativistic one both took place at the beginning of the 20-th century. I shall argue that quantum and relativistic revolutions were simultaneous since they had common origin - the clash (...) between the fundamental theories of the second half of the 19-th century that constituted the “body” of Classical Physics. The revolution’ s most dramatic point was Einstein’s 1905 photon paper that laid the foundations of both Special Relativity and Old Quantum Theory. Hence the dialectic of the old theories is crucial for theory change. Modern physics began with Einstein’s reconciliation of electrodynamics, mechanics and thermodynamics in 1905 and his unification of Special Relativity and Newtonian Theory of Gravity. Or, in more general social context: progressive scientific change can be described not in Weberian terms of zweckrational action forcing out all the other forms of action only but in terms of Habermas’s communicative rationality encouraging the establishment of mutual understanding between the various scientific communities also. Einstein’s programme constituted a progressive step in respect to its rivals not because it could explain more “facts” or was more “mathematical”. It was high than its rivals because it constituted a basis of communication and interpenetration between three main paradigms of 19-th century physics. Of course in the long run it resulted in empirical successes. Key words: Einstein, scientific revolution, communicative rationality. (shrink)

COVID-19 has necessitated inquiry into the capacity of technology to build learning communities to solve problems beyond proximal boundaries. Platforms like Zoom offer pathways for communication and content-delivery, but little stimulus for collective online outcomes (projects/learning-objects/discussion forums). We aim to examine how monetized platforms fit within Marcuse’s technological rationality and its capacity to exercise social control. This owes to dominance of aspects of technology related to providing content rather than how we direct agency towards using it. Such (...) control is reminiscent of influence exercised by portals like television and radio in the mid-1900’s. We suggest Habermas’ communicative rationality using technology can foster critical thinking in online education. We often assume technology is the basis for change in classrooms. As Marcuse says, this enables technology to exact control upon us, and fragment outcomes obtained from using it to learn, warranting creation of new tools. Integrating bottom-up ways of using technology into existing frameworks can mitigate fragmentation of the public sphere resulting from industrialized online education. Fragmentation becomes pervasive with migrating classes online. We provide a framework/design to better encourage critical reflection in online learning communities during unprecedented times such as the era of COVID-19. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to analyze the thesis that an agreement between representatives of two different cultures can and should be reached at a theoretical level. The author tries to verify the Theory of Communicative Action proposed by Jürgen Habermas in the light of philosophical reflections of American neopragmatist Stanley Fish. Habermas is one of the most important and widely read social theorists in the post-Second World War era. He is also one of the authors of the (...) concept of deliberative democracy, which holds that, for a democratic decision to be legitimate, it must be preceded by authentic deliberation – disinterested exchange of reasons – not merely the aggregation of preferences that occurs in voting. The foundation of deliberative democracy is, according to the German thinker, a communicative action based on communicative rationality. Stanley Fish, in turn, is one of the most eminent American philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The main area of his scientific activity is the theory of literature, law, and history. In the course of his reflections, Fish constructed the concept of an interpretive communities, which implies an original view on the nature of the process of cognition, status of human convictions or beliefs, nature of communication situation and capabilities of theory. The final conclusion stemming from the reflection on Fish’s philosophy explains why Habermas’ theory is not an adequate tool to reach an intercultural agreement. (shrink)

The concept of hermeneutic science is outlined by Habermas as a reflection within the ordinary language, addressed to the dialogic dimension of intersubjective recognition and connected to the juridical guarantee. The guarantee function fulfilled by the discursive agreement towards every real dialogue is obvious: it indicates the main reference point for the regulation and coordination of social action, tracing a line of demarcation between being and having to be, facts and norms. Speech, communicative agreement and legal guarantee are mutually (...) qualified terms where the public discussion of institutional issues makes it possible to define the normative validity as non-assimilatory generality, placed beyond any populistic yearning, tracing a line of demarcation between law and power. The idea of deliberative democracy expresses the relationship and distinction between the universalism of rights and the factuality of the norm issuing, between the idea of good and the idea of right, in order to support democratic decision-making legitimacy. Combining the reasons of the markets with those of civil solidarity, through independent forms of regulation both from the obsolete state sovereignties and from the traditional international perspectives, represents a primary challenge of the Habermasian theory where the critical role of the rational public sphere appears fundamental. (shrink)

Literary scholarship has paid little serious attention to Habermas' philosophy, and, on the other hand, the reception of Habermas has given little attention to the role that literary practice can play in a broader theory of communicative action. David Colclasure's argument sets out to demonstrate that a specific, literary form of rationality inheres in literary practice and the public reception of literary works which provides a unique contribution to the political public sphere.

