THE FIRST EXHAUSTIVELY SCIENTIFIC, speculative inquiry into the notion and nature of essence in the Western philosophical tradition is found in Aristotle's Metaphysics. In contrast to the earlier Greek philosophers and Plato, after considering the problem of being and change Aristotle reached the conclusion that the essential identity of material phenomena, or ousia, is an immanent and inseparable quality that forms the identity of each particular phenomenon. In Aristotle's concept, however, which constitutes the original form of phenomenal realism, (...) ousia is not "it"-self some-thing or some it. For though its presence may certainly be speculatively implied, "it" is not. Following Aristotle, though, and for reasons extraneous to the theme of this present article, the speculative inquiry into the nature of essence and phenomenality deviated from the orientation that Aristotle initially imputed to that study, evolving in a philosophical milieu whose theoretical propensity was predominantly transcendental. This article, then, focuses on the problematic of essential identity in the Western transcendental tradition, and, more particularly, seeks to contrast and compare the essence of the transcendental philosophers against the ousia of Aristotle's metaphysic. (shrink)

This article attempts to develop the abandoned occasionalist model of causation into a credible present-day theory. If objects can never exhaust one another through their relations, it is hard to know how they can ever interact at all. This article handles the problem by dividing objects into two kinds: the real objects that emerge from Heidegger’s tool-analysis and the intentional objects of Husserl’s phenomenology. Each of these objects turns out to be split by an additional rift between the object as (...) an enduring unit and its plurality of traits. This explains Heidegger’s notorious ‘fourfold’ model of the thing. This article shows that Heidegger’s Geviert must be reinterpreted as a system of four tensions that can be identified as time, space, essence, and eidos. Time and space can no longer be left as peerless dimensions of the cosmos. Instead, they are shown to arise from the tensions between things and their qualities. And for this reason they are joined by essence (in the classical sense of the term) and eidos (in Husserl’s sense, not Plato’s) as two out of four basic features of the fabric of the world. (shrink)

Given Locke’s views on primary and secondary qualities, it seems he is committed to there being real underlying properties in objects, the arrangement and disposition of which underlies and produces the observed properties of that object. It might be natural to think that these primary qualities provide a general system for classifying objects into classes: that we could delineate the real kinds of objects in nature by looking at what their real primary qualities were. A list of the particular qualities (...) of some object would define that object perfectly precisely; by looking at which properties were shared or divergent between this object and others, we group the object with others in the same kind. These real kinds in nature can play several important theoretical roles. They can support real scientific understanding, including inductive inferences (iof things are of the same real kind, then observed properties of one support the inference to unobserved properties of the other); they can form the basis for our judgements about the powers and capacities of particular objects, based on the what other things of that type can do; and these real kinds can provide the meanings for general terms: the thought being that the meanings of class names are empty without real classes to which they correspond. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:What Is Literature? What Is Art?Integrating Essence and HistoryJerry Farber (bio)I. Aesthetic ExperienceThere remains a widespread belief among literature professors that literature doesn't exist; that is, that it has no stable, transhistorical identity. The very term "literature," we are reminded, shifts its meaning from one century to another. And even if someone should insist that, when they talk about literature, they're not talking about writings in general or (...) a familiarity with books or whatever else the term "literature" may have signified in the past, but only about those texts that one might consider aesthetic, what has this person gained? Not much—since a literature professor who, in recent decades, has turned for answers to the philosophical study of aesthetics will have been likely to confront either a Wittgensteinian dismantling of "art" or, more commonly these days, an institutional theory that defines "art" not on the basis of any properties that it might possess or of any function that it might serve, but solely on the basis of its relation to a cultural institution that, in return, is identified in relation to "art." One might be forgiven for concluding that to follow this quest for essence from "literature" to "aesthetic" or "art" is to go from one sinking ship to another.So literature—as Terry Eagleton, for example, has continued to insist through two editions of his widely read Literary Theory: An Introduction1 —doesn't exist. Which makes it awkward to be a literature professor and helps to explain why so many of us have tried to reinvent ourselves as professors of something else. But this is by no means a mere problem of academic nomenclature, since more than a few of us continue to believe on some level (a level obviously below the graduate level) that there is something there all the same, something that is more stable and less culturally contingent than our theories tell us it is. We just don't know how to legitimize that belief. This dilemma tends to be reflected one way or another in [End Page 1] our teaching. We may repress any essentialist qualms and seek a lofty theoretical consistency as cultural historians for whom aesthetics is merely one more thing to situate—and we pass this disbelief in literature on to our students. Or we may learn to live with cognitive dissonance and pass that on to our students. Literature is hardly alone among the arts in its identity problem, but it does seem to have a more advanced case.Someone came for a job interview on my campus a few years ago, fresh out of a fairly prestigious doctoral program. He made his presentation and then mentioned during the question period afterward that, in his classes, he did make an effort not to ignore a text's aesthetic qualities. He stopped, looked around apprehensively, and said, "I know the term's problematic, of course...""So how do you resolve that?" I asked.He shrugged. "I don't know really."Nonetheless, just as there has been a "return of the aesthetic" in broader terms, books and articles have been appearing from the mid-90s on, arguing for or heralding a reemergence of the aesthetic in literary study.2 Certainly this makes sense, if only as a way of trying to shore up our precarious position in the academy, since, as has been repeatedly observed, literary study, in the absence of any delimiting aesthetic criterion, simply dissolves into other disciplines. And if literature doesn't exist, why spend money on literature professors? Why not hire real historians, sociologists, philosophers, psychologists, etc., to do those more respectable and definable things we keep claiming we do? But still, practical motives aside, what is to be the theoretical basis for any return to literary aesthetics? Can this merely be a matter of fashion? Will "the return of the repressed" do as a justification?The time has come, I think, not to revert to a simple, blind faith in "literature" and "art," but to find a way of reconciling our stubborn essentialist belief, on one hand, and our constructionist perspective, on the other—a way of understanding and teaching literature... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: From Being to Essence Essence and Seeming Reflexion Positing and Presupposing External and Determining Reflexion Identity and Difference Diversity Reflexive and Non‐reflexive Immediacy Reflexion and the Concept Conclusion Abbreviations.

