Marcel Proust ha passat a la història de la cultura occidental com un escriptor, principalment novelista. Amb tot, la seva obra mestra. A la recerca del temps perdut, un dels cims de la literatura mundial, conté nombroses reflexions que permeten identificar clarament també un Proust pensador. Reconstruir la filosofia de Proust tot resseguint la mirada sobre el món que representa a la recerca?. és l'objectiu d'aquest assaig. A partir dels aforismes, sovint metafòrics, del Narrador proustià, Jaume Urgell ens ofereix una (...) anàlisi de la posició de l'escriptor francès en el context de la filosofia del segle XX. Expressant-se de vegades com a hereu d'un pensament anti-racionalista, en ocasions com a a coetani del existencialisme europeu i sovint precursor tant del pensament ironista com de mites de la quotidianitat més contemporània, Marcel Proust ens llega una obra plena de significats i alhora lliure de qualsevol convencionalisme, cosncient de les seves pròpies màscares i alhora innocent en el seu desenvolupament. Aquest assaigpresenta també algunes de les contribucions més rellevants en l'estudi de l'obra proustiana, com són les de Samuel Beckett, Gilles Deleuze i Richard Rorty, i desbrossa les incursions de Proust en el camp de la psicologia, l'ètica i l'estètica. Jaume Urgell És llicenciat en ciències empresarials i MBA per ESADE i Màster en Administració Pública per la Universitat de Harvard. Té un Diploma d'Estudis Avançats en Filosofia i Literatura per la UB. Dedica la seva vida intel·lectual a la literatura, la filosofia, la política i les relacions internacionals, i ha publicat diversos llibres i articles sobre aquestes matèries. (shrink)

El pensament català proposa un petit tast del que ha estat el pensament filosòfic a Catalunya i la seva àrea d’influència cultural —País Valencià i les Illes Balears—, des dels grans mestres medievals Ramon Llull i Ramon Martí fins als contemporanis Eugenio Trías i Josep Maria Terricabras tot passant per les grans figures del segle xix com Jaume Balmes i Josep Torras i Bages. Diem «pensador català» a tot el qui ha treballat amb les idees i que ho ha fet (...) en el català del Principat, o en el seu bessó el valencià, o en el bessó mallorquí, o també en castellà, o en el llunyà àrab o en el remot llatí… Però al capdavall, i sobretot, des d’un mateix punt d’origen geogràfic i cultural: la Mediterrània occidental. (shrink)

Recopilació dels textos de les reflexions que van tenir lloc en l'encontre inter nacional "Noves fronteres de la ciència, l'art i el pensament. Física de l'estèt ica", celebrat els dies 6 i 7 de setembre de 2005 a l'Auditori Caixa Catalunya-l a Pedrera de Barcelona. En la trobada es plantejaren preguntes universals relati ves als límits de la nostra percepció, al disseny de la matèria o a la narrativa de la complexitat circumdant. Va comptar amb la col·laboración de personalitats d'àmbits (...) no científics que, des de la seva perspectiva, contribuiren a destil·l ar l'estètica emanada de les tendències contemporànies d'aquesta disciplina cien tífica. (shrink)

Aquesta publicació recull els textos de les ponències de "L'encontre Fora d'equi libri", organitzat pel Departament de Cultura i Mitjans de Comunicació els dies 5, 6 i 7 de setembre de 2008, que planteja el paper de la inestabilitat i la tra nsformació en el món contemporani. Les causes, els mecanismes i les conseqüèncie s d'estar fora d'equilibri apareixen de forma diversa en els més diversos àmbits de les ciències, les humanitats i la creació en general. L'encontre s'organitzàe n tres (...) sessions: "homo ecologicus", que reflexiona sobre el fer de manera respec tuosa amb l'ambient; "viure el canvi", que reflexiona sobre la necessitat d'adap tació a un món canviant, i "artistes al laboratori", que reflexiona sobre les co ndicions favorables al procés de creació. (shrink)

