Ernst Cassirer's The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms fails to account properly for personalized experiences; it cannot provide a basis for understanding how some experiences become personal while others do not. Our account of personalized experience will remain lacking as long as we follow Cassirer in viewing personalized experience as a non-necessary feature of other symbolic forms such as myth, language, religion, or art; instead it must be understood that personalized experience is grounded in an independent symbolic activity as basic to (...) human cultural life as language, myth, or objectivating knowledge. This basic personalizing symbolic function is best understood as that same activity articulated in Gabriel Marcel's phenomenological descriptions of the act of "creative fidelity." Once this relationship has been grasped, it becomes possible to articulate a symbolic form of personalized experience by describing the unique way in which creative fidelity (as the personalizing symbolic function) spatializes, temporalizes, numeralizes (and as a result subjectifies/objectifies) its own distinct horizon of meaning (or: cultural world). The result will be a symbolic form, as Cassirer understands it, that is as far-reaching and fundamental to human cultural life as the three symbolic forms elaborated in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. By articulating this fourth symbolic form, we will have taken a significant step toward Cassirer's ultimate goal of a robust philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur: Between Text and Phenomenon calls attention to the dynamic interaction that takes place between hermeneutics and phenomenology in Ricoeur's thought. It could be said that Ricoeur's thought is placed under a twofold demand: between the rigor of the text and the requirements of the phenomenon. The rigor of the text calls for fidelity to what the text actually says, while the requirement of the phenomenon is established by the Husserlian call to return "to (...) the things themselves." These two demands are interwoven insofar as there is a hermeneutic component of the phenomenological attempt to go beyond the surface of things to their deeper meaning, just as there is a phenomenological component of the hermeneutic attempt to establish a critical distance toward the world to which we belong. For this reason, Ricoeur's thought involves a back and forth movement between the text and the phenomenon. Although this double movement was a theme of many of Ricoeur's essays in the middle of his career, the essays in this book suggest that hermeneutic phenomenology remains implicit throughout his work. The chapters aim to highlight, in much greater detail, how this back and forth movement between phenomenology and hermeneutics takes place with respect to many important philosophical themes, including the experience of the body, history, language, memory, personal identity, and intersubjectivity. (shrink)

Scepticism about phenomenology typically begins with worries concerning the reliability of introspection. Such worries concern the accuracy or fidelity of descriptions of experience to the experience itself, although if pressed, such worries ultimately call into question the very idea of the experience itself. This chapter considers scepticism in both its epistemological and ontological varieties and questions whether either form genuinely engages phenomenological method, properly understood. Starting from the problematic identification of phenomenology with introspection and drawing upon considerations from (...) the work of Edmund Husserl, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the chapter argues that phenomenological reflection, in its concern for essential structures, is largely unaffected by worries concerning how best to capture the details of particular episodes of experience. Moreover, many of the sceptical challenges phenomenology is alleged to face presuppose an overly objective understanding of experience that phenomenology typically rejects. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the underlying motives for phenomenological scepticism. These motives have little if anything to do with worries about introspection and the like, but instead involve scepticism about the viability of transcendental philosophy. The real challenge phenomenology confronts is one of establishing the legitimacy – and authority – of its distinctive methods in opposition to naturalism. (shrink)

This book champions phenomenology’s place in networked learning theory, research, and practice. The book illuminates and showcases something of the powerful richness, depth, and novel insights offered by phenomenological perspectives on human experience to invoke a fundamental rethinking of experience in networked learning. It also signals the broader learning technology community to acknowledge and engage with these perspectives. -/- The editors and authors have collaborated to bring a renewed focus upon the human facet of networked learning. As our world (...) becomes more digitally enmeshed, infiltrated, and contested, the need to investigate and convey, at maximum fidelity, the lived experience of learners, teachers, and other stakeholders in education becomes paramount. Through phenomenological inquiry, we disclose the complex dance between the human and the technical, spotlighting how individuals engage, navigate, and find meaning within virtual yet embodied landscapes. This approach suitably honours the complexity, profundity, and ethicality of human existence in our evolving digital ecologies. -/- The first section, “Phenomenological Perspectives in Researching Networked Learning” lucidly explains phenomenology and some of its potential affordances. The second section, “Practising Phenomenological Research in Networked Learning”, explicates the tangible practice of phenomenological research into specific phenomena: chapters sample of a select range of studies that also indicate the kind of insights such research can bring to networked learning. The concluding section presents two chapters that denote novel and arresting, “Critical Phenomenological Perspectives on Networked Learning”. Together, these final chapters demonstrate the type of radical challenge that phenomenology can bring to the field, refreshing even networked learning’s most basic conceptions and practices. -/- With this book, we open a space for anyone who wishes to join us in the wonderful, inspiring, and challenging application of phenomenology within the field of networked learning. (shrink)

