In the Summa Theologia I, beginning at question 2, article 3, and in the Summa Contra Gentiles I, beginning at chapter 13, Aquinas provides five proofs for the existence of God. These proofs are intended to demonstrate that God exists and to provide the foundation for a larger program to demonstrate many other doctrines which are held by faith. However, the program which Aquinas sets up for himself in the two great Summae is trivial and unnecessary if the (...) class='Hi'>existence of God is self-evident in such a way that God's existence needs no demonstration. So, as a preamble to the five ways, Aquinas argues that the existence of God is not self-evident in any way that would hinder his program of rational theology.In STI the argument occurs in question 2, article 1, and in CGI it occurs in chapters 10 and 11. Aquinas also argues the same point in Commentum in Primum Librum Sententiarum distinction 3, question 1, article 2, and in Quaestiones Disputate De Veritate question 10, article 12. (shrink)

The paper explores the status of the proposition "God exists" in late scholastic debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in some key authors of the era. A proposition is said to be self-evident if its truth is known solely from the meaning of the terms and is not inferred from other propositions. It does not appear to be immediately evident from the terms that God exists, for the concept expressed by "God" is based on the relation to creatures (...) and negation of imperfection and does not reach to the divine essence. Thomas Aquinas maintains that there are two types of self-evident propositions: those self-evident in themselves but not to us and those self-evident in themselves as well as to us. "God exists" is of the fi rst type. For Scotus a self-evident proposition is such that if its terms are conceived by any intellect, the truth of the proposition becomes known from the terms, non-inferentially. In his view there is no distinction between a self-evident proposition in itself and that in relation to us, because any proposition self-evident in itself is known to be such to any intellect, even though it might not be actually known; it would be known, provided that the terms are conceived. So for Scotus the sentence "God exists" expresses diff erent propositions for the blessed in heaven, the angels and God on the one hand and humans on the other. The former is self-evident, the latter is not. While later scholastics accept either the solution of Thomas or that of Scotus, according to which "God exists" is not self-evident for humans, Thomas de Argentina diff ers in that for him "God exists" is self-evident for humans too. The position of Thomas Aquinas was defended by Domingo Ban¯ez, Francisco Zumel and Gregorio de Valentia. In contrast, Johannes Poncius was a famous adherent of Scotus. There is a fair number of scholastics harmonizing the doctrine of Thomas and Scotus: Bernard Sannig, Luis de Molina, Gabriel Vázquez, Rodrigo de Arriaga and Jean Lalemandet. According to these authors, when Thomas says that "God exists" is self-evident in itself, he speaks about the extensional proposition, i.e. the state of affairs being conceptualized, which does not contradict Scotus’s teaching. © FILOSOFIA, 2013. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine, in five parts, the nature and function of evidence in Husserl’s phenomenology of existence. By “evidence” I understand the intentional achievement of self-giving in Husserl’s sense, and by “phenomenology of existence” I understand the branch of his philosophy that addresses the question concerning a meaningful life. In Part One, I propose that Husserl’s philosophy includes a phenomenology of existence. In Part Two, I employ a selection of texts from Grenzprobleme (...) der Phänomenologie to sketch the basic outlines of his phenomenology of existence. In Part Three, I demonstrate that Husserl develops a concept of evidence rich enough to encompass the evidence appropriate to his phenomenology of existence. In Part Four, I investigate the way in which Husserl appeals to what one may describe as “existential evidence” to ground his manner of apprehending the world as he sees it. In Part Five, I expand the horizon of the investigation by situating “existential evidence” – the “given” that keeps on giving – in the context of other kinds of evidence more familiar to scholars and students of Husserl’s phenomenology. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas holds that the existence of God is self-evident in itself (because God’s essence is his existence) but not to us (since we do not know the divine essence). Giles of Rome agrees with the first part of Thomas’s claim, but he parts company with Aquinas by maintaining that God’s existence is self-evident to the wise. Since the wise can know that God is his existence, they cannot think of him as not existing. (...) This paper reexamines Thomas’s teaching in the light of Giles’s criticisms. By examining closely what is involved in the claim that God’s essence is his existence, and how one’s knowledge of this claim is related to the knowledge that God exists, it argues that Thomas’s position has the resources to withstand Giles’s objections. (shrink)

Rationale, aims and objectives : Evidence-based medicine (EBM) claims to be based on 'evidence', rather than 'intuition'. However, EBM's fundamental distinction between quantitative 'evidence' and qualitative 'intuition' is not self-evident. The meaning of 'evidence' is unclear and no studies of quality exist to demonstrate the superiority of EBM in health care settings. This paper argues that, despite itself, EBM holds out only the illusion of conclusive scientific rigour for clinical decision making, and that EBM ultimately (...) is unable to fulfil its own structural criteria for 'evidence'. Methods : Our deconstructive analysis of EBM draws on the work of the French philosopher, Jacques Derrida. Deconstruction works in the name of justice to lay bare, to expose what has been hidden from view. In plain language, we deconstruct EBM's paradigm of 'evidence', the randomized controlled trial (RCT), to demonstrate that there cannot be incontrovertible evidence for EBM as such. We argue that EBM therefore 'auto-deconstructs' its own paradigm, and that medical practitioners, policymakers and patients alike ought to be aware of this failure within EBM itself. Results : EBM's strict distinction between admissible evidence (based on RCTs) and other supposedly inadmissible evidence is not itself based on evidence, but rather, on intuition. In other words, according to EBM's own logic, there can be no 'evidentiary' basis for its distinction between admissible and inadmissible evidence. Ultimately, to uphold this fundamental distinction, EBM must seek recourse in (bio)political ideology and an epistemology akin to faith. (shrink)