Descartes is often identified as having fired one of the opening shots of the scientific revolution: rejecting the four Aristotelian causes in favor of the efficient causes characteristic of mechanistic science. Scholars often write as if Cartesian science and corporeal metaphysics is best understood as a rejection of all causal notions other than the efficient. I argue that this is a mistake. On the contrary, Descartes endorses an avowedly Aristotelian notion of formal causality, inherited from Suárez, and this notion is (...) central to his physics and corporeal metaphysics. -/- I begin by tracing the history of the formal cause from Aristotle to Aquinas and Suárez. My main thesis here is that the Aristotelian notion of formal causation picks out two distinct explanatory modes. The first is linked to hylomorphic ontology, and so by rejecting hylomorphism Descartes rejects one sort of formal causation. Crucially, however, the Aristotelians also identify explanations from essence as a species of formal causality. Now, Descartes’s entire philosophical project is built upon the intellectual perception of the essences of God, mind, and matter; the uncovering and exercise of this broadly Platonic intellectual capacity is, as Descartes explained to Hobbes, a key raison d’être for project of the Meditations. So we might expect Descartes to embrace formal causal explanations from essence, which harmonize so thoroughly with his philosophical project. And indeed, this is what we find. This is most obvious in the case of the ontological argument. In the course of defending the claim that God is causa sui, Descartes explicitly appeals to formal causation and claims to be only be “following in the footsteps” of Aristotle. Thus, there is a Cartesian notion of formal causation that is both continuous with and distinct from its Aristotelian predecessors. -/- Other cases are less obvious, but no less important. For example, one of the most strikingly “modern” aspects of Cartesian physics is its emphasis on quantitative laws. Yet Descartes’s official account of how these laws explain particular phenomena is puzzling: He claims that the laws are causes. This, however, is prima facie absurd; Descartes seems to claim that the law of inertia is literally pushing the moon forward along its orbital path. I argue that this is not and cannot be what Descartes means. On the contrary, he clearly takes the laws of physics to follow from the divine essence, especially immutability and simplicity. The laws are true and epistemically accessible to us because they follow from the divine essence. In other words, Descartes thinks nomological explanation in physics is formal causal explanation from (the divine) essence. -/- Another central issue is the impenetrability, or solidity, of matter. I offer a close reading and reconstruction of Descartes’s argument that matter is necessarily but not essentially impenetrable, and I show how Descartes accounts for impenetrability without compromising his mathematical conception of the corporeal. Descartes argues that impenetrability follows from the nature of matter as geometrical extension, thereby reducing a paradigmatic quality of matter (its solidity) to quantity (extension). Note that the explanatory bite throughout is from essence. Thus, while solidity is not a genuine corporeal causal power, it does give bodies an ineliminable causal role in Cartesian physics and corporeal metaphysics. This role is as a formal cause, since every explanation from impenetrability is ipso facto an explanation from the corporeal essence, geometrical extension. This, in turn, shows that Descartes has a principled response to idealists, like Berkeley, who claim that matter’s lack of efficient causal power implies idealism; Berkeley’s mistake, Descartes would argue, lies in equating efficient causality with causality simpliciter. -/- Thus, I argue that formal causal explanation from essence is both well-attested textually in Descartes and is consonant with some of his deepest projects and commitments, including his Platonic intellectualism and mathematization of the corporeal. All this in mind, it is shocking how little attention has been paid to formal causation in Descartes’s metaphysics. If I am right, a thorough re-thinking of Descartes’s physics and metaphysics is long overdue. (shrink)

Quality of nursing cannot be assessed in terms of performance referenced criteria, but only in terms of the personal qualities displayed in the performance. The key to improvement in practice may be the improvement of emotional and motivational tendencies. In essence, professional development implies personal development. Harré makes a distinction between ‘powers to do’ and ‘powers to be’ (a state of being). The former are the capacities that individuals acquire to perform their tasks and roles. Professional development therefore (...) involves, first, the acquisition of the capacities necessary for the successful completion of a set of professional tasks (the powers to do). Secondly, it involves the acquisition of the appropriate emotions and motivations, and the theories about human nature and the conduct that underpins them (the powers to be). Therefore, these capacities cannot be derived from an analysis of tasks, since what are defined as tasks in the first place are determined by the exercise of such powers. The acquisition of attitudes constitutes a source of competent practice. Harré’s model of ‘personal identity’ provides a conceptual framework for thinking about the process of the acquisition of nursing competence and its relationship to differing views of nursing. Considerations relating to different priorities within Harré’s model make it possible to raise questions about the objectives of competence at different stages. (shrink)

The notion of essence in psychology is examined from a constructivist viewpoint. The constructivist position is summarized and differentiated from social constructionism, after which constructs are distinguished from concepts in order to position ontology and epistemology as modes of construing. After situating constructivism in relation to philosophical approaches to essences, the distinction between essences and kinds is examined and the presumed constructivist critique of essences in psychology outlined. It is argued that criticizing constructivism as an “anything goes” form of (...) antirealism fails to grasp how constructivist psychology, by emphasizing structure and viability, does indeed place limits on the constructions people may hold. In applying a constructivist understanding of essences in general to those fundamental to human psychology, people can be seen as having three essential psychological qualities: they are closed systems, active meaning-makers, and irreducibly social beings. Yet a constructivist view also maintains that these psychological essences only hold while operating within and committed to a constructivist perspective. In other words, what counts as an essence always depends on one's assumptions, or how one construes events. Finally, a personal construct theory model of essentialist and nonessentialist construing is introduced based on the assumption that everyone construes in both essentialist and nonessentialist ways at different times because doing so is pragmatically viable. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The question of how to improve the quality of nursing care is quite properly perceived to be at the heart of the contemporary nursing debate. Yet it is not clear what quality in health care is; nor is it clear what quality nursing care is. This article will explore why quality issues are such a matter of concern in public and political debate and how different concepts of quality determine different definitions of nursing. The former (...) definitions constitute a developmental continuum of nursing from minimally acceptable levels of competence to excellence. It is argued that the quality of nursing cannot be assessed in terms of performance referenced criteria, but only in terms of the personal qualities displayed in the performance. The key to improvement in practice may be the improvement of emotional and motivational tendencies. In essence, professional development implies personal development. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the relationships between language, definition and being in Antisthenes. I start from Plato’s Sophist 251b–c, in which the reference to the ὀψιμαθεῖς stands out, and I conclude that it is not possible to identify these characters with Antisthenes. The conception of ὀψιμαθεῖς provides for the exclusive legitimacy of identical judgments, exploiting in an eristic sense an evident Eleatic legacy. But this position, rather than concordances, reveals serious opposition to what is surely known to us (...) of the logical and linguistic doctrines of Antisthenes. The most explicit testimony about the relationship between language and being in Antisthenes is handed down by Porphyry, who attributes to Antisthenes the equation λέγειν = λέγειν τι = λέγειν τὸ ὄν. My analysis intends to show that this equation is assumed by Antisthenes through a Socratic mediation and has a double objective: to ensure an objective reference of language, as opposed to Gorgias’ self-referential conception of language, and to nullify the antilogy, which is typical of sophistic argumentation. To it Antisthenes contrasts the ἐπίσκεψις τῶν ὀνομάτων, which is a development of Socratic ἐξετάζειν, and whose aim is to reach, at the end of the examination, no longer just a ὁμολογία, but a definition valid once and for all. Antisthenes is aware that there is a distinction between essence and quality, and with this, he moves a first important step beyond the univocal conception of being proper to Parmenides. The doxography will sum up Antisthenes’ position by describing him as the first philosopher to advance a definition of logos, i. e., definition. He bases his theory of definition on the identification of that attribute which is ἴδιον καὶ οἰκεῖον of the proposed object. Antisthenes coined the phrase τὸ τί ἦν to designate what the predicate is meant to say in a definition, i. e., the proper quality. This expression does not seem to identify the general notion of a predicate as such, but rather to indicate the determination or qualification necessary to actually define the object in question. In the final part of my article, I examine some testimonies that show how, with his theory of definition, Antisthenes is, and was considered already in antiquity, the precursor of the Stoic theory of definition, whose objective is, according to Chrysippus’ formula, to provide the explanation of what is proper (ἰδίου ἀπόδοσις). (shrink)

This article describes the conception of sensory perception during the early modern period. It discusses David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature where he contrasted the ancient metaphysics of substantial forms and occult qualities with the metaphysics of the Moderns. The article argues that Hume was fundamentally correct and that the doctrine of secondary qualities is indeed a distinctively modern doctrine that captures something of the very essence of the new philosophical age.

