한국의 전통교육에서 불교는 큰 영향력을 차지하고 있다. 『삼국유사』 는 불교적 세계관을 바탕으로 민중성을 담보하고 있는 저작이다. 넓은 범위에서 민중성은 민중들의 수양교육으로 이어진다. 본고는 『삼국유사』 에 나타난 불교적 민중성을 존 듀이의 ‘경험-학습’ 모델에 근거하여 수양교육의 모습으로 검토한 것이다. 『삼국유사』 에 나타난 ‘성인-되기’라는 ‘의미-경험’은 불교적 세계관인 생성의 지평에서 볼 때, 강력한 수양교육의 성격을 띠고 있다. 듀이의 이론을 현대화한 듀이-들뢰즈적인 수양교육은 불교적 세계관을 바탕으로 한『삼국유사』 의 세 설화와 민중성이라는 지점에서 만난다. 이는 서구의 교육론과 한국의 전통사상의 수양론이 상호 교차하면서 독해될 수 있는 가능성을 열어준다. (...) 승려에서 서민에 이르기까지 민중의 성장과 성숙을 다루고 있는 『삼국유사』 의 설화에는, ‘충동-관찰-지식-판단’에 이르는 수양 교육의 과정을 통해, 불국토(佛國土)의 성취를 염원한다. 이러한 일련의 ‘성인-되기’의 과정은, 그 삶 자체가 수양론적 특성을 갖추고 있다. 이런 점에서 『삼국유사』 의 설화는 한국의 전통 수양론의 모습을 보여주고 있으며, 서구의 교육이론과 접목할 수도 있는 수양교육의 담론서 역할을 할 수 있다. (shrink)

이 글에서는 『장자』와 『열자』에 공통적으로 등장하는 일화에서 발견할 수 있는 수양의 지향점을 짚어보고, 그것이 두 저작에 등장하는 우주생성론적 텍스트와 어떻게 연결되는 지 탐색해 보고자 한다. 특히 수양의 단계나 지인(至人)의 경지를 묘사하는 일화들을 우주 생성론에 비추어 이해해 봄으로써 수양관과 우주생성관 사이의 유비 관계를 읽어낼 수 있 다. 예컨대 생성론에서 등장하는 무형(無形)과 유형(有形), 혼륜(渾淪) 과 일(一), 태초(太 初) 등의 개념들은 수양의 과정에서 요청되는 인식론적 전환과 맞닿아 있다. 인식의 다층적 경계들을 지워나가는 마음의 수양은 허(虛), 망(忘) 등으로 대변된다. 『장자』와 『열자』에 공통적으로 등장하는 지인의 일화에서는 (...) 이러한 마음 수양이 주체와 대상 사이 물리적 경계를 초월하는 상태로 이어지고, 더 나아가 경계 없이 비워진 마음으로 대상과 감응함으로써 만물의 이치를 체득하는 앎을 얻을 수 있음을 말한다. 수양이 몸 과 마음의 타고난 순수 상태의 회복이라면, 그것은 태초에서 분화된 만물의 생성 과정을 거슬러 올라가 다다르는 경지이다. 『장자』나 『열자』에 등장하는 우주생성론적 텍스트를 각 사상의 특성, 특히 수양론과 인식론의 맥락에 비추어 볼 때 그 의의와 가치를 보다 명 확히 규명할 수 있을 것이다. (shrink)

Constructing a self model with universal cultural adaptability is a common concern of cultural psychologists. These models can be divided into two types: one is the self model based on Western culture, represented by the self theory of Marsh, Cooley, Fitts, etc.; the other is the non-self model based on Eastern culture, represented by the Mandela model of Hwang Kwang Kuo and the Taiji model of Zhen Dong Wang. However, these models do not fully explain the self structure and (...) development of Chinese people in the context of Chinese Buddhist culture. Based on the self theory of Chinese Buddhism and inspired by the famous Buddhist work Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna, this article constructs the “one mind, two aspects” self model. This model not only can properly represent the self structure of Chinese people in the context of Chinese Buddhism but also can explain the self-cultivation process and the realm of practice of Chinese Buddhist believers and thus has satisfactory cultural validity. (shrink)