In this article from 1928, translated here for the first time, Tanabe Hajime examines the concept of self-evidence, mainly in the light of Husserl and Brentano. The author starts out by establishing, through a preliminary analysis of the Cartesian cogito, two criteria for self-evidence, namely adequate fulfillment of the intention of Sosein, and the coextension of Dasein and Sosein (being-there, or existence, and being-such, or essence/properties). He then proceeds to consider four domains of knowledge through (...) the prism of the question of their claim to self-evidence: knowledge of mathematical objects, categorial intuition, the ontological proof for the existence of God and finally, outer perception. Dedicating the last paragraph to a critical assessment of Husserl’s account of perception, the author concludes that all self-evidence is founded on inner perception. Outlining a creative appropriation of phenomenology while elucidating the conditions for certainty, this text constitutes an important milestone in a period leading up to Tanabe’s break with Nishida as well as to his critique of Heidegger, thus laying the groundwork for his independent philosophical stance. (shrink)

Robust self-deception, in Funkhouser and Barrett’s sense, consists in the strategic pursuit of the goal of misleading oneself with respect to some proposition. Funkhouser and Barrett’s thesis is that an evaluation of the relevant empirical literatures reveals that the unconscious mind engages in robust self-deception. If Funkhouser and Barrett are correct, the psychological evidence vindicates an account of self-deception that challenges the orthodox motivationalist approach and makes clear the distinction between self-deception and other forms of (...) motivated belief formation such as wishful thinking. The aim of this paper is to show that the evidence adduced by Funkhouser and Barrett fails to establish the existence of robust, unconscious self-deception. (shrink)

"The objective of this book is to review the complex of issues in Soren Kierkegaard's concept of existence. It is evident that for Kierkegaard existence is always composed of three elements: namely, the subject, freedom, and the ethical. In the process of clarifying the relation between these three elements in the different stages of existence, the course of the development the individual must go through in order to become the single individual is described. "The study falls into (...) four parts. The first section describes the levels in existence on which as person attempts by his own powers to actualize the ethical ideals; in this stage the center of gravity for a person's effort still lies within the bounds of immanence. The second section describes a person's ethical and religious growth as it develops in relation to a transcendent power, whose highest expression is Christ as the revelation of God. The third section discusses the issues in existence that Kierkegaard himself designated as the most difficult of all for human thought. The last section points to the highest existential position to which philosophy in the broader sense and Christianity respectively can take a person. Kierkegaard utilizes these positions as a standard for evaluating existence within immanence and for Christian existence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT We exist only because we inhabit a world in common, embedded within networks of associations between humans and nonhumans. This is endlessly disclosed by our experience of the world. And yet, despite its palpability, it is clear that we have failed to mobilize a notion of the common world into something capable of guiding our modes of thought and collective forms of activity—our attitudes, our affective lives, our politics. How have we arrived here? Bruno Latour's work suggests that an (...) answer can be found in the common world's status as information—its self-evidence works to exclude it from a world of values. What, then, should be done? In his recent work on the modes of existence Latour develops a pragmatic metaphysics inspired by the speculative method of Alfred North Whitehead. Metaphysical speculation becomes a tool for moving beyond the “bifurcation of nature” through the construction of abstractions with which to interpret the pluralism of experience. Rather than thinking of the common world as either a given fact or as a totalizing universal, Latour develops a notion of a common world out of the messiness of experience and, as such, hopes to transform us into beings who would be moved to actively pursue and care for such a notion. (shrink)

In the first experiment, I exhibit unreliable judgment about the primeness or divisibility of four-digit numbers, in contrast to a seeming Excel program. In the second experiment, I exhibit an imperfect memory for arbitrary-seeming three-digit number and letter combinations, in contrast to my seeming collaborator with seemingly hidden notes. In the third experiment, I seem to suffer repeated defeats at chess. In all three experiments, the most straightforward interpretation of the experiential evidence is that something exists in the universe (...) that is superior in the relevant respects – theoretical reasoning (about primes), memorial retention (for digits and letters), or practical reasoning (at chess) – to my own solipsistically-conceived self. (shrink)

Exploring Augustine's Confessions as far more than autobiography, more than an elaboration and admission of guilt, more so than a chronicle and more precisely as the very act of coming into the truth in his heart, in front of God, in his confession, and in his public writings. His Confessions charts his becoming a witness to his self-witnessing, as his matter of testimony. Confession becomes an onto-existential practice. But, what is the mode or nature of the type of confession (...) at work when confession becomes ontological? Using Heidegger, the paper hinges on two poetic instances, one in Confessions, one in Being and Time, to develop an idea of ontology as testimony when being is a diligent witness to Being. It is confession as an admission of guilt insofar as being seeks absolution of its presumptions of being as a genus, as indefinable, and as the most self-evident concept, and being then acknowledges the question of Being. This acknowledgement of the obligation of the question is, then, a confession as a public declaration of faith, of the openness to question. The ontological project, for Heidegger, is then confession and testimony perhaps more fundamentally than Augustine’s Confessions, whose autobiographical detail and positing of the self as a relation to God must carefully elaborate itself so as not to be guilty of the offense of metaphysics. (shrink)

