The aim of our study was to explore the first three associations for the following two stimulus words: compassion and self-compassion. In addition, we were interested in whether the participants would conceptualise these words more in terms of emotions, cognitions, or behaviours. The sample consisted of 151 psychology students. A consensual qualitative research approach was adopted. Three members of the core team and an auditor analysed the free associations of compassion and self-compassion. The data showed that there were four (...) domains for both compassion and self-compassion: the Emotional, Cognitive, Behavioural and Evaluative Aspects of compassion/self-compassion. The only domains that differed were the Biological Aspect of compassion and the Situational Aspect of self-compassion. The most frequently represented domain for both compassion and self-compassion was the Emotional Aspect, while both more positive as well as negative emotions were associated with self-compassion than was the case with compassion. The findings of our study show that the participants perceived compassion as mainly consisting of empathy; the emotions of love, sadness and remorse; cognitive understanding; and behavioural displays of help, physical or mental closeness. Compassion was seen as being mainly directed at those close to them, such as family and friends, and at vulnerable people. Compassion occurs in situations of loss or any other kind of suffering. The participants viewed self-compassion primarily in terms of the positive emotions of love and calmness; the negative emotions of unhappiness, sadness and remorse; cognitive understanding; and behavioural displays of self-help through the provision of self-support and self-assurance. Self-compassion is triggered mainly in situations involving internal suffering caused by criticism or externally as a response to a difficult situation. Self-compassion is evaluated in both negative (because of its misuse) as well as positive terms (because of its connection to virtues). The findings of our qualitative study support the idea that compassion is a multidimensional construct consisting of emotional, cognitive, and behavioural aspects. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the question of how to resolve disagreement and uses the Lehrer-Wagner model as a formal tool for investigating consensual decision-making. The main result consists in a general definition of when agents treat each other as epistemic peers (Kelly 2005; Elga 2007), and a theorem vindicating the “equal weight view” to resolve disagreement among epistemic peers. We apply our findings to an analysis of the impact of social network structures on group deliberation processes, and we demonstrate (...) their stability with the help of numerical simulations. (shrink)

Consensual homicide remains a crime in jurisdictions where active voluntary euthanasia has been legalized. At the same time, both jurisdictions, in which euthanasia is legal and those in which it is not, recognize that all patients (whether severely ill or not) have the right to refuse or withdraw medical treatment (including life-saving treatment). In this paper, I focus on the tensions between these three norms (the permission of active euthanasia, the permission to reject life-saving treatment, and the prohibition of (...) consensual homicide), assuming a justification of euthanasia based on the right to (personal) autonomy. I argue that the best way to provide a coherent account of these norms is to claim that patients have two distinct rights: the right to autonomy and the right to bodily integrity. This solution has some relevant implications for the discussion of the legalization of active euthanasia. (shrink)

Rights are commonly distinguished in African ethics from Western rights according to the distinct ideas of personhood which ground them. However, this sacrifices universality for cultural specificity. Against this approach, I argue that universal rights are better supported by consensual rights recognition. I show how normative justification of rights from consensual recognition is consistent with deliberative ideas of justice in African ethics. Africanist criticism, of individualist bias in Eurocentric interpretations of rights, supports the contention that rights are justified (...) between people, not in personhood. Consensually accredited, recognized critical norms are preferable to rules derived from personhood, for the normative justification of universal rights from African ethics. (shrink)

This article makes a comparative examination of the widening spectrum of cases in which both tort law and contract law are employed, jointly or separately, to impose non-consensual liability on a contracting party. The article focuses on liability imposed on a contracting party either toward another contracting party or toward a third party for failure to perform an obligation that, on the one hand, is predicated on and arises from the contract, but, on the other hand, does not genuinely (...) originate in the consent of the liable party because it is external to her genuine intention. The primary objective of this article is to propose general guidelines for either choosing between tort law and contract law when imposing non-consensual liability on a contracting party or else allowing liability under both headings. These guidelines for the classification of non-consensual liability also bear on the preliminary question of whether to impose non-consensual liability at all and on the delicate interplay between contract and tort in general and particularly when the two lead to conflicting legal outcomes. (shrink)