Ever since Hegel made poignant the difference between morality and ethical life, philosophical discourse in the traditions that developed subsequently, up to and including the Frankfurt school, has oscillated between those poles. This paper starts out with a short exposition of autonomy as one of the few large-scale innovations in the history of philosophy and then proceeds to discuss Hegel’s concept of “Sittlichkeit” and the objections to be raised against it from a Kantian point of view. Political theory, however, has (...) to move beyond pure normativism and consider actual social relations of power, as Marx disclosed. Mapping out this winding trajectory from Kant to Marx provides some perspective that may be illuminating for challenging present-day issues. (shrink)

In this important volume Habermas outlines the views which form the basis of his critical theory of modern societies. The volume comprises five interlocking essays, which together define the contours of his theory of communication and of his substantive account of social change. ′What is Universal Pragmatics?′ is the best available statement of Habermas′s programme for a theoryof communication based on the analysis of speech acts. In the following two essays Habermas draws on the work of Kohlberg and others (...) to develop a distinctive account of moral consciousness and normative structures. ′Toward a Reconstruction of historical Materialsim′ takes these issues further, offering a wide–ranging reconstruction of Marx′s historical materialsim understood as a theory of social evolution. The final essay focuses on the question of legitimacy and on the legitimation problems faced by modern states. This book is essential reading for anyone concerned with the key questions of social and political theory today. (shrink)

The essays in this book - all of them published here for the first time - provide a long-overdue critical discussion of Jürgen Habermas's cascade of ideas. These are topped off by a freshet of original Habermas: in the final essay, he replies to the criticism developed in the preceding contributions and to other recent assessments of his work, provides an important clarification of his earlier views, and reveals the direction of his current thought.Each essay probes a particular theme (...) in Habermas's work, and each presents both an exposition and a critique. Among the subjects covered are Habermas's theory of knowledge-constitutive interests, his account of language and truth, his "overcoming" of hermeneutics, the concept of universal pragmatics, the orientation of his thought relative to the Marxist tradition, and his project of analyzing the crisis tendencies of capitalism within the context of evolutionary theory.The contributors are philosophers and social theorists of international standing, most of them affiliated with German, English, and American universities. They are Agnes Heller, Rudiger Bubner, Thomas McCarthy, Henning Ottmann, Mary Hesse, Steven Lukes, Anthony Giddens, Michael Schmid, Andrew Arato, and the editors. The editors have also contributed a substantial introduction outlining the central contours of Habermas's work and summarizing the main arguments of the essays.John B. Thompson is a Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge, and David Held is Lecturer in Politics, University of York. (shrink)

This article is a translation of Eine politische Verfassung für die pluralistische Weltgesellschaf which is published in Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion: philosophische Aufsäze (2005). The article deals with the project of forming a cosmopolitan order and a harmonization of national policies by agreeing upon and implementing shared global politics which require an intergovernmental coordination. This project has its origin from Hobbes and Kant, and Habermas discuss Kant"s concept of a world republic and a constitution which apply to all the citizens (...) in the world. Habermas argues that the Kantian project must be understood in the international political situation today, and that we have to substitute the traditional and Kantian cosmopolitan ideal of a world republic by the project of a "constitutionalizationâ€? of international law. Habermas suggest that the world community need a political constitution for an emerging world society which allows for global governance without a global government. This solution Habermas denotes as a global extension of domestic politics. A presupposition for this argument is that it has been a shift that has taken place from the former national to the present post-national constellation. In order to realize this international coordination and transnational harmonization, the national states has to perceive themselves as members of an international community and to act accordingly. Such an arrangement requires first a change in the conception of state-sovereignty. Then citizens will enjoy, in addition to their national citizenship, the status of world-citizens. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s two-volume Theory of Communicative Action is at once an attempt to develop a socially-based theory of action as an alternative to the subjectivist and individualist underpinnings of much of social theory, a “two-level concept of society that connects the ‘lifeworld’ and ‘system’ paradigms,” a critical theory of modernity which retains the enlightenment ideal of rationally-grounded societies, and a theory of meaning rooted in a developmental logic of world­historical rationality. Habermas seeks to find a via media between (...) totalitarian closure and relativism, to show why the modernist project of a universal reason is still viable, and to propose a “public” discourse of rationally-grounded argumentative speech, or communicative action, as his answer. Despite the widespread attention Habermas’s work has received, and despite my sympathy for issues Habermas has raised, I show why his project is fundamentally flawed because of its uncritical assumption that only critical rationality can provide a legitimate standard for communicative reason: reasonableness is far more than that constricted view. These flaws become particularly evident in examining his analyses of myth, action, lifeworld, George Herbert Mead, and the “three spheres” of modernity. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a reconsideration of the complex concept of mimesis, as it is deployed in the critical theory of Theodor W. Adorno, which, I argue, provides some interesting and original avenues through which we may interpret some of the infinitely engaging if enigmatic films of Andrei Tarkovsky. The paper is divided into two parts. In the first, I explore Adorno's development and usage of the concept of mimesis, as well as the latter's fall into disfavour since (...) class='Hi'>Habermas's influential 'communicative turn'. In the second part, I undertake to read some of Tarkovsky's work in an Adornian vein, with the hope of reconfiguring mimesis as a valuable and fruitful concept in understanding the somatic and extra-discursive elements within communication. What I call Tarkovsky's 'mimetic method' can be seen to follow Adorno's epistemological principle of the 'preponderance of the object', while testifying to the mimetic potential of non-discursive communication. In so doing, Tarkovsky's filmic work - with Adorno's critical theory - refutes the purely linguistic/discursive grounds of Habermasian communication. This implicit refutation works on two levels. It enacts forms of mimetic construction, at the first level, and calls forth acts of interpretation and mimetic reception, at the second. I argue that these features are in need of greater attention and elaboration. The works of Adorno and Tarkovsky, in my view, provide useful grounds for challenging and enhancing existing understandings of aesthetic and philosophic communication, by more fully appreciating their interconnectedness and complementarity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 36.1 (2003) 1-21 [Access article in PDF] Did Habermas Cede Nature to the Positivists? Gordon R. Mitchell Jürgen Habermas's "colonization of the lifeworld" thesis (1987, 332-73) posits that many of society's pathologies are due to the tendency of institutions to convert social issues that ought to be sorted out by a debating citizenry into technical problems ripe for resolution by expert bureaucracies, thus pre-empting important (...) public discussion. Habermas has attempted to lay bare the pernicious effects of this colonization process in his analysis of public opinion polling, welfare policy, education, German reunification, immigration, and other social issues (see Habermas 1997, 1994, and 1970; Holub 1992). In each of these contexts, Habermas has publicly challenged the encroachment of scientistic modes of decision-making into spheres where joint communicative action by deliberating citizens would yield more appropriate and legitimate judgments. This critical impulse is also evident in Habermas's methodological reflections on the proper role of academic scholarship, where he has argued vigorously against attempts to graft "objectivating" methods of natural scientific inquiry onto research projects in the social sciences (1971, 304-17).From all of this, one might gather that Habermas's commitment to rolling back the influence of technical forms of reasoning is connected to some intrinsic quarrel he has with the natural sciences. Yet such a sweeping generalization is hard to sustain in light of the fact that Habermas does not oppose technical reasoning per se; he recognizes that the daunting complexity of social life in late capitalism requiresthat certain "steering" tasks be delegated to systems that utilize largely instrumental logics to co-ordinate action. Likewise, he acknowledges that the disciplines of the natural sciences necessarily play important supporting roles in such steering projects.One normative presupposition of Habermas's colonization thesis is that there exists some proper boundary demarcating where the sphere of technical reasoning ends and the realm of communicative rationality begins. [End Page 1] On one side of this boundary, Habermas has provided many details on what he sees as the essential qualities of a properly functioning "public sphere," where "new social movements" continuously reweave the threads of communicative fabric holding society together (1996, 359-87), and where "historico-hermeneutic" academic study reflects on public life, sluicing insight back into the capillaries of democratic deliberations (1987, 374-403).What lies on the other side of the boundary is murkier. The proper role of natural scientific investigation has received relatively scant attention in Habermas's critical theory of society, and this has led to some confusion regarding his account of the natural sciences, as well as debate over whether this account has political purchase. One would think that sympathetic commentators, such as Helen Longino (who bases much of her own coherence theory of scientific truth on Habermas), would have reassuring things to say on this point. Yet her lukewarm assessment that, "in trying to clear a space for an autonomous social and critical theory, [Habermas] has ceded nature to the positivists" (1990, 202), raises questions about the flexibility and scope of Habermas's theory of communicative action as a basis for critique of scientific practice.One way to test Habermas's account of the natural sciences on this count is to put his views in conversation with science studies commentators who share a similar commitment to the idea that dialogue and argumentation are constitutive elements of scientific practice. Such an approach recasts the "ceding to positivism" question into a moment of controversy over the role of dialogue, not only as an essential motor driving the scientific enterprise, but also as a vehicle for democratic decision-making on issues related to the purpose and direction of scientific inquiry in society.Part one of this essay locates discursive norms embedded pragmatically in the notion of scientific objectivity. By bringing a modified version of Habermas's theory of communicative action into conversation with other approaches to science studies that foreground intersubjective dialogue as the key motor driving the scientific enterprise, I develop a foundation for robust criticism of systematically distorted scientific communication. Specific strategies of... (shrink)