In the age of neoliberalism, feminists strongly disagree on the ideal legal status of prostitution while the pro-prostitution lobby endeavours to keep their male-dominated business running smoothly. Feminist debates should be concerned with the sex buyers' belief system about women, which is likely to have practical consequences in the way they behave with women (prostituted and non-prostituted) in terms of sexuality and, therefore, for feminist purposes of equality, on a broader scale. A Critical Discourse Analysis of buyer-authored online reviews of (...) prostituted women provides the opportunity to verify whether the relationship they establish with them is based on democratic mutual equality or gendered power relations driven by domination and subordination.En la era del neoliberalismo, no hay consenso entre las feministas acerca del estatus legal que debería tener la prostitución; mientras, el lobby pro-prostitución intenta proteger tan lucrativo negocio. Los debates feministas deben abordar críticamente el sistema de creencias de los sujetos prostituyentes, en tanto que afecta a cómo actúan con las mujeres (prostituidas y no prostituidas) dentro del marco de la sexualidad y, por tanto, al potencial logro de la igualdad fáctica a nivel social. El análisis crítico del discurso online de los sujetos prostituyentes sobre las mujeres prostituidas permite comprobar si las relaciones que establecen con ellas están basadas en términos igualitarios o en la dicotomía dominación-subordinación característica de las relaciones de poder de género. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to elucidate whether and how the theory of erotic capital may function as a feminist tool to subvert the hierarchies and relations in current economy in favour of the empowerment and liberation of women. Thus, by analyzing the ways in which white, liberal feminism directly constructs its claims and petitions through the absorption of liberal epistemological dogmas, we intend to search the direct relation between the ideology developed by white, cisgender feminists and liberal economics (...) and politics. This article demonstrates how a theory of erotic capital does not lead to a feminist subversion of economy, but reinforces the liberal economic and political system that relies on a masculine and androcentric epistemology. The subjectivity that women can achieve through the exploitation of erotic capital is only as consumers and not as productive agents.El objetivo de este artículo es arrojar luz sobre si el capital erótico puede ser considerado una herramienta feminista para la subversión de las jerarquías y relaciones económicas y favorecer una liberación de las mujeres. Para ello, observaremos cómo el feminismo blanco y liberal, ha construido sus peticiones sin cuestionar los principios fundamentales de la economía liberal con el objetivo de demostrar la relación que existe entre el feminismo blanco liberal cisgénero y el sistema político-económico liberal. Este artículo demuestra que la implementación del capital erótico no conduce a una subversión feminista de la economía, sino que fortalece el sistema económico y político liberal que se fundamenta en una epistemología masculina y androcéntrica. La subjetividad a la que acceden las mujeres por medio del capital erótico es en clave de consumidoras. (shrink)

Much recent feminist theory tacitly subscribes to some version of what cognitive and evolutionary scientists are successfully undermining as untenably Cartesian, namely, the view that moral agency is achieved through the transcendence of physical causality guaranteed by self-consciousness. Appealing to Wittgenstein's insights concerning self-reference, I argue that abandoning Cartesian dualism implies abandoning neither subject nor moral agency but rather opens up nonandrocentric possibilities unavailable to the traditional model of mind.

The second-wave feminist critique of privacy defies the liberal opposition between the public-political and the private-personal. Feminist thinkers such as Hanisch, Young or Fraser note that, according to this liberal conception, public institutions often keep asymmetric power relations between private agents away from political discussion and action. The resulting subordination of some agents to others tends, therefore, to be naturalised and redefined as a «personal problem». Drawing on these contributions, this article reviews the social and political implications of big data (...) exploitation and questions whether personal data protection must remain a matter of «privacy self-management». It aims to show that feminist political theory can decidedly help to identify and tackle the root causes of what I call «data domination».La crítica feminista de segunda ola a la privacidad desafía la oposición liberal entre lo público-político y lo privado-personal. Pensadoras feministas como Hanisch, Young o Fraser señalan que, de acuerdo con esta concepción liberal, las instituciones públicas a menudo dejan fuera de la discusión y la acción política las relaciones de poder asimétricas entre agentes privados. La resultante subordinación de unos agentes a otros tiende, por tanto, a ser naturalizada y redefinida como un «problema personal». Basándose en estas contribuciones, este artículo revisa las implicaciones sociales y políticas de la explotación de datos masivos y cuestiona si la protección de los datos personales debe continuar siendo una cuestión de «auto-gestión de la privacidad». Su objetivo es mostrar que la teoría política feminista puede ayudar decididamente a identificar y enfrentar las causas de lo que llamo «dominación a través de los datos». (shrink)

PENSAMENT POSITIVISTA A CATALUNYA és un conjunt d'estudis sobre la recepció al nostre país de les idees culturals, socials, polítiques i científiques del corrent de categories formulades per August Comte i Émile Littré. L'objectiu de l'estudi que es presenta és mostrar el marc històric i institucional —la funció instructora d'ateneus com el Centre de Lectura reusenc— en què es produeix l'evolució de la concepció positivista de la realitat. La recerca se situa en el context contemporani que abocarà a la industrialització (...) i a l'emergència del moviment obrer i republicà. Pel que fa a l'àmbit del pensament econòmic, el volum estudia el programa de Pere Estasén —relació entre política econòmica i territori—, que duu a plantejar la irrupció del positivisme a Catalunya com una estratègia explicativa que vincula les idees generals a la situació de la vida nacional, tant políticament (catalanisme regeneracionista) com econòmicament (proteccionisme com a via de modernització de les estructures productives). En aquesta línia de coneixement sociològic també cal destacar, com es planteja al llibre, un cert gir humanista del cientisme en l'àmbit de la cultura fisiològica representat per les Monografies Mèdiques. Finalment, arran de la lectura del text, el lector es pot arribar a formular un doble interrogant: si existeix un pensament positivista autòcton o bé si a quest pensament sorgeix de la formalització i aplicació de la idea de progrés en un context determinat. (shrink)