The goal of my comments regarding the case study of Eve Hyde — presented in the introduction of this symposium — is not first and foremost to resolve the conflict between individual autonomy and medical paternalism regarding non-consensual psychiatric treatment. Instead, the goal is to step back far enough from what is generally accepted as the morally appropriate basis for non-consensual psychiatric treatment, including involuntary hospitalization and medication, and to ask very basic questions about when patients may permissibly (...) be treated without their consent. My goal, in short, is Socratic — to explore aspects of what we take for granted in order better to determine whether we ought to take them for granted. Commentators routinely urge that it is morally permissible forcibly to treat psychiatric patients, such as Eve Hyde, in order to preserve the patient’s best interests and restore the patient’s autonomy. Such arguments typically specify duties of beneficence toward others, while appreciating personal autonomy as a positive value to be weighed against other factors. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that we can make sense of moral norms against consensual, adult incest by appealing to the value of familial relationships and the potential for sex to damage them. Viewing sex as unconscionable between family members helps to enable the loving intimacy normally associated with family relationships. Therefore, there is good reason for incest, even when consensual and between adults, to remain taboo. That being said, I argue that there is insufficient legal justification for (...) all consensual, adult incest to be criminalised. I examine four potential arguments in favor of consensual, adult incest being illegal, and conclude that none of them succeeds in justifying a total legal prohibition against it. (shrink)

Wiredu’s call for democracy by consensus is illustrated by his description of traditional African consensual rationality. This description contains the attribution of immanence to African consensual rationality. This paper objects to this doctrine of immanence. More importantly, the doctrine of immanence has led to the attribution of pure rationality to traditional African consensual practices. With reference to Aristotle’s three components of persuasion, I object to deliberation as purely rational and impervious to extraneous factors. I further argue that (...) it is because deliberation is not always perfectly rational that the process of consensus can suffer three forms of social conformity: conformity to dominant players, to numerical opinion majority, and to group-centrism. These forms of conformity mean that a consensus task order could lead to decisions of more inclusive value, but not necessarily decisions of more epistemic value. The concept of agonistic inquiry is employed to tackle what I see as the dangers of conformity and complacency in the project of inclusivity, and this is to strike a crucial balance between too-consensual and purely adversarial forms of deliberation. (shrink)

In the present study we scrutinize the historical development of a remarkable strategy to justify state punishment, conceived in the philosophy of the Enlightenment: the argument from the consent of the offender. We follow the development of this argument and its variants from Grotius to Hegel. Our particular interest lies in ascriptions of purely fictitious mental states to justify palpable moral or legal reactions. This investigation opens up a specific and illuminating perspective on the legal-philosophical theories of the investigated authors (...) and their conceptual connections. In that way it also helps to properly grasp important aspects of the systematic problem of criminal justice. (shrink)

The following is a defense of Jurgen Habermas' argumentational consensual procedure against Keith Lehrer and Carl Wagner's weighted averaging consensual procedure (and, I tentatively claim, against any weighted averaging consensual procedure). The argument is twofold: if Lehrer and Wagner intend, implicity, to replace what is for Habermas the metatheoretical stage of a discussion with the aggregation of judgments of respect, then their procedure fails to make use of all available information and the participants are not committed to (...) the weighted average position on these grounds; if, on the other hand, they do not intend to replace metatheoretical discussion by aggregation, then the conditions under which the discussion could conceivably have come to a halt are such as to provide no support for the claim that it is rational to aggregate, rather than to consider the discussion unresolved until more information is available. (shrink)

Criticism and self-criticism have far reaching impacts on wellbeing and emotional balance. In order to create better interventions for criticism and self-criticism, more in-depth knowledge about these two constructs is required. The goal of our study was to examine three associations for criticism and self-criticism. The data were collected from a sample of 151 psychology students: 114 women and 37 men (Mean age 22.2; SD 4.4). We were interested in the associations participants would produce in relation to criticism and self-criticism, (...) whether participants conceptualized these two concepts in the same categories and whether the categories were equally important for each concept. The data were analyzed using Consensual Qualitative research (CQR). The team consisted of four core members and one auditor. Separately all four members analyzed the data multiple times and then discussed it until all the researchers including the auditor reached a consensus. We identified four domains common to both criticism and self-criticism. These were – Emotional Aspects, Cognitive Aspects, Behavioral Aspects, and Preconditions. For both stimulus words, the most saturated domain was Behavioral Aspects. These findings suggest that both concepts – criticism and self-criticism – are multidimensional constructs consisting of Behavioral Aspects, Cognitive aspects, Emotional Aspects, and Preconditions. Further research on this topic would be beneficial. (shrink)