Among the most surprising claims in The Methods of Ethics is Sidgwick’s assertion that his key ethical axioms are corroborated by Kant. This article analyses Sidgwick’s claim that his axioms of justice and benevolence closely correspond to particular features in Kant. I shall argue that his claim of agreement with Kant was a serious overstatement. In particular, the restrictions which Sidgwick places on his acceptance of Kant’s universal law formula of the categorical imperative (FUL) seem to call into question whether (...) the alleged convergence with the axiom of justice has a solid basis. Further, Sidgwick seemed unaware of a crucial aspect of Kant’s conception of the humanity formula that constitutes a substantial divide between their views on benevolence. The upshot is that the divide between Kantian and Sidgwickian ethics appears deeper than Sidgwick seemed to realize. This analysis is confirmed by Sidgwick’s famous worries regarding freedom and the existence of God in Kant’s work. (shrink)

This study examines whether Chinese complement coercion sentences with aspectual verbs will elicit processing difficulty during real-time comprehension.Complement coercionis a linguistic phenomenon in which certain verbs (e.g.,start, enjoy), requiring an event-denoting complement, are combined with an entity-denoting complement (e.g.,book), as inThe author started a book. Previous studies have reported that the entity-denoting complement elicited processing difficulty following verbs that require event argument compared with verbs that do not (e.g.,The author wrote a book). While the processing of complement coercion has been (...) extensively studied in Indo-European languages such as English and German, it is relatively under-researched in Sino-Tibetan languages such as Mandarin Chinese. Given the fact that there are many linguistic elements behaving distinctly in the different language families, for instance, verbs with respect to their semantic properties and syntactic representations of the complement, it is meaningful to investigate whether or not the existing linguistic differences have any effect on the processing of complement coercion in Mandarin. With this research goal, we recorded self-paced reading time of 61 native Mandarin speakers to investigate the processing of the entity-denoting complement in sentences with three different verb types (aspectual verbswhich require an event-denoting complement,preferred verbswhich denote a preferred interpretation of the aspectual expressions, andnon-preferred verbswhich denote a non-preferred but plausible interpretation of the aspectual expressions), as exemplified in 顾客开始/填写/查看这份问卷gù-kè kāi-shǐ/tián-xiě/chá-kàn zhè-fèn wèn-juàn“The customer started/filled in/checked the questionnaire.” It was found that the entity noun complement (e.g., 这份问卷zhè-fèn wèn-juàn“the questionnaire”) elicited significantly longer reading times in coercion sentences than non-coercion counterparts. The results are compatible with the previous findings in English that complement coercion sentences impose processing cost during real-time comprehension. The study contributes empirical evidence to coercion studies cross-linguistically. (shrink)

Why does female under- representation emerge during undergraduate education? At the University of Sydney, we surveyed students before and after their first philosophy course. We failed to find any evidence that this course disproportionately discouraged female students from continuing in philosophy relative to male students. Instead, we found evidence of an interaction effect between gender and existing attitudes about philosophy coming into tertiary education that appears at least partially responsible for this poor retention. At the first lecture, disproportionately (...) few female students intended to major. Further, at the first lecture, female students were less interested in philosophy, were less self-confident about philosophy, and were less able to imagine themselves as philosophers. Similarly, female students predicted they would feel more uncomfortable in philosophy classes than male students did. Further study with a control is warranted to determine whether this interaction effect is peculiar to philosophy, or whether it is indicative of a more general gendered trend amongst first year undergraduate students. (shrink)

Is the fact that our universe contains fine-tuned life evidence that we live in a multiverse? Ian Hacking and Roger White influentially argue that it is not. We approach this question through a systematic framework for self-locating epistemology. As it turns out, leading approaches to self-locating evidence agree that the fact that our own universe contains fine-tuned life indeed confirms the existence of a multiverse. This convergence is no accident: we present two theorems showing that, (...) in this setting, any updating rule that satisfies a few reasonable conditions will have the same feature. The conclusion that fine-tuned life provides evidence for a multiverse is hard to escape. (shrink)

In a non-German-speaking environment is Jaspers sometimes mistakenly called as an existentialist. But Jaspers saw himself as a philosopher of existence, and he sharply criticized existentialism. This error arose because of confusion in the translations of the names Existenzphilosophie and Existentialismus from German into other languages. The difference between these terms was actively discussed immediately after Sartre’s lecture on humanism, in which Sartre, as he thought, announced a new direction in philosophy — existentialism (Existentialisme), to which he also included (...) Jaspers as a religious member of this direction. The purpose of paper is to investigate and analyze Jaspers’ criticism of existentialism and his rejection of it. Because long before Sart re’s lecture, Jaspers wrote about the false philosophical method of the investigation of human being as opposed to the true way — the elucidation of existence (Existenzerhellung), and also noted that he created a new word to denote this false method — existentialism (Existentialismus). While Jaspers understood the elucidation of existence as self-reflection and self-experience, which deepen in the experiences of boundary situations (Grenzsituationen), he considers existentialism as the knowledge of human being as a certain object among other objects. Already later — after Sartre’s lecture — Jaspers began to criticize existentialism as a direction that arose under the influence of the philosophy of existence and as its decline. Jaspers connected existentialism mainly with Sartre and outlined the main grounds of his criticism: existentialism is based on bare abstraction and Sartre’s main slogan — existence (of personality) precedes essence — is an evidence of this; existentialism uses a certain poetic vagueness of some statements, and is an attempt to overcome nihilism through nihilism itself; this philosophy denies the existence of any transcendent basis of human and world. For these reasons, Jaspers rejected existentialism, which is fundamentally different from the philosophy of existence. (shrink)

