In The Ethics of Discernment, Patrick H. Byrne presents an approach to ethics that builds upon the cognitional theory and the philosophical method of self-appropriation that Bernard Lonergan introduced in his book Insight, as well as upon Lonergan's later writing on ethics and values. Extending Lonergan's method into the realm of ethics, Byrne argues that we can use self-appropriation to come to objective judgements of value. The Ethics of Discernment is an introspective analysis of that (...) process, in which sustained ethical inquiry and attentiveness to feelings as "intentions of value" leads to a rich conception of the good. Written both for those with an interest in Lonergan's philosophy and for those interested in theories of ethics who have only a limited knowledge of Lonergan's work, Byrne's book is the first detailed exposition of an ethical theory based on Lonergan's philosophical method. (shrink)

The purpose of this thesis is not to present exhaustively the ethical doctrine of Plato, but to disclose one specific aspect in the development of his ethical thought. We shall attempt to show that Plato realized the necessity for a metaphysical foundation for his ethical theory. The search itself will begin in the early or Socratic dialogues, continue through such major works of the middle period as Phaedo and Symposium, and culminate in a definite resolution of the problem through (...) the doctrine of the Republic. The exposition will be developed in three stages: (1) an indication of the ways in which the need for a "metaphysical foundation of morals" is expressed or implied in the early dialogues; (2) an account of the development of Plato's metaphysical theory in dialogues of the middle period; and (3) the argument that this metaphysic was for Plato the completion and foundation of his ethical theory. (shrink)

In the course of our daily lives we make lots of evaluations of actions. We think that driving above the speed limit is dangerous, that giving up one’s bus seat to the elderly is polite, that stirring eggs with a plastic spoon is neither good nor bad. We understand too that we may be praised or blamed for actions performed on the basis of these evaluations. The same is true in the case of certain beliefs. Sometimes we blame people for (...) what they believe falsely or irrationally. On occasion, we praise them for their intellectual discoveries. The goal of the present study is to describe the foundations which allow for these kinds of judgments. If you think that people are not always forgivable for what they believe, you will find in this book the resources to defend this thought. (shrink)

The article deals with a contemporary debate on Hippocratic ethics. Both the opponents and proponents of Hippocratic medical ethics seem to ignore the complexity of the said ethical system. The ethics of the Corpus Hippocraticum can be properly understood only in relation to physiological, psychological, and other factors. Therefore, the ongoing debate only partially represents ethical issues, and a number of arguments in it cannot be considered as valid. Moreover, the complexity of Hippocratic ethics reveals that (...) quite a few of its principles are still valid today and deserve to be further analyzed. In addition, some of its principles have been incontestably incorporated into contemporary medical ethics. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the relationship between patients and their health care providers need not be construed as a contract between moral strangers. Contrary to the (American) legal presumption that health care providers are not obligated to assist others in need unless the latter are already contracted patients of record, I submit that the presence of a suffering human being constitutes an immediate moral commandment to try to relieve such suffering. This thesis is developed in reference to the (...) French philosopher Levinas and the Dutch theologian Schillebeeckx. An expanded version of the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan serves as test case. (shrink)

This paper presents the principal findings from a three-year research project funded by the US National Science Foundation on ethics of human enhancement technologies. To help untangle this ongoing debate, we have organized the discussion as a list of questions and answers, starting with background issues and moving to specific concerns, including: freedom & autonomy, health & safety, fairness & equity, societal disruption, and human dignity. Each question-and-answer pair is largely self-contained, allowing the reader to skip to those (...) issues of interest without affecting continuity. (shrink)

Proposed solutions to the problems of this country's health care system range along a spectrum from central planning to free market. Central planners and free market advocates provide various ethical justifications for the policies they propose. The crucial flaw in the philosophical rationale of central planning is failure to distinguish between normative and metanormative principles, which leads to mistaken understanding of the nature of rights. Natural rights, based on the principle of noninterference, provide the link between individual morality and social (...) order. Free markets, the practical expression of natural rights, are uniquely capable of achieving the goals that central planners seek but find beyond their grasp. The history of this country's health care system and the experiences of other nations provide evidence of the superiority of free markets in reaching for the goals of universal access, control of costs, and sustaining the quality of health care. (shrink)