Les définitions de la rationalité fondées sur les seules ressources des activités communicationnelles et des formes de vie qui leur sont liées se heurtent à des difficultés dont la tentative de Habermas constitue un eminent exemple. La question de la légitimation en constitue la pierre de touche; elle est au coeur de la controverse qui oppose Apel à Habermas et de ce qui les conduit à chercher différemment une issue dans les prétentions à la validité que renferment à leurs yeux (...) les activités communicationnelles. Leur mobilisation d’un modèle pragmatique de la rationalité s’articule ainsi à la recherche d’un élément inconditionné dans lequel on peut voir une source majeure d’apories et de désaccords quant aux solutions respectivement envisagées. Cette situation conduit à se demander 1) si le concept de « rationalité communicationnelle » n’est pas intrinsèquement affecté par l’ambiguïté qui associe à l’argumentation et à l’immanence des pratiques communicationnelles l’idée d’une légitimation, elle-même liée à une transcendance que celles-ci paraissent exclure, 2) si un éclairage, à défaut d’une issue, ne résiderait pas dans une meilleure compréhension des liens qui associent le nécessaire à l’arbitraire.The possibility of defining the rationality upon the only basis of communicative actions and forms of life lies at the root of several difficulties, of which Habermas’ attempts give a very significant example. Legitimation is its touchstone. It is the central point of the Apel-Habermas controversy and it is the basis of its latest developments. Apel and Habermas are both seeking an out- come by looking at " claims to validity " which they consider to be embodied in communicative actions. So they appeal at the same time to a pragmatist account of rationality and to some Unconditional, which is the main source of the dilemmas and disagreements they have to cope with. One may wonder whether the kind of tension which strikes the tie relating argumentation to some " transcendant moment " is not built into the very notion of communicative rationality. But one may also wonder whether some illumination, if not outcome, might not consist in some attempt to investigate the very connections between Necessary and Arbitrary. (shrink)