Roommate relationships are fundamental to the social environment of many emerging adults. However, no validated, widely used, measure of roommate relationship quality exists for examining the impact of these relationships on individual functioning and health. In this report, we present preliminary evidence of the factor structure, concurrent validity, and construct validity of the Roommate Relationship Scale as a measure of roommate relationship quality using a sample of U.S. college students who participated in a multi-wave study. An exploratory factor analysis (...) at the first wave, and confirmatory factor analyses with independent samples of new participants at each of two subsequent waves showed stable factor loadings and adequate fit. Moreover, the scale demonstrated good fit and reliability in a longitudinal multilevel CFA framework. The RRS significantly positively correlated with relationship length, self-esteem, extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, and negatively correlated with symptoms of anxiety and avoidant attachment style, indicating concurrent validity of the scale with respect to these constructs. Consistent with findings from other relationship types, self-reported RRS scores decrease longitudinally, both across and between semesters of academic life, indicating construct validity of the scale. We conclude that the RRS is useful for evaluating roommate relationship quality among U.S. college students, and hopefully beyond. Further research should validate the scale’s utility in other, more diverse, populations and refine its underlying generating psychological process. (shrink)

Whether and how the differentiated social cognition of the elderly affects their self-rated health has not been deeply discussed. Based on social cognition theory and Chinese situation, this study constructs the social cognitive dimension of Chinese elderly including social attitude, class identity and perception of social relations. Using the data from Chinese General Social Survey in 2017, this study screens out 1,728 elderly people aged 60 and over, and discusses the impact mechanism of social cognition on self-rated health (...) of Chinese elderly people aged 60 and over by the construction of structural equation model and mediation effect test method. The results show that social attitude, class identity and perceptions of social relationships have significantly positive effects on the self-rated health levels of elderly individuals. Among them, the path coefficient of social attitude to self-rated health was 0.049, the path coefficient of class identity to self-rated health was 0.171, and the path coefficient of social relationship perception to self-rated health was 0.248; both class identity and perception of social relationship have significant mediating effects on elderly self-rated health through social engagement. This study shows that social cognition rarely studied in existing literature has significant effects on the self-rated health of older adults, providing fruitful insights for enhancing the self-rated health level of elderly individuals. (shrink)

In this article, I present a new argument for God’s existence, which I term the argument from non-bruteness. The argument is premised on the idea that the fundamental structure of reality cannot be a brute fact and must have an ultimate reason. By focusing on the concept of self-evidence, I first examine the relationship between possible worlds and what I refer to as cognitive perspectives. I then argue that an ultimate explanation for reality's fundamental structure necessitates an (...) absolute perspective—one that fully grasps this explanation— thereby affirming the existence of God as the absolute subject who possesses it. I summarize the core ideas of the argument, provide a formal exposition, and address potential objections. (shrink)

Arabic literacy skills are essential for Muslim learners to comprehend religious texts; however, when trying to improve these skills, students face numerous obstacles that require immediate attention. This study aims to develop and evaluate an Arabic learning model designed to enhance the capability of students in Indonesian boarding schools to read religious books. The research follows a three-stage approach: introductory study, model development, and model validation. The study takes place in Al-Jawami and Al-Falah boarding schools in West Java Province, Indonesia. (...) These schools were selected due to the emphasis they place on the Arabic reading skills needed for comprehending religious scriptures. The research employs the research and development (R&D) method, involving 80 students. A three-time experimental test compared the learning outcomes of students in the experiment group (EG) using the new model with those in the control group (CG) using the existing model. Data analysis utilized both qualitative and quantitative approaches, employing t-test statistics. Results indicated significantly higher effectiveness in the treatment group, demonstrating that the Arabic learning model utilized in this study effectively enhances the reading capacity of students. Additionally, student perspectives on the developed model were sought, revealing a highly positive response. The majority of students expressed satisfaction with the model's impact on their reading skills and demonstrated enthusiasm for self-directed Arabic learning. Overall, the research contributes valuable insights into effective Arabic language education strategies, with the developed model proving to be a successful approach in enhancing students' reading proficiency in religious texts. (shrink)

The aim of the book is to show that the ’five ways’ of Thomas Aquinas, i.e., his five arguments to prove the existence of God, are logically correct arguments by the standards of modern predicate logic. In the first chapter this is done by commenting on the two preliminary articles preceding the five ways in which Thomas Aquinas points out that on the one hand the existence of God is not self-evident to us and on the other (...) hand, that, similar as in some scientific explanations, the mere existence of a cause for an effect which is evidently known to us can be proved. In the second chapter every argument is translated into the symbolic form of predicate logic and its logical validity is shown. Additionally a detailed and critical discussion of the premises of each argument is given. (publisher). (shrink)

This article focuses on the events surrounding a homosexual Romanian man's attempt to be recognized as a refugee in Britain. Numerous themes emerge such as the nature of authenticity, knowledge, identity, pleasure, evidence and the homosexual refugee as being caught in between two legal apparatuses (that is, fleeing from the hostility of one legal regime and then trying to gain refugee status, and thus legal protection, via a British Immigration Tribunal). In this article, the corporeality and sensuality of legal (...) practices are exposed in the form of `practices of truth'. That is, in this case medico-legal `living individuals' were to perceive, hear, speak, touch and penetrate the `secrets' of Mr Vraciu's body in order to authenticate his sexual identity for the purposes of law. This case also demonstrates the existence of a differend between what I describe as the self-knowledge of homosexuality and the `legal' fact-based, or authorized knowledge of homosexual identity produced through practices of truth. (shrink)

We argue that Descartes’s theistic proofs in the ’Meditations’ are much simpler and straightforward than they are traditionally taken to be. In particular, we show how the causal argument of the "Third Meditation" depends on the intuitively innocent principle that nothing comes from nothing, and not on the more controversial principle that the objective reality of an idea must have a cause with at least as much formal reality. We also demonstrate that the so-called ontological "argument" of the "Fifth Meditation" (...) is best understood not as a formal proof but as an axiom, revealed as self-evident by analytic meditation. (shrink)

The history of "evidence of the existence of God" is closely intertwined with the history of classical philosophy. Most philosophers, beginning with Plato and ending with Hegel, were very careful about these ancient creatures of religious thought, and even if they destroyed them, like Kant, then immediately, in another form, they restored. The proposed article is intended to emphasize this content of "philosophical" philosophy, expressed in a theological form, and to show that "proof of the existence of (...) God" in the language of philosophy means certain logical arguments that, if properly processed, could constitute a philosophical speculative method. (shrink)

That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.