Organizations are making massive investments in artificial intelligence, and recent demonstrations and achievements highlight the immense potential for AI to improve organizational and human welfare. Yet realizing the potential of AI necessitates a better understanding of the various ethical issues involved with deciding to use AI, training and maintaining it, and allowing it to make decisions that have moral consequences. People want organizations using AI and the AI systems themselves to behave ethically, but ethical behavior means different things to different (...) people, and many ethical dilemmas require trade-offs such that no course of action is universally considered ethical. How should organizations using AI—and the AI itself—process ethical dilemmas where humans disagree on the morally right course of action? Though a variety of ethical AI frameworks have been suggested, these approaches do not adequately address how people make ethical evaluations of AI systems or how to incorporate the fundamental disagreements people have regarding what is and is not ethical behavior. Drawing on moral foundations theory, we theorize that a person will perceive an organization’s use of AI, its data procedures, and the resulting AI decisions as ethical to the extent that those decisions resonate with the person’s moral foundations. Since people hold diverse moral foundations, this highlights the crucial need to consider individual moral differences at multiple levels of AI. We discuss several unresolved issues and suggest potential approaches for thinking about conflicts in moral judgments concerning AI. (shrink)

The ethics of artificial intelligence (AI) is a research topic with both theoretical and practical significance. However, the ethical and moral aspects of conceptual, ontological, semantic, and knowledge modeling, more specifically, and which are sometimes found in AI applications, is not being given sufficient attention. I argue that it should. Whether considering using or developing these meaning-focused models, there are ethical aspects. This paper offers a preliminary outline about this potentially new research field, discussing: some questions and areas of (...) concern, their significance; scenarios of ethical import, and initial ethical guidelines. A focus area, potential case study, and lens through which to see the ethical significance at hand, is ontologies, with emphasis on the most abstract ontologies (so-called generic, foundational, top-level or upper ontologies). This would aim to show the ethical import of highly abstract (often philosophical) ontological choices, assumptions, and their effects on data, developers, users, and society. In particular, I stress the need for critical examination of such models, their content, their intended meanings, assumptions, ideologies, as well as the development process. Both the ethics of, and ethics in, these activities are, therefore, of interest. Topics in the ethics of AI that are relevant include: transparency, bias, data-sharing, privacy, control over data, etc. This paper thereby contributes to the ethics of AI, as well as the ethics of information, of knowledge managment and relevant topics by developing and discussing the ethics of ontology (and similar systems). Future development will refine and add to the ideas expressed in this paper. (shrink)

This essay is an existential approach to the issue of foundations in Philosophy. The style of approach is designed to engage the philosophic reader into his or her own foundational dynamics through personal conversation and as a way of overcoming the obfuscation that has dominated the history of philosophy. Relating this to “an ethics” is an effort to manifest the critical dynamic of following one’s own acts of intelligence. The conversational approach is an effort also to overcome the isolation (...) and egoism of philosophic debate towards a more collaborative enterprise that would unify the disparate views on cognition, epistemology, and metaphysics with a view towards a more systematic control of academic work and history. (shrink)

Soldiers hold special ethical obligations to prioritise care for those closest to them when dealing with combat casualties. This obligation draws on the unique, personal relationships already established, which soldiers have with their comrades. These relationships arguably overrule the need for impartiality barring only a significant difference in the severity of injuries. The bonds of fraternity deserve moral recognition that is not reflected in current conceptions of battlefield medical care. However, an ethics of care (or care ethics) approach (...) does not reject care for enemies but suggests that extension to them occurs when there is no significant difference in severity to comrades first. It also calls on a different form of care called ethical caring, which as opposed to natural caring requires introspection on behalf of the caregiver. Ethics of care distinguishes treatment of the enemy from emotionally detached positions. Emotional detachment rejects the call to care and denies the development of a relationship, which is a foundational principle of care ethics. (shrink)

Anthropology lies at the heart of the human sciences, tackling questions having to do with the foundations, ethics, and deployment of the knowledge crucial to human lives. The Ethics of Knowledge Creation focuses on how knowledge is relationally created, how local knowledge can be transmuted into ‘universal knowledge’, and how the transaction and consumption of knowledge also monitors its subsequent production. This volume examines the ethical implications of various kinds of relations that are created in the process of (...) ‘transacting knowledge’ and investigates how these transactions are also situated according to broader contradictions or synergies between ethical, epistemological, and political concerns. (shrink)

How can we be responsible for our attitudes if we cannot normally choose what we believe, desire, feel, and intend? This problem has received much attention during the last decades, both in epistemology and ethics. Yet its connections to discussions about reasons and rationality have been largely overlooked. This book develops the foundations of an ethics of mind by investigating the responsibility that is presupposed by the requirements of rationality that govern our attitudes. It has five main goals. (...) First, it reinterprets the problem of responsibility for attitudes as a problem about the normativity of rationality. Second, it connects substantive and structural rationality by drawing on debates about responsibility. Third, it supports recent accounts of the normativity of rationality by explicitly defending the view that epistemic reasons and other ‘right-kind’ reasons are genuine normative reasons. Fourth, it breaks the stalemate between rationalist and voluntarist accounts of mental responsibility by proposing a hybrid view. Finally, it argues that irrationality can warrant moral blame, thus revealing an unnoticed normative force of rational requirements. Length of manuscript: 85,000 words. (shrink)