플라톤과 아리스토텔레스 이래로, 기억은 한편으로는 과거의 충실한 보존이면서 다른 한편으로는 과거의 자유로운 변형이라는 이중적이고 모순적인 면모를 가진 것으로 정의되어 왔다. 그런데 기억을 외부로부터의 지각 인상이 우리의 마음에 남긴 흔적으로 이해하는 전통적인 밀랍 각인 모델에서는 기억의 이 양면성을 제대로 설명할 수 없다. 기억의 존재 방식에 대한 새로운 모델이 요구되는 까닭이 여기에 있다. 우리의 가설은, 베르그손의 『물질과 기억』 1장에 제시된 이미지 개념을 확장하여, 베르그손의 본의와 반대로 기억 또한 지각과 마찬가지로 이미지로 보고, 기억과 지각의 차이를 동일한 이미지들의 상이한 관계 체계들에서 찾는 데 있다. (...) 이에 따를 때, 기억의 충실한 보존은 이미지들이 시간 순서에 따라 맺는 관계와 관련 되며, 반대로 기억의 가변적 재생은 동일한 기억 이미지가 지각적 이미지 체계와 인접과 유사의 논리에 따라 연결되는 데에서 성립한다. 그런데 베르그손이 설명하는 인접과 유사는 구조주의 언어학자 야콥슨의 은유와 환유에 대한 설명과 일치한다. 따라서, 기억의 가변적 변형은 기억 이미지 자체의 변형이 아니라, 기억 이미지들이 은유와 환유의 ‘언어논리’에 따라 지각 이미지들과 관계 맺게 됨으로써 생겨나는 ‘의미’ 차원의 변형이다. 이렇게 해서, 본 연구는 기억의 충실한 보존과 자유로운 가변성의 양면성을 기억 이미지 자체와 기억 이미지들이 언어논리에 따라 맺는 관계라는 두 차원을 구분함으로써 해명한다. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.2 (2003) 280-281 [Access article in PDF] Maria Dimova-Cookson. T. H. Green's Moral and Political Philosophy: A Phenomenological Perspective. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xiii + 175. Cloth, $60.00 Like most today who study Green's idealism, Dimova-Cookson finds only his ethics to be still relevant. She rejects his metaphysical epistemology and consequently his teleology, but offers an alternative. Dimova-Cookson proposes a Husserlian (...) analysis of Green's positions on goodness and a critical defense that attempts to rectify his apparently inconsistent formulations of that concept. Provided we recall that Husserl's method is not unproblematic and resist the tendency to adjust the doctrine analyzed for the sake of methodological fidelity, there is reason to be open to the author's proposal. Several of Husserl's ideas seem relevant to Green's thought: intentionality; "noematic content of the determinable X" and "horizon" developed in Ideas; intersubjectivity; and Husserl's teleological descriptions of phenomenological consciousness. But Dimova-Cookson pursues none of these. She employs Husserl's problematic "epoche" and a "necessary feature of human practice" she calls "the phenomenological circle" (69, hereafter, PC).Dimova-Cookson uses PC to resolve certain confusions imputed to Green. Green himself anticipates the charge of vicious circularity concerning the moral ideal when he reasons that "the unconditional good for man" is the good will and that the good will is to will the unconditional good. He subsequently explains that the circularity is not logically vicious for the two terms describe different states of one teleological process of a will actualizing its potential for perfection, and are distinguished "as the complete from the incomplete." According to Dimova-Cookson, Green hasn't escaped the charge and needn't try. Rather, he has unwittingly stumbled upon PC, but confused matters by carelessly conflating perspectives on the senses of "good" which she believes are two different definitions of two different things, elements in PC. "Circularity in explaining morality can be legitimized," she says, provided one rigorously clarifies the shift in perspective between the two elements in PC (70ff.). This move, she holds, can resolve certain contemporary criticisms. But note that if Green hasn't escaped the charge, and it is a genuine logical circle, then, as Husserl recognized, it cannot be avoided simply by making a rigorously clear shift in perspective. That would be a psychologistic response to a logical problem. Moreover, even if clarity of perspectival shift is useful here, it fails to capture the continuity in the moral progress of the self-actualization of moral agent to moral citizen. Finally, had Green represented his distinction in such dichotomous fashion, this would have compromised the teleological component of his explanations and made it more difficult to keep his theory from being conflated with utilitarianism. Green is far-sighted here, given recent tendencies to confuse utilitarianism and teleology on the basis that both can be represented as versions of consequentialism, a confusion based on the fallacy of undistributed middle.Most of Dimova-Cookson's connections are highly suggestive and many of her distinctions useful. She teases out several possible meanings of Green's conception of good, and is to be commended for having tried to answer some of his critics and calling attention to the valuable content of Green's doctrine. Her attempt at a phenomenological approach is novel.It is troubling, though, that Dimova-Cookson thinks it is also transcendental, for her words reveal a grave confusion about what this means. When discussing what she thinks is either transcendental or phenomenological, she uses the language of contingent psychological experience; e.g., "storing experience" (44), and projecting and relating to one's self-image (65). The process of learning she describes is more reminiscent of Piaget's "assimilation-accommodation" model than anything Husserlian or transcendental. Yet the author considers this an "advanced transcendentalism" wherein "our experience is preconditioned—that is, made possible—by the conceptual baggage that has accumulated and is always present at the back of our minds" (27). If one holds that we accumulate... (shrink)