"When the book opens, Jim Lo Scalzo is a blur to his wife, her remarkable tolerance wearing thin. She is heading to the hospital with her second miscarriage, and Jim is heading to Baghdad to cover the American invasion of Iraq. He hates himself for this - for not giving her a child, for deserting her when she so obviously needs him, for being consumed by his job - but how to stop moving? Sure, there have been some tough trips. (...) He's been spit on by Mennonites in Missouri, by heroin addicts in Pakistan, and by the KKK in South Carolina. He's contracted hepatitis on the Navajo Nation, endured two bouts of amoebic dysentery in India and Burma and four cases of giardia in Nepal, Peru, Afghanistan, and Cuba. He's been shot with rubber bullets in Seattle, knocked to the ground by a water cannon in Quebec, and sprayed with more teargas than he cares to recall. But photojournalism is his career, and travel is his compulsive craving.". (shrink)

The axiom of infinity states that infinite sets exist. I will argue that this axiom lacks justification. I start by showing that the axiom is not self-evident, so it needs separate justification. Following Maddy’s :481–511, 1988) distinction, I argue that the axiom of infinity lacks both intrinsic and extrinsic justification. Crucial to my project is Skolem’s From Frege to Gödel: a source book in mathematical logic, 1879–1931, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp. 290–301, 1922) distinction between a theory of real (...) sets, and a theory of objects that theory calls “sets”. While Dedekind’s argument fails, his approach was correct: the axiom of infinity needs a justification it currently lacks. This epistemic situation is at variance with everyday mathematical practice. A dilemma ensues: should we relax epistemic standards or insist, in a skeptical vein, that a foundational problem has been ignored? (shrink)

Kierkegaard occasionally mentions a type of belief which he calls an “existence communication,” and his discussion of such beliefs parallels his discussion of subjective truths (in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Existence communications include religious beliefs. I suggest that it is less misleading to focus on this term than it is to wrestle with the difficult and overworked notion of subjective truths; ultimately, his view of religious beliefs can be seen more clearly.His view does not fully emerge, however, without (...) the assistance of some other concepts. My thesis is that existence communications are comparable in their resistance to objective forms of adjudication to first principles, and comparable in their “self-involving” characteristics to teleological principles about the “raison d’etre of existence.This account not only helps to clarify Kierkegaard’s discussion, but it also offers two important hints about modern problems regarding religious belief. It suggest that religious claims may indeed be truth claims, and it suggests that there is more to the justification than comes out in a consideration of evidence. (shrink)

Background: There is evidence that household point-of-use water treatment products can reduce the enormous burden of water-borne illness. Nevertheless, adoption among the global poor is very low, and little evidence exists on why. Methods: We gave 600 households in poor communities in Dhaka, Bangladesh randomly-ordered two-month free trials of four water treatment products: dilute liquid chlorine, sodium dichloroisocyanurate tablets, a combined flocculant-disinfectant powdered mixture, and a silver-coated ceramic siphon filter. Consumers also received education on the dangers of untreated (...) drinking water. We measured which products consumers used with self-reports, observation, and chlorine tests. We also measured drinking water's contamination with E. coli. Findings: Households reported highest usage of the filter, although no product had even 30% usage. E. coli concentrations in stored drinking water were generally lowest when households had Water Guard. Households that self-reported product usage had large reductions in E. coli concentrations with any product as compared to controls. Conclusion: Traditional arguments for the low adoption of POU products focus on affordability, consumers' lack of information about germs and the dangers of unsafe water, and specific products not meshing with a household's preferences. In this study we provided free trials, repeated informational messages explaining the dangers of untreated water, and a variety of product designs. The low usage of all products despite such efforts makes clear that important barriers exist beyond cost, information, and variation among these four product designs. Without a better understanding of the choices and aspirations of the target end-users, household-based water treatment is unlikely to reduce morbidity and mortality substantially in urban Bangladesh and similar populations. © 2011 Luoto et al. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;Belief in God is a belief about a matter of fact and existence . I assume that BG is meaningful, coherent and neither probably true or probably false . ;The evidentialist objection to BG presupposes that we have obligations in respect of those beliefs that we accept, this being a voluntary form of assent to propositions . EO claims that acceptance of BG without sufficient evidence in (...) its support is irrational. But we cannot have evidence for all our beliefs; the need to avoid an infinite regress of justification typically leads EO to endorse some form of foundationalism . This allows certain beliefs to be basic ; EO must defend a criterion of proper basicality which excludes BG from that status. Typically, this restricts properly basic beliefs to those that are either self-evident, evident to the senses or incorrigible . ;Plantinga argues that this criterion is self-referentially incoherent and implausible , and claims that BG can be properly basic. This does not commit him to allowing just any belief to be properly basic, because basic beliefs have justifying conditions which allow him to point to differences between BG and obviously irrational beliefs . Criteria for proper basicality are to be arrived at inductively, from sample-sets of the beliefs we do in fact hold as basic . ;However, this procedure can be used to defend the restriction of proper basicality for matter of fact beliefs to those formed, justified and defeated on the basis of sense-experience, and so allows EO to be maintained . BG cannot be formed directly on the basis of religious experience, for this procedure shows none of the features of reliable, and some of the features of unreliable, epistemic practices . Nor is BG related to our trust in epistemic practices as are our fundamental beliefs about matters of fact . ;'Wittgensteinian basicalism' sees BG as an unjustified and unjustifiable cognitive claim constitutive of the religious language-game and form of life . But a Wittgensteinian epistemology rejects metaphysics as illusion, and grants BG rationality only at the cost of sacrificing its objectivity . Attempts to show that BG is presupposed in the assumption that the universe is intelligible fail because scepticism is not self-refuting; we cannot know that the universe is in fact intelligible . ;BG is not analogous to those beliefs we hold without evidence but which are clearly rational. It must be supported by evidence in order to secure acceptance. (shrink)