The Oxford English Dictionary explains that the word “consent” originally derives from the “Latin consentīre to feel together, agree, accord harmonize”, further broken down into “con- together + sentīre to feel, think, judge, etc.” Thus, consent is originally a matter of mutual activity and receptivity, specifically a co-creating co-creation based on shared, ongoing feeling. What this seems to imply – and this is certainly always been true in my experiences with social Latin dance – is that consent is not a (...) static thing, not an object or product that has been definitively produced and recorded. Instead, consent is an ongoing process, a reciprocating experiencing that is crucially both beyond one individual dancer, and also simultaneously active and receptive. Altogether, then, consent in social Latin dance emerges as a process of doing and undergoing together. Thus, if the connection of dancing consent is broken, for example if one partner shifts from the acting/receiving balance to a state of exclusive acting (with no receiving), then consent is no longer transpiring, which greatly increases the risk of unwanted touch beginning and continuing. Put simply, wanted touch is consensual touch, and consensual touch is touch that is supported by an ongoing activity and receptivity of consent. Wanted touch in dance is thus analogous to a “closed” electrical circuit. (In fact, at the cellular level of a dancer’s body this truth is literal rather than merely analogous, given the neurochemical dimension of the body’s activities). A closed circuit, in this technical sense, refers to a circuit in which there is no break in the path (for example between a device and an outlet), an unbrokenness that sustains a live current in the circuit. By contrast, unwanted touch in social Latin dance is like an open circuit, involving a break in the path between the partners, which entails the absence of the necessary current of consent. (shrink)

What makes discrimination morally bad? In this paper, we discuss the putative badness of a case of consensual discrimination to show that prominent accounts of the badness of discrimination—appealing, inter alia, to harm, disrespect and inequality—fail to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. In view of this, we present a more promising account.

A political challenge facing constitutional democracies in Africa is the lack of adequate representation and participation of citizens in democratic processes and institutions. This challenge is manifest in the vesting of power solely in, and the exercise of this power by, a sectional group – the majority party – to the exclusion of others; as evinced in the liberal democratic systems extensively practised on the continent. Wiredu proposes as a solution to these challenges the adoption of consensual democracy; an (...) indigenous, non-party democratic system rooted in the traditional African humanist and communitarian conceptions of the individual and the community, in which political decisions are characteristically reached by consensus. In this article, I present a critical exposition of Wiredu’s consensual democracy and defend it against liberal democracy on the one hand, and criticisms levelled against it on the other hand. I also offer some modifications to Wiredu’s theory in a bid to render it more suitable for practice in Africa. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt a critical assessment of Hallen’s case for reconsidering consensual democracy in Africa and argue that it is unconvincing. In furthering the discourse, I argue against a case for consensual democracy by exposing some other salient problematic aspects of Wiredu’s model of consensual governance. Contra Wiredu and Hallen on non-party consensual governance, I make a case for enriching majoritarian democracy through a fusion of some moral-ontological aspects of indigenous political practices for good (...) governance. This eclectic model, I argue, is more appropriate for post-colonial African polity and should rather be taken more seriously in the ongoing conversations on how best to organise the African polis. (shrink)

This article argues that non-consensual vaccination is morally impermissible, for the same reasons for which sexual assault is not permissible. Likewise, mandatory vaccination is morally akin to sexual harassment, and therefore is not to be allowed.