In an effort to reassess the status of Phenomenology of Perception and its relation to The Visible and the Invisible, this essay argues that Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl's text and his discussion of the “field of presence” in La temporalité are intended to think through the field in which time makes its appearance as one of passage. Time does not show itself as presence or in the present but manifests itself as Ablauf, as lapse or flow, an écoulement that is (...) simultaneously an explosion, an éclatement. Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in these pages is thus legible as recovering the primordial experience of time as a self-differentiating déhiscence in its dual power of articulation and erosion. Time is thus simultaneously the vehicle of the world's appearance and of its “disarticulation”, the passage of a rhythm of affirmation and disintegration. Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in Phenomenology of Perception is oblique, somewhat fragmentary and circuitous.11 References to Merleau-Ponty's works cite the French followed by the English translation. I will use the abbreviation PhP for Phenomenology of Perception and VI for The Visible and the Invisible. Other texts by Merleau-Ponty will be referenced by the title. References to Husserl and Heidegger use the German followed by the translation. I will use the abbreviations ZB for the Zeitbewußtsein lectures; FT for Formale und transzendentale Logik; EU for Erfahrung und Urteil; and SZ for Sein und Zeit. View all notes While of course this phenomenon comes under close scrutiny in La temporalité, a brief inspection of this text as a whole finds it to be virtually everywhere.22 The theme of temporality is introduced as early as the Preface to Part I, “Experience and Objective Thought” and appears again in almost every subsequent chapter: the first chapter of Part I ; in his discussion on number blindness and Goldstein's patient known as Schneider in La spatialité du corps et la motricité ; in the sexuality chapter ; in the discussion of memory in La corps comme expression et la parole ; in Le sentir ; in the discussion of depth in L'espace ; in La chose et le monde naturel ; in Autrui et le monde humain and in Le cogito. Rather than providing the perhaps much called for synopsis of these scattered accounts of time or trying to locate a unified account in Phenomenology of Perception through such a synopsis, this essay will focus only on La temporalité, particularly the discussion of Husserl's diagram from the Zeitbewußtsein and the “champ de présence”. View all notes It is this apparent ubiquity that will motivate scholars such as Renaud Barbaras to claim that “… the entire structure of Phenomenology of Perception rests on a chapter devoted to temporality”.33 Barbaras The Being of the Phenomenon, 218. View all notes In spite of this ubiquity and apparent centrality, however, the treatment of temporality seems to neglect a systematic and thoroughgoing approach, and whether this work manages to address this theme with a sufficient degree of rigor remains open to debate. Furthermore, beyond the scattered and fragmented appearance of temporality in the text, the chapter devoted to its exploration contains numerous, well-recognized problems.44 Merleau-Ponty's misinterpretation of Bergson in this chapter has received much warranted attention. Alia Al-Saji, for example, has criticized Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in this chapter of Phenomenology of Perception for this misreading as well as its perhaps too uncritical infatuation with Husserl and his emphasis on presence. See Lawlor Thinking Through French Philosophy, Al-Saji “The Temporality of Life” and “A Past Which Has Never Been Present” and Barbaras “The Turn of Experience”. View all notes Among these difficulties, Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl's lectures on time-consciousness, the Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins,55 The 1928 publication of the Zeitbewußtsein, edited by Heidegger, is what appears in the bibliography of Phenomenology of Perception. This version, from the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologishe Forschung, as Brough notes, appears as “Part A” of Husserliana X. The notes that constitute this version of the text, furthermore, as Heidegger mentions in his preface to the Jahrbuch version and which Brough repeats were heavily edited by Husserl's assistant at the time, Edith Stein. Merleau-Ponty's references to the Zeitbewußtsein cut across various moments of the text and do not focus on one section in particular, and in fact, he actually references section 11, “Urimpression und retentionale Modifikation”/“Primal impression and retentional modification” in his discussion of the field of presence. As Al-Saji has noted, the extent to which Merleau-Ponty's account of time in La temporalité centres the account of time on “the living present” can be shown to be at play behind the misreading of Bergson. While I do not wish to dispute the specifics of her compelling reading, it is nonetheless worth noting that Al-Saji's reading of the Zeitbewußtsein only focuses on Appendix V, “Gleichzeitigkeit von Wahrnehmung und Wahrgenommenem”/“Simultaneity of Perception and the Perceived”. View all notes looms large, as it seems that his discussion of what he designates as le champ de présence or “field of presence” commits him to the ontological primacy of the present in his account of time. As a result, this earlier work appears to confine itself to a metaphysics organized around the privilege and authority of the present in establishing the structure of time.66 Leonard Lawlor has convincingly argued against this interpretation. Following the famous remark at the end of Le Sentir about “a past which has never been present”, Lawlor argues that precisely because Merleau-Ponty's critique of Bergson is a straw man – that is, because his critique of Bergson is based on a misreading – a closer inspection of Le Sentir and La temporalité shows Merleau-Ponty to be committed to the ontological primacy of an “originary” past. See Lawlor Thinking Through French Philosophy, 89. Marratto, following Lawlor, takes up the charge of a metaphysics of presence in Phenomenology of Perception in dialogue with Derrida. Marratto argues that Derrida's reading selectively overlooks “the very imporant dimensions of difference, discontinuity, and delay and non-self-presence in Merleau-Ponty's descriptions”, located particularly in the latter's theory of subjectivity. I agree with Marratto's assessment, and my aim here is to deepen it by turning in more detail to La temporalité. View all notes This apparent commitment to the ontological primacy of the present, for some readers, has also functioned as an index for tracking the revision of Phenomenology of Perception that is said to figure in The Visible and the Invisible, where a metaphysics of the present is replaced with a commitment to the primacy of an original past, signalling a significant break in the development of Merleau-Ponty's thought.77 This has bearing on the debate mentioned above as the question of temporality and Merleau-Ponty's evolving relationship with Bergson are also cited as part of the index for tracking the differences between Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible. What we see, according to this reading, is Merleau-Ponty move away from a more strictly phenomenological orientation of Phenomenology of Perception, an orientation that is said to adversely mediate his early, critical stance with respect to Bergson, toward a progressively less Husserlian and more Bergsonian stance in The Visible and the Invisible. While he does not specifically address Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Bergson, Marratto's reading also places a special emphasis on the significance of the past, specifically Merleau-Ponty's reference to a “past which has never been present”. It is also not my intention to enter into the question of Merleau-Ponty's relationship with Bergson. Rather, I will restrict my remarks specifically to Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl and the Zeitbewußtsein in La temporalité in order to show that there are grounds for at least questioning one of the premises of the interpretation mentioned above, namely that Phenomenology of Perception is unequivocally legible as committed to the ontological primacy of the present. As will become clear later in the essay, I also dispute interpretations that would place the emphasis on the ontological primacy of an original past. For my own views on the significance of a “past which has never been present”, see Whitmoyer “The Primary Silence of the Past”. View all notes In considering the manner in which the Zeitbewußtsein figures in La temporalité and Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the field of presence, it will do to think about the parameters in which his engagement with Husserl is staged more generally. It seems that Merleau-Ponty never considered his task in terms of the perhaps false alternative of fidelity and heresy, because “any commemoration is also a betrayal”, and because the task of the interpreter is, as he famously notes, thinking through that “unthought-of element … which is wholly his [Husserl's] and yet opens out on something else”.88 Merleau-Ponty, Signes, 203/160. This methodological dictum is developed in more detail in the notes to the course offered on Husserl's Origin of Geometry in 1959–1960. “We are saying not that Husserl was that, but that Husserl was not only what they say, was also another, bearer of an unthought”. View all notes Following Merleau-Ponty's own indications, we could suggest that Husserl's text, rather than a source of orthodoxy, functions as a point of orientation through which Merleau-Ponty marks out his own theory of temporality.99 I will not, therefore, address the question of the “accuracy” of his interpretation of Husserl because, according to Merleau-Ponty himself, this question presupposes that the author, in this case Husserl, has a privileged access to his thought, as if there is some kernel or essence of what a philosopher thought that interpreters can either get right or wrong. As the remarks in “The Philosopher and His Shadow” make clear, interpretation can never really avail itself of this presupposition and in this manner the question of accuracy is precisely the wrong question. View all notes This essay argues that his discussion of the Zeitbewußtsein in Phenomenology of Perception does not offer an account of time that “centers around the living present”, as some have argued,1010 Al-Saji “A Past Which Has Never Been Present”, 42–44. View all notes but that the discussion of the field of presence and what follows are rather intended to account for the field of temporal phenomenalization – not as a presence – but as écoulement, passage and flux. Time, therefore, does not appear in the present or as presence, but manifests itself as a flow and movement that is simultaneously an éclatement, an eruption, and a self-differentiating “dehiscence”.1111 A favorite word of Merleau-Ponty, borrowed from botany, where it designates the splitting open of a seed-pod or flower as well as medicine, where it refers to the splitting open of a healed or partially healed wound. The idea here is that, in its flow and passage, time splits open in a process of differentiation – which is simultaneously a process of degeneration, decay, and what Merleau-Ponty will term in The Visible and the Invisible, “disarticulation”. View all notes Time's passage is not determined, organized and oriented in advance in accordance with a transcendental synthesis that would give it shape and form, privileging one temporal dimension over another, so much as it is understood in terms of a splitting open, or to use another favoured locution of Merleau-Ponty, a “deflagration”.1212 In Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the “deflagration of being”. Metaphors of explosiveness and dissonance populate his attempt to think being otherwise than as structure, form, and stability. Here I will focus particularly on écoulement, flux and éclatement, eruption, because these are the terms he uses in his discussion of time in La temporalité. See Merleau-Ponty L’Œil et l'esprit, 64/369. View all notes To this extent, Merleau-Ponty's account of temporality in Phenomenology of Perception cannot be said to orient itself in terms of the ontological primacy of any one temporal dimension – past, present, or future – but is more accurately understood as an attempt to recover the primordial experience of time as the simultaneity of écoulement and éclatement – an account that thinks time in its dual power of phenomenalization and erosion, the “pulse [pulsation] of my existence, its systole and diastole”.1313 Merleau-Ponty PhP, 337/332. View all notes Time is the vehicle of the world's appearance, and at the same time of its “disarticulation” [désarticulation],1414 This is a term Merleau-Ponty uses in The Visible and the Invisible in a well-known working note entitled “ Transcendence – forgetting – time”. See Merleau-Ponty VI, 247/197. View all notes the vehicle through which “becoming” – rather than being – shows itself. This process of phenomenalization, precisely because it is temporal, never achieves the density of fully realized being – the sense of this becoming is never fully articulate – but is perpetually subject to a temporal erasure that necessitates its repetition and reiteration. Time, in other words, is the principle of the world's eloquence – it is that thanks to which things have and make sense and simultaneously the principle of the world's murmuring stutter, the principle through which the sense of things remains incomplete and even erodes, decays, and degenerates. To begin, I will turn to Merleau-Ponty's reading of Husserl's diagram from the Zeitbewußtsein, which opens his attempt to “arrive at authentic time”.1515 Merleau-Ponty PhP, 477/483. View all notes Rather than simply rehearsing Husserl's discussion of primal impression, retention and protention, Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the diagram provides an opportunity for raising two problems: the problem of time's representability and the problem of its synthesis. Rather than through an “act intentionality” carried out by a transcendental subjectivity, time appears in accordance with an “operative intentionality” always already under way. Turning to the section of La temporalité aptly entitled “Passive Synthesis”, we see that Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the diagram leads him to the paradox of passive synthesis and what he calls, following Husserl, “transition synthesis”. Time does not show itself punctually – time appears neither as presence nor in the present – but only in the dual movement of its flux, its écoulement, and its éclatement, its explosive, self-differentiating unfurling. These reflections, finally, bring Merleau-Ponty into dialogue with Heidegger on what the latter called the Zusammenhang des Lebens. The “unity of a life”, accordingly, is not a question of any “resolution”, but is a function of our immersion in this temporal dehiscence. The important lesson to be learned from Merleau-Ponty's engagement with Husserl's Zeitbewußtsein is not something about the ontological primacy of one temporal dimension over another but what Merleau-Ponty famously calls in The Visible and the Invisible the “passivity of our activity”1616 Merleau-Ponty VI, 270/221. View all notes and our immersion in time's power of disarticulation. (shrink)