This book contains diverse and critical reflections on Richard Rorty’s contributions to ethics, an aspect of his thought that has been relatively neglected. Together, they demonstrate that Rorty offers a compelling and coherent ethical vision. The book's chapters, grouped thematically, explore Rorty’s emphasis on the importance of moral imagination, social relations, language, and literature as instrumental for ethical self-transformation, as well as for strengthening what Rorty called "social hope," which entails constant work toward a more democratic, inclusive, and cosmopolitan (...) society and world. -/- Several contributors address the ethical implications of Rorty’s commitment to a vision of political liberalism without philosophical foundations. Others offer critical examinations of Rorty’s claim that our private or individual projects of self-creation can or should be held apart from our public goals of ameliorating social conditions and reducing cruelty and suffering. Some contributors explore hurdles that impede the practical applications of certain of Rorty's ideas. -/- The Ethics of Richard Rorty will appeal to scholars and advanced students interested in American philosophy and ethics. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to explore the ethical foundations for a caring conversation. The analysis is based on the ethics of Paul Ricoeur and deals with questions such as what kind of person the nurse ought to be and how she or he engages in caring conversations with suffering others. According to Ricoeur, ethics (the aim of an accomplished life) has primacy over morality (the articulation of aims in norms). At the ethical level, self-esteem and autonomy (...) were shown to be essential for a person (nurse) to act with respect and responsibility. The ethical relationship of a caring conversation was found to be asymmetrical, because of the passivity inflicted by suffering. This asymmetry was found to be potentially unethical if not balanced with reciprocity. In the ethical context, the caring conversation is one in which the nurse makes room through the ethos of caritas for a suffering person to regain his or her self-esteem, and thus makes a good life possible. (shrink)

Blur: Alongside other moral dilemmas and corporate social responsibility related issues, conflicts of interest are one of the most common challenges faced in the workplace. This is the first book devoted to examining the ethics behind conflicts of interest in the context of business, focussing on the foundations of moral philosophy which informs our understanding of ethics. -/- Through clear writing and applied examples, the author shows how ethics can be used to identify and manage conflicts of (...) interest in the business world. The book offers original insights on this topic, moving the scholarly debate forward in conflicts of interest. Offering a clear guide to the ethics of conflicts of interest in business, this is essential reading for students at all levels studying business ethics. (shrink)

This paper argues for the adoption of pluralist pragmatism about concepts of law. The first part of the paper introduces the argument by reference to the debate over conceptual prescriptivism in the contemporary literature on the methodology of legal theory. The second part of the paper offers a method for recognising pluralism in traditions of jurisprudential inquiry: it does so on the basis of the use of modes of objectification that can be said to underwrite the construction of concepts of (...) law. A number of examples of such modes are offered, with the focus thereafter being on two such modes: on the one hand, the explanatory paradigm of reason; and on the other hand, the explanatory paradigm of cause. A map of traditions of jurisprudential inquiry is sketched on the basis of these two modes. The third part of the paper goes on to show how combining the prescriptive resources that follow from the two traditions of jurisprudential inquiry classified in such a manner makes our response to certain practical context more robust. The four practical contexts are: the exercise of judicial behaviour; the structure of international law; legal education; and, legal scholarship. It is only by adopting the pluralist pragmatism espoused by the ethics of legal theory that we can avoid theoretical insularity (the belief that any one theoretical picture is capable of corresponding truthfully to the world) and theoretical imperialism (the belief that any one theoretical picture can be used as a foundation for a prescriptive agenda). (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present the essence of Ayn Rand's theory of rational egoism and to indicate how it is the only ethical theory that can provide a foundation for ethics in business. Justice, however, cannot be done to the breadth and depth of Rand's theory in so short a space as this article; consequently, I have provided the reader with a large number of references for further study. At minimum, Ayn Rand's theory, because of (...) its originality and challenge to establishment theories, should be included in all business ethics courses and discussions of business ethics. (shrink)