This paper employs tools and critiques from analytic feminist scholarship in order to show how particular values commonly on display in analytic theology have served both to marginalize certain voices from the realm of analytic theological debate and to reinforce a particular conception of the divine—one which, despite its historical roots, is not inevitable. I claim that a particular conception of what constitutes a “rational, objective, analytic thinker” often displays certain affinities with those infinite or maximal properties that analytic theologians (...) have taken to be most relevant or essential to their theological conceptions of the divine, and I explore what thinking differently about the former might mean for how we think about the latter and vice versa. (shrink)

The book then addresses the human/animal opposition implicit in much feminist theorizing, arguing that the opposition helps to maintain the essentialism that feminists have so often criticized. The final chapter brings us back from ideas of what 'the animal' is, to ask how these questions might relate to environmental politics, including ecofeminism and animal rights.

Birke, a feminist biologist who has written extensively on the connections between feminism and science, seeks to bridge the gap between feminist cultural analysis and science by looking "inside" the body, using ideas in anatomy and physiology to develop the feminist view that the biological body is socially and culturally constructed. She rejects the assumption that the body's functioning is fixed and unchanging, claiming that biological science offers more than just a deterministic narrative of how nature works. Annotation copyrighted by (...) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

I understand feminist epistemology to be epistemology put at the service of feminist politics. That is, a feminist epistemology is dedicated to answering the many questions about knowledge that arise in the course of feminist efforts to understand and transform patriarchal structures, questions such as: Why have so many intellectual traditions denigrated the cognitive capacities of women? Are there gender differences in epistemic capacities or strategies, and what would be the implications for epistemology if there were? I argue here that (...) such questions situate feminist epistemology much more in mainstream epistemological discussion than probably most feminists would admit, finding that, at least for issues in these areas, the naturalistic approach to the study of knowledge advocated by W. V. Quine has been extremely useful. (shrink)

In this introductory essay, I describe feminist ethics as a kind of approach to morality that says we ought to pay attention to the facts on the ground and empirical information in order to know whether and how a moral problem is a gendered problem. One of the best accounts of feminist ethics is by Hilde Lindemann, who wrote that feminist ethics aims “to understand, criticize, and correct how gender operates within our moral and social beliefs and practices.” She doesn’t (...) define feminism as a theory about women, and neither do I. The term 'feminist' has more to do with the sources of this approach to ethics than the ultimate goals of such theorists; women were influential and early advocates of the view that sometimes a moral problem is a problem because it is gendered. (shrink)

Structural gaslighting arises when conceptual work functions to obscure the non-accidental connections between structures of oppression and the patterns of harm they produce and license. This paper examines the role that structural gaslighting plays in white feminist methodology and epistemology using Fricker’s (2007) discussion of hermeneutical injustice as an illustration. Fricker’s work produces structural gaslighting through several methods: i) the outright denial of the role that structural oppression plays in producing interpretive harm, ii) the use of single-axis conceptual resources to (...) understand intersectional oppression, and iii) the failure to recognize the legacy of women of color’s epistemic resistance work surrounding the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. I argue that Fricker’s whitewashed discussion of epistemic resistance to sexual harassment in the United States is a form of structural gaslighting that fails to treat women of color as knowers and exemplifies the strategic forgetting that is a central methodological tactic of white feminism. (shrink)

Feminist metaphysicians have recently argued that many of the most influential contemporary meta-metaphysical frameworks are at odds with feminist metaphysics. In this paper I argue that the Finean framework of grounding, essence, and reality evades the main challenges that have been raised for alternative frameworks. The upshot of my discussion is that the Finean framework is an apt one for feminist metaphysics.

In this monograph, I offer feminist reasons to develop a multidimensional account of forgiveness as a moral, and therefore at least partially deliberative, action or set of actions, which functions as a remedy in responding to blame or condemnation, releasing offenders from the fullness of their blameworthiness, in relational contexts which therefore require considerations of power between relata. I rely on feminist philosophical account of the relational self in order to contextualise these power relations. I provide accounts of forgiveness as (...) a performative utterance, third-party forgiveness, and self-forgiveness based upon this feminist and multidimensional model of forgiveness. (shrink)

The feminist conception of discourse offered below differs from classical discourse ethics. Arguing that inequalities of power are even more conspicuous in global than in local contexts, I note that a global discourse community seems to be emerging among feminists, and I explore the role played by small communities in feminism's attempts to reconcile a commitment to open discussion, on the one hand, with a recognition of the realities of power inequalities, on the other.