Mortal being is not being pure and simple, not posit-ive being alone, as the lived experiencesuggests it to be. Living being is always a living of mortal flesh, a living taunted by death as “thenothingness that wearies it.” This taunting doggedly pursues the living being and turns it inward inwhat Levinas terms “inter-esse.” In living its mortality, essence is always inter-esse — inside ofitself — in the for-itself of self-interest.This paper attempts to track the opening of essence from its “innocent” (...) lived mortality, through the“thinking” awakening that brings it to an awareness of the violences entailed in its living, to itsopening as an ethical being where self is abandoned, ruptured, sacrificed for the sake of thesuffering other. This paper also addresses the larger question of what, if anything, is missing inLevinas’ account of living being. In his fidelity to a monadic view of isolated existence with itsmeaning-appropriations, is Levinas bound to maintain the “innocence” of all living beings, even intheir most vile acts against others? Can Levinas account for the ability of the existent to leap outsidehis enclosed world to effect the destructive works that we witness every day in the human world?Can Levinas, committed to the “innocence” of living being, do justice to the injustices of theholocaust that motivate his work, or to the endless parade of holocausts that mark the history of thehuman species even to the present day? Finally, this paper entertains whether Levinas’ weddednessto this view of living being as isolated self-enclosure compels him to overlook the degree to whichour meanings are preordained by the socio-politico-economic realities of our cultural contexts,whether the phenomenologist, as much as the existent, must remain blind to the powers of histories and institutions and systems to dictate the meanings that we find as the borders that give us the stable lifeworld. (shrink)

Although many scholars have recognized the pivotal importance that the notion of conscience plays in Hegel’s thought, much of the scholarship surrounding this notion has remained piecemeal. Dean Moyar’s book Hegel’s Conscience breaks new ground on this subject in offering a comprehensive analysis of the indispensable role that conscience plays in Hegel’s philosophy, demonstrating not only its foundational place for Hegel’s approach to ethics, but also the contemporary relevancy of Hegel’s account for understanding the performative character of practical reason. Despite (...) the novelty and intellectual rigor of Moyar’s position, my essay “Translating Convictions into a Clear Conscience” argues that in confining his approach to a “cognitivist” interpretation of conscience, Moyar ends up neglecting the richness and existential depth of Hegel’s discussion. And so although Moyar’s interpretation is clear, succinct, and plausible, it accomplishes this by overlooking much of Hegel’s original phenomenological fidelity to the actual experience of conscience. (shrink)

Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) is an approach to apprehending and describing pristine inner experience in high fidelity. The DES participant wears a random beeper in her natural environments. The beep cues the participant to jot down notes about her inner experience that was ongoing at the moment of the beep. A subsequent expositional interview produces a description of the beeped experience. It is likely that the fidelity of those descriptions iteratively increases across sampling days as participant and investigator (...) acquire skill at bracketing presuppositions about the nature of the participant's experience. (shrink)

We begin by accepting that introspective evidence is important to cognitive science. However, as its history shows, introspection is risky, so methods should be used that minimize those risks. We argue that there are 13 ways that a beeper can reduce those risks, dividing those ways into three categories: time sampling per se, minimizing the reactive disturbance of evanescent phenomena, and aiding phenomenological fidelity. We turn aside six criticisms of beeper-based research, and describe five characteristics of a good (...) beep. (shrink)

The paper argues that Paul Ricoeur's The Philosophy of the Will retained a certain fidelity to phenomenology's early emphasis on subjectivity. When Ricoeur turned to the philosophy of language, he found a way to retain a certain emphasis on subjectivity and individuality that would make his work distinctive among other approaches to the philosophy of language. Hence, the title, Preserving the Eidetic Moment, intends to characterize Ricoeur's distinctive contribution to philosophy. The paper goes on to show how Ricoeur's approach (...) can contribute to Critical Theory, particularly in relationship to its theory of interlocution. (shrink)

L'originalité de cet ouvrage consiste à poser à deux philosophes contemporains français des questions-clefs de la phénoménologie que jusqu'ici on ne posait guère qu'à Husserl. Ce changement de perspective permet de lire autrement des problèmes essentiels de ce champ philosophique : la corporéité, la relation à autrui, l'être au monde. Le renouveau actuel de l'intérêt pour Merleau-Ponty et Levinas, que l'on commence enfin à étudier pour eux-mêmes et non plus simplement comme des disciples plus ou moins fidèles de la phénoménologie (...) allemande, permet de prendre au sérieux le renouveau apporté par ces deux auteurs. Leur confrontation - rarement étudiée comme telle jusqu'à présent - peut ouvrir à une nouvelle compréhension de ces thèmes : leurs chemins, parallèles pendant un temps, s'éloignent ensuite de façon radicale, tout en témoignant toujours d'une " manière de faire " commune. On voit enfin ici comment se réalise de façon exemplaire ce mouvement de transformation de la phénoménologie que Paul Ricœur avait désigné comme " hérétique " par rapport aux seules reprises ou explications de la pensée de Husserl : il y a, chez ces deux penseurs, du nouveau! (shrink)