Argues that later developments in Leibniz's thinking about the relation between perfection and existence provide a more promising basis for a version of his ontological argument for theism – a version that is substantively metaphysical rather than purely logical in nature. These developments involve viewing existence not as one of the qualities into which an essence may be analyzed, but as entailing a higher‐order property or status that an essence may have. The revised argument rests on a strong (...) form of the principle of sufficient reason and on the thesis that a bias in favor of existence is built into the foundations of ontology. (shrink)

Recent interpreters portray Aristotle as a Protagorean antirealist, who thinks that colors and other perceptibles do not actually exist apart from being perceived. Against this, I defend a more traditional interpretation: colors exist independently of perception, to which they are explanatorily prior, as causal powers that produce perceptions of themselves. They are not to be identified with mere dispositions to affect perceivers, or with grounds distinct from these qualities, picked out by their subjective effect on perceivers (so-called “secondary qualities”). Rather, (...) they are intrinsic qualities of objects, which are in reality just as they appear to be. At the same time, Aristotle rejects any “simple theory of color” according to which the essence and nature of colors is fully revealed in experience. Although the character of perceptibles as they are experienced is “better known to us,” their essence and nature only comes to be known through a correct theory. (shrink)

There is a remarkable difference between Plato scholarship and Aristotle scholarship. Despite Xenophon’s Memorabilia, Socrates was the ironic philosopher par excellence, and Plato’s own writing style quite obviously preserved, or even further enhanced, this distinguished quality of his teacher. Although Plato himself left no doubt that Socrates’ questioning and irony was no play, but rather quite literally a matter of life and death, Plato had recourse to playfulness in his presentation of such deadly matters, be it only in order (...) to cope with his own mourning for Socrates and to express, as well as hide, his bitter sarcasm, scorn, and anger for those people who finally sentenced Socrates to death. Teaching, learning, and interpretation often have an aspect of assimilation. Thus, there is a large tribe whose members—sometimes playfully, sometimes less so—claim that studies on Plato should adopt the peculiar quality of the object of their studies. Even some of the members of the other tribe of Plato scholarship, the Vlastonians, sometimes cannot avoid doing so, and one can gratefully acknowledge that they often perform this half-voluntary exercise in a graceful manner. None of this can be found in scholarship on Aristotle. Aristotle’s texts, which were almost exclusively notes for lectures, are for the most part extremely sober. So, too, is the scholarship on Aristotle. The division of playfulness and labor within Plato scholarship itself, as well as between research on Plato and Aristotle, is certainly very fruitful and by no means unreasonable. Still, a certain playfulness in Reiner Schürmann’s thinking has always waited for an echo in Aristotle studies; for a response to one aspect of his wide-ranging interests. In this paper, I will first comment upon some fragments of one of Aristotle’s dialogues. This will be followed by a few general remarks on the notions of τί ἦν εἶναι and οὐσία. Thereupon, I will address aspects of Metaphysics VII:4-6, in which Aristotle discusses the notion of τί ἦν εἶναι. Finally, in light of the preceding sections of this paper, I will take up Reiner Schürmann’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of ἀρχή. (shrink)

In this paper, I will discuss the need for a theory of essences within Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) and then formulate one. I will do so by drawing on Graham Harman’s work on OOO and Martin Heidegger’s thought on the essence of being, presented in his Introduction to Metaphysics. Harman touches on essences, describing them as the tension between a withdrawn object and its withdrawn qualities, but fails to distinguish between essential and inessential qualities within this framework. To fill in (...) the gaps, I will turn to Heidegger’s explication of phusis in order to show that an essential aspect of being is how one enters into causal relations and continually reveals oneself to other beings. In bringing OOO and Heidegger together, I will find that each object has a unique way of exerting itself in the world and that the domestic relations that make up this unique profile are essential to it, while other domestic relations, those that do not influence its particular way of exerting itself, are inessential. Thus, the essence will be found to be the set of domestic relations that make up the determinate form, or unique causal profile, of the object. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:125. HUME ON PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES Hume's view of the primary/secondary quality distinction is, I believe, a matter of considerable interest. It bears upon Hume's position in relation to Locke and Berkeley, and has important implications for general features of his epistemology and metaphysics. The central part of my discussion will therefore be taken up with a consideration of those passages from his writings in which Hume (...) refers to the primary/ secondary quality distinction. Hume's treatment of this aspect of the 'modern philosophy' may be seen against the background of his discussion of perception and its objects, and it is therefore this with which I begin. HUME'S SYSTEM I refer to Hume's system in relation to perception and the manner in which objects affect the senses. Hume's avowed purpose here is to discuss the way in which objects appear to the senses (in particular, those of sight and touch), rather than to account for their real nature and operations. Our ignorance of the nature of bodies reflects the fact that we are limited in experience to those properties of objects which discover themselves 2 to the senses. In determining the nature of Hume's system there are, I think, two (related) factors to be taken into account: (i) Hume's distinction between perceptions and objects; and (ii) Hume's critique of the Naive or Direct Realist theory of perception. (i) Perceptions and Objects The distinction which Hume wishes to make between perceptions and objects, and his general account of the relation between them, is embodied in his 126. discussion of the idea of external existence (T 6). We may observe, that 'tis universally allow'd by philosophers, and is besides pretty obvious of itself, that nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and· ideas, and that external objects become known to us only by the perceptions they 3 occasion. We should note that what Hume is describing here is, in essence, the Indirect Realist account of perception, i.e. that we are acquainted with an external reality only in the form of perceptions ('impressions') which arise from sensory contact with it. That Hume is prepared to speak elsewhere of per4 ceptions in their relation to external objects as images is indicative of his commitment to a Representative theory. There are, of course, severe limitations upon our understanding of the relation between perceptions and objects. As every idea is deriv'd from a preceding perception, 'tis impossible our idea of a perception, and that of an object or external existence can ever represent what are specifically different from each other. In so far as external objects are supposed to differ from perceptions in their specific identity, we can form only a relative idea of them (T 68). Nevertheless the idea of bodies or objects is clearly to be distinguished from that of perceptions; while being specifically the same, like ideas and impressions, these items, or rather the ideas involved, are attended with the supposition of a difference, that is unknown and incomprehensible (T 244). As different existences perceptions and objects may be conceived to differ in respect of their relational properties, for example, but otherwise whatever is true of the one must also be true of the other. These two sets of distinctions — between, on the one hand, ideas and impressions and, on the other, perceptions and objects — may usefully be compared and 127. contrasted. In each case the items with which we are concerned are numerically different but specifically identical; and, furthermore, the relation between the items which make up each pair is a causal one. The obvious difference between the two cases is that while both impressions and ideas are objects of experience, the causal dependence of the one upon the other being revealed by the order of their appearance before the mind, we do not directly experience external objects as opposed to perceptions. Questions concerning the 'real nature' of objects or bodies belong to the province of natural - rather than 'moral' - philosophy, which indeed has reasonable hypotheses to offer (T 48). As for our idea of body, this comprises nothing more than the ideas... (shrink)