Habermas has argued that many of the endemic socio- economic problems of Western society are either symptoms or prod ucts of a 'lopsided' process of cultural rationalization, one that has emphasized instrumental forms of rationality over communicative. But other than presenting a rather general typology of lifeworld pathologies, Habermas has not done much to specify what these problems might be, nor has he provided any 'middle-range' analysis of the mechanisms through which they might be generated. This paper discusses (...) some of the ways in which, consistent with Haber mas's general framework, rational choice theory can be used for pre cisely this task. In this analysis, rational choice theory is not presented as a comprehensive theory of action, but is employed as a critical- diagnostic tool that allows the theorist to identify undesirable social interaction patterns that arise from a broader instrumentalization of the lifeworld. Key Words: critical theory • Habermas • instrumental rationality • market failure • rational choice theory. (shrink)

McCarthy begins this first systematic review of the development of Habermas's thought with general accounts of the relation of theory and practice and of the reduction of praxis to techne in positivist conceptions of reason. We learn how the communication structures presupposed by the community of natural scientists cannot be grasped within the framework of empirical-analytic science and the technological cognitive interests on which it is based. He then goes on to explain clearly the practical interest supposedly underlying (...) the historical-hermeneutic sciences and the emancipatory interests said to be the basis of critical theory. McCarthy shows how the perceived weaknesses in the initial attempt to elucidate this view by incorporating some of Freud's insights into a revised historical materialism set the program for most of Habermas's subsequent work. He examines in some detail the central points at issue between hermeneutics and critical theory and shows how the existence of systematically distorted communication structures and the tendency of the hermeneutical sciences to reduce inquiry to the interpretation of transmitted meanings force Habermas to a critique of ideology. Having shown the importance of psychoanalysis to this critique and to social theory as conceived by the Frankfurt School, McCarthy proceeds to outline Habermas's project for the general theory of communicative competence presupposed by a consistent theoretical development of psychoanalysis. Since critical theory regards the reflexive application of science to social structures as a process of enlightenment, Habermas must also take seriously the challenge laid down by functional analysis, which understands life processes of the human species not a quest for liberation, but as a drive for the self-maintenance of social systems. In concretizing the critique of systems theory, McCarthy shows how Habermas is driven to project a theory of social evolution, a reconstructed historical materialism which goes beyond explaining historical development through changes in the forces of production to include the learning processes that take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and the consensual regulation of conflicts. This brings us to Habermas's most recent work on communication theory, and one of the considerable merits of McCarthy's book is that it brings together the widely scattered publications which bear on this matter. He shows how Habermas's universal pragmatics, his theory of communicative competence, is an attempt to rework the normative-theoretical foundations of critical theory. Since speech is seen as the distinctive medium of human life, a theory of communication becomes the foundation for the human sciences by disclosing the universal infrastructure of socio-cultural life. Since Habermas is particularly concerned with a theory of social action, his work in universal pragmatics focuses on speech acts and the interpersonal relations which underlie them. McCarthy argues that the theory of communicative competence can be seen as an attempt to make good the claim Habermas made some thirteen years ago in his inaugural lecture at Frankfurt: that the human interest in autonomy and responsibility can be apprehended a priori since it lies at the root of language. Habermas attempts to reconstruct the normative basis of speech as a system of universal and necessary validity claims, and McCarthy provides a clear account of the "logics" of truth and morality, as well as Habermas's argument for their inseparability. McCarthy concludes by examining the crisis tendencies Habermas perceives in advanced capitalism and the correlative question of legitimizing the private appropriation of public wealth. No such legitimization can withstand discursive examination or rational consensus since it must suppress generalizable interests by treating them as particular. Thus, a repoliticization of the public sphere becomes the "new conflict zone" in organized capitalism.--G.E. (shrink)

This important new volume brings together Jürgen Habermas's key writings on religion and religious belief. In these essays, Habermas explores the relations between Christian and Jewish thought, on one hand, and the Western philosophical tradition on the other. He often approaches these issues through critical encounters with the work of others, including Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, Johann Baptist Metz, and Gershom Scholem.In an introduction written especially for this volume, Eduardo Mendieta places Habermas's engagement with religion in the context (...) of his work as a whole. Mendieta also discusses Habermas's writings in relation to Jewish Messianism and the Frankfurt School, showing how these essays reflect an important yet often neglected dimension of critical theory. The volume concludes with an original extended interview that examines Habermas's current views on religion and modern society. (shrink)

Since the publication of Between Facts and Norms, Habermas’s concept of communicative power has been the topic of significant discussion. This article contributes to this conversation by examining Habermas’s account of what makes communication powerful. I argue that Habermas’s conception of communicative power describes a nonviolent and noninstrumental mode of acting and being with others in language. This mode of engagement underwrites a conception of power that is structurally different from willing, one that builds meaningful worlds (...) and (trans-)forms those engaging in communicative procedures. In drawing out this aspect of Habermas’s conception, I show that he is not a rationalist and proceduralist whose account of communicative procedures protects decision-making from irrational aesthetic powers. Rather, he presents communication as a mimetic achievement, a set of aesthetic practices and experiences that affectively alter its participants. With this position, Habermas makes an important contribution to and not just against the analysis of the aesthetic dimensions of political life. In casting communication as a mimetic achievement, Habermas presents an account of how communication opens worlds and forms subjects. Yet since these aspects of communication arrive in linguistic form, he can also examine affective and aesthetic experiences within discursive procedures. We can understand world-opening and aesthetic (trans-)formation as an essential part of democratic politics while also identifying the perspectives and resources by which actors can reflect on and critically evaluate whether an opinion is justified or whether a political project is worth pursuing. (shrink)