The work of David R. Lachterman, The Ethics of Geometry, subtitled A Genealogy of Modernity, concerns essentially the status of geometry in Euclid’s Elements and in Descartes’s Geometry. It is a remarkable work, at once by the declared breadth of its ambitions and by the very great precision of its analyses, which are always supported by a prodigious philosophical culture. David Lachterman’s concern is to grasp, by way of an in-depth commentary of certain, particularly crucial passages of these two (...) foundational works, the change in geometry’s status from the one to the other, and this, as a sort of symptom of what the Moderns, since Descartes, will always experience as a necessary, inaugural rupture with regard to tradition. This change is underlaid, according to the author, by a profound change in the philosophical ethos, and in particular, in the geometer’s ethos. One must understand ethos, Lachterman explains, in the manner of Aristotle: those characteristic means that human beings have by which to act in the world or to behave in relation to one another, or to themselves. There is thus an “ethics” of geometry, namely, in the manner and the style of doing geometry, of behaving as a mathematician both toward apprentices and toward the veritable nature of the “entities” which are to be taught or learnt, and which give their discipline its name. That there is a difference of ethos between Euclid and Descartes implies, according to Lachterman, that there is also a difference in the source of intelligibility of the “mathematical,” understood in the most general sense. This in turn implies a deeper difference in the mode of being in general: it suffices to note that, in the ancient case, the source of intelligibility of the geometric figure lies in the nature of the figure itself, and that in the modern case, the same source is found in the “strategies” and “tactics” suited to bringing the figure to its visibility or to its embodiment, 315 in order to notice that this change in the mode of access to intelligibility must have had profound repercussions upon philosophical thought. It is in this sense that the author’s design is also, at the same time, not genetic, but genealogical. The break between ancient and modern mathematics pleas in favor of a consideration of the rupture of modern thought relative to ancient thought; thus, implicitly—and it is one of the great merits of this book that it shows this—against all homogenizing levelling, in Heidegger’s fashion, of the history of thought down to the history of “the” discipline of metaphysics. If there is something Heideggerian, in the best sense of the term, in Lachterman’s way of considering ethos as coextensive with modes of being, there is, on the other hand, and we ought to be very glad of it, something anti-Heideggerian in his original manner of bringing out the effective novelty of modern thought. For, according to him, modern thought is no longer to be defined, explicitly or exclusively, by the so-called “metaphysics of subjectivity.” Instead, it is defined by a self-regulated, operative, and constructive productivity of thought—and this as much with regard to itself as to its objects. To put it briefly, whereas ancient thought is rather polarized by the logico-eidetic, modern thought is polarized by a sort of methodical constructivism, the status of which is, in reality, very complex. If Descartes speaks of “the construction of a problem,” while Leibniz speaks of the “construction of an equation,” and Kant of the “construction of a concept,” everything depends—as we might guess—upon the multiple meanings that the term ‘construction’ may take on. Is it to be taken in the sense of an absolute creation, a quasi ex nihilo creation, which would render mathematics divine? Is it the creation of artefacts, or again, is it the methodical exploration of problems posed to thought by the existence of objects or corresponding ideas, themselves supposed to be somewhere in the divine understanding? We already discern the breadth and the depth of the debate, and we sense that the essential will be played out in Lachterman’s commentaries on the famous Cartesian solution of the problem of Pappus—the birth certificate, as we know, of analytic geometry. (shrink)

This article takes up the work of Judith Butler in order to present a vision of ethics that avoids two common yet problematic positions: on the one hand, the skeptical position that ethical norms are so constitutive of who we are that they are ultimately impossible to assess and, on the other hand, the notion that we are justified in our commitment to any ethical norm that appears foundational to our identity. With particular attention to the trajectory of Butler’s (...) project from The Psychic Life of Power to Giving an Account of Oneself, the article discusses the shortcomings of these two positions and the virtues of the alternative account that Butler develops during this period. (shrink)

Abstract I consider Paul Thompson’s Agrarian Vision from the perspective of the philosophy of technology, especially as it relates to certain questions about public engagement and deliberative democracy around food issues. Is it able to promote an attitudinal shift or reorientation in values to overcome the view of “food as device” so that conscientious engagement in the food system by consumers can become more the norm? Next, I consider briefly, some questions to which it must face up in order to (...) move closer in dismantling the barriers that inhibit the capacity for virtuous caretaking of the food system at various levels. Lastly, and more deeply, how successful might agrarianism be in inculcating citizenship values (ones that go beyond food ethics as a private affair), for the democratization of agricultural technologies? Might the Jeffersonian foundation to which the agrarianism (a la) Thompson appeals need something like a contemporary theory of justice in order to facilitate the reconstitution of our politico-moral selves? How can it help guide appropriate ruminations on the intra and intergenerational question, “What do we want the shape of our current and future social and political institutions to look like in relation to food?” Content Type Journal Article Category Articles Pages 1-10 DOI 10.1007/s10806-011-9339-x Authors Raymond Anthony, Department of Philosophy, University of Alaska Anchorage, Anchorage, AK 99508, USA Journal Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics Online ISSN 1573-322X Print ISSN 1187-7863. (shrink)