Conversation-as-material is a language-based artistic research practice for attempting to speak from within the experience of collaborative artistic exploration, a linguistic practice attentive to the lived experience of aesthetic co-creation. The practice of conversation-as-material, which forms the basis of this article, has evolved through tentative exploration of the questions: How can the shared act of conversation bring into reflective awareness the live and lived, yet often hidden or undisclosed, experience of artistic practice and process, especially within collaboration? How can the (...) event of conversation be developed as an artistic research practice for attempting to give tangibility, whilst also remaining in fidelity, to the pre-reflective aspects of this lived experience? Considered less as a means for talking about, conversation-as-material may be understood as a practice for inviting immanent, inter-subjective modes of verbal-linguistic sense-making emerging through different voices enmeshed in live exchange. Conversation — from con- meaning ‘with, together’ and versare, ‘to turn, bend’; or else, from conversare — ‘to turn about, to turn about with’. Conversation-as-material has emerged as a practice of collaborative writing, which unfolds through the interplay of different voices ‘turning about’ together in conversation. In this sense, the practice can be differentiated from that of interview — for in the practice of conversation-as-material there is no researcher/researched dichotomy. Within the practice, an attempt is made to develop an approach to writing that finds expression first through verbal conversation, which is then subsequently distilled, even densified, towards poetic text. Conversation-as-material involves the gradual revelation of an artistic-poetic, perhaps even phenomenological, mode of emergent writing for speaking from the experience of collaborative co-creation, where linguistic content is not already known in advance, but rather emerges in and through the lived working-with of language. The practice of conversation-as-material thus comprises a quadripartite process of conversation, transcription, distillation, and presentation, where each part involves the activation of a particular aesthetic or poetic mode of attention, perhaps even a specific phenomenological attitude or disposition. (shrink)

This paper contends that, even though Husserl demonstrated that consciousness intends objects in the world rather than mental representations, he ultimately failed to provide a convincing account of how the ego constitutes itself and other egos. By reconfiguring consciousness as an operation rather than as a container, Husserl opened consciousness to the world and thereby overcame previous solipsistic frameworks. But despite his attention to the “things themselves,” his fidelity to another maxim—that all sense-bestowing activity be traced back to the (...) operations of the ego—prohibited him from fulfilling his goal of describing otherness accurately. This paper examines the tension between Husserl’s desire to describe phenomena and his mandate to constitute phenomena, to show that both cannot be accomplished simultaneously. If phenomenology is to come to terms with the challenge of otherness and describe self and other adequately, the demand that self and other be constituted within the ego must be relinquished. (shrink)

Comment developper une phenomenologie de la connaissance qui, tout en restant fidele aux perspectives fondamentales des deux peres fondateurs de la phenomenologie, tire profit des acquis essentiels des deux generations posterieures de phenomenologues? L'auteur se propose de poursuivre le projet d'une refondation de la phenomenologie qui prend au serieux les critiques du fondationalisme (traditionnel) sans pour autant abandonner une perspective visant a legitimer le bien-fonde de tout discours exhibant le sens de ce qui apparait. La these fondamentale est qu'une telle (...) refondation se doit de mettre en son centre non plus la perception objectivante, mais l'imagination (Einbildungskraft) a la source de toute formation ou configuration du sens (Sinnbildung), laquelle constitue la base de tout apparaissant et de tout evenement. L'imagination est ici comprise a la fois comme devoilant la constitution imageante (imaginaire et imaginal) du reel et comme productrice d' images (ou d' icones ) dont il s'agit de preciser la dimension genetique, voire generative, eu egard a plusieurs concepts determinants de la phenomenologie (tels que la verite, la subjectivite, le reel, l' inconscient, le temps, l' espace, etc.). (shrink)

Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) attempts to apprehend in high fidelity pristine inner experience (the naturally-occurring, directly-apprehended phenomena that fill our waking lives, including inner speaking, visual imagery, sensory awarenesses, etc.). Previous DES investigations had shown individual differences in the frequency of inner speaking ranging from nearly zero to nearly 100% of the time. In early 2020, the Internet was ablaze with comments expressing astonishment that constant internal monologue was not universal. We invited Lena, a university student who believed she (...) had constant internal monologue, to participate in a DES analog of a pre-registered study: We would announce, on the Internet, that we would conduct a fully transparent DES investigation and roll out videos of the DES interviews (and annotated transcripts) as they occurred in (almost) real-time, something like “reality TV about inner experience,” so that spectators could examine for themselves our characterizations of Lena and how we arrived at them. We describe here the procedure and its findings: Lena did _not_ have frequent internal monologue (contrary to her expectations); she _did_ have frequent visual imagery (to her surprise); and we speculated about the frequent presence of two simultaneous “centers of gravity” of her experience. The entire procedure is available for inspection. (shrink)

It is common to assume of an “objectivist” stage of Zubiri, prior to his meeting with Heidegger in Freiburg. However, if we analyze Zubiri’s philosophy before his stay in Freiburg, we already find a “metaphysical” orientation, and not merely an objectivist one. This orientation is intrinsically related to the early appearance of the notion of “reality” in his courses. The appearance of his concept of reality is at least partially motivated by Zubiri’s early reading of Heidegger’s habilitation thesis on Duns (...) Scotus. Zubiri discovered in Heidegger the possibility of trying to carry out a phenomenological characterization of reality, which took him beyond the conception, basically idealistic, of being as a “position” or as a “belief.” With Heidegger, Zubiri was able to sustain that reality is not something extra animam. However, Zubiri could not follow Heidegger in his conceptualization of reality based on human existence, and with this he began his own path in philosophy. A path that, in a certain sense, breaks with all phenomenology, because reality is located at a moment prior to the meaning of things for a subject or for a human existent. And yet, a path that continues the phenomenological claim of a descriptive fidelity to the things themselves. (shrink)

Prompted by the ever-increasing cesarean rate, this paper considers the interpretive disjunct between two significant strands of feminist analysis that have arisen in the last four decades as a consequence of the phenomenon of medicalized birth. In contrast to the dominant paradigm of bioethical “Principalism,” both modes of analysis, understood as “the critique of industrialized labor” and “the critique of idealized labor,” are attentive to the way in which social discourses inform bioethical deliberation and practice, but significantly diverge in the (...) nature of their accounts. The “industrialization critique” understands the culture of medical intervention to be impelled by an “obstetric desire” to appropriate women's reproductive potency, whereas the “idealization critique” relates new mothers’ “low childbirth satisfaction” to a pernicious normative ideal propagated by the natural childbirth movement. This paper will explore the anatomy of both critiques and interrogate their fidelity to the phenomenological insight of the body as chiasm between material and ideal. I will argue that while the insights of the idealization critique are well grounded, we must exercise caution about the critique's tendency to reductively understand the embodied experience of labor as entirely discursively produced, a gesture that risks re-performing the dematerialization of women often effected through obstetric intervention itself. (shrink)