It is commonly argued that Liu Zongzhou was dissatisfied with the fact that some followers of Wang Yangming in the late Ming Dynasty paid insufficient attention to self-cultivation practices (gongfu工夫), so he deliberately emphasized the difficulty and importance of personal cultivation which is often misunderstood as some kind of strict inner spiritual cultivation. This essay will argue that with the gradual deepening in the studies on Liu Zongzhou’s thought as a whole, there are more dimensions to be (...) recovered in our understanding of his self-cultivation theory. Liu Zongzhou’s holistic self-cultivation theory is based on the unity of body and heartmind, and theory and practice, where each person is a node of relations, and is an unbounded narrative in the world. On this basis, self-cultivation is not simply an inward vector that relates to inner spiritual practice, but has an important and often overlooked relational and social dimension. (shrink)

The epistemology in Chinese philosophy remarkably emphasizes the cultivation of cognitive subjects. According to such epistemology, intelligence arises from benevolence, and thus morality should be valued to gain knowledge. In this way, epistemology is integrated with theories of values and cultivation. The cultivation of cognitive subjects in Chinese philosophy mainly involves a stance, attitudes, ways of thinking and feelings of a cognitive subject. To expatiate and develop the theory of the cultivation of cognitive subjects in (...) Chinese philosophy has much meaning for the construction of a modern Chinese-style Marxist philosophy system. (shrink)

Is _Invisible Man_ a sexist novel? Some critics have said so. I argue that reading _Invisible Man_ solely with a focus on gender representation misses an ethically significant dynamic between Ralph Ellison's narrator and white women. Reading _Invisible Man_ alongside Iris Murdoch's moral philosophy reveals a shared emphasis on cultivating attention to the realities of individuals by resisting fantasy. In viewing white women, the invisible man undergoes a Murdochian moral pilgrimage from fantasy to reality with courage, humility, and generosity. By (...) situating this triumph within the American white supremacist patriarchy, Ellison corrects some of Murdoch's disengagement from politics. (shrink)

This book analyses the moral theory of the seventh century Indian Mahayana master, Santideva. Santideva is the author of the well-known religious poem the Bodhicaryavatara (Entering the Path of Enlightenment) , as well as the significant, but relatively overlooked, Siksasamuccaya (Compendium of Teachings) . Both of these works describe the nature and path of the bodhisattva, the altruistic spiritual ideal especially exalted in Mahayana literature. With particular focus on the Siksasamuccaya , this work offers a response to three questions: (...) What is Santideva's moral theory? How does it compare to other analyses of Buddhist ethics? Can one moral theory adequately describe Buddhist moral thought? An exegetical account of the bodhisattva path as outlined in the Siksasamuccaya is provided by textual analysis and translations. The central moral concept of this Buddhist thinker and Santideva's ethical presuppositions and moral reasoning are brought to light by analysing the use of key moral terms and comparing them to other Buddhists' principles. It is also considered in relation to dominant Western ethical theories. By focusing on a neglected Buddhist Sanskrit text by a major Mahayana figure, Barbra Clayton helps to redress a significant imbalance in the scholarship on Buddhist ethics, which has up to now focused primarily on the ethics of the Pali literature and as interpreted in the Theravada tradition. (shrink)

Discussing Plato's views on knowledge, recollection, dialogue, and epiphany, this ambitious volume offers a systematic analysis of the ways that Platonic approaches to education can help students navigate today's increasingly complex moral environment. Though interest in Platonic education may have waned due to a perceived view of Platonic scholarship as wholly impractical, this volume addresses common misunderstandings of Plato's work and highlights the contemporary relevance of Plato's ideas to contemporary moral education. Building on philosophical interpretations, the book argues persuasively that (...) educators might employ Platonic themes and dialogue in the classroom. Split into two parts, the book looks first to contextualise Plato's theory of moral education within political, ethical, and educational frameworks. Equipped with this knowledge, part two then offers contemporary educators the strategies needed for implementing Plato's educational theory within the pluralistic, democratic classroom setting. A Platonic Theory of Moral Education will be of interest to academics, researchers, and post-graduate students in the fields of: ethics; Plato scholarship; moral psychology; educational foundations; and the philosophy of education. This book would also benefit graduate students and scholars in teacher education. Mark E. Jonas is Professor of Education and Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton College, US. Yoshiaki Nakazawa is Assistant Professor of Education at University of Dallas, US. (shrink)