Morality in Sport Sport continues to make its presence known throughout the world as it prospers at all levels. Amazingly, there is no end in sight to the popularity and growth of sport. Essential to sport's continued prosperity, growth, and overall livelihood is the sustenance of a firm moral base. It is the goal and hope of the author that you find this textbook to be a useful guide in helping you maintain and build upon the foundation of moral (...) good that is required for sport to exist now and in the future. The need to make good moral decisions in sport is constant. And, although opportunities to make such decisions in sport are seemingly endless, what is "moral" can be somewhat unclear. Given the various perspectives on morality and the lack of clear-cut distinctions between moral and immoral actions, disagreements regarding moral behavior and sport are likely to always exist. However, having a blatant disregard for good moral behavior in sport is difficult to defend from most any position. (shrink)

This chapter explores the theoretical and practical aspects of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism’s ethics of generosity from a philosophical point of view. Buddhism is a religion par excellence of strangification and generosity. After an introduction, I discuss some essential sources both from Indian and Chinese Buddhism. Then I develop the idea of strangification and ethic of generosity in Chinese Mahayana Buddhism, before I arrive at some words of conclusion.On the theoretical side, I explore the ontological foundation of the (...) class='Hi'>ethics of generosity in The Awakening of Faith. This is one of the founding texts in the history of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism that offers an ontological foundation to Buddhist generosity. It does this by the affirmation of One Mind or the Mind of All Sentient Beings as the Ultimate Reality. However, it also sets certain limits to generosity by denying difference/otherness, and sees difference/otherness as merely a delusion. On the practical side, I discuss three types of gift, namely the gift of material goods, the gift of no fear and the gift of teaching Dharma, and more interestingly, the practice of huixiang 迴向 as discussed by Huiyuan in the entry “huixiang” of his Dasheng Yizhang.Some conclusive reflections are done to consider the Chinese Buddhist ethics of generosity in relation to the post-modern ethics of generosity to many others. (shrink)

The Ethics of Belief: Morality and the Will to Believe describes, investigates, and provides a resolution to a conceptual dilemma at the foundation of most ethics of belief. In the first part of the dissertation this dilemma is thoroughly explored. The following claims are addressed in the first part: that every ethic of belief presupposes that beliefs are appropriate objects of moral 'ought' judgments; that nearly all ethics of belief presuppose that we have control over the (...) voluntary acts of belief formation, belief rejection, belief change, and belief maintenance; that there is a significant conceptual connection between moral 'ought' judgments and the voluntary; and, contrary to these ethics of belief, that we actually lack control of belief formation, belief rejection, belief change, and belief maintenance. The second part of the dissertation describes the variety and scope of the different kinds of ethics of belief that face the dilemma. Historical and contemporary accounts of ethics of belief are considered . The final part of the dissertation provides a novel account of an ethic of belief, one employing social practice theoretic concepts, that avoids the dilemma previously described, even though it presupposes a connection between moral judgments of beliefs and the voluntary. The nature of the connection presupposed by this "Practice" ethic of belief is described and arguments are offered to show that despite the fact that believing is involuntary we can still be justifiably held responsible for our beliefs. (shrink)

Is there a circular relationship between trust and ethics? Is it possible to alter their relationship, changing the perception that social actors have of them? How has trust changed in the transition from modernity to post-modernity and how does it change in times of crisis? Starting from the epistemological assumption that progress in the social sciences is determined by the change in the theoretical horizon produced by “a reformulation of metaphysical assumptions” [1] and combining this path with the relational (...) perspective, according to which “not the facts, but the relationship between the facts is what requires analysis” [2], we will examine definitions, meanings, functions and relationships between trust and ethics. Following the theoretical logical method, we will understand that trust and ethical behaviour are particular forms of gift [3] that co-own each other. As such, they are ambivalent in nature and their circle can also produce dysfunctional outcomes that depend on the ability of social systems to modify collective perceptions through forms of communication, in the awareness that distrust constitutes an ineliminable and, paradoxically, preparatory element for the restoration of the trust circle. The relational circle between gift, trust, collective ethics and personal morality does not end with distrust, but changes in a contingent way, determining perverse effects: correct behaviour could produce, unintentionally, a disaster; incorrect actions could generate unforeseen positive effects.The perverse effects cannot be defined as exceptional - as is believed in the theory of rational choice - but recurrent because daily practices are marked by an intuitive, emotional and moralistic trust circle that prevails over logical reasoning, as ascertained by both relational theory and behavioural economics. Functionalist paradigms cannot engineer and optimise the performance of trust. [1] See J. Alexander's strong programme in S. Segre, Le teorie sociologiche contemporanee, Carocci, Rome, 2019, p. 12. It is not enough to observe reality, it is necessary to interpret it, taking into account theories and traditions whose foundations have a metaphysical character. [2] F. Ferrarotti, La sociologia come analisi critica della società, in R. Cipriani, Nuovo Manuale di Sociologia, Maggioli, Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, 2018 p. 24. [3] The classical meaning in M. Mauss, Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques, 1ª ed. 1925, revisited by G. Satta, L’ambiguità del dono. Note su dono, violenza e potere nell’ Essai di Mauss, in V. Rasini, Aggressività. Un’indagine polifonica, Mimesis, Milano 2011. (shrink)