The article is a bold extraction of the intangible cultural heritage (ICH) value of traditional African education, attempting to capture the essence of what education made a young person be when he/she qualified for marriage. At the marriage stage an adult was given the green light to become the head of a family and manager of a home, and permitted make all the decisions touching on the family and, at the same time, take care of the community and country (...) at large. In that situation, Prof. F.X. Gichuru has identified the qualifications as five pillars, viz. self-discipline, self-drive, integrity, harmony and patriotism, qualities that have been eroded in Kenya today by modernization and westernization, rendering the people generally irresponsible and non-accountable. The author proposes the five pillars as a solution to this problem, thereby creating a new accountable and responsible people, a new nation and a new leadership quality, targeting the young as the people to culturally transform in the space of twenty years. The African Cultural Regeneration Institute the author founded, now accredited by UNESCO to advise on ICH in Africa, has been proposed as the institution to champion this transformation of the national ethos of Kenya, starting with an initial action of two years. The success of the model will serve other countries of Africa and, indeed, the global community, in showing how ICH can be used to solve the challenges of modern society. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Randall Allsup, “Music Teacher Quality and Expertise”Bennett ReimerI am delighted to have this opportunity to reflect on Randall Allsup’s excellent, incisive, and wise paper. The issues he raises reach to the core of who we have been, where we are now, and how we must adapt ourselves to new challenges that deeply question both our ideals and our practices.Allsup’s opening questions relate directly to the most (...) pressing matters our profession is now facing—questions philosophical in essence. What kind of music teachers do our students deserve? What is the purpose of public education? And how do we get beyond our continuing and understandable desire for better-trained music teachers to ask the more pertinent question of what constitutes effective music teaching and learning in what the musical world is swiftly becoming. He has the courage to address this level of complexity seriously, and to make significant progress toward clarification. That deserves my respect and, I am quite sure, the respect of all of us.Allsup approaches his central premise on the significant changes needed in our professional identity by reminding us that we have “a long and distinguished [End Page 108] commitment to teaching and teachers.” That commitment, however, is based on the established assumption that music education is founded on excellence of performance as its ultimate goal and its greatest value. To achieve this musical end, he points out, requires mastery, attained through prolonged, careful apprenticeship. This “long running pedagogy of mastery and excellence appears closed to, or at least hostile to, innovation and popular input.”In addition, he argues, this belief system embroils all of us, teachers and their students, in the dichotomy of, on the one hand, replication of existing excellence as our goal, and, on the other, the need for emancipation from what was and what is, toward what might be; the need, that is, for transformation. The past, he recognizes, cannot simply be ignored: it is too precious for that. The future, however, also cannot be excluded. Within this antinomy we must find our way, honoring the past while not allowing it to constrict our future.At this point in his exposition Allsup approaches the proposition he is harboring, a proposition I want to explore for its potential in both clarity and complication. The basis of his key proposal is our need for teachers who are able “to think openly and less certainly about the design and implementation of musical instruction. Our pluralistic society,” he continues, “makes it imperative that we multiply the methods employed in the pursuit and construction of knowledge.”To accomplish this, Allsup presents a foundational dichotomy. There are “open forms of music” relating to “new and evolving ways of aesthetic participation that break with our traditional processes and our established codes and standards.” Contrasting with open forms are “closed forms,” representing the authoritative, the certain, and the canonic. “Closed forms,” he says, “represent culturally-structured and norm-driven literacies, where valuations of goodness pre-exist any aesthetic encounters.” Closed forms, he argues, are based on culturally agreed-upon modes of participation that are rigid in nature, such as in the prescribed and proscribed sequence of musical events proceeding inexorably in the order of composer-conductor-performer-audience.Such past (and present) rigidities, he points out, have become increasingly irrelevant. In every dimension of our lives significant and fast-occurring changes have become dominant, even expected, leaving us, as citizens and as educators, in confusion and uncertainty, and therefore in distress. We encounter aesthetic forms that are open-sourced and de-authored, unconnected to shared standards of practice. Technologies of music making and taking, he points out, have overthrown tradition to a startling degree, erasing distinctions among expert and amateur, between master and apprentice, between process and product, specialist and generalist, the classical and the vernacular.All this, and much more, is argued cogently and, I think, persuasively. It leads us to a central conception influencing how we must act as professionals. Our [End Page 109] obligation is to not only incorporate openness of musical engagements into our present culture of musical “closedness,” but to recognize the advent of openness as being a... (shrink)

Somatic awareness is bodily sensation imbued with consciousness. Directing and cultivating somatic awareness is a practice fundamental to many therapeutic and spiritual enterprises. Recent developments in neuroscience attempt to explain the operational aspects of somatic awareness. But it has long been a topic of conversation in other paradigms, from philosophy to health care. Somatic input provides information for use in wellness treatment applications, including therapeutic bodywork. Yet few massage therapy scholarly investigations aim to capture the quality of body awareness (...) experience. The essence of the experience and its associated language remain imprecise and under-explored holistically.This article implements the therapeutic practice technique of the Body Scan to capture the essence of an inner body exploration (proprioception and interoception). Based on a narrative collected during a verbally self-directed exercise, a phenomenological description is explicated to represent one incidentof internal body experience. The pilot study suggests that the Body Scan offers potential as a research tool, as well as a modality for therapeutic intervention. (shrink)

The remarks of my exciting and ebullient colleague, John King-Farlow do not clarify what I find most perplexing either in Wittgenstein’s analogy of the builders or in Rhees’ famous comments on it. Professor King-Farlow does, however, lay before us important and challenging allegations as to an incoherent or nonsensical quality of the discussion so far. Before one turns to these allegations, something should be said on behalf of Saint Augustine’s remarks in The Confessions of language-learning.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

When I classify Fluffy as a cat, I appear to do so out of an appreciation of a prior metaphysical fact, namely, that she has a nature or essence common to creatures we classify as cats. Locke turns this picture on its head. Our actual practices of naming and sorting individuals into kinds proceed according to ideas in the mind. As Locke puts it, species (kinds) are ‘the Workmanship of the Understanding,’ not the workmanship of nature, because their essences (...) consist in abstract ideas, or ‘nominal essences,’ we make. Many take Locke to mean that the observable similarities and differences between things leave it undetermined how we are to group and distinguish them, so that classification is, and must be, a matter of convention. And while Locke never denies that individuals have real essences, it is argued that knowledge of them would not reveal natural boundaries, either. On this influential reading, nature does not draw boundaries between kinds, and she makes this fact apparent to us. I argue that Locke’s claim that nature does not determine the ‘Boundaries of the Species of Things’ should be understood as the claim that nature does not draw the variable boundaries set out in the nominal essences we make. Differences in our nominal essences reflect differences in speakers’ knowledge of external ‘standards,’ which we latch on to by way of their ‘leading’ qualities, which present the mind with a limited number of unique and highly salient bases for classification. On my reading, nature may very well draw boundaries of her own. (shrink)