The notion of moral exemplarity, though repeatedly alluded to in John Stuart Mill’s writings, is rarely treated as an essential element of his democratic theory. This article, however, highlights and explains the centrality of exemplarity in Mill’s project of fostering public-minded citizens for a successful democracy. In Representative Government, Mill conceives the exemplary influence of deliberative elites as a necessary condition for making local deliberative bodies the main site for the cultivation of a public spirit. Mill’s Romantic reading (...) of Plato’s Gorgias suggests that this move resulted from his radical skepticism about the power of reason to motivate virtuous behavior along with his corresponding faith in the moral exemplar’s aesthetic force of beauty to improve the spectator’s conduct. Mill’s emphasis on the necessity of exemplary influence for achieving a civic ideal based on a detailed account of its moral psychology reveals him to be a unique political thinker who continues to invite contemporary interest. (shrink)

Challenging the popular perception that Confucianism provides mostly a moral defense of political hierarchy, this article demonstrates that Confucianism is more than compatible with democracy and f...

This article constructs a theory of moral cultivation from the writings of John Dewey. Examining his early work in ethics, I argue that the goal of moral cultivation for such a Deweyan scheme is an individual who is attentive and engaged with the particulars of her situation. I then sketch an account of art's moral value and its connection to attentiveness, intimating a way to dissolve longstanding problems in the philosophy of art.

This paper repudiates Manuel Vargas’s attempt to supplant the traditional moral influence theory of responsibility with his ‘agency cultivation model’. By focusing on fostering responsiveness to moral considerations, ACM purports to avoid the chief pitfalls of MIT. However, I contend that ACM is far less distinctive than it initially appears and so possesses all of MIT’s defects. I also assail Vargas’s counterfactual test for assessing whether a wrongdoer can respond to moral considerations. It is argued that the counterfactual (...) test is epistemically redundant because it can only be fleshed out once we have settled the issues it is supposed to resolve. Moreover, it tacitly inverts the relation between freedom and responsibility—we cannot attribute free will to wrongdoers unless we have already established their blameworthiness. The upshot of this is that enquiries into an agent’s freedom are irrelevant to the ethics of holding her responsible. (shrink)

Cultivation: Art and Aesthetics in Everyday Life is an inquiry into everyday practices with an aesthetic dimension such as collecting, walking and domestic life. I examine the implications of a critical engagement with these practices for philosophical aesthetics and cultural studies. Traditional aesthetic theory has been informed by a fine arts model of creativity and aesthetic experience and, thus, has not adequately treated everyday aesthetic life. The rapidly expanding field of contemporary cultural studies, on the other hand, has (...) been marked by a dramatic shift in attention toward non-fine art objects like film and television. However, the attention of cultural studies remains, for the most part, limited to mass produced commodities, thereby presenting a narrow picture of aesthetic life outside the fine arts. Cultivation presents an alternative to both approaches. Following John Dewey, I develop a model of cultivation that allows me to locate and describe creativity and aesthetic experience in everyday life. Seen within the framework of everyday life, cultivation becomes more than the development of aesthetic sensibility, as in traditional connoisseurship. Instead, it includes as well the ongoing development of the capacity to satisfy this sensibility through the creative manipulation of one's actions and the world. This Pragmatist version of cultivation emphasizes the importance of creating occasions for aesthetic experience, that is, of refining and developing experience through the design of aesthetically motivated endeavors like walking, interior decoration and collecting. Cultivation is essentially a process: we do or make things in order to have experiences which then, internalized through habit and re-organized and redirected upon reflection, serve as the basis for further doing or making and still more refined experiences. This model of cultivation is then deployed in extended analyses of everyday practices. In these analyses, I develop a critical approach that seeks to understand practice as a creative process whose possibilities are intrinsically open to development. (shrink)