Risks and burdens in the study participation, as well as an adequate risk-benefit balance, are key concepts for the evaluation of clinical studies by research ethics committees. An adequate assessment and continuous monitoring to ensure compliance of risks and burdens in clinical trials have long been described as a central task in research ethics. However, there is currently no uniform and solid theoretical approach to risk assessment by RECs. Regulatory standards of research ethics such as the Declaration (...) of Helsinki provide only minimal guidance on how risk decisions are considered. Due to discrepancies in the existing literature and guidance documents, adequate risk assessment by RECs remains to be elusive. In this article, we address current definitions of risk and present our own concept of aggregate risk definition. Moreover, we highlight the concept of benefit, the standard of reasonableness with respect to ethics literature and different approaches of risk-benefit assessment. In order to present a comprehensive theoretical approach of risk assessment by RECs, further understanding of the definitions of risk may improve adequate decision-making tasks by RECs. To improve the process of risk assessment by RECs, a dynamic framework will be illustrated, showing step-by-step risk assessment functions. This approach may be a promising tool to ensure adequacy in risk assessment by RECs. (shrink)

In light of the development of “CRISPR” technology, new promising advances in therapeutic and preventive approaches have become a reality. However, with it came many ethical challenges. The most recent worldwide condemnation of the first use of CRISPR to genetically modify a human embryo is the latest example of ethically questionable use of this new and emerging field. Monotheistic religions are very conservative about such changes to the human genome and can be considered an interference with God’s creation. Moreover, these (...) changes could cause perpetual changes to future generations. The Muslim scholars establish their decisions by addressing five foundations of Islamic law i.e. “maqāṣid al sharı̄`a”; the purposes of the law. These are dın̄, nafs, nasl, `aql and māl. To achieve this, the five principles should all be met before approval of an experiment like the Chinese embryo modifications; Qaṣd which is achieved in this case as it aims to protect the embryo from HIV. Yaqın̄ and Ḍarar were not satisfied as they require strong scientific certainty of the procedures, and evidence of safety. Ḍarūra by which the alternatives being compared; in this case more established and proven safe alternatives to protect the HIV transmission from the father are available, so this principle is not met. The final principle is `Urf, by which the social context of using any contemporary technology should be taken in consideration, and clearly this was not achieved. Collectively, germline changes are rejected from an Islamic perspective until the five principles are fulfilled. In the Chinese Twins gene editing case, there was clearly no justification or support for it according to the Muslim Jurisprudence laws. These laws and approaches can serve as an ethical checklist for such controversial research, especially in early stages of the research. (shrink)

The amount of data available to healthcare practitioners is growing, and the rapid increase in available patient data is becoming a problem for healthcare practitioners, as they are often unable to fully survey and process the data relevant for the treatment or care of a patient. Consequently, there are currently several efforts to develop systems that can aid healthcare practitioners with reading and processing patient data and, in this way, provide them with a better foundation for decision-making about the (...) treatment and care of patients. There are also efforts to develop algorithms that provide suggestions for such decisions. However, the development of these systems and algorithms raises several concerns related to the privacy of patients, the patient–practitioner relationship, and the autonomy of healthcare practitioners. The aim of this article is to provide a foundation for understanding the ethical challenges related to the development of a specific form of data-processing systems, namely clinical algorithms. (shrink)

A lengthy critique of Kant's apriorism precedes discussions on the ethical principles of eudaemonism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, and positivism.

Martin Heidegger’s existential account of care in _Being and Time_ (2010) provides us with an opportunity to reimagine what the proper theoretical grounding of an ethic of care might be. Heidegger’s account of care serves to deconstruct the two primary foundations that an ethic of care is often based upon. Namely, that we are inevitably interdependent upon one another and/or possess an innate disposition to care for fellow humans in need. Heidegger’s account reveals that both positions are founded upon an (...) ontic (meaning factual existence), as opposed to an ontological (which refers to the nature of being), understanding of care. The distinctions between an ontic and ontological understanding of care are significant. Yet, I maintain that they are not completely incompatible. Both Heidegger and care ethicists contend that our existence with others is understood through a relational ontology. Furthermore, there are certain ontological structures from Heidegger which resonate with an ethic of care. Two key existential structures are leaping-ahead and being-guilty. These existential structures are latent in care ethics, and by explicitly revealing them I reinforce the connection between Heidegger’s account and care theory. Lastly, I develop the theoretical foundations of care ethics by proposing an existential ethic of care. (shrink)