In a postmodern framework, the traditional subject-object dynamics within literature transform, eschewing possessive relationships for a symbiotic interplay mediated through vision. This shift is evident in the subversive narrative techniques of postmodern novels, where linear plots dissolve into fragmented memories and character development unfolds through nightmarish psychological narratives. This paper delves into the philosophical and theological implications of such narrative strategies in Eileen Chang’s The Little Reunion. It examines the inner discourse of the novel’s characters through a tripartite analysis of (...) free, direct, and indirect quotations, exploring how these narrative forms challenge traditional notions of identity and consciousness. Further, this study discusses the complexities involved in translating and interpreting these layered psychological discourses, highlighting the intertwined relationship between language, thought, and spiritual introspection. Eileen Chang’s novel not only marks a significant evolution in the modernization of the narrative form but also engages deeply with themes of psychological realism that resonate with existential and spiritual inquiries. The novel's artistic and content-driven aspects offer insights into a version of Chang that connects profoundly with philosophical explorations of self and otherness, making it a pivotal work for understanding the evolution of Chinese modern and contemporary literature within a broader philosophical and religious context. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69 HUME, DEMONSTRATIVES, AND SELF-ASCRIPTIONS OF IDENTITY I. In his A Treatise of Human Nature1(hereafter referred to as the Treatise and, for purposes of citation, abbreviated as 'T'), Hume says that "[T]he identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man, is only a fictitious one..." (T 259) Although some commentators read this as tantamount to the claim that we can have no idea of a mind, this (...) seems too strong. To see what Hume is getting at, we need to return to the beginning of the section entitled "Of Personal Identity" where he says: There are some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity. (T 251, my emphasis) "Unluckily", he continues, we do not have "any idea of self, after the manner it is here explain'd." (T 251, my emphasis) What this suggests, I think, is that it is only the idea of a simple, changeless mind that ought to be called fictitious. With respect to the question "What kind of an idea of mind à o we have?", Hume suggests what has come to be called the "Bundle Theory of Mind". According to the bundle theory, every object of awareness is an individual perception and "what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united together by certain relations..." (T 207) In other words, Hume is saying that what we are aware of is a stream of perceptions, none of whose members is a perception of a simple, changeless mind. However, given Hume's account of (strict/perfect) identity, an acceptance of the bundle theory seems to entail the rejection of the 70 continuous existence of any mind. Put differently, if true the theory seems to require that the very idea of a mind continuous through time is a fiction. This raises the following problem which Hume must address: Since the ordinary (vulgar) person has a great propensity to ascribe identity through time to minds (T 253), then, from the point of view of a study of human nature, it is important to provide an answer to the question: "why do the vulgar have such a propensity?" Understanding Hume's answer to this question is, I believe, dependent upon the recognition that it is only the idea of a simple, changeless mind that Hume believes is fictitious. Once this is seen, it follows that the ascription of strict identity through time to a mind must, on Hume's account, be a result of the activity of the imagination (see T 209). As Hume says:...identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them (T 260). Although the qualities that unite ideas typically include causation, resemblance and contiguity, Hume excludes contiguity as a factor in the case of ascriptions of strict identity through time to minds (T 260) and restricts his attention to the relations of resemblance and causation. Of these two relations, a 2 number of commentators have found the relation of resemblance especially problematic. Accordingly, in what follows I will consider whether Hume's explanation of the role of resemblance is sufficient to account for and justify self-ascriptions of strict identity through time. Contrary to the judgement that Hume's explanation of the role of resemblance fails as an account of self-ascriptions of strict identity through time, I will suggest that by recognizing a primitive 71 theory of demonstrative content in Hume's explanation of the role of resemblance many of the problems that the explanation seems to give rise to can be avoided. II. I begin with Hume's description of the role of resemblance: To begin with resemblance; suppose we cou'd see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle, and suppose that he always preserves the memory of... (shrink)

The aim of the book is to show that the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas, i.e. his five arguments to prove the existence of God, are logically correct arguments by the standards of modern Predicate Logic. In the first chapter this is done by commenting on the two preliminary articles preceeding the Five Ways in which Thomas Aquinas points out that on the one hand the existence of God is not self-evident to us and on the other (...) hand, that, similar as in some scientific explanations, the mere existence of a cause for an effect which is evidently known to us can be proved. In the second chapter every argument is translated into the symbolic form of Predicate Logic and its logical validity is shown. Additionally a detailed and critical discussion of the premises of each argument is given. (shrink)