Until recently, any sex or sexual activity with a person under the age of 16 was criminalised, regardless of consent. All such incidents were considered criminal offences and needed to be reported to the police. This paper explores the knowledge, practices and perspectives of seventeen social workers in KwaZulu-Natal in relation to their mandatory reporting responsibilities on consensual underage sex. All social workers were clear about their reporting responsibilities regarding child abuse and non-consensual underage sex. However, findings suggest (...) that social workers were less clear on the exact circumstances in which they ought to report consensual underage sex. Most participants indicated that they would make individual assessments about when to report underage consensual sex and sexual activity. Such decisions would be influenced by structural factors, the personal circumstances of affected children and the availability of other interventions to address early sexual activity. This study has shown that social workers are struggling to comply with mandatory reporting responsibilities involving underage consensual sex. Most social workers approach reporting of consensual sex and sexual activity differently to other reporting responsibilities and use a case-by-case approach. Given these findings, it is argued that parliament should consider reforming mandatory reporting provisions so that there is a distinction between the obligation to report consensual and non-consensual sexual offences against children. The mandatory obligation to report non-consensual sexual offences against children should remain but the obligation to report consensual sex or sexual activity should be discretionary and depend on the facts of each case. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze Lonergan’s criteria of truth, which is the absence of further pertinent questions. This position is compared with that defended by Habermas in his book Truth and Justification, in which he abandoned the consensual theory of truth, in order to adopt a truth called for him “pragmatic”. In both positions there is a distinction between factual judgments which could be made in the common sense realm of meaning, and in scientific propositions in (...) which it is not possible to reach certainty. (shrink)

How justified are those who think that the clamour for one-party politics in Africa was inspired by the character of African consensual democracy such as the one defended by Kwasi Wiredu? I show that though Wiredu’s consensual democracy may share some similarities with a one-party polity, it does not necessarily follow that it has inspired the emergence of one-party polities in Africa. Similarly, the absence of any discernible similarities between African consensual democracy and one-party polity may not (...) also necessarily entail that the former has not inspired the latter. When one considers the ontological nature of Wiredu’s consensual democracy and the one-party polity, it becomes contentious to claim that the latter emerges from the former. However, based on Wiredu’s idea of consensual democracy, one might argue that consensual democracy has a common ancestry with a one-party polity because they both seem to emerge from “party1”. (shrink)

A central tenet of medical ethics holds that it is permissible to perform a medical intervention on a competent individual only if that individual has given informed consent to the intervention. However, in some circumstances it is tempting to say that the moral reason to obtain informed consent prior to administering a medical intervention is outweighed. For example, if an individual’s refusal to undergo a medical intervention would lead to the transmission of a dangerous infectious disease to other members of (...) the community, one might claim that it would be morally permissible to administer the intervention even in the absence of consent. Indeed, as we shall discuss below, there are a number of examples of public health authorities implementing compulsory or coercive measures for the purposes of infectious disease control (IDC). The plausibility of the thought that non-consensual medical interventions might be justified when performed for the purpose of IDC raises the question of whether such interventions might permissibly be used to realize other public goods. In this article we focus on one possibility: whether it could be permissible to non-consensually impose certain interventions that alter brain states or processes through chemical or physical means on serious criminal offenders. We shall suggest that some such interventions might be permissible if they safely and effectively serve to facilitate the offender’s rehabilitation and thereby prevent criminal recidivism. (shrink)

Consensual sexual relationships between faculty and students at universities are a growing issue for administrators. Often times, administrators view these relationships as potential sexual harassment cases given the power disparities that often exist between the parties involved. Therefore, many universities have written policies essentially equating CSRs to sexual harassment. Despite the recent growth of these policies, how faculty compare CSRs and sexual harassment is often overlooked, particularly as it relates to perceived power differentials. The current study examined responses from (...) 166 faculty members to explore these perceptions. Results indicate faculty had varying opinions, depending on previous experience with CSRs and beliefs around power differentials. These findings contribute to previous literature which indicates there is rampant ambiguity and subjectivity when defining and handling CSRs on campus. (shrink)

The article analyses the role and moral force of consent in BDSM (Sado-masochistic and related practice). The view defended accepts consent as a key feature in sexual morality, and explains in detail the relation between consent and autonomy. In brief, it is argued that consent as a genuine extension of personal autonomy both justifies and draws limits to justifiable BDSM-practices: autonomy-undermining practices cannot be justified by appealing to autonomy. The paper discusses in detail the necessary conditions for consent with an (...) emphasis on relevant pitfalls in the context of BDSM and moves to an analysis of the prevalent “official” morality of the BDSM-community, expressed in the slogan “safe, sane, and consensual.” Finally, it draws attention to an un-discussed parallel between sexual morality and the concept of exit-rights as it is known from political philosophy. (shrink)