Beginning with the influential discussion of the dialectic of progress found in Amy Allen’s The End of Progress, this paper outlines some difficulties encountered by critical theories of normative justification drawing on the early Frankfurt School. Characterizing Adorno and Horkheimer’s critical social theory as a dialectical reflection eschewing questions of normative foundations, I relate their well-known treatment of the dialectic of enlightenment reason and myth to their critique of capitalist society as a negative totality. By exploring the concepts of (...) historical development used by Adorno and Horkheimer to describe both the progressive domination of capitalism, and the formation and cultivation of reflective consciousness, I trace the importance of progression and its inseparable relationship to regression in these early versions of critical theory. The dialectical social theory found here recognizes the persistence of social contradictions on both a methodological level and on the level of theory’s development and expression, a connection potentially obscured by a division of historical progress according to its temporal orientation. Particularly in Adorno’s later work, an opposition to the negative social totality requires notions of cultivation and learning which work against the prevailing forms of conceptual thinking, including the concern for the stability of rational foundations. (shrink)

PONIC P, REID C and FRISBY W.Nursing Inquiry2010;17: 324–335 Cultivating the power of partnerships in feminist participatory action research in women’s healthFeminist participatory action research integrates feminist theories and participatory action research methods, often with the explicit intention of building community–academic partnerships to create new forms of knowledge to inform women's health. Despite the current pro‐partnership agenda in health research and policy settings, a lack of attention has been paid to how to cultivate effective partnerships given limited resources, competing agendas, (...) and inherent power differences. Based on our 10+ years individually and collectively conducting women's health and feminist participatory action research, we suggest that it is imperative to intentionally developpower‐withstrategies in order to avoid replicating the power imbalances that such projects seek to redress. By drawing on examples from three of our recent feminist participatory action projects we reflect on some of the tensions and complexities of attempting to cultivate power‐with research partnerships. We then offer skills and resources needed by academic researchers to effectively harness the collective resources, agendas, and knowledge that each partner brings to the table. We suggest that investing in the process of cultivating power‐with research partnerships ultimately improves our collective ability to understand and address women's health issues. (shrink)

In the US, an emergent cultural icon of resistant agriculture, the agrarian heroine, attests to growing popular interest in first-generation women farmers. Drawing on practice theory, historical geographical materialism, intersubjective ethnography and feminist scholarship, this ethnography focusses on three first-generation women farmers growing organic vegetable crops for the Chicago market, with critical attention to the body, the land and their uses. By applying permaculture's theory of ‘the edge’ anthropologically, this study explores the work these women do to cultivate (...) relational spaces that promote fluidity, diversity and solidarity in opposition to industrial agriculture and the homogenising forces of globalisation. The portraits that emerge problematise popular representations of first-generation women farmers. (shrink)

This thesis offers an original theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments based on the Francophone interpretation of the Hellenistic conception of self-cultivation. Recently Harry Frankfurt, Bernard Williams, and Susan Wolf have argued that practical philosophers must direct more attention to how our passionate attachments radically affect our resolution to the question of ‘how one should live’. By neglecting this topic, these thinkers argue, we overlook some of the strongest and most distinctively human motivations that guide (...) our practical lives, ones that have a powerful effect on our capacity to flourish. Not only should philosophers explain how our moral obligations and prudential concerns guide our conduct, they should also explain how and why we are guided by deep-seated passionate attachments, considerations that Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf argue provide the conditions for leading a life with a sense of meaning and purpose. Despite viewing passionate attachments as being vitally important, Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf offer separate accounts of either why we cannot actively cultivate them, or why we cannot form a philosophical theory of doing so. If there is a way in which we can cultivate our passionate attachments, then these thinkers argue that we must look outside philosophy: to the contingency of personal preference, to self-help instruction manuals, to guidance from religious traditions, or in extremis to clinical psychology. My study aims to show that this attitude is overly pessimistic. Not only do we have reason to view passionate attachments as susceptible to growth, change, and improvement, but we should view these entities as amenable to self-cultivation. Only by understanding this process can we construct a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. Focusing on Pierre Hadot’s and Michel Foucault’s respective accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation, provides vital conceptual tools to formulate a theory of cultivating our passionate attachments. First, their accounts of Hellenistic self-cultivation offer the conceptual resources for a philosophical theory of how we can cultivate our passionate attachments. Second, the exercises of self-cultivation they focus on allow us to outline a practical method though which we can cultivate our passionate character. This takes the exercises of self-cultivation beyond their historical use, as well as beyond their role in the respective projects of these Francophone thinkers. Doing this brings out a significantly new dimension to the role of the passionate attachments in the flourishing life: not only are they valuable in the way Frankfurt, Williams, and Wolf suggest, but we can offer theoretical and practical accounts how we can cultivate them based on the Hellenistic conception of self-directed character change. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibilities of using character education through poetry to cultivate virtue in a secondary-school context. It focuses on the philosophical assumptions behind the intervention development and some implications of the intervention. We explore character education and poetry teaching as a tool for moral reasoning through the means of the method of ‘poetic inquiry,’ drawing also on insights from Wittgenstein. Character education and ‘poetic inquiry’ share similar goals, but are not harmonious as far as theory and methodology (...) goes. It clearly matters what exactly is to be cultivated, and in this paper we show that ‘poetic inquiry’ and character education, if used to foster practical reasoning, can be used as a means of ethical-cum-emotional self-cultivation. What makes both these case-specific approaches effective, and to some extent unique, is the possible employment of creative writing, and the development of the intellectual virtue of creative critical thinking. (shrink)