J. David Velleman casts foreknowledge of one's own next move as psychologically active. As agents, we form prior intentions about what we will do next. Such prior intentions are licensed self-fulfilling beliefs or directive cognitions. These cognitions differ from ordinary predictions in their psychological relation to the evidence, in that they precede that crucial part of the evidence which consists in the fact that they have been formed. However, once formed, these cognitions are epistemologically unremarkable: they are (...) directly justified by evidence, which saliently includes the fact of their own existence. I argue that Velleman distorts both the epistemology and the etiology of self-knowing agency. Self-knowing agents typically know what they will do next non-evidentially, and yet their knowledge of their own next move is formed in response to their (perspective-relative) epistemic grounds. Velleman's account of self-knowing agency is doubly distortive because it ignores the role of the purely first-person point of view which typically characterizes such agency. In developing an alternative account of self-knowing agency, I argue that the kind of knowledge that we typically have of what we are about to do is like the kind of knowledge we have when we non-evidentially know what our own current, conscious propositional thoughts are. We can non-evidentially know what we think in virtue of having made up our minds what to think. Likewise, we can non-evidentially know what we are about to do in virtue of having settled on what to do next. (shrink)

What sort of existence does the Sum have? Whether we affirm it to be the conceptual being of thought or the concrete existence of an individual, we will be forced to draw conclusions inimical to the Cartesian philosophy, for the alternative interpretations give rise to a serious dilemma. Jules Lequier states the dilemma in this way: "I think, therefore I am. Now in saying: 'I am,' after having said: 'I think,' either I say less, or I say more. (...) If I say less, I am proceeding with certainty, but backwards; if I say more, I advance indeed, but by what right? What perplexity!...Such are the two aspects of this proposition which is alternately evident and sterile, pregnant and obscure for the mind that examines it. But to the extent it is evident, it is sterile; to the extent that it is fruitful, it is obscure.". (shrink)

Although most existing studies have considered entrepreneurial bricolage as a means to overcome resource constraints in new ventures, few have explored the direct effects of entrepreneurial bricolage on employee creativity, particularly in the context of entrepreneurial internet firms. Drawing from multiple theories, this study proposes a cross-level mediation model for the trickle-down effects of entrepreneurial bricolage and business model innovation on employee creativity. By using a 2-wave longitudinal design, survey data were collected from multiple sources, including 49 leaders and 336 (...) employees from entrepreneurial internet firms in China. Multilevel structural equation modeling was applied to analyze the cross-level mediation model. The results show that both entrepreneurial bricolage and business model innovation failed to significantly and positively direct employee creativity. Furthermore, entrepreneurial bricolage exerted a cross-level influence on employee creativity that was sequentially transmitted through between-level business model innovation and within-level creative self-efficacy. The theoretical and managerial implications of these findings are also discussed. (shrink)

In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made (...) at bridging these two domains of inquiry, despite intriguing evidence of overlap between the phenomenology and neurophysiology of meditation practice and psychedelic states. In particular, many contemplative traditions explicitly aim at dissolving the sense of self by eliciting altered states of consciousness through meditation, while classical psychedelics are known to produce significant disruptions of self-consciousness, a phenomenon known as drug-induced ego dissolution. In this article, we discuss available evidence regarding convergences and differences between phenomenological and neurophysiological data on meditation practice and psychedelic drug-induced states, with a particular emphasis on alterations of self-experience. While both meditation and psychedelics may disrupt self-consciousness and underlying neural processes, we emphasize that neither meditation nor psychedelic states can be conceived as simple, uniform categories. Moreover, we suggest that there are important phenomenological differences even between conscious states described as experiences of self-loss. As a result, we propose that self-consciousness may be best construed as a multidimensional construct, and that “self-loss,” far from being an unequivocal phenomenon, can take several forms. Indeed, various aspects of self-consciousness, including narrative aspects linked to autobiographical memory, self-related thoughts and mental time travel, and embodied aspects rooted in multisensory processes, may be differently affected by psychedelics and meditation practices. Finally, we consider long-term outcomes of experiences of self-loss induced by meditation and psychedelics on individual traits and prosocial behavior. We call for caution regarding the problematic conflation of temporary states of self-loss with “selflessness” as a behavioral or social trait, although there is preliminary evidence that correlations between short-term experiences of self-loss and long-term trait alterations may exist. (shrink)

This paper presents an introduction to Arne Grøn’s existential hermeneutics as a philosophical method, while also attempting to indicate how Grøn’s work contributes to and engages in a number of crucial topics in modern continental philosophy. The first section of the paper shows how Grøn draws on Paul Ricoeur and Michael Theunissen to rethink the concept of existence through a reading of Kierkegaard that uncouples this concept from the self-evident status it attained in twenty-century existentialism. The second section (...) of the paper argues that Grøn proposes an existential ethics that takes the Kierkegaardian notion that humans are inherently normative beings and uses this as a basis for a critique of ethics, as well as for establishing an ethics of vision inspired by Kierkegaard. The third section of the paper presents a reading of Grøn’s notion of religion as an inextricable part of human existence. (shrink)

Chilling Effects occur when the risks surrounding a speech restriction inadvertently deter speech that lies outside the restriction’s official scope. Contrary to the standard interpretation of this phenomenon I show how speech deterrence for individuals can sometimes, instead of suppressing discourse at the group level, intensify it – with results that are still unwelcome, but crucially unlike a ‘chill’. Inadvertent deterrence of speech may, counterintuitively, create a Heating Effect. This proposal gives us a promising explanation of the intensity of public (...) debate on topics for which there is, simultaneously, evidence of people self-censoring, for fear of breaching speech restrictions. It also helps to pinpoint two problems with existing theoretical analyses of the Chilling Effect: (i) in how they construe the relation between individual- and group-level discursive phenomena; and (ii) how they characterize the distinctively wrongful nature of inadvertent speech deterrence. (shrink)