The recent global increase in environmental regulation does not necessarily signal improvement in firms’ ecological imprints. Like many markets, the Arab world is struggling to implement environmental compliance measures among local firms. For Arab countries, the reliance solely on formal policies to improve local firms’ ecological footprints may be risky given the evident institutional challenges to enforce environmental regulations, specially post the Arab Spring. Drawing from the literature highlighting the merits of combining formal and informal controls to ensure successful implementation (...) of a strategy, we argue that the emphasis for regulation must be accompanied by an emphasis for developing environmental ethics of individuals, who are the expected implementers of any environmental policy. In that light, we propose that the Eco-Islam phenomenon can serve as an influential and effective foundation for building organizational cultures with stronger environmental ethics among local small and medium enterprises. We explain the underlying maxims of Eco-Islam then conduct qualitative research among experts preaching or practicing the concept to gain better insights into the potential of leveraging it in Muslim-majority Arab countries. Finally, we conclude with insightful implications for local SMEs in the region. (shrink)

The ethics of technology deals with the moral grounds of creating and using devices and technological systems. This paper deals with the ethics of technology from the point of view of postphenomenology – by analysing multistability, mediation and technological intentionality – and of Wittgenstein’s fundamental grammar – by analysing technology as a rule-governed practice. Using these theoretical frameworks, this paper is able to offer a description of the way ethical values are embedded in technology and to present the (...) foundation for a normative ethics of technology. (shrink)

In this paper, we review the conventional analyses of management control systems, to conclude, first, that the illusion of control can mislead managers into believing that everything can be controlled and monitored, and, second, that no incentive system based only on extrinsic rewards can motivate individuals properly. Then, we investigate the philosophical foundations of the basic assumptions that, implicitly or explicitly, are made about the nature of the acting person. Based on personalist phenomenology, we show how the development of technical (...) and moral values is crucial to the long-run survival of organizations. We end by offering some guidelines as to what control systems should be like in order to be compatible with the nature of human persons. (shrink)

The purpose of __Aquinas's Ethics__ is to place Thomas Aquinas's moral theory in its full philosophical and theological context and to do so in a way that makes Aquinas readily accessible to students and interested general readers, including those encountering Aquinas for the first time. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen McCluskey, and Christina Van Dyke begin by explaining Aquinas's theories of the human person and human action, since these ground his moral theory. In their interpretation, Aquinas's theological commitments crucially shape his (...) account of the human person, human capacities for action, and human flourishing. The authors develop a comprehensive picture of Aquinas's thought, which is designed to help students understand how his concept of happiness and the good life are part of a coherent, theologically-informed worldview. Many studies of Aquinas naturally focus on certain areas of his thought and tend to assume a general knowledge of the whole. __Aquinas's Ethics_ _takes the opposite approach: it intentionally links his metaphysics and anthropology to his action theory and ethics to illuminate how the moral theory is built on foundations laid elsewhere. The authors emphasize the integration of concepts of virtue, natural law, and divine grace within Aquinas's ethics, rather than treating such topics in isolation or opposition. Their approach, presented in clear and deliberately non-specialist language, reveals the coherent nature of Aquinas's account of the moral life and of what fulfills us as human beings. The result is a rich and engaging framework for further investigation of Aquinas's thought and its applications. _"___Aquinas’s Ethics_ _is a perfect introduction to one of the most sophisticated and influential ethical systems in Western thought. DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke capture the brilliant clarity of Aquinas’s moral vision, offering an illuminating perspective true to both the theoretical depth and practical richness of Aquinas’s writings. Those new to Aquinas’s ideas will find this book eminently readable. Everyone—students and scholars alike—will appreciate its direct, distinctive voice and clear philosophical intelligence." —_Scott MacDonald, Norma K. Regan Professor in Christian Studies, Cornell University_ "__Aquinas's Ethics_ _is an excellent contribution to the literature on Aquinas and ethics, providing an integrated and robust account of the relationship between a metaphysics of human nature, natural law theory, and virtue theory. Showing these inextricable connections, it is very much like the work of St. Thomas himself, and suggests why so many lesser theories of ethics are unsatisfying for their lack of depth and comprehensive reach." —_John Kavanaugh, S.J., Saint Louis University_ “DeYoung, McCluskey, and Van Dyke have written the ideal introduction to Aquinas’s ethics, situating it in the broader context of his thinking about human nature and action. Although Aquinas cared more about—and wrote more about—ethics than about any other philosophical topic, it remains the most unjustly neglected aspect of his thought. I know of no better guide to that territory than this book.” —_Robert Pasnau, University of Colorado at Boulder_. (shrink)