Although different perspectives on the essence and qualities of the absolute existence have been put forward by the philosophers, theologians, and Sufī philosophers, in the context of this article, we will examine whether absolute existence has a causal efficacy in addition to special existence in the unity of the First Principle and the first effect. We will discuss the views of two Ottoman scholars, Baghdādīzāda (who lived in the second part of the 10th/16th century) and Arpacīzāda (d.1033/1623), who analyzed (...) the effect of absolute existence with its aforementioned qualities on the simplicity of the First Principle and its being a part of the complete cause as an incomplete cause. It is generally accepted by the philosophers that the First Principle is the simple complete cause of the first effect by virtue of its essence without the need for conditions, tools, or the removal of any obstacle. Therefore, the First Principle must be the cause of the first effect with its simple existence that does not consist of any sensory or intellectual parts. Therefore, the decisive issue in the discussions regarding the definition of the complete cause is the inclusion of both simple and compound entities. Because the definition of a complete cause that includes only simple or compound causes would be incomplete since it does not include all entities. The definition of complete cause preferred by philosophers such as al-Asīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d.663/1265) and Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d.675/1277), who made important contributions to the conceptualization of complete and incomplete causes, as the totality of the things on which the maʿlūl depends in its existence, can only include composite entities. As a matter of fact, al-Sayyīd Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.816/1413), in his Sharh al-Mawāqif and Hāshiya al-Tajrīd, states that the aforementioned definition of complete cause, which was mentioned by his predecessors al-Abharī and al-Kātibī has the possibility of including only composite entities, but he expresses that this situation is not a necessity with the example that a simple substance can be formed from a simple complete cause. The Ottoman scholar al-Khatībzāda (d.901/1496), who supported al-Jurjānī's sentiment that the aforementioned definition of the complete cause could only include composite entities, emphasized in his commentary on Tajrīd al-iʿtikād the possibility of accepting absolute existence as a necessary element for the realization of the complete cause, which led to the writing of separate treatises following the traces of this problem. In the context of al-Jurjānī and al-Khatībzāda's explanations, al-Baghdādīzāda addressed the possibility of absolute existence being a part of the complete cause without damaging the simplicity of the First Principle and wrote a separate treatise emphasizing that absolute existence does not eliminate the First Principle”s being a simple complete cause. Arpacīzāda was another Ottoman scholar who wrote a critical text in response to this treatise, which analyzed the effect of absolute existence on the existence of the first effect as a part of the complete cause and its relation to the special existence of the First Principle. In this article, we will try to reveal the effect of absolute existence on the First Principle's being a simple complete cause and the possibility of accepting it as a part of the complete cause through these individuals and treatises. (shrink)

According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort (...) of alternative. I argue here that this can be done, given a particular conception of both the qualitativity and powerfulness of properties. On this conception, a property is qualitative just in the sense that its essence is fixed independently of any distinct properties, and it is powerful just if its essence grounds its dispositional role. (shrink)

A matter of significance for the history of philosophy is the question of what are the issues that underlie Leibniz's response to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in his own New Essays on Human Understanding. Exploration of that question can contribute to interpretations of both Locke and Leibniz. Equally important, it can provide insight into problems of philosophy that have their genesis in the seventeenth century. ;The dissertation uses the Essay and the New Essays to explore what it regards as (...) the central conflict between Locke and Leibniz: the conflict about the primacy of metaphysics. It takes for its focus their differing positions on atomism, contrasting the particle theory of matter that it finds central to the Essay with Leibniz's metaphysical unit, the monad. It develops the implications of those differing positions for an idea of nature specifically--nature here conceived as the arena in which science and metaphysics meet. ;The thesis of the dissertation is that the positions of Locke and Leibniz on atomism express opposing responses of philosophy to science; and, further, that this opposition had profound significance for the subsequent direction of philosophy. The first element in the thesis is the specific concern of the dissertation. Its second element, which suggests an approach to the history of philosophy since the seventeenth century, is an issue for further exploration. ;Locke's Essay is shown as a deliberate construction of an epistemology grounded in the new science, combining that purpose with an explicit rejection of the value of metaphysical speculation as the basis for knowledge. Locke's scientific background and orientation determine his analysis of ideas, of the powers and qualities of matter, and of real essences of material substances. ;In contrast, the New Essays is seen as asserting the primacy of metaphysics for the solution of epistemological and scientific questions. Leibniz's arguments against atomism are examined, to show why the basic reason for his rejection of all particle theories of matter is their violation of specific metaphysical principles. His positive position is presented in a discussion of the monad, emphasizing its characteristics in the realm of nature. (shrink)

The article made an attempt to understand the nature of jus, going from an analysis of its genesis and the primary simplest forms, the formation of which constituted the transition from the pre-social to the social world. In line with the hypothesis of Levi-Strauss of the beginning of society, the author considers dual-group unions to be the first social formations, halfs of which, in relation to and through each other, acquired the quality of historically original subjects of jus – (...) the space of freedom jointly built by them, based on the consensus of non-violence of the parties, rational coordination of wills and judicial resolution of conflicts. Subsequent social evolution gives rise to fundamentally new forms of both deploying the essence of jus and obstructing it. Among the latter, the most important is the state that does not need coordination and is able to impose its will on so­ciety by violence. History develops mechanisms for curbing state authority by jus, based on its high axiological status, which ensures the readiness of society to defend legal val­ues, among which freedom of speech plays a key role, which, firstly, acts as the main form of concordance of wills in society that forms the jus, and secondly, it allows contin­uous control over the state and in the threat of its going beyond the framework of the jus to initiate social activity that prevents this. (shrink)

In current philosophical literature we encounter many contradictions, in particular, numerous difficulties and conflicts concerned with differentiation between the logical and ontological approaches to defining the category of matter; with an adequate interpretation of the categories of essence, substance, structure, and quality; with certain problems in the dialectics of practice and theory; and so forth. In this article, I shall consider the problem of being and structure. A correct understanding of this problem presumes, above all, a fundamental distinction (...) between the basic questions of epistemology, i.e., the question of the independence of being from consciousness, and the ontological characteristics of being. (shrink)

The 3Rs, or the replacement, reduction, and refinement of animal research, are widely accepted as the best approach to maximizing high-quality science while ensuring the highest standard of ethical consideration is applied in regulating the use of animals in scientific procedures. This contrasts with the muted scientific interest in the 3Rs when they were first proposed in The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique. Indeed, the relative success of the 3Rs has done little to encourage engagement with their original text, (...) which remains little read and out of print. By adopting a historical perspective, this article argues that one explanation for this disjunction may be found in another, more celebrated, event of 1959: C. P. Snow’s Rede lecture on The Two Cultures. The moral outlook of The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique derived from an earlier ethos wherein humanistic and scientific values occupied a shared culture. While the synthetic style of The Principles has hindered its readership, this article concludes that there is value to recovering the notion that the humanities and social sciences can contribute to the improvement of animal research. (shrink)