​This book is the first sustained scholarly account of women and goddesses in presocratic philosophy. It approaches the origin of western philosophy via Nietzsche, Feminism, and Embodied Cognition in order to argue that the presocratics were reviving, within the largely patriarchal and death-glorifying culture of archaic Greece, a paleo/neolithic goddess-centered religiosity that affirmed life and rebirth. By taking readers from prehistoric Europe to classical Athens, Joseph I. Breidenstein Jr. provides a novel narrative of the dawn of western philosophy which is (...) more comprehensive than traditional accounts and which helps us address contemporary problems—the patriarchal attitudes and ideas that continue to corrupt academic-philosophical culture; the fascist-dominator lifestyle that continues to threaten western democracy and which is encouraged by the patriarchal aspects of academia; and the consumerism that continues to result from a materialistic-secular paradigm that is being increasingly recognized as both intellectually untenable and socially unsustainable. (shrink)

Several feminist philosophers of science have tried to open up the possibility that feminist ethical or political commitments could play a positive role in good science by appealing to the Duhem-Quine thesis and underdetermination of theories by observation. I examine several different interpretations of the claim that feminist values could play a legitimate role in theory justification and show that none of them follow from a logical gap between theory and observation. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach for defending the (...) possibility that feminist political commitments could play a legitimate role in science. (shrink)

Our universities are the locus of ongoing debates over the politics of gender, of class, of disadvantage and disability—and over the issue of “political correctness.” In _A Feminist I_ Christine Overall offers wide-ranging reflections from a first-person point of view on these issues, and on the politics of the modern university itself. In doing so she continually returns to underlying epistemological concerns. What are our assumptions about the ways in which knowledge is constructed? To what degree are our perceptions shaped (...) by our social roles and identities? In the past generation feminists have led the way in recognising the importance of such questions, and recognising too the ways in which personal experience may be an invaluable reference point in academic theory and practice. But reliance on personal experience is fraught with problems; how is one to deal with tensions between the autobiographical and the analytic? This book points the way to resolving some of those tensions, and to fruitfully sustaining others. It is a book of considerable insight, warm humanity, and genuine importance. (shrink)

An attempt is made to try to delineate the common ground of feminist concerns and the work of Wittgenstein by alluding to several areas of theory - among them are the orality-literacy distinction, the notion of the universal, and the realm of particulars. I cite portions of both the Tractatus and the Investigations, and utilize the work of commentators such as Anscombe, Fogelin and Genova. The broader argument is that Wittgenstein's turn away from a kind of logical atomism is a (...) move that can readily be used for feminist purposes, but that it requires precise articulation and a clear setting-out of conditions. Key Words: feminist theory • orality-literacy • particulars and the universal • reference • Wittgenstein's Investigations • Wittgenstein's Tractatus. (shrink)

In this paper, I ask feminist philosophers and science studies scholars to consider the goals of developing critical analyses of evolutionary psychology. These goals can include development of scholarship in feminist philosophy and science studies, mediation of the uptake of evolutionary psychology by other academic and lay communities, and improvement of the practices and products of evolutionary psychology itself. I evaluate ways that some practices of feminist philosophy and science studies facilitate or hinder meeting these goals, and consider the merits (...) of critical engagement with some of the scientists themselves. Finally, I describe a community of feminist evolutionary psychologists with whom it might be both fruitful and interesting to engage, and identify ways that these interactions may benefit the science and the study of the science. (shrink)

A feminist phenomenological analysis of voice, rooted in both the feminist understanding of the role of voice in identity, agency, and the creation of meaning, and the phenomenological thematization and theorization of phenomenal, lived experience, leads to a deeper understanding of the importance of the materiality of the voices with which we speak, and their role in both subjective and intersubjective experience. Starting from an analysis of the intertwined associations and imageries of the feminine, voice, and embodiment, I discuss the (...) denaturalization and abstraction of voice in standard narratives of voice and voice metaphorization, and the corresponding forgetting of the living, bodily voice. In looking to recall a re-naturalized and immanent corporeality and retrieve the material voice through an account of embodied vocality, I consider examples of the power and immediacy of the corporeal voice in the female operatic voice, and in contrast, the compromised agency and attenuated (inter)subjectivity which attends the impaired or lost physical voice. These vocal counterpoints of presence and absence are often separated by corporeal disturbance or limitation, underscoring the importance of corporeality and the material voice as intermediary between the individual and the social world. This sets the contours of a phenomenology of embodied voice and vocality, holding implications for accounts of identity and intersubjectivity, gendered vocality and expressive agency, and an intercorporeality mediated by the living material voice. (shrink)