In the second half of the nineteenth century utilitarianism and naturalism dominated Russian ethical thought. The Russian intelligentsia, nurtured on the works of N. G. Chernyshevskii, P. L. Lavrov, and D. I. Pisarev, regarded utilitarianism as an alternative to all the ideologies that harness man to the service of "ends higher than himself." It was thought that only man, as a concrete, living individual, could be regarded as the end and purpose of activity. Such concepts as individual interests, utility, and (...) calculus became the cornerstones of practical morality, while scientific studies of human nature became the foundation of theoretical ethics. Any mention of "a priori duty" or "categorical imperative" were regarded as manifestations of religious authoritarianism and political conservatism. (shrink)

The Commission's recentinterpretation of the Precautionary Principleis used as starting point for an analysis ofthe moral foundation of this principle. ThePrecautionary Principle is shown to have theethical status of an amendment to a liberalprinciple to the effect that a state only mayrestrict a person's actions in order to preventunacceptable harm to others. The amendmentallows for restrictions being justified even incases where there is no conclusive scientificevidence for the risk of harmful effects.However, the liberal tradition has seriousproblems in determining when (...) a risk of harm isunacceptable. Nevertheless, reasonable liberalarguments in favor of precaution can be basedon considerations of irreversible harm andgeneral fear of harm. But it is unclear whenthere considerations can be overridden.Within the liberal framework, the Commissionadvocates a so-called proportional version ofthe Precautionary Principle. This should beclearly distinguished from a welfare-basedapproach to precaution based on risk-aversiveweighing up of expected costs and benefits.However, in the last resort, the Commissiondoes seem to make a covert appeal to suchconsiderations. (shrink)

A comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops (...) and defends distinctive accounts of the nature of personal identity, the evaluation of death, and the wrongness of killing. The central metaphysical claim of the book is that we are neither nonmaterial souls nor human organisms but are instead embodied minds. In ethical theory, one of the central claims is that the morality of killing is not unitary; rather, the principles that determine the morality of killing in marginal cases are different from those that govern the killing of persons who are self‐conscious and rational. Another important theme is that killing in marginal cases should be evaluated in terms of the impact it would have on the victim at the time rather than on the value of the victim's life as a whole. What primarily matters is how killing would affect that which would be rational for the victim to care about at the time of death. By appealing to various foundational claims about identity, death, and the morality of killing, this book yields novel conclusions about such issues as abortion, prenatal injury, infanticide, the killing of animals, the significance of brain death, the termination of life support in cases of persistent vegetative state, the use of anencephalic infants as sources of organs for transplantation, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and advance directives in cases of dementia. In particular, the book defends the moral permissibility of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in certain cases and argues that brain death is not the appropriate criterion of death either for a person or a human organism. (shrink)

"One of the expected fruits of Descartes' philosophical enterprise is "the highest and most perfect moral system," a system which, organically developed from its metaphysical and physical foundations, will provide the moral agent with direction and purpose in each of life's contingencies. Yet, Descartes' published work contains no such moral system, and commentators have generally agreed that Descartes "has entered the history of philosophy as perhaps the only systematic philosopher of the first rank who failed to provide any methodical treatment (...) of moral problems."" "Through a careful investigation of primarily Descartes' Correspondence and his final treatise, The Passions of the Soul, Vance Morgan here constructs the framework of a working ethical system, consistent with the spirit of Cartesian metaphysics and physics. He finds that while Descartes' metaphysics are remarkable for their insistence on indubitably clear and distinct principles, his ethic is equally remarkable in its conclusion that indubitably certain, inviolable principles are not available in the realm of morals and human activity. Virtue is not defined with reference to the results of one's actions, nor to one's faithful adherence to a set of rationally derived moral directives. Rather, virtue consists in the moral attitude with which one lives one's life, the psychological conviction that one has always resolutely acted upon the best intellectual activity of which one is capable."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

This chapter is a survey of the ethics of belief. It begins with the debate as it first emerges in the foundational dispute between W. K. Clifford and William James. Then it surveys how the disagreements between Clifford and James have shaped the work of contemporary theorists, touching on topics such as pragmatism, whether we should believe against the evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, doxastic partiality, and doxastic wronging.

Companies increasingly deploy artificial intelligence technologies in their personnel recruiting and selection process to streamline it, making it faster and more efficient. AI applications can be found in various stages of recruiting, such as writing job ads, screening of applicant resumes, and analyzing video interviews via face recognition software. As these new technologies significantly impact people’s lives and careers but often trigger ethical concerns, the ethicality of these AI applications needs to be comprehensively understood. However, given the novelty of AI (...) applications in recruiting practice, the subject is still an emerging topic in academic literature. To inform and strengthen the foundation for future research, this paper systematically reviews the extant literature on the ethicality of AI-enabled recruiting to date. We identify 51 articles dealing with the topic, which we synthesize by mapping the ethical opportunities, risks, and ambiguities, as well as the proposed ways to mitigate ethical risks in practice. Based on this review, we identify gaps in the extant literature and point out moral questions that call for deeper exploration in future research. (shrink)