The paper reviews the extent to which main formulations in Habermas's recent major work, Between Facts and Norms, make ground against feminist objections to the Habermasian project. Although the later work does not tamper with the core project of Habermas's theory of modernity, the terms in which the procedural norms of democratic interaction are now conceived clarify the sympathetic relevance of Habermas's project to feminism's own vital concerns. There is reason to suppose Habermas's construction of the (...) motivations that prompt and guide struggles to achieve personal autonomy is rather too narrowly conceived to capture the range of impulses that inform contemporary feminism. Despite this, I suggest that there remain good reasons for supposing that the recent conception of the project opens up the possibility for a more positive stage in Habermas's dialogue with feminism. Key Words: aesthetic communication • feminism • Habermas • private/public relations • public sphere. (shrink)

While the critique of neoliberalism, as the form of contemporary capitalism, has been advanced from Marxian and Foucauldian perspectives, it has had limited attention from the perspective of Critical Theory. Largely unrecognized is the suitability of the theory of reification for this critique, specifically, Habermas’s version. This article reconsiders Habermas’s colonization thesis as the basis for a critical theory of neoliberalism, refining its theoretical framework to deepen its critical diagnosis. Against the dismissal of the system–lifeworld concept, a novel critique is (...) advanced to suggest its original elaboration fell confusedly between two versions of social systems theory. Drawing from late developments, the scheme is reinterpreted as distinguishing two forms of communication in capitalist society: delinguistified and linguistic. This opens the way to reframe and communicatively transform colonization as relinguistification; that is, the translation of monetary coding into ordinary language such that communicative action is distorted from within by reifying concepts. (shrink)

A kind of political complacency has become a common complaint of Habermasian philosophy. At odds with some earlier stances, according to which he had claimed to represent the best critical hopes of a Marxist tradition that he regarded as exhausted, Habermas has come to defend the legitimacy of liberal democratic institutions and forms ofpolitical expression. No longer the last Marxist, but a hesitant post-Marxist, Habermas is today arguably the foremost intellectual spokesperson for a presently existing democracy which bears as much (...) relation to its stated principles as did the so-called socialisms suffered during the Cold War. The author seeks in this article merely to identify the philosophical bases for the seemingly increasing conservatism of Habermas’s thought. I argue that tensions between the normative dimensions of communicative rationality emerge more clearly as Habermas moves from a general account of discourse, to ethics, and then to democratic politics. Habermas increasingly embraces an abstract normativity and abandons the practical-critical dimensions which were embedded in the counterfactual moment of communicative action. The normative ground for politics itself has narrowed to accommodate the abstract normativity of discourse. (shrink)

This is a constructive critique of Habermas’s account of rationality, which is central to his political theory and has sparked theoretical and empirical research across academia. Habermas and many critical theorists caricature means-ends rationality (the ability to pick good means to ends), e.g. by wrongly depicting it as egocentric. This weakens Habermas’s attempt to distinguish means-ends rationality from his hugely important and influential idea of communicative rationality (roughly, the rationality of genuine discussion). I suggest (...) that sincerity and autonomy, rather than non-egocentrism, are the key distinguishing features of communicative rationality. This shows that communicative rationality actually overlaps with means-ends rationality. Indeed, means-ends rationality is needed by critical theorists, as I exemplify by showing its use in deliberative democracy. Moreover, means-ends rationality will be present in discourse ethics, as I show with the example of moral discourse about gay marriage. My article thus challenges decades of what Habermas and critical theorists have written on means-ends and communicative rationality, but I stay broadly true to – and hopefully improve – Habermas’s account of rationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.1 (2002) 105-128 [Access article in PDF] The Metaphoric Circuit: Organic and Technological Communication in the Nineteenth Century Laura Otis [Figures]In a public lecture in 1851, Emil DuBois-Reymond proposed that the wonder of our time, electrical telegraphy, was long ago modeled in the animal machine. But the similarity between the two apparatus, the nervous system and the electric telegraph, has a much (...) deeper foundation. It is more than similarity; it is a kinship between the two, an agreement not merely of the effects, but also perhaps of the causes. 1In 1851 the telegraph and the nervous system appeared to be doing the same things and for the same reasons. Their common purpose was the transmission of information, and they both conveyed this information as alterations in electrical signals. By calling the nervous system a "model" for the telegraph, DuBois-Reymond suggested that organic communications systems offered solutions to problems encountered by technological ones.In the same decade, however, Claude Bernard remained skeptical about the epistemological value of metaphor. From the classical notion of nervous fluid to the more recent ones of animal spirits and animal electricity, he pointed out, people's "knowledge" of the nervous system had consisted largely of a series of comparisons, "the expression of a way of seeing meant to explain the facts." 2 Priding himself on his empiricism, Bernard mistrusted analogy as a means of constructing knowledge. Does one know more or less about something, if one asserts that it is like something else? What exactly is the relationship between metaphor and knowledge? [End Page 105]Many scientific investigators have shared Bernard's concern that claims of likeness will change their perceptions of physiological systems, but for the same reason some scholars of language are more optimistic about the epistemological possibilities of metaphor. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson assert that the role of metaphor in scientific thinking provides one of the best illustrations of how metaphors reflect and influence what we see and do. "Formal scientific theories are attempts to consistently extend a set of ontological and structural metaphors," they argue. 3 This "extension," though, is just what worried Bernard. Metaphors provoke and give birth to new images. By establishing and reinforcing connections, they encourage us to see in new ways. While Bernard is correct that assertions of likeness alter the way we see, Lakoff and Johnson are equally correct in claiming that "much of cultural change arises from the introduction of new metaphorical concepts and the loss of old ones." 4 Alterations in the way we see can be extremely productive.One of the most intriguing cases through which to study the epistemological role of metaphor is that of comparisons between physiological and technological communications systems. Throughout the nineteenth century scientists' electrophysiological understanding of the nervous system closely paralleled technological knowledge that allowed for the construction of telegraph networks. Timothy Lenoir has demonstrated that Hermann Helmholtz and Emil DuBois-Reymond, the nineteenth-century scientists who made some of the greatest contributions to neurophysiology, worked closely with communications engineers like Werner Siemens. By developing models that reflected the apparatus they had adapted from physics and media technology, Helmholtz, and DuBois-Reymond changed people's understanding of the way nerves transmitted impulses. I agree with Lenoir that these comparisons between organic and technological systems were not mere devices for popularization but became incorporated into the scientists' own vision and understanding of the nervous system. 5 When one reads the proposals of nineteenth-century engineers, one begins to suspect that communication in the body and in society can only be understood in terms of each other. But can one claim that comparisons of communication mediated by bodies and machines actually contributed to knowledge of the nervous system and of early telecommunications networks?From the late eighteenth century onward, scientists studying organic and technological communications systems continually inspired one another. As Friedrich Kittler argues in Discourse Networks, nineteenth-century media for writing and communication—the telegraph, typewriter, and telephone—affected not just the way people wrote and... (shrink)