Feminist bioethics is a relatively new field, the major works in which only started to appear in the late 1980s. At first feminist bioethicists focused mainly on issues of particular concern to women such as reproduction. Recently, papers have begun to appear that show that a feminist analysis can be brought to bear on any subject traditional bioethics discusses. So far, however, feminist bioethics has not been brought to bear on psychiatry. There have been feminist critiques of psychiatry and feminist (...) discussions of certain diagnostic categories that disproportionately affect women, but these are concerned with womens issues within psychiatry and how psychiatry has been used to oppress women. Certainly these are important, but what has been missing is a discussion of psychiatry in the sense that feminist bioethics suggests a general critique of psychiatry and the rethinking of the practice of psychiatry, regardless of whether the specific instances involved are womens issues. In this paper I look at what such a feminist bioethical intervention into psychiatry would look like. (shrink)

Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept in light of core aims of trans writers and activists. Most importantly, the concept should make good trans people’s understanding of their own gender identities and help understand why misgendering is a serious harm and why it is permissible to require information about people’s gender identities in public (...) life. I conclude that none of the available accounts meets these essential criteria, on the assumption that the gender norms of femininity and masculinity are unjustified. But we can, and should, pursue the feminist project without “gender identity”. Such feminism can include trans people because it is possible to account for the specific harm of misgendering without assuming a claim to the recognition of our gender identities. I conclude that we should eliminate the concept of “gender identity.” To understand the phenomena that are putatively captured by “gender identity,” we are better off employing other concepts, such as “sexual dysphoria,” (assigned or aspirational) “gender roles,” and (internalised or endorsed) “gender norms”. These concepts can usefully replace “gender identity” in an individual evaluation of each of the trans people’s claims to inclusion into particular spaces. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Phyllis Rooney’s 2003 chapter, “Feminist Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology: An Uneasy Alliance,” taking guidance from her critique of naturalized epistemology in pursuing my own analysis of another uneasy alliance: that between feminist epistemology and social epistemology. Investigating some of the background assumptions at work in prominent conceptions of social epistemology, I consider recent analyses of "epistemic bubbles" to ask how closely such analyses are aligned with ongoing research in feminist epistemology. I argue that critical feminist (...) insights in political philosophy are called for here, especially those that focus on multiple politically salient relationships and also emphasize practices of personal transformation as inseparably bound up with broader movements for social transformation. Insofar as feminist epistemology continues to carry another world in its heart, I argue that it will continue to rest uneasily with any effort to align it with—let alone subsume it within—the still emerging field of social epistemology. (shrink)

Standpoint theory is an explicitly political as well as social epistemology. Its central insight is that epistemic advantage may accrue to those who are oppressed by structures of domination and discounted as knowers. Feminist standpoint theorists hold that gender is one dimension of social differentiation that can make such a difference. In response to two longstanding objections I argue that epistemically consequential standpoints need not be conceptualized in essentialist terms, and that they do not confer automatic or comprehensive epistemic privilege (...) on those who occupy them. Standpoint theory is best construed as conceptual framework for investigating the ways in which socially situated experience and interests make a contingent difference to what we know (well), and to the resources we have for determining which knowledge claims we can trust. I illustrate the advantages of this account in terms of two examples drawn from archaeological sources. (shrink)

Building on developments in feminist science scholarship and the philosophy of science, I advocate two methodological principles as elements of a naturalized philosophy of science. One principle incorporates a holistic account of evidence inclusive of claims and theories informed by and/or expressive of politics and non-constitutive values; the second takes communities, rather than individual scientists, to be the primary loci of scientific knowledge. I use case studies to demonstrate that these methodological principles satisfy three criteria for naturalization accepted in naturalized (...) philosophy of science, and allow for the differential assessment of episodes in which values and sociopolitical factors inform, or contribute to the adoption of, theories for which there is sufficient evidential warrant — and episodes in which such factors inform, or contribute to the adoption of, theories for which there is not. I contend that in terms of their empirical and normative import, these principles constitute a further naturalization of the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss how feminist research focusing epistemological issues can be used within computer science. I approach and explore epistemological questions in computer science through a number of themes, which I believe are important to the issues of what knowledge is produced as well as how it is produced and how knowledge is perceived in CS. I discuss for example paradigms and metaphors in computer science, the role of abstractions and the concept of naturalisation. In order to illustrate (...) epistemological views in CS and how these can be questioned from the viewpoints of feminist epistemology, I also do a close reading and commenting of a recent book within the philosophy of computing. (shrink)

In this article I shall be looking at the life and work of Carol P. Christ, ‘…pioneer and founding mother of the Goddess, women's spirituality, and feminist theology movements…’ charting her development from a student of theology, through feminist theology and into full-blown Goddess studies, or thealogy. 1I shall then focus on her continuing efforts to establish thealogy as a legitimate area for academic discourse. Although women's experiences are a legitimate source of theological reflection in feminist theology, Christ controversially draws (...) on personal experience as material for her work on the sacred, which has opened her to criticism. However, there are voices that support thealogy as being both informative and transformative and rightfully belonging within the academic canon. I shall draw, in particular, upon the Introductions and Forewords of her books, as they contain much biographical information, knowledge of which is essential to an understanding of Christ's work. (shrink)

I defend one leading strand of Descartes's thought against feminist criticism. I will show that Descartes's “first-person” approach to our knowledge of minds, which has been criticized on feminist grounds, is at least compatible with key feminist views. My argument suggests that this strand of Cartesianism may even bolster some central feminist positions.