A key question in the art debate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was whether color should be used for sculpture. Recent archaeological research had shown that the sculpture in ancient Greece was polychrome, but skepticism about applying paint to one’s own work was widespread among modern sculptors. Some scholars explain this reluctance as a consequence of racial prejudice: the Greek athlete was an image of white Europeans. This article will try to show that a re-reading of Johann Gottfried Herder’s (...) book on sculpture can give us a different and more probable explanation. Herder shared Roger de Piles’s view that the essence of sculpture was form, while color was most characteristic of painting. What set Herder apart from his predecessor, however, was his attempt to give the theory a scientific rationale. He found this in contemporary accounts of visually impaired persons’ relationship to the sensory world and not least in empiricist philosophy’s distinction between primary and secondary sensory properties. (shrink)

Universals: Loux, M. J. The existence of universals. Russell, B. The world of universals. Quine, W. V. O. On what there is. Pears, D. F. Universals. Strawson, P. F. Particular and general. Wolterstorff, N. Qualities. Bambrough, R. Universals and family resemblances. Donagan, A. Universals and metaphysical realism. Sellars, W. Abstract entities. Wolterstorff, N. On the nature of universals.--Particulars: Loux, M. J. Particulars and their individuation. Black. M. The identity of indiscernibles. Ayer, A. J. The identity of indiscernibles. O'Connor, D. J. (...) The identity of indiscernibles. Allaire, E. B. Bare particulars. Chappell, V. C. Particulars re-clothed. Allaire, E. B. Another look at bare particulars. Meiland, J. W. Do relations individuate? Long, D. C. Particulars and their qualities. Copi, I. Essence and accident. Chandler, H. S. Essence and accident. Plantinga, A. World and essence. (shrink)

What is business ethics? How can we mediate between private interests and moral demands? What are the moral core responsibilities in quality management? What is enlightened egoism and why is it one of the best ethical theories for business? The Essence of Business Ethics is an invaluable reference source for MBA students and managers, whether on a short course or as a reference work for the bookshelf. It is intended to focus upon the core of the subject and (...) is an ideal summary for undergraduates, postgraduates, other students and aspiring managers wishing to improve their knowledge and skills. (shrink)

Rethinking “philosophy” to-day, it is necessary to think first of all about ontological foundations of the modern scientific universe description and rethink them on the ground of modern scientific knowledge, because until now there is no any precise scientific conception of the structure of the universe, of reasons and movingforces of its permanent evolution. All of it create basis to propose various unscientific ideas of creationism. Until now most of philosophers associate the motion of Matter on the whole only with (...) its motion in space and in time, mixing philosophical and physical aspects of these two principle categories. Generally speaking, the present-day ontological model of understanding the World, the Universe is constructed purely on the basis of only these two fundamental categories. However, a more deep reflection of the essence of Being, if to realize it on the basis of only these two global categories, brings us to the disappointing conclusion, that in this case we have nothing more except a mechanical motion, i.e. spatial displacement of a material point (or a system of points) relatively some point of counting off. To make it normal and logic we should add to the ontological model one more essential part – the motion in quality. So, in order to create the full and complete picture of the formation and evolution of the material World it is necessary to observe the motion of material forming in the three equivalentphilosophical categories: in space time quality. The ideas of the new conception of ontological model become actual supplementation of really scientific philosophical knowledge on the way of a more objective ontological comprehension of our Being, of the law of development of the human civilization and the Universe as a whole. This knowledge can be successfully used for the description of the realistic paradigm of Being, in explanations of the meaning of Life. (shrink)

x8.1 `Real' The word `real' has many senses, and has been much misunderstood in consequence. It was, along with other philosophical terms, such as quality, quantity, entity, identity, essence and substance, coined by the Schoolmen in the Middle Ages|realis, reale from the Latin res, a thing|to mark the distinction between what really existed and what mere existed in intellectu, in the mind; and the word still carries connotations of thinginess, which can confuse our thinking about reality in the (...) present age. (shrink)

Aristotelian notions such as matter, form and substance should be used carefully; not only is the rich tradition in their background marked by variety of interpretation, even Aristotle's own use of these concepts is far from uniform. In his different works, matter, form and substance display contents that do not always agree. There is reason for believing that in the Metaphysics Zeta the notion of form embodies essence, and that accordingly something without essence does not qualify as substance. (...) This cannot be generalized or regarded as Aristotle's standard view, however, for in the Physics there are contexts in which the form is not conceived as essence. There, “the form or shape” is the arrangement of the substance's parts, or the object's shape, in addition to either all or some of its qualities. Outside the Metaphysics, substance, too, seems to be a less distinguished entity. In the Physics, and especially in the Categories, substance is anything capable of independent existence, any particular concrete thing that is a bearer of attributes. To the extent that our modern “object” corresponds to Aristotle's primary substance, it has a similar polysemy. While in some contexts it will mean an articulated object belonging to a specific kind, in others it will denote bodies without organized structure, that is, it will have as extension the particular bits and pieces that fill the world. A similar diversity applies to matter. When understood, for example, as a chunk out of which an artist casts her statue, matter is an object, a body, itself endowed with a boundary and a multitude of properties. But matter can be much simpler than that; it can be a plain homoeomere, a mere element, or as in prime matter, may lack every actual attribute. When in my “Matter and Objecthood” I criticized Henry Laycock's views propounded in “Some Questions of Ontology” I found comparable ambiguities transposed to contemporary discourse. In the paper just cited, Laycock examines the ontic status of matter, contrasting it with objects as particular concrete things; throughout his discussion no radical distinction is made between articulated objects and unorganized bodies. In my criticism I employed ‘object’ in the same inclusive sense. (shrink)

Locke, in his discussion of essences, makes extensive use of a distinction he introduces between nominal and real essences. This distinction has always been found interesting and important, and in fact, R.I. Aaron said of it that ‘there is no more important distinction in the Essay.’ Nevertheless, to say there has not been general agreement about what Locke was getting at is putting it mildly. Interpretations of Locke's point in making such a distinction have varied widely, depending upon whether the (...) importance of the real or the nominal essence is stressed. Locke tells us we should distinguish the nominal essence, which is the abstract idea to which a general name is attached and for which it stands, from the real essence, which is the ‘real internal, but generally in Substances, unknown Constitution of Things, whereon their discoverable Qualities depend.’. (shrink)

Purpose. The dynamics and pace of social and economic transformations that are characteristic of modern society, lead to an increase in tension and the destruction of habitual stereotypes – ideals, values, norms, patterns of behaviour that unite people. These moments encourage us to rethink the understanding of "security" essence, in particular, psychological, which emphasizes the urgency of its study in the philosophical and sociocultural coordinates. Theoretical basis of the research is based on the philosophical methodology of K. Jaspers, E. (...) Fromm and the A. Maslow’s psychological approach to understanding of a person. Originality. Psychological security is considered at different levels: first and foremost, society is a characteristic of social security, that is an analysis of how today’s social technologies, social changes affect the quality of life of the country’s population; secondly, the social environment – the family, the immediate environment, reference groups, training teams; thirdly, a person is an experience of his own security-insecurity, when it is possible to talk about the manifestations of psychological violence, when certain behavioral acts contribute to the violation of the security of the other or to self-destruction. It is found out that the knowledge of psychological security is closely connected with the socio-historical conditions of being, with the level of development of material and spiritual culture, with the interests and values prevailing in society, which determines its ontological, epistemological and axiological features. The presented issue is considered in the correlation of psychological security with types of scientific rationality – classical, nonclassical and post-nonclassical approaches, within the framework of which various perspectives, aspects, forms and types of psychological security are studied. Conclusions. The concept of security requires a systematic description of its manifestations, types, levels, concepts: security as the absence of dangers ; security as a certain activity to ensure or to prevent any threats or dangers ; security as a conscious necessity, the value of the individual. The study systematizes various ideas about psychological security in accordance with the logic of scientific knowledge: in the mainstream of classical, non-classical and post-nonclassical approaches. (shrink)