With the rapid advancement of AI, there exists a possibility of rogue human actor(s) taking control of a potent AI system or an AI system redefining its objective function such that it presents an existential threat to mankind or severely curtails its freedom. Therefore, some suggest an outright ban on AI development while others profess international agreement on constraining specific types of AI. These approaches are untenable because countries will continue developing AI for national defense, regardless. Some suggest having an (...) all-powerful benevolent one-AI that will act as an AI nanny. However, such an approach relies on the everlasting benevolence of one-AI, an untenable proposition. Furthermore, such an AI is itself subject to capture by a rogue actor. We present an alternative approach that uses existing mechanisms and time-tested economic concepts of competition and marginal analysis to limit centralization and integration of AI, rather than AI itself. Instead of depending on international consensus it relies on countries working in their best interests. We recommend that through regulation and subsidies countries promote independent development of competing AI technologies, especially those with decentralized architecture. The Sherman Antitrust Act can be used to limit the domain of an AI system, training module, or any of its components. This will increase the segmentation of potent AI systems and force technological incompatibility across systems. Finally, cross-border communication between AI-enabled systems should be restricted, something countries like China and the US are already inclined to do to serve their national interests. Our approach can ensure the availability of numerous sufficiently powerful AI systems largely disconnected from each other that can be called upon to identify and neutralize rogue systems when needed. This setup can provide sufficient deterrence to any rational human or AI system from attempting to exert undue control. (shrink)

This article examines a community producing complex space technology. We attempt to highlight which aspects of the community’s activities can help democratize high-tech development while providing a context for similar cases involved in developing and manufacturing nonhigh-technological artefacts. We discuss how this has been made possible by using a technology-determined organizational approach based on the CubeSat open platform infrastructure, blending formal and hands-on education, open communication, specific recruitment and working practices, and a genuine passion for technology. We identify (...) as critical enablers for community-based collaborative development of space technology the open-source architecture standard called CubeSat Design Specifications, the modularization of work in subsystems and between different organizations, and the open and participatory approach work tasks distribution and decision making. Moreover, we argue that the digital/informational aspect of this technology allows the community to implement organizational practices that resemble how open-source movements over the internet produce complex digital artefacts like Wikipedia or Linux. ESTCube can shed light on community-driven complex technology development, providing lessons on what a democratized version of high technology would resemble and how open and digitalized technology can help develop the capacities of a community. (shrink)

Such a moral theology not only provides us with a convincing certainty of God's being, but it also has the great advantage that it leads us to religion, since it joins the thought of God firmly to our morality, and in this way it even makes better men of us. Kant, Lectures on Philosophical TheologyThis philosophy too, which takes up the thought of confederation in the concept of communicative, historically situated reason, will be able to provide no assurance (keine (...) Zuversicht); it stands in the sign of a transcendence from within and must content itself with the justified encouragement of a skeptical but non-defeatist “resistance to the gods and demons of a world contemptuous of man.” Habermas, “Israel oder Athen: Wem gehoert die anamnetische Vernunft?”. (shrink)

Since its appearance in English translation in 1996, Jurgen Habermas's Between Facts and Norms has become the focus of a productive dialogue between German and Anglo-American legal and political theorists. The present volume contains ten essays that provide an overview of Habermas's political thought since the original appearance of Between Facts and Norms in 1992 and extend his model of deliberative democracy in novel ways to issues untreated in the earlier work. Habermas's theory of democracy has at (...) least three features that set it apart from competing positions. First, it combines a concern with questions of normative justification with an empirical analysis of the social conditions necessary for the realization of democratic institutions. Second, at the heart of his model is the assertion of an internal relationship between liberalism and democracy. Finally, Habermas defends a conception of universal human rights that is not only sensitive to cultural differences but also calls for legal and political institutions that facilitate the cultivation of cultural and religious identities within pluralistic societies. These essays demonstrate the extraordinary power of Habermas's theory of democracy through a further engagement with Rawls's political liberalism and through original contributions to current debates over nationalism, multiculturalism, and the viability of supranational political institutions. (shrink)