The literature on sado‐masochism (S/M) and dominance and submission (D/S) tends to focus either on the psychodynamics of perversion or, in more magnanimous moments, on rites of reversal in the power relations of participants. This paper shifts the focus of analysis to the altered states of consciousness achieved in consensual S/M, bondage and fetish play and demonstrates the self‐conscious affinity between S/M and ecstatic religious practices like those well documented in the anthropological literature. The paper will explore sensory and (...) other shifts used to produce what one informant called "that transformative experience." It is posited that "dominance/ submission" and "top/bottom" are not simply asymmetrical relations in terms of power relations, but that they evoke fundamentally different states of consciousness. Further, altered states in consensual bondage and fetish play differ significantly in hetero‐ and homosexual play. The reasons for this appear to have both historical and political implications which are explored briefly in the paper. (shrink)

Although the research on compassion is growing, there is a lack of knowledge about how non-expert people perceive compassion. Therefore, the aim of the study was to explore compassion from the perspective of non-experts. Our sample consisted of 56 non-expert participants in 10 focus groups and we conducted a Consensual Qualitative Research analysis with two members of a core team and one auditor. In general, compassion was described as a mixture of non-specified positive emotions and specified negative emotions. Compassion (...) was related to empathy. In terms of behaviours, compassion was revealed to help, support, favour, mental closeness, and interest. Compassion is displayed mainly to people close to us in situations of suffering. However, people tend to evaluate beforehand whether the situation and person deserve compassion. Moreover, people are cautious about being exploited through compassion. To sum up, our findings support a multidimensional definition of compassion. (shrink)

Humanoid robots used for sexual purposes are beginning to look increasingly lifelike. It is possible for a user to have a bespoke sexbot created which matches their exact requirements in skin pigmentation, hair and eye colour, body shape, and genital design. This means that it is possible—and increasingly easy—for a sexbot to be created which bears a very high degree of resemblance to a particular person. There is a small but steadily increasing literature exploring some of the ethical issues surrounding (...) sexbots, however sexbots made to look like particular people is something which, as yet, has not been philosophically addressed in the literature. In this essay I argue that creating a lifelike sexbot to represent and resemble someone is an act of sexual objectification which morally requires consent, and that doing so without the person’s consent is intrinsically wrong. I consider two sexbot creators: Roy and Fred. Roy creates a sexbot of Katie with her consent, and Fred creates a sexbot of Jane without her consent. I draw on the work of Alan Goldman, Rae Langton, and Martha Nussbaum in particular to demonstrate that creating a sexbot of a particular person requires consent if it is to be intrinsically permissible. (shrink)

Under what conditions is it morally permissible to commit suicide, to assist in someone’s suicide, or to kill another person with his/her consent? Under what conditions is it morally permissible to use force to prevent such acts? I shall defend a libertarian answer to these questions. On this view, autonomous agents initially fully own themselves in the same sense that one can fully own an inanimate object such as a car. Just as full owners of cars are morally permitted, under (...) a broad range of conditions, to destroy their cars or have someone else do so, autonomous agents who fully own themselves are permitted, under a broad range of conditions, to terminate their lives or to have someone else do so. Furthermore, under these conditions, other agents are not permitted to use force to prevent a full self-owner’s consensual death. I shall focus on consensual killing (i.e., with the killed person’s consent) of autonomous agents. This includes suicide, assisting with suicide, voluntary euthanasia, and even cases where a non-sick person requests that another kill her. I shall not address cases of killing that are involuntary (against the will of the person killed) or non-voluntary (where the being killed is not autonomous; e.g., killing animals, children, and incapacitated adults). These are important issues, but they cannot be addressed here. (shrink)

The head and the stomach January 1996 -- Borges in Sarajevo March 1996 -- Fin de siècle and new millenarium May 1996 -- Cold racism July 1996 -- The last enemy November 1996 -- The grounded plane January 1997 -- Dialectic in the dialectic August 1997 -- Voyage to the country of the last sociologists November 1997 -- Justice in the past April 1998 -- The crisis of art or a crisis of thought July 1998 -- Is cinema to blame (...) March 1999? -- The nameless war May 1999 -- One image right can sweep away another October 1999 -- The syllogism of corruption October 2000 -- Voici/voila : the destiny of images January 2001 -- From facts to interpretations : the new quarrel over the holocaust April 2001 -- From one torture to another June 2001 -- The filmmaker, the people and the government August 2001 -- Time, words, war November 2001 -- Philosophy in the bathroom January 2002 -- Prisoners of the infinite march 2002 -- From one month of May to another June 2002 -- Victor Hugo : the ambiguities of a bicentenary August 2002 -- The machine and the foetus January 2003 -- Death of the author or all too living artist April 2003 -- Logic of amnesia June 2003 -- The principle of insecurity September 2003 -- The new fictions of evil November 2003 -- Criminal democracy March 2004 -- The difficult heritage of Michel Foucault June 2004 -- The new reasons for the lie A\august 2004 -- Beyond art October 2004 -- The politics of images February 2005 -- Democracy and its doctors May 2005. (shrink)