In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted and which values have to shape it. In this context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory (...) tradition, in this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of “being ethical” and, ultimately, of what it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only compliance, ethical decision-making consists in using certain moral abilities, which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities of data subjects. Therefore, rather than “applying ethics”, data scientists should cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records. (shrink)

This study explores the doctoral cultivation system and mechanism of university think tank in China. A policy narrative analysis of doctoral cultivation mechanism aims to unpack how to cultivate university think tank talents. It is suggested that we need to promote the construction of interdisciplinary disciplines and clarify the attribution of disciplines for personnel training; build an interdisciplinary interaction mechanism and form a collaborative training system and give priority to the construction of policy disciplines as basic disciplines for (...) personnel training. Along with the policy suggestions above, the cultivation pathways of cultivating doctoral students in university think tanks is provided systematically in the last section. (shrink)

"[This book is] focused on the place of character and virtue in professional practice. Professional practices usually have codes of conduct designed to ensure good conduct; but while such codes may be necessary and useful, they appear far from sufficient, since many recent public scandals in professional life seem to have been attributable to failures of personal moral character. This book argues that there is a pressing need to devote more attention in professional education to the cultivation or development (...) of such moral qualities as integrity, courage, self-control, service and selflessness... [This] volume looks beyond traditional professions to explore the ethical dimensions of a broad range of important professional practices. Inspired by a successful international and interdisciplinary conference on the topic, the book examines various ways of promoting moral character and virtue in professional life from the general ethical perspective of contemporary neo-Aristotelian virtue theory."--. (shrink)

A Cultivated Reason is an intriguing book. Everyone who thinks she understands Hume or is pretty sure that she doesn't should read it. It is elegantly written, informal and illuminating. It does take patience however, partly because its organization is idiosyncratic and sometimes confusing. Williams combines exegesis of Humean texts—the Treatise, the two Enquiries, and the Essays—with the defense of a view that he calls "nonrationalism." This wide-ranging theory stakes claims in ontology, theory of knowledge, ethics, aesthetics, and (...) in the broader issue of how philosophical reflection is related to the concerns of everyday life. Williams endorses nonrationalism and believes that Hume is its progenitor; for almost every nonrationalist thesis, Williams finds a Humean precedent. Here he goes against the tradition in which the explication des textes requires the explicator to keep his own theoretical commitments in the background. Williams does not do this and thus he aligns himself with philosophically sophisticated commentators—David Pears, Robert Fogelin, and Barry Stroud are examples—who are explicit and candid about where they stand. As a consequence of Williams's procedure, the reader is often at a loss to know whether a particular thesis is being ascribed to Hume or whether the author is trying in a Humean spirit to advance the nonrationalist cause. There do seem to be significant differences, for example, the nonrationalist does not countenance the gap that was important to Hume between the "is" and the "ought." So if you object or disagree, you don't know where to complain. (shrink)