Feminist philosophers have challenged a wide range of gender injustices in professional philosophy. However, the problem of precarity, that is, the increasing numbers of contingent faculty who cannot find permanent employment, has received scarcely any attention. What explains this oversight? In this article, I argue, first, that academics are held in the grips of an ideology that diverts attention away from the structural conditions of precarity, and second, that the gendered dimensions of such an ideology have been overlooked. To do (...) so, I identify two myths: the myth of meritocracy and the myth of work as its own reward. I demonstrate that these myths—and the two-tier system itself—manifest an unmistakably gendered logic, such that gender and precarity are mutually reinforcing and co-constitutive. I conclude that feminist philosophers have particular reason to organize against the casualization of academic work. (shrink)

During the scientific revolution reductionism and mechanism were introduced together. These concepts remained intertwined through much of the ensuing history of philosophy and science, resulting in the privileging of approaches to research that focus on the smallest bits of nature. This combination of concepts has been the object of intense feminist criticism, as it encourages biological determinism, narrows researchers’ choices of problems and methods, and allows researchers to ignore the contextual features of the phenomena they investigate. I argue that the (...) historical link between mechanism and reductionism is not a necessary one, that this link should be severed, and in many cases has already been severed. Teasing reductionism away from mechanism allows us to hold onto the mechanistic view that science should explain how things work, without mandating methods and approaches that reduce the objects of scientific investigation to their smallest parts. Mechanism without reductionism decenters reductive methods, and so creates intellectual space for a plurality of methods that may engage the world at a variety of levels of organization. This ensuing pluralism opens the door for a wide variety of approaches to research, including feminist and gender-sensitive science. (shrink)

Feminist socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy make the presence of idealized social conditions necessary for autonomy. I argue that such conceptions cannot, when applied under nonideal conditions, play two key feminist theoretical roles for autonomy: the roles of anti-oppressive character ideal and paternalism-limiting concept. Instead, they prescribe action that reinforces oppression. Treated as character ideals, socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy ask agents living under nonideal ones to engage in self-harm or self-subordination. Moreover, conceptions of autonomy that make idealized social conditions (...) a requirement of autonomy yield the conclusion that oppressed agents are appropriate objects of paternalism. (shrink)

Feminist criticism of health care and ofbioethics has become increasingly rich andsophisticated in the last years of thetwentieth century. Nonetheless, this body ofwork remains quite marginalized. I believe thatthere are (at least) two reasons for this.First, many people are still confused aboutfeminism. Second, many people are unconvincedthat significant sexism still exists and aretherefore unreceptive to arguments that itshould be remedied if there is no largerbenefit. In this essay I argue for a thin,``core'' conception of feminism that is easy tounderstand and (...) difficult to reject. Corefeminism would render debate within feminismmore fruitful, clear the way for appropriaterecognition of differences among women andtheir circumstances, provide intellectuallycompelling reasons for current non-feminists toadopt a feminist outlook, and facilitatemutually beneficial cooperation betweenfeminism and other progressive socialmovements. This conception of feminism alsomakes it clear that feminism is part of alarger egalitarian moral and political agenda,and adopting it would help bioethics focus onthe most urgent moral priorities. In addition,integrating core feminism into bioethics wouldopen a gateway to the more speculative parts offeminist work where a wealth of creativethinking is occurring. Engaging with thisfeminist work would challenge and strengthenmainstream approaches; it should also motivatemainstream bioethicists to explore othercurrently marginalized parts of bioethics. (shrink)

The primary contribution of feminism to bioethics is to note how imbalances of power in the sex‐gender system play themselves out in medical practice and in the theory surrounding that practice. I trace the ten‐year history of feminist approaches to bioethics, arguing that while feminists have usefully critiqued medicine's biases in favor of men, they have unmasked sexism primarily in the arena of women's reproductive health, leaving other areas of health care sorely in need of feminist scrutiny. I note as (...) well that feminist bioethicists have contributed very little to bioethical theory. In the second part of the paper I suggest two future directions for feminist bioethics. The first is to expand its critique of gender bias beyond reproductive medicine, devoting attention to the same issues raised by advances in biomedical technology as are taken up by mainstream bioethicists. The second is to develop bioethical theory that is more responsive than are mainstream moral theories to the social practices that subordinate women and minority groups. (shrink)