Consensus has been highlighted by African philosophers as an element essential to African societies, past and present, that has not been assigned the importance it deserves. The philosophers involved have done this in part by drawing upon firsthand experience of their own indigenous cultures. Consensual governance presents a rather different view of the constitution of indigenous African societies and what should be their most appropriate form of political order today. A legitimate concern, therefore, is why this element supposedly foundational (...) to sub-Saharan African societies came to be underrated. (shrink)

A recent study has argued from theological and classicizing parallels that the first, anti-pagan book of Augustine’s De consensu euangelistarum belongs between 406 and 412 CE. This article defends the traditional dating ca. 400–405 CE, implied by Retractationes. Uncertainty over the dating of parallels in De trinitate 1–4 cautions against reliance on theological peculiarities (a variant of John 5:19 and the phrase unitas personae, both otherwise paralleled in the 410s CE or later), while a close review of the patterns of (...) classical citation proves resemblance to De ciuitate dei to be superficial. Not only does Augustine demonstrably cite the same classical texts on widely separated occasions, De consensu euangelistarum 1 evinces little of Augustine’s later knowledge of Porphyry and Varro. The crowning proof comes, however, in a brief rebuttal to pagan complaints over contemporary misfortunes. Although he focuses on Rome’s religious history, Augustine omits any hint of Alaric’s sack (410 CE), the religious-political instability of 408–409 CE, or Radagaisus’ invasion of Italy (405–406 CE), all of key importance for later works. The book’s method, scope, and tenor place it neatly within the span 400–405 CE, as our first testimony to the interreligious milieu for which De ciuitate dei would later be aimed. (shrink)

There is an extensive literature on the allocation of medical resources in many disciplines including ethics, law, medicine, psychology and sociology (Cicognani et al., 2007; Krütli et al., 2016; P...

The illicit diffusion of intimate photographs or videos intended for private use is a troubling phenomenon known as the diffusion of Non-Consensual Intimate Images (NCII). Recently, it has been feared that the spread of deepfake technology, which allows users to fabricate fake intimate images or videos that are indistinguishable from genuine ones, may dramatically extend the scope of NCII. In the present essay, we counter this pessimistic view, arguing for qualified optimism instead. We hypothesize that the growing diffusion of (...) deepfakes will end up disrupting the status that makes our visual experience of photographic images and videos epistemically and affectively special; and that once divested of this status, NCII will lose much of their allure in the eye of the perpetrators, probably resulting in diminished diffusion. We conclude by offering some caveats and drawing some implications to better understand, and ultimately better counter, this phenomenon. (shrink)

This article is a critical presentation of Habermas' "Consensual Theory of Truth" as a theory without experience, with a careful analysis of the practical expectations linked by Habermas to this theory.

The authors believe there is a need for novel ways of enhancing professional judgment and discretion in the contemporary healthcare environment. The objective is to provide a framework to guide a discursive analysis of an ongoing clinical scenario by a small group of healthcare professionals (4–12) to achieve consensual understanding in the decision-making necessary to resolve specific healthcare inadequacies and promote organisational learning. REPVAD is an acronym for the framework’s five decision-making dimensions of reasoning, evidence, procedures, values, attitudes and (...) defences. The design is set out in terms of well-defined definitions of the dimensions, a rationale for using REPVAD, and explications of dimensions one at a time. Furthermore, the REPVAD process of application to a scenario is set out, and a didactic scenario is given to show how REPVAD works together with a sample case. A discussion is fleshed out in four real life student cases, and a conclusion indicates strengths and weaknesses and the possibility of further development and transferability. In terms of findings, the model has been tried, tested and refined over a number of years in the development of advanced practitioners at university healthcare faculties in two European countries. Consent was obtained from the four participating students. (shrink)