The essence of the Man self-reflection has discovered Materialistic monism with understanding of substance as the reality of all existed, including universal: qualities – continuity, interruptness, corpuscleness, reflection; characteristics – transition from quantity to quality and vice versa, unity and struggle of opposites, denial of denial, unity of substance; states – rest, development, form, motion; processes – physical, chemical, biological, mental. The Materialistic monism consists of the unity of methodological, theoretical, sociological, statistical and practical levels of cognition, mastered (...) by the Man through five known historical ways of the vital activity. Each successive historical period of life is characterized by more perfect forms of the Man bodiness, his common character and relationships, subject interaction, reflection and consciousness, and hence by it considerable broadening of the boarders of cognition and its set of instruments.Philosophical significance of the levels of cognition consists in their possibility to consider a phenomenon as universal, general, particular, separate and single; stratificated methods of cognition and technologies of penetration into different aspects of the phenomenon essence. The methodological cognition with itsown distinctive methods contains all other methods, thus this unity pretends to be the Modern Philosophy, including monistic, systemic, dialectial, metaphisical and empirical methods of cognition. (shrink)

Missional discipleship is more than a movement seeking a new methodological and strategic mission paradigm. Missional discipleship is the essence of Christianity concerning the ontological foundation for the prime reason for existence as believers and the epistemological lens to see the world from the perspective of transformed values in Christ. In other words, missional discipleship requires acknowledging the lordship of Christ by demonstrating the ontological embodiment of who Christ is and epistemological resemblance by perceiving the reality as Christ does. (...) These radical transformations in both ontological and epistemological areas can enable believers to authentically follow Christ as disciples and demonstrate Christlikeness in all spheres of their existence as missionaries. Christlike attributes and qualities are progressively cultivated in believers lives as they conform to the image of Christ, and the most profound nature of Christlikeness is holiness. Missional discipleship provides a platform to expand the concept of Christlikeness as holiness from the personal dimension to the public dimension to overcome the privatisation of discipleship and Christian religious dualism polarising things into the categories of the sacred and secular. (shrink)

Institutional investors, policy makers, and researchers have advocated for greater director independence in hopes of improving corporate governance and discouraging unethical behaviors such as corporate frauds, accounting irregularities, and other organizational failures. However, increasing demands upon directors and sitting CEOs, as well as constraints on the number of boards on which they can serve, has resulted in a dramatic increase in the use of retired independent directors. Compared to other directors with full-time job demands, we argue that RIDs have lesser (...) time constraints and greater attentional capacities with which to discharge their responsibilities, thereby improving overall board “bandwidth.” Using S&P 1500 firms for the period of 2000–2012, we find that enhanced board bandwidth associated with an increased proportion of RIDs on the board relates to greater resource provisioning through reducing costs of capital, improved monitoring through reducing disclosure-related weaknesses, and better accounting and market performance. We thereby advance traditional board bandwidth research by contemplating the available time that independent directors would have by virtue of being retired and relating this to board effectiveness. (shrink)

With the publication of this translation the quality of Heidegger literature available in English takes a quantum leap forward. No book--save perhaps Otto Poeggeler's--can match Marx's for its depth of insight into Heidegger's thought. The central theme of the book is as follows. Hegel's claim to have consummated the Western "tradition" is accepted by Heidegger. The foundations of this tradition are in Greek ontology. Marx locates the classic formulation of the basic tenets of Greek ontology in the Aristotelian doctrine (...) of ousia. Being as ousia is the perduring, necessary and intelligible. The Hegelian idea of Being remains within the Aristotelian perspective because it determines Being as the unfolding of the self-same substance according to necessary law and so as to develop into a stage of maximum intelligibility. Being is more radically temporal, of course, for Hegel but this stays within the perspective of the Greek notion of eternity, because the Hegelian "substance" is relentlessly working out an eternal pattern of categories which is inscribed in its very essence, and which the Logic articulates. Heidegger's philosophy seeks to "overcome" the "tradition," and so the whole metaphysics of "substance and subject." Being is even more radically temporalized, for Heidegger does not think time on the "model" of eternity. Being as time is not the movement of the self-same through time but time itself--as Being. The necessity and lawfulness of Being, moreover, is replaced by the "play" of the "fourfold." And the radical intelligibility of Being is overcome in Heidegger's thought by the interplay of concealment and unconcealment. Finally, against the Aristotelian-Hegelian teleology Heidegger posits the hope of a "new beginning" of history whose coming to pass--by a "turn" on Being's part--can only be obscurely intimated and at best "awaited." Not the least among this book's merits is the refreshingly critical attitude of the author to Heidegger--the book he says was prompted by a reflection on Heidegger-critic Lowith's [[sic]] work on Heidegger. His criticism of Heidegger in the conclusion of this book sets out important objections which the usual commentator ignores or evades or attributes to a "fallenness" into "calculative" thinking.--J. D. C. (shrink)

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God as the universal reflection of Human essence has discovered Materialistic monism with understanding of substance as the reality of all existed, including universal: qualities – continuity, interruptness, corpuscleness, reflection; characteristics – transition from quantity to quality and vice versa, unity and struggle of opposites, denial of denial, unity of substance; states – rest, development, form, motion; processes – physical, chemical, biological, mental, where Man and God are united. The Materialistic consists of the unity of methodological, theoretical, sociological, (...) statistical and practical levels of cognition, mastered by the Man through five known historical ways of the vital activity. Each successive historical period of life is characterized by more perfect forms of the Man bodiness, his common character and relationships, subject interaction, reflection and consciousness, and hence by it considerable broadening of the boarders of cognition and its set of instruments. Philosophical significance of the levels of cognition consists in their possibility to consider a phenomenon as universal, general, particular,separate and single; stratificated methods of cognition and technologies of penetration into different aspects of the phenomenon essence. The methodological cognition with its own distinctive methods contains all other methods, thus unity pretends to be the Modern Philosophy, including monistic, systemic, dialectial, metaphisical and empirical methods of cognition, where there is no contradiction of Science and Religion. (shrink)

This study investigates the value essence of “Double reduction” (Shuang jian) policy in China from a perspective of policy narrative. It examines three values essences of “Double reduction” (Shuang jian) policy, including the core value of running schools: student-centered education; the leading value of running schools: quality-based education and the dominant value of running schools: home-school cooperative education. The interactive analysis of “Double reduction” (Shuang jian) policy in China highlights that the main purpose of the "double reduction" policy (...) is to solve major problems related to people’s livelihood in the field of education and provide people with higher quality and universal educational resources. In addition, suggestion, conclusion, and remark are offered in the last. (shrink)