This article examines the best contemporary arguments for a feminist epistemology of scientific knowledge as found in recent works by S. Harding. I argue that no feminist epistemology of science is worthy of the name, because such an epistemology fails to escape well-known vicissitudes of epistemic relativism. But feminist epistemology merits attention from philosophers of science because it is part of a larger relativist turn in the social sciences and humanities that now aims to extend its critique to science, and (...) Harding's "standpoint feminism" is the best-developed case. She attempts to make new use of discredited philosophical ideas concerning underdetermination, Planck's Hypothesis, and the role of counterfactuals in historical studies of science. (shrink)

Should feminist ethical theories include rights as a component? There is a tension between feminist politics and the endorsement of the language of “women’s rights,” and feminist ethics and its critique of rights.1 In this paper I begin the project of reconciling moral theories that include rights as a component with feminist criticisms of rights. There are two parts to this project. First, I must respond to the criticisms feminists have made against rights theories in order to show that it (...) is possible for a moral theory that includes rights to be a feminist moral theory. Answering these criticisms is necessary if I am to establish that moral theories that include rights are among the candidate theories from which feminists might choose. Second, I must develop a feminist moral theory that encompasses rights, and argue for its superiority to other sorts of moral theories in order to show that a moral theory that encompasses rights is a plausible feminist moral theory. Going beyond responding to criticisms and developing a positive feminist rights theory is necessary if feminists are to find rights theories to be attractive candidate moral theories.2 In this paper I am concerned mostly with the first part of the project, responding to some feminist arguments against theorizing about morality in terms of rights, although in the course of responding to the objections I make remarks that might suggest ways in which some rights theories might be developed as feminist moral theories. (shrink)

This paper develops a new feminist paradigm for global justice that includes several components. I deploy a non-ideal ethics approach based on an argumentabout what principle of justice is possible to act on, given a historical and intersectional feminist analysis of what kind of feminist coalitions are possible in the present period. I claim that the time is ripe for a new progressive feminist Solidarity paradigm of justice that supersedes the classical liberal debates between Libertarian Freedom paradigm and the Social (...) Democrat Equality paradigm of Justice. I outline the antiglobalization economic and political networks coming into existence, as evidenced by networks of worker-owned cooperatives, labor unions, fair trade commitments, squatter and other land reform movements. Such movements are creating the material conditions in which North-South women’s coalition movements, based not on essentialist but on transformational identities, can unite around various issues of global gender justice, including reproductive rights, environmental justice, and the feminization of poverty. (shrink)

What is feminist curiosity? Or better yet, how is feminist curiosity practiced, where is it practiced, and with whom is it practiced? In this essay, I develop a philosophical account of feminist curiosity by drawing on direct contributions from the feminist philosophical tradition, but also by interweaving scattered testaments to feminist curiosity from critical race theory, intersex studies, disability studies, and trans studies. What surfaces in this inquiry is an account of feminist curiosity that goes far beyond the act of (...) asking feminist questions. Feminist curiosity proper, I suggest, reconfigures not simply what gets asked, but with whom, where, and how inquiry happens. Feminist curiosity is rooted in companionship (with self and others), reorients time (a visionary future, but also a material past and present), and resists oppressive forms of inquiry such as spectacularization and the presumptions of access. As such, feminist curiosity is committed not only to a relational world but to a relational investigation of that world. (shrink)

This article draws on research at an eco/feminist peace camp set up to facilitate blockades against clear-cut logging in coastal temperate rainforest in Clayoquot Sound on Vancouver Island, British Columbia, in Canada in the early 1990s. The camp was said to be based on feminist principles and sometimes these were even articulated as eco/feminist principles. The slippage between these terms provides a focus for my discussion. Specifically the article explores the apparent paradox of the sheer vitality of this eco/feminist activism, (...) and in particular its insistence on international connections, in contrast to the widely circulating accounts of the end of feminism, and especially the end of global sisterhood, which emerged in the early 1990s. Thus this article is also necessarily about how recent histories of eco/feminism, including tensions between theory and activism, are narrated. I take as a departure point references to the work of Vandana Shiva and the Chipko movement which circulated in accounts of the camp, and explore ways in which eco/feminists might read such utterances as more than evidence of a naive and problematic universalism. I situate eco/feminism’s internationalism genealogically in feminism and eco/feminism and read this as a counter-narrative to the ending of global sisterhood. Through paying attention to various movements, back and forth, between Clayoquot and Chipko, Canada and India, and drawing on Anna Tsing’s notion of ‘friction’, I offer an account of what has been at stake in disavowals of the possibility of reading Chipko as eco/feminist, and suggest the importance of a more generous reading of eco/feminists’ attention to the Chipko movement. (shrink)