Fenomenologia e Educação na perspectiva de Creusa Capalbo Resumo: Creusa Capalbo fez seu doutorado em Filosofia na Universidade Católica de Louvain. Faleceu em 2017, aos 83 anos, e deixou uma obra centrada na meditação sobre Fenomenologia e Ciências Humanas. Editou um livro com esse título, cujo sexto capítulo aborda o tema Fenomenologia e Educação. Mostrando invulgar erudição e fazendo a crítica de pensadores que reduzem a educação à adequação ou à revolta contra a sociedade industrial, Creusa Capalbo entende que o (...) papel da educação é o de propiciar a introdução de valores que assegurem a realização do bem comum. Inspira-se, para tanto, nas meditações exponenciais de Husserl, Scheler, Buber, dentre outros autores. Retomando as meditações desses pensadores, Creusa Capalbo realiza um percurso admirável, sublinhando sua fidelidade ao tema da Filosofia da Educação.Palavras-chave: Fenomenologia; Crítica filosófica; Educação; Bem-comum. Phenomenology and Education from Creusa Capalbo’s perspective: Creusa Capalbo did her PHD in Philosophy at the Catholic University of Louvain. She died in 2017, at the age of 83, and her work reflects the Phenomenology and the Human Sciences. In fact, she edited a book with that title, whose sixth chapter accounts the topics of Phenomenology and Education. Creusa Capalbo, with a lot of scholarship and criticizing the philosophers who reduce education to adequacy or to conflict against industrial society, she defends an education with values that support the realization of the common good. For this, she was inspired, among other philosophers, by Husserl’s, Scheler’s and Buber’s ideas. Resuming their thoughts, Creusa Capalbo did a great way, emphasizing her fidelity to the Philosophy of Education.Key Words: Phenomenology; Philosophical criticism; Education; Common good. Phénoménologie et Éducation dans la perspective de Creusa Capalbo Résumé: Creusa Capalbo a fait son doctorat en Philosophie dans l'Université Catholique de Louvain. Elle est décédée à 2017, avec 83 années, et elle a laissé une oeuvre axée sur la méditation au sujet de la Phénoménologie et les Sciences Humaines. Elle a publié un livre avec ce même titre, dont le 6ème chapitre étudie le sujet: Phénoménologie et Éducation. Sa remarcable érudition et sa critique des philosophes contemporains qui circonscrivent l'éducation soit à l'adéquation, soit à la révolte contre la société industrielle, l'amenèrent a affirmer que le rôle de l´éducation est celui de favoriser l'introduction dans la société des valeurs qui puissent assurér la réalisation du bien commun. Elle s'inspire, dans la proposition de cette perspective, dans les méditations de Husserl, Scheller, Buber, parmi d'autres penseurs, et elle réalise un parcours admirable, qui souligne sa fidélité au sujet de la philosophie de l'éducation.Mots clés: Phénoménologie; Critique philosophique; Éducation; Bien commun. Data de registro: 20/08/2020Data de aceite: 30/11/2020. (shrink)

A standard view would suggest that research is a neutral apolitical activity. It neutralizes external pressures by its fidelity to robust scientific methods. However, politics is an inevitable part of human knowledge. Our knowledge of the world is always mediated by human priorities. What matters is therefore a contested and political debate rather a neutral accumulation of factual data. How researchers manage this varies. Research paradigms are one way in which research engages with knowledge. They frame knowledge within epistemological (...) and ontological philosophies. In this paper, I will explore this view in relation to neo‐positivism, qualitative research, Foucault and critical realism. I will argue that if nursing knowledge is to be effective it needs to acknowledge the political, particularly in the context of neoliberalism. Healthcare systems are having to cope with a social world increasingly dominated by market fundamentalism, extreme levels of inequality and a rise in xenophobia. These forces are undermining the provision of ethically sound health care, misdirecting research practice and contributing to a discourse of dehumanization. These forces need to be challenged politically and I will argue that epistemologically diverse approaches, alongside a realist ontology can provide a way forward for nursing research. (shrink)

Benjamin Décarie-Daigneault Le présent article se penche sur une préoccupation commune au transcendantalisme husserlien et à la phénoménologie « existentielle » de Merleau-Ponty : la mise au jour des fondements de l’expérience du monde. Par sa méthode « archéologique », Husserl met en lumière, dans les Méditations cartésiennes, les différentes strates de sens qui sous-tendent le phénomène du monde concret. Si cette description a pour point de départ l’ego philosophant qui thématise sa propre expérience, elle a pour point d’arrivée l’ego (...) transcendantal qui se révèle être le foyer ultime qui possibilise et sous-tend le monde dans son être-tel. Loin de s’opposer radicalement à cette thèse, Merleau-Ponty reste fidèle à Husserl en acceptant que le monde n’a de sens que pour autant qu’il se donne à une conscience, mais il considère qu’il est possible pour la philosophie d’atteindre la strate de l’expérience du monde qui précède l’acquisition de son sens. Notre article soutient que cette quête d’une primordialité préobjective est fondée dans l’interprétation merleau-pontienne de certains textes tardifs de Husserl. (shrink)

The notion of value neutrality has been a contentious issue within the human and social sciences for some time. In this paper, some of the philosophical and scientific bases for the confusion surrounding the fact-value dichotomy are covered and the discrepancy between how psychology studies values and expresses them is noted. The sense of value neutrality is clarified historically and the clarified meaning of the term applied to some qualitative data demonstrating in what sense values may be expressed in psychology. (...) The position is upheld that psychology as a human science intentionally should not be absolutely value free in the sense that human reality has to be studied in a non-reductionistic manner and thus methods of study must be respectful of the full ethical sense of humanness. This is simply meeting the phenomenological requirement of "fidelity to the phenomenon". However, psychology can be value free in the historical sense of the term properly understood because it refers to the fact that the personal values of the scientists ought not to be conflated with scientific findings. The discussion of values takes place primarily within the context of science, where the problem of value neutrality emerged, but it is acknowledged that non-scientific approaches to value have merit and can also be compelling. (shrink)

This article examines Gabriel Marcel’s unique approach to the existence of God, and its implications for traditional philosophy of religion. After some preliminary remarks about the realm of “problems” (which would include the “rational”), and about the question of whether Marcel thinks God’s existence admits of a rational argument, Part I explains his account of how the individual subject can arrive at an affirmation of God through experiences of fidelity and promise-making. Part II proposes a way in which Marcel’s (...) own philosophical and phenomenological approach could be regarded as a type of argument for the existence of God. The last section suggests that Marcel’s approach offers an advance upon the views of William Alston and John Hick concerning the analysis of religious experience. (shrink)