In his long attempt to solve the vexing and diverse problems of formulating a critical social science of modern societies, Habermas has along the way borrowed from many and quite diverse theoretical and philosophical resources, including Anglo-American analytic philosophy of language, ethics and political philosophy. Initially, Habermas borrowed extensively from American Pragmatism, first Peirce’s philosophy of inquiry and then later from George Herbert Mead, whose thought his own enterprise most closely resembled. With his increasing concern with the rationality of (...) communication and action, Habermas turned to analytic theories of meaning, or more specifically, to speech act theory and its account of illocutionary force. As one part of a large research program in which various empirical disciplines could be appropriated for normative philosophical purposes, speech act theory and theories of meaning became crucial to reconstructing the competence and rationality that knowledgeable social agents manifest in their everyday activities and interactions. Taken together, these theories provided him with the means to formulate the master distinction on which his account of rationality and the theoretical edifice built upon it stands or falls: the deeply substantive and thus not merely analytic distinction between instrumental and communicative action on which a novel and distinctive theory of rationality could be based. (shrink)

This anthology brings together for the first time, in revised or new translation, ten essays that present the main concerns of Jürgen Habermas's program in formal pragmatics. Jürgen Habermas's program in formal pragmatics fulfills two main functions. First, it serves as the theoretical underpinning for his theory of communicative action, a crucial element in his theory of society. Second, it contributes to ongoing philosophical discussion of problems concerning meaning, truth, rationality, and action. By the "pragmatic" dimensions (...) of language, Habermas means those pertaining specifically to the employment of sentences in utterances. He makes clear that "formal" is to be understood in a tolerant sense to refer to the rational reconstruction of general intuitions or competences. Formal pragmatics, then, aims at a systematic reconstruction of the intuitive linguistic knowledge of competent subjects as it is used in everyday communicative practices. His program may thus be distinguished from empirical pragmatics--for example, sociolinguistics--which looks primarily at particular situations of use. This anthology brings together for the first time, in revised or new translation, ten essays that present the main concerns of Habermas's program in formal pragmatics. Its aim is to convey a sense of the overall purpose of his linguistic investigations while introducing the reader to their specific details, in particular to his theories of meaning, truth, rationality, and action. (shrink)

Two countervailing trends mark the intellectual tenor of our age the spread of naturalistic worldviews and religious orthodoxies. Advances in biogenetics, brain research, and robotics are clearing the way for the penetration of an objective scientific self-understanding of persons into everyday life. For philosophy, this trend is associated with the challenge of scientific naturalism. At the same time, we are witnessing an unexpected revitalization of religious traditions and the politicization of religious communities across the world. From a philosophical perspective, this (...) revival of religious energies poses the challenge of a fundamentalist critique of the principles underlying the modern Wests postmetaphysical understanding of itself. The tension between naturalism and religion is the central theme of this major new book by Jrgen Habermas. On the one hand he argues for an appropriate naturalistic understanding of cultural evolution that does justice to the normative character of the human mind. On the other hand, he calls for an appropriate interpretation of the secularizing effects of a process of social and cultural rationalization increasingly denounced by the champions of religious orthodoxies as a historical development peculiar to the West. These reflections on the enduring importance of religion and the limits of secularism under conditions of postmetaphysical reason set the scene for an extended treatment the political significance of religious tolerance and for a fresh contribution to current debates on cosmopolitanism and a constitution for international society. (shrink)

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In this new collection of recent essays, Habermas takes up and pursues the line of analysis begun in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. He begins by outlining the sources and central themes of twentieth–century philosophy, and the range of current debates. He then examines a number of key contributions to these debates, from the pragmatic philosophies of Mead, Perice and Rorty to the post–structuralism of Foucault. Like most contemporary thinkers, Habermas is critical of the Western metaphysical tradition and its exaggerated (...) conception of reason. But he cautions against the temptation to relinquish this conception altogether. In opposition to the radical critics of Western philosophy, Habermas argues that postmetaphysical thinking can remain critical only if it preserves the idea of reason while stripping it of its metaphysical trappings. Habermas contributes to this task by developing further his distinctive approach to problems of meaning, rationality and subjectivity. This book will be of particular interest to students of philosophy, sociology and social and political theory, and it will be essential reading for anyone interested in the continuing development of Habermas′s project. (shrink)