‘Feminist masculinity’ might seem like a contradiction in terms. One might have assumed that we can embrace feminism or embrace masculinity, but not both. If traditional masculinity is contrary to feminist values, a pressing query for feminist men is whether repudiation of traditional masculinity should move one to reject normative masculinity entirely, or to reframe and reclaim it instead. bell hooks and Michael Kimmel each counsel against discarding manhood and masculinity. hooks envisions feminist masculinity as an alternative to patriarchal dominance, (...) with masculinity to be reconstituted in terms of love, integrity, and mutuality; Kimmel advocates moving from immature and traditional masculinities toward justice and democratic manhood, with a new model of masculinity that identifies real men with adulthood and doing the right thing. Neither proposal provides a viable stance for feminist men without collapsing into androgyny or risking erasure of some men’s and women’s identities and experiences. Building on Alcoff’s work on anti-racist whiteness, I suggest that feminist allyship practices ground a normative model of masculinity compatible with, and informed by, feminist values. We may understand allyship masculinities as open-ended feminist approaches to manhood: masculinities predicated on recognizing and responding to, rather than ignoring or accepting, the privileges and expectations distinctive of men under patriarchy. (shrink)

Many influential Western feminists of diverse backgrounds have expressed concerns that multiculturalism, while strengthening the power of racial ethnic minorities vis-à-vis the majority, worsens the position of its most vulnerable members, women. Despite their good intentions, these feminists have been consistently dismissive of the voices of racial ethnic women, many of whom argue for the importance of sustaining their own “illiberal” cultures within the Western context. I offer a Third World feminist defense of multiculturalism by paying attention to these women (...) whose varying assessments of multiculturalism are less unequivocally negative, more ambivalent and complex, and even affirming and positive. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the standard notion of informed choice is unacceptable and must be replaced. To do so, I examine Foucault's analysis of people in contemporary society, drawing attention to the ways power relations act upon us, and to the possibility of resistance. I show how feminist moral theory can be enriched by Foucault's analysis. Applying this new understanding of people and moral theory to an analysis of informed choice, I claim that the standard (...) notion of informed choice is unacceptable, in part because it relies on a false conception of people. Its “necessary” features—intention, understanding, and absence of controlling influences—are much more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain than proponents of the standard notion believe. I end by offering direction for creating a new, Foucault-inspired, feminist theory of informed choice. (shrink)

In the process of challenging epistemological assumptions that preclude relationships between knowers and the objects of knowing, feminist epistemologists Lorraine Code and Donna Haraway also can be interpreted as troubling forms of argumentation predicated on positivist-derived logic. Against the latter, Christopher Tindale promotes a rhetorical model of argument that appears able to better engage epistemologies of situated knowledges. I detail key features of the latter from Code, especially, and compare and contrast them with relevant parts of Tindale’s discussion of context (...) on the rhetorical model, and I suggest ways that his work could be expanded to accommodate rhetorical implications of situated knowledges. (shrink)

In this essay I distinguish four different modes of feminist critique of reason. Discussing the work of authors such as Keller, Irigaray, and Butler, I point out that the issue of masculine connotations has been addressed with regard to different concepts-or at least different aspects-of reason. In view of a tendency to overdraw the objections, I suggest to reformulate the feminist critique of reason. I also argue that a rediscovery of those philosophical concepts of reason that do not restrict this (...) term to instrumental rationality might be useful for this purpose. (shrink)

In this paper I critique two popular, non-scientific attitudes toward genetically engineered foods. In doing so, I will be employing the concepts of ambiguity, purity/impurity, control/resistance, and unity/diversity as developed by Latina feminist metaphysicians. I begin by casting a critical eye toward a specific anti-biotech account of transgenic food crops, an account that I will argue relies on an anti-feminist metaphysics. I then cast that same critical eye toward a specific pro-biotech account, arguing that it also relies on such an (...) anti-feminist metaphysics. I will argue further that this metaphysics yields a less accurate account of genetics. I end by arguing that if we adopt a Latina feminist metaphysics we can more accurately understand plants, genetics, and genetic engineering. (shrink)

How has feminism changed in the UK since the 1960s? This was the question I set out to explore in my research on the British Women’s Liberation Movement, published as Radical Feminism: Feminist Activism in Movement (2015). I found that the motivations and aspirations of activists today were similar to those reported by feminists of the Second Wave; but the methods and tactics were more professionalized and there was less of a focus on women-only space.

Abstract: This essay explores the relation between feminist epistemology and the problem of philosophical skepticism. Even though feminist epistemology has not typically focused on skepticism as a problem, I argue that a feminist contextualist epistemology may solve many of the difficulties facing recent contextualist responses to skepticism. Philosophical skepticism appears to succeed in casting doubt on the very possibility of knowledge by shifting our attention to abnormal contexts. I argue that this shift in context constitutes an attempt to exercise unearned (...) social and epistemic power and that it should be resisted on epistemic and pragmatic grounds. I conclude that skepticism is a problem that feminists can and should take up as they address the social aspects of traditional epistemological problems. (shrink)