A revival of Confucianism in post-Mao China helped the government legitimate its power in the face of a new socio-political and economic situation. This paper specifically explores the role of Confucian self-cultivation in China’s governance. Drawing on Beetham’s theory of legitimation of power and Weber’s tri-typology of authority, we argue that self-cultivation, appealing to ingrained cultural values and traditions, fulfils the criteria of legitimation of power through two principles, namely, differentiation and community interest. In the context of (...) suzhi education and China’s national university entrance exam, we interrogate tensions and paradoxes between the need for a presentation of modern and liberal authority and the CCP’s one-party rule. The paper illustrates the complexity of China’s authoritarianism and the intricacies and intrinsic relevance of self-cultivation in current practice. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic is a tragedy for those who have been hard hit worldwide. At the same time, it is also a test of concepts and practices of what good care is and requires, and how quality of care can be accounted for. In this paper, we present our Care-Ethical Model of Quality Enquiry (CEMQUE) and apply it to the case of residential care for older people in the Netherlands during the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead of thinking about care in healthcare (...) and social welfare as a set of separate care acts, we think about care as a complex practice of relational caring, crossed by other practices. Instead of thinking about professional caregivers as functionaries obeying external rules, we think about them as practically wise professionals. Instead of thinking about developing external quality criteria and systems, we think about cultivating (self-)reflective quality awareness. Instead of abstracting from societal forces that make care possible but also limit it, we acknowledge them and find ways to deal with them. Based on these critical insights, the CEMQUE model can be helpful to describe, interrogate, evaluate, and improve existing care practices. It has four entries: (i) the care receiver considered from their humanness, (ii) the caregiver considered from their solicitude, (iii) the care facility considered from its habitability and (iv) the societal, institutional and scholarly context considered from the perspective of the good life, justice and decency. The crux is enabling all these different entries with all their different aspects to be taken into account. In Corona times this turns out to be more crucial than ever. (shrink)

Educational philosophies of self-cultivation as the foundation and cultural ethos for education have a strong and historically effective tradition stretching back to antiquity in the classical ‘cra...

This paper addresses some of the contours of an ethics of knowledge in the context of ameliorative epistemology, where this term describes epistemological projects aimed at redressing epistemic injustices, improving collective epistemic practices, and educating more effectively for higher-order reflective reasoning dispositions. Virtue theory and embodiment theory together help to tie the cultivation of moral and epistemic emotions to cooperative problem-solving. We examine one cooperative vice, ‘knavery,’ and how David Hume’s little-noticed discussion of it is a forerunner (...) of contemporary game theory’s concern with behavior of ‘free riding’ on systems of trust or cooperation. We develop these and other examples as calling for “risk-aware” social epistemology, which ties epistemic risk with doxastic responsibility. Risk-aware social epistemology aims at describing and ameliorating epistemic practices, but without confusing over-generalizing about culpability in ways that would conflate philosophical censure or critique of bias, with “blameworthiness” in any stronger sense. (shrink)

The article takes up and challenges the Lockean conception of common sense and common right to property in two ways: first, through a critical investigation of Locke's historical connection to colonialism, and second, by turning to contemporary indigenous conceptions of common sense. Locke's practical experiences in the founding of Carolina, I argue, serve not simply to explain the problematical colonial impulses of the Second Treatise, but indeed to help undo the credibility of that text's ideological claim to acquire and assimilate. (...) Next, I turn from an internal historicized critique of the Second Treatise to a contemporary external challenge, examining current indigenous perspectives de-legitimized by the Second Treatise. I contend that traditionalized conceptions of indigenous knowledge and understanding provide a strategic revitalization of common sense in ways that re-define and re-characterize the word's roots not only in the common but also in the senses themselves. The article concludes by questioning whether these revitalized ‘traditionalisms’ — as much as they challenge exclusionary Lockean conceptions of the ‘common’ and common sense — also carry the risk of denying aspects of indigenous modernity and excluding alternative indigenous conceptions of land and resource use. (shrink)