Over the last thirty years, the narrative conceptions of the Self attempted to account for the connection that ties together human lives and the narratives thanks to which they come to expression. In a famous passage of Nausea, the main character of Jean-Paul Sartre’s novel claims that our first-person narratives necessarily fail to account for the irreducibility of life as it is lived. Analyzing this passage, Richard Moran recently pointed out the weaknesses of Sartre’s phenomenological claim about life as (...) it is lived, which wrongly describes narratives as fundamentally inadequate to our lives, and thus fails to account for their relationship. This article addresses this critique by examining the different kinds of involvement of narrators within their own story, and the ways Sartre dealt with this particular issue in his analysis of the relationship between writers and readers in literature. This particular focus on Sartre’s theory of literature allows us to highlight the originality of his critique of first-person narratives, which stresses the problem of the credibility of the narrator and must bring us to interrogate the claim for recognition that first-person narratives involve, giving a novel meaning to their inadequacy. -/- Les discussions entourant depuis une trentaine d’années le développement des conceptions narratives du soi ont tenté de préciser la nature du lien qui permet aux formes narratives du récit en première personne de rendre compte des articulations propres à la vie humaine. C’est très précisément ce lien que critiquait dans La nausée le personnage principal du roman de Jean-Paul Sartre, dans un passage où l’irréductibilité de l’expérience vécue en première personne lui sert d’argument pour décréter l’incapacité du récit à en rendre fidèlement compte. Richard Moran a récemment proposé une critique de la conception sartrienne de l’expérience vécue que met en avant ce passage, en montrant les limites de toute analyse qui reprocherait au récit son inadéquation à l’égard à la vie dont il prétend rendre compte. Cet article tente de répondre à cette critique en examinant les différentes modalités d’implication du narrateur dans son récit, et le traitement auquel cette question a donné lieu dans l’œuvre de Sartre. Cette analyse permet ainsi de mettre en valeur l’originalité de la critique sartrienne du récit de soi, qui, en faisant passer au premier plan le problème de la crédibilité du narrateur et du type de reconnaissance que le récit en première personne exige, confère un sens nouveau à son inadéquation. (shrink)

"Si le "jargon de l'authenticité" a sans doute rendu nombre de phénoménologies incapables de penser l'histoire et le politique, Merleau-Ponty a su le faire au coeur des textes étrangement les moins commentés, dans leur lien même, ceux des cours au Collège de France de 1954-1955: L'Institution et La Passivité. Des cours que cet ouvrage se propose enfin de relire, en discussion serrée avec l'ensemble de l'oeuvre merleau-pontienne, tant celle qui les précède que celle qui leur succède, pour la dévoiler autrement. (...) Cela, en trois temps, qui sont autant de "lectures de Merleau-Ponty", et de portes d'entrée dans son oeuvre la moins connue. Trois temps formant les parties de cet ouvrage qui suivent l'élaboration du concept merleau-pontien d'institution dans son rapport même à la passivité, sans chronologie fixe, et sans voeu de systématicité, mais en tentant d'être fidèle à la rédaction même de ces notes de cours d'une rare densité. Des cours qui foisonnent de références, tant à son oeuvre propre qu'aux nombreux auteurs avec lesquels Merleau-Ponty dialogue, tissant ainsi de nouveaux liens thématiques, et n'hésitant pas, par exemple, au coeur même d'un chapitre sur le vivant, à évoquer la question de la révolution marxiste. De Ruyer, Gesell, Lévi-Strauss, Alquié, Lachièze-Rey, à Sartre et Freud, etc., ce sont autant de dialogues qui éclairent en effet l'oeuvre et l'auto-critique de Merleau-Ponty, qui se confronte ici, mieux que nulle part ailleurs, à l'échec de son oeuvre passée, comme au contexte de l'époque. Plutôt qu'une exégèse ou qu'une interprétation orthodoxe, il s'agit au fond de continuer la pensée de Merleau-Ponty en questionnant ses dilemmes, ceux de la praxis mais aussi et en amont ceux de la méthode entre analogie et métaphore, en puisant à des essais qu'il aura en partie abandonnés, et qui nous semblent pourtant les plus prometteurs. D'où le pluriel, encore, de ces lectures."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Marc Richir est l'un des phénoménologues les plus importants de sa génération. Ces conversations avec Sacha Carlson sont d'abord l'occasion de revenir sur son itinéraire philosophique et intellectuel. Il s'y explique pour la première fois sur sa formation et sur les sources initiales de sa pensée, de celles qui ont éveillé son mouvement. Au fil de la discussion, il reprend en outre les thèmes principaux de son oeuvre, à savoir le phénomène comme rien que phénomène, le simulacre, l'épochè phénoménologique hyperbolique, (...) le sublime, l'affectivité, l'architectonique, l'institution symbolique, etc. Sans sacrifier à la vulgarisation, mais en restant fidèle à l'exigence du dialogue philosophique qui invite à étayer le propos sur des exemples concrets, ces conversations ouvrent non seulement sur une retraversée de l'oeuvre et de ses moments fondamentaux, mais aussi sur une méditation, dans le présent de la parole échangée, où le phénoménologue s'explique sur son rapport avec d'autres champs de recherche, comme l'anthropologie, la psychanalyse, les mathématiques, la physique, l'art, le politique et l'histoire. (shrink)

J. L. Austin famously thought that facts about the circumstances in which it is ordinarily appropriate and reasonable to make claims to knowledge have a great bearing on the propriety of a philosophical account of knowledge. His major criticism of the epistemological doctrines about which he wrote was precisely that they lacked fidelity to our ordinary linguistic practices. In The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Barry Stroud argues that Austin was misguided: it is one thing for it to be inappropriate (...) under ordinary circumstances to deny that someone knows that P, another thing for it to be true that she knows that P. Thus, to the philosophical enterprise of determining which knowledge attributions are true, Austin’s form of criticism is beside the point. I argue that, attractive though it may be, this response to Austin badly underestimates the force of his sort of criticism. (shrink)

This book develops a philosophical conception of human rights that responds satisfactorily to the challenges raised by cultural and political critics of human rights, who contend that the contemporary human rights movement is promoting an imperialist ideology, and that the humanitarian intervention for protecting human rights is a neo-colonialism. These claims affect the normativity and effectiveness of human rights; that is why they have to be taken seriously. At the same time, the same philosophical account dismisses the imperialist crusaders who (...) support the imperialistic use of human rights by the West to advance liberal culture. Thus, after elaborating and exposing these criticisms, the book confronts them to the human rights theories of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, in order to see whether they can be addressed. Unfortunately, they are not. Therefore, having shown that these two philosophical accounts of human rights do not respond convincingly to those the postco lonial challenges, the book provides an alternative conception that draws the understanding of human rights from local practices. It is a multilayer conception which is not centered on state, but rather integrates it in a larger web of actors involved in shaping the practice and meaning of human rights. Confronted to the challenges, this new conception offers a promising way for addressing them satisfactorily, and it even sheds new light to the classical questions of universality of human rights, as well as the tension between universalism and relativism.. (shrink)

Public reason is central to John Rawls’s political liberalism, as a mechanism for citizens to discuss about matters of common interest. Although free and equal, reasonable and rational, citizens of a democratic society disagree on their understanding of truth and right, giving rise to the fact of reasonable pluralism. Thus, Rawls works out an idea of public reason which allows citizens to argue about political matters and yet remaining divided in their comprehensive doctrines. On the other hand, African culture has (...) developed the practice of palaver as way of dealing with social and political questions of the community. Usually held under a tree, scholars believe that the palaver is the African version of deliberative democracy. In this article, I elaborate the two ideas and compare them in order to see whether they are completely opposite or whether they can enrich each other. Thus, the first section focuses on Rawls’s idea of public reason, the second explores the palaver practice and the last section compares them. (shrink)