The essence of Chinese modernization is fundamentally about human development. This process unfolds within the dialectical interaction where individuals shape society and are in turn shaped by it. The new path of Chinese modernization challenges the prevailing logic of modern capitalism by fostering the emergence of the "real human," recognizing and reinforcing the masses' role as the primary agents in creating, enjoying, and evaluating values. These values are integral to the fabric of societal development, aligning with inclusive, autonomous, and (...) comprehensive growth. Crucially, this pathway transcends mere economic metrics, aspiring towards a value framework rooted in post-developmental goals such as peaceful advancement, shared prosperity, and high-quality development. In this context, the value activities on this new road are guided by a philosophical and, significantly, a religious ethos that emphasizes holistic development, resonating with themes of moral and spiritual growth. This abstract offers a perspective where the value philosophy intrinsic to Chinese modernization is not only a secular agenda but is deeply interwoven with spiritual dimensions that reflect broader, universally resonant themes in religious philosophy. (shrink)

A recent, seemingly appealing version of the powerful qualities view defines properties’ qualitativity via an essentialist claim and their powerfulness via a grounding claim. Roughly, this approach holds that properties are qualities because they have qualitative essences, while they are powerful because their instances or essences ground causal-modal facts. I argue that this theory should be replaced with one that defines the powerfulness of qualities in terms of both a grounding claim and a ‘meta-grounding’ claim. Specifically, I formulate and defend (...) a view on which qualities are powerful just if instances of those qualitiesat least partiallyground dispositionsin virtue of the essences of those qualities. (shrink)

In this, his first philosophical publication, McGinn introduces a distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility, in order to diagnose the reason for Mackie's misinterpretation of Kripke's essentialism about natural kinds. McGinn then argues—on behalf of Kripke and pace Mackie—that the secondary qualities of natural kind substances are rigidly identical to the underlying primary qualities.

1. Consider a circle. It has both a radius and a circumference. There is obviously a real distinction between the properties having a radius and having a circumference. This is not because, when confining ourselves to circles,1 having a radius can ever exist apart from having a circumference. A real distinction does not depend on that. Descartes thought that a real distinction between x and y meant that x could exist without y or vice versa, if only by the power (...) of God. But Descartes was wrong. Separable existence is a sufficient but not necessary condition of there being a real distinction. The difference between a real and a conceptual distinction derives from medieval philosophy. Aquinas, for one, held that things can be really distinct even though not separable (the form and matter of a material substance or its essence and existence, for example).2 For a merely conceptual distinction between x and y to exist, it is necessary for the distinction to exist in thought only. There is only a conceptual distinction between an upward slope and a downward slope, or between a glass’s being half empty and half full. Not only are the members of such pairs inseparable (whether by God or in any other way), but there is no real distinction between them. There is no numerical distinctness between the entities or qualities between which there is only a conceptual distinction. To this extent alone is Galen Strawson (2008) correct.3 But when it comes to.. (shrink)

In the seventeenth century the microscope opened up a new world of observation, and, according to Catherine Wilson, profoundly revised the thinking of scientists and philosophers alike. The interior of nature, once closed off to both sympathetic intuition and direct perception, was now accessible with the help of optical instruments. The microscope led to a conception of science as an objective, procedure-driven mode of inquiry and renewed interest in atomism and mechanism. Focusing on the earliest forays into microscopical research, from (...) 1620 to 1720, this book provides us with both a compelling technological history and a lively assessment of the new knowledge that helped launch philosophy into the modern era. Wilson argues that the discovery of the microworld--and the apparent role of living animalcula in generation, contagion, and disease--presented metaphysicians with the task of reconciling the ubiquity of life with human-centered theological systems. It was also a source of problems for philosophers concerned with essences, qualities, and the limits of human knowledge, whose positions are echoed in current debates about realism and instrument-mediated knowledge. Covering the contributions of pioneering microscopists (Leeuwenhoek, Swammerdam, Malpighi, Grew, and Hooke) and the work of philosophers interested in the microworld (Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Malebranche, Locke, and Berkeley), she challenges historians who view the abstract sciences as the sole catalyst of the Scientific Revolution as she stresses the importance of observational and experimental science to the modern intellect. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:I. William of Ockham and Mental SynonymyIn recent years an important point of discussion among the scholars of William of Ockham has been the possibility of accounting for a reductionist interpretation of Ockham's mental language. Especially, the debate focused on the legitimacy of eliminating connotative simple terms from mental language by reducing them to their nominal definition. The distinction between absolute and connotative terms plays an important role in (...) Ockham's philosophy of language. Ockham introduces it as a subdivision of the class of categorematic terms, i.e. of the terms provided with signification, and such a distinction overlaps that between concrete and abstract terms. In the Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 10, devoted to the explanation of such a distinction, Ockham makes three major claims concerning connotative terms.First, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms signify something primarily and something else secondarily. Paradigmatic examples of connotative simple terms are 'white' and 'father,' while instances of absolute terms are 'animal,' 'man,' and 'whiteness.' The term 'white' is connotative for it signifies something primarily while co-signifying something else secondarily .Second, unlike absolute simple terms, connotative simple terms do not have a real definition but only a nominal one. While a real definition is intended to capture the real essence of the defined thing, a nominal definition is none other than a linguistic explication of a name's signification. Only concrete and abstract terms of the category of substance, and abstract terms of the category of quality, can have a real definition. The reason is that, for Ockham, only individual substances and qualities can exist outside the mind, therefore only such entities can be grasped immediately and directly, by means of acts of intelligible intuitive cognition. Any other term can have only a nominal definition, for each of them can make reference to nothing but to fictive or only putatively existent entities. A nominal definition, in particular, is made in such a way that something is expressed in recto and something else in obliquo . Ockham indicates 'something having whiteness' as the nominal definition of 'white': in it, 'something' is expressed in recto, while 'whiteness' in obliquo.Third and finally, Ockham says that a connotative term has only one nominal definition, while an absolute term can have several real definitions.According to these claims, the problem of the existence of connotative terms in mental language might be reconstructed as follows. Ockham holds to two fundamental tenets about mental language and connotation: first, synonymous terms cannot be found in mental language and second, each connotative simple term can have only one nominal definition, as was said. Ockham is unequivocal about these principles in his works. But if an interpreter also supposes Ockham subscribing to the view that connotative simple terms are synonymous with their nominal definitions, the interpreter must conclude that, for Ockham, connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions cannot both be present in mental language. Nonetheless, since Ockham seems to admit the existence of both connotative simple terms and their nominal definitions in mental language, one of the previous sentences needs to be revised.Up to this day many proposals of revision have been put on the table, but it seems to me that they can be reduced to three principal ones.The first proposal suggests reconsidering claim , while preserving the reasoning -, since - are claims Ockham indisputably states. As is known, this was Paul V. Spade's initial position. The gist of Spade's influential argument was that connotative simple terms cannot exist in mental language for if they did, they would be synonymous with their fully expanded nominal definitions. According to , though, synonymy cannot be found in mental language. But Ockham grants the.. (shrink)