This dissertation engages the following question: how, in the absence of an uncontroversial source of moral guidance, can liberals make political and moral claims across cultural divides? While committed to toleration, liberals cannot escape the compulsion to apply basic standards of equal individual human rights and liberties universally. Under postmetaphysical conditions, however, they no longer find credible arguments that assure them of the sources of these standards in "natural law," "human nature," or "practical reason." Aware that individual rights have their (...) provenance in modern "Western" history, liberals fear being intolerant when they apply these standards universally, and experience as a result a problem of cross-cultural judgement. ;In this project I engage in a sympathetic critique of Richard Rorty's, Jurgen Habermas's and John Rawls's attempts at addressing this problem and provide a fourth alternative that cannot be absorbed by any of their frameworks. Rorty offers liberals the comforts of ethnocentrism. He assures them that political and moral judgements are always made by someone from somewhere. For this comfort, however, he extracts the exorbitant ethical price of other-disregard. Habermas derives individual rights from the universal practice of argumentation. By relying on the overly exacting standard of "rational consensus," however, he limits the applicability of his answer to liberal secular contexts. In his free-standing answer, Rawls offers the promising standard of an "overlapping consensus." His overly static use of this concept, however, drains it of its promise. ;Drawing on each of these attempts as well as on Aristotle's Rhetoric, I offer the alternative of a political project of moral persuasion. Instead of seeking to address the problem of cross-cultural judgement by coup de plume, liberals' best hope is to obviate it in practice, by forging a global, minimally liberal, overlapping consensus. As moral persuaders liberals would intrude actively in nonliberal debates and would seek to convince nonliberals from within their various lights, of the worthiness of the commitment to the freedom and equality of persons. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article investigates Habermas's communicative ethic in relation to changes in the roles of institutions and the state. I reference Alexy, Weber and Taylor, arguing that an artificial delimitation of the public sphere as disparate from the private or religious cramps the capacity of those identified as outsiders to communicate within it. I question the ability of public reason as Habermas has outlined it to meet the challenges it faces regarding interreligious dialogue and integration in democratic societies, and (...) I suggest, instead, an approach more open to dialogue with religions in terms that are more comprehensible to them. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s recent work is defined by two trends: an engagement with the realm of the sacred and a concern for the future of the European Union. Despite the apparent lack of connection between these themes, I argue that the early history of European integration has important implications for Habermas’s conclusions about the place of faith in public life. Although Habermas’s work on religion suggests that the sacred contains important normative resources for postsecular democracies, he continues to bar explicitly religious (...) justifications from discourse within state institutions. I question this exclusion of faith by reconstructing the role that political Catholicism played in the foundation of the European project. By focusing on two of the most important actors involved in the creation of the first European Community, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, I show how explicitly religious reasons can broaden political perspectives, resulting in the creation of new, inclusive, postnational forms of communal life. Pushing Habermas to accept the implications of his theological turn, I argue that pluralistic, nondogmatic and nonauthoritarian religious claims should be allowed to enter into the formal public sphere through a discursively determined interpretation of secular translation. (shrink)

The text examines the attempt by Jürgen Habermas to renew the tasks of critical theory. The systematic reconstruction of his writings reveals a system of typical functions: a) the rationalization of instrumental and strategic action in the material reproduction of social systems (social technology); b) the analysis of the pathologies in the symbolic reproduction of the world of life; c) the clarification of the cognitive, value and expressive models in the public sphere; d) the unveiling of false representations that dominate (...) the mainstream (critique of ideology); e) sketching out alternatives to the status quo, through the utopia of a non-reified communicative everyday practice. All these functions actualize the Enlightenment project to place the cultural tradition in the service of civil and social progress. This ambitious program, however, must recognize the limitations of critical theory, with respect to the need for consolation and hope of human existence. The dialogue between philosophy and religion, which marks the last decade of Habermas's reflection, should be understood in this light. (shrink)

This is the first book to consider the debate between two of the most prominent philosophers and social theorists of the 20th century: Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas. It presents a unique collection of articles by the two figures and by those who have written about them, and includes pieces published in English for the first time.The book will be of interest to students and scholars with an interest in the implications of Derrida's deconstruction and Habermas's critical theory for (...) issues such as international relations, Europe, tolerance, rights, multiculturalism and identity politics, and the nature of philosophy.Including an introduction to the differences and affinities between Derrida's and Habermas's works, introductions to each text, suggestions for further reading, and a bibliography, this book is the ideal starting point for students and scholars wishing to understand the relationship between these two great thinkers.Key Features: *Unique - the first Reader to consider the Habermas-Derrida debate*Features pieces by Habermas and Derrida published in English for the first time*Includes primary and secondary texts*Provides introductions to the debate and to each text, and suggestions for further reading. (shrink)

Over the past 25 years, Jürgen Habermas has presented what is arguably the most coherent and wide-ranging defence of the project of European unification and of parallel developments towards a politically integrated world society. In developing his key concepts of the transnationalisation of democracy and the constitutionalisation of international law, Habermas offers the main players in the struggles over the fate of the European Union a way out of the current economic and political crisis, should they choose to follow it. (...) In the title essay Habermas addresses the challenges and threats posed by the current banking and public debt crisis in the Eurozone for European unification. He is harshly critical of the incrementalist, technocratic policies advocated by the German government in particular, which are being imposed at the expense of the populations of the economically weaker, crisis-stricken countries and are undermining solidarity between the member states. He argues that only if the technocratic approach is replaced by a deeper democratization of the European institutions can the European Union fulfil its promise as a model for how rampant market capitalism can once again be brought under political control at the supranational level. This volume reflects the impressive scope of Habermas?s recent writings on European themes, including theoretical treatments of the complex legal and political issues at stake, interventions on current affairs, and reflections on the lives and works of major European philosophers and intellectuals. Together the essays provide eloquent testimony to the enduring relevance of the work of one of the most influential and far-sighted public intellectuals in the world today, and are essential reading for all philosophers, legal scholars and social scientists interested in European and global issues. (shrink)