This paper develops a form of transcendental naïve realism. According to naïve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental naïve realism, the naïve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis that weighs performance along a number of different dimensions: for instance, fidelity to appearances, simplicity, systematicity, fit with scientific theories, and so (...) on. Rather, naïve realism enjoys a special status in debates in the philosophy of perception because it represents part of the transcendental project of explaining how it is possible that perceptual experience has the distinctive characteristics it does. One of the potentially most interesting prospects of adopting a transcendental attitude towards naïve realism is that it promises to make the naïve realist theory of perception, in some sense, immune to falsification. This paper develops a modest form of transcendental naïve realism modelled loosely on the account of the reactive attitudes provided by Strawson in ‘Freedom and Resentment’, and suggests one way of understanding the claim that naïve realism is immune to falsification. (shrink)

El objetivo de la educación es la formación universal del ser humano. ¿Qué significa la formación universal del ser humano? Significa su máxima realización. Esta máxima realización hace posible la reproducción de los valores universales por medio de la educación garantizando la continuidad de la especie humana. Esta tarea de la educación se ve truncado en el hombre moderno por el paradigma fragmentario de formación unilateral. Esta formación unilateral es la causa de la fragmentación espiritual del individuo que se refleja (...) en la crisis existencial y de valores. El predominio de los antivalores en la sociedad conduce a la involución espiritual del individuo y, en consecuencia, a la destrucción de la sociedad. Ante este problema global, surge la necesidad de replantear el objetivode la educación sobre nuevas bases ontológicas que comprende la naturaleza y esencia del hombre, y los principios universales. (shrink)

The problem of identities and cultural differences constitute one of the global problems of our time. Identity and the differences in human beings are expressed in each individual, in each society and in humanity itself as a species. The differences of individual identities are solved by the integration of the latter inside society. The differences of the social or cultural identities are solved by humanity's integration. Is humanity's integration possible? If it was possible, what are the ontologic foundations for such (...) an integration?, why is humanity integration necessary? To understand the problem of the integration and confront mans imminent self-destruction as species becomes necessary not only to return to the study of nature and the essence human beings but, also of other entities of the universe. (shrink)

Cet article explore la relation entre le langage humain, la philosophie et la théologie, en mettant l'accent sur la difficulté d'exprimer le divin. Il part du postulat que le langage, à la fois extérieur et intérieur, est propre à l'homme, et examine sa capacité à articuler la transcendance. D'une perspective phénoménologique, l'étude analyse comment la philosophie attribue des concepts aux phénomènes, tandis que la théologie rencontre des obstacles lorsqu'elle tente de nommer Dieu, car le divin semble dépasser les limites du (...) langage. L'article suggère que, bien que le langage soit essentiel à la communication et à la pensée, sa capacité à exprimer la réalité divine reste limitée. Le silence apparaît alors comme une voie herméneutique plus appropriée pour approcher le sacré, car la nature de Dieu transcende les concepts humains, révélant ainsi les limites du langage face à l'ineffable. (shrink)

The first clear and faithful guide to the timeless, practical teachings of the Stoic philosopher Seneca. Stoicism, the most influential philosophy of the Roman Empire, offers refreshingly modern ways to strengthen our inner character in the face of an unpredictable world. Widely recognized as the most talented and humane writer of the Stoic tradition, Seneca teaches us to live with freedom and purpose. His most enduring work, over a hundred "Letters from a Stoic" written to a close friend, explains how (...) to handle adversity; overcome grief, anxiety, and anger; transform setbacks into opportunities for growth; and recognize the true nature of friendship. In Breakfast with Seneca, philosopher David Fideler mines Seneca's classic works in a series of focused chapters, clearly explaining Seneca's ideas without oversimplifying them. Best enjoyed as a daily ritual, like an energizing cup of coffee, Seneca's wisdom provides us with a steady stream of time-tested advice about the human condition-which, as it turns out, hasn't changed much over the past two thousand years. (shrink)

The objective of this research work was to determine what are the factors that condition the labor insertion of graduates of the 14 Study Programs of the Faculty of Technology, in the Technical Variant Educational Institutions, the Productive Technical Centers and in the Higher Institutions. Technological, in the year 2023, with its two dimensions of employability and occupancy; The methodology applied was quantitative, type of applied research, non-experimental research method, simple descriptive design, 13 questions were prepared for the employability dimension (...) and 12 questions for the employability dimension, this questionnaire was developed through Google form and It was applied through virtual social networks to graduates who obtained their degrees in the years 2019, 2020 and 2021. The sample consisted of 160 graduates. The statistical process of reliability and validity of the instruments was carried out using the SPSS V-27 statistical package, the following result was reached, of the 160 respondents, 16.88 % indicate that insertion is low, another 28.75 % respond which is medium and 54.37 %, which is equivalent to 87 graduates surveyed, specify that it is high. (shrink)

In recent years, transitional justice has become such an important field that it is believed to have become an international norm. Beginning as an initiative to help countries recovering from...

El artículo examina cómo la guerra de Ucrania ha contribuido a crear un vínculo cada vez más estrecho entre la seguridad en el espacio euroatlántico y en el Indo-Pacífico. En este sentido se dedica una especial atención al Concepto Estratégico aprobado en la cumbre de la OTAN en Madrid y al giro de Japón en su política de seguridad. Se aborda también la intensificación de la competencia tecnológica entre Estados Unidos y China, especialmente en el campo de los semiconductores, así (...) como las tensiones crecientes en torno a Taiwán. Finalmente se analizan los dilemas que plantea para Europa la rivalidad entre las dos grandes potencias y los difíciles equilibrios de la UE y sus Estados miembros entre la convergencia con Estados Unidos respecto a China y la necesidad de promover una esfera autónoma de decisión. (shrink)

Reasons of intimacy, i.e. reasons to care for friends and other intimates, resist categorization as either subjective Humean reasons or as objective consequentialist reasons. Reasons of intimacy are grounded in the friendship relation itself, not in the psychological attitudes of the agent or in the objective intrinsic value of the friend or the friendship. So reasons of intimacy are objective and agent-relative and can be understood by analogy with reasons of fidelity and reasons of prudence. Such an analogy can (...) help us to understand which objective agent-relative reasons we have and which, such as deontological constraints, we do not have. (shrink)

El concepto cartesiano de una _mathesis universalis _tiene como antecedente histórico inmediato algunas de las ideas defendidas en el contexto de las discusiones del aristotelismo renacentista acerca de la certeza matemática y el puesto de las matemáticas en la clasificación de las ciencias. Una de las figuras principales en este debate es la del jesuita valenciano Benet Perera (1535 – 1610). A través de la presentación de una serie de pasajes extraídos de los manuscritos inéditos de Perera, en este artículo (...) analizamos la defensa que este autor realiza de la existencia de una ciencia matemática común, en relación con algunas de sus ideas fundamentales, como la impugnación del carácter científico de las matemáticas, o la división de la metafísica en una filosofía primera dedicada al ente en cuanto ente y una teología natural que estudia las inteligencias y Dios. (shrink)