According to ethical intuitionists, basic moral propositions are self-evident. Robert Audi has made significant progress articulating and defending this view, claiming that an adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition justifies rather than compels belief. It is argued here that understanding a proposition cannot justify belief in it, and that intuition, suitably understood, provides the right sort of justification. An alternative account is offered of self-evidence based on intuition rather than understanding, and it is concluded that once (...) we have an adequate understanding of a self-evident proposition, we can see that it does no distinctive epistemic work. It merely reports that intuition is doing some significant epistemic work. Since the very idea of self-evident moral propositions is so controversial, and self-evidence does no significant epistemic work, ethical intuitionists should drop this notion from their moral epistemology. All they need are intuitive propositions and our intuition of these. (shrink)

This article presents an introductory overview of the interpretations of schizophrenia offered by three phenomenological psychiatrists: Eugene Minkowski (1885-1972), Wolfgang Blankenburg (b. 1928), and Kimura Bin (b. 1931). Minkowski views schizophrenia as characterized by a diminished sense of dynamic and vital connection to the world ("loss of vital contact"), often accompanied by a hypertrophy of intellectual and static tendencies ("morbid rationalism," "morbid geometrism"). Blankenburg emphasizes the patient's loss of the normal sense of obviousness or "natural self-evidence"—a loss of (...) the usual common-sense background that enables normal persons to cope easily with the social and practical world. Kimura focuses on certain distortions of self-experience: a distinctive splitting of the subjective self, alienated awareness of one's own ongoing consciousness, and profound uncertainty about the "I-ness" of the self. In addition to a summary, this article offers a comparison and critique of these three approaches. The three approaches are also considered in light of a more recent, phenomenological formulation of schizophrenia as a disorder of self-experience (an ipseity disturbance) involving hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection (i.e., heightened awareness of aspects of experience that would normally remain tacit or presupposed and decline in the feeling of existing as a subject of awareness). (shrink)

Cobb's stated purpose in this book is to inquire into what is distinctive about Christianity and into its claim to finality. Hence half the book is taken up with the explication of other "structures of existence" which antedated or which have paralleled "Christian Existence." For Cobb, the term existence refers to how a subject relates itself to itself and what it is in and for itself. Cobb traces the move from the primitive self, which is not (...) yet conscious of itself as a self, across the threshold to "axial" man who breaks with the primitive mythic age by exhibiting a "seat of existence" or center of consciousness which involves a new role for rationality and which for the first time subordinates the unconscious to the conscious. The particular structures of axial existence which Cobb explores are Buddhist Existence, Homeric Existence, Socratic Existence, and Prophetic Existence. In contradistinction to these, Christian existence emerges as the crossing of a new threshold: it is spiritual existence expressing itself in love. Cobb's efforts to fulfill the second purpose of the book are half-hearted and unconvincing, a fact perhaps consistent with the book's objectivity: it is not Christian apologetics. Cobb's well known Whiteheadianism is only subtly and incidentally evident in this work, although occasionally it is used directly to expand and enrich certain explanations. The print in the book is annoyingly small.--S. O. H. (shrink)

Bergman's approach to epistemology has deep roots in the Prague School of philosophy, particularly in the philosophical system of Bolzano and an interest in the problem of inner perception. In his criticism of Kant's system, however, we also find an emphasis on faith as an attitude of trust and confidence between man and God. This move is not meant to present faith as superior to knowledge or replacing it. The trend is rather in the direction of a complex co-existence (...) of the two attitudes. This co-existence comes to the fore in the relation between construction and evidence and a certain delineation of the spheres to which these concepts can be applied. The suggestion is that in spite of the presence of evidence in the inner realm of human perception, that realm is open to the immanent sphere. Paradoxically self-certainty exhibited in faith goes beyond the self, while construction as a liberate activisation of the self remains within the empirical. (shrink)

The Self-Evidencing Agent offers a unique method for addressing difficult philosophical questions. Self-evidencing occurs when an agent uses their model of the world and of themselves to explain what they observe in the world and in themselves, such that those observations become evidence for their model – the more agents explain, the more they self-evidence. This book argues that there is good reason to cast an agent’s existence itself in terms of self-evidencing, and (...) that if we begin from this as a first principle, then we can make better sense of who and what we are, of how we engage in diverse ways with the world, and what matters to us. Self-evidencing can help situate attention, action, and perception. It also furnishes compelling approaches to decision-making and rationality, the self, of preferences and values. It can build bridges to consciousness, and even on to free will, and to meaning and wisdom. (shrink)

A recent development in the philosophy of religion has been the attempt to justify belief in God using Bayesian confirmation theory. My dissertation critically discusses two prominent spokesmen for this approach--Richard Swinburne and J. L. Mackie. Using probabilistic confirmation theory, these philosophers come to wildly divergent conclusions with respect to the hypothesis of theism; Swinburne contends that the evidence raises the overall probability of the hypothesis of theism, whereas Mackie argues that the evidence disconfirms the existence of (...) God. After a careful analysis of the individual authors, this dissertation critically examines the assumptions of the project. The authors consider arguments for the existence of God separately--the cosmological argument, the argument from design, apparent miracles, the problem of evil, and arguments from religious experience--and then conjoin them to assess the cumulative effect of the arguments. The assumptions are that the probability calculus may be interpreted for a successful inductive argument for or against the existence of God, that inference to best explanation is applicable to the justification of religious belief, that the justification of belief in God is analogous to the justification of a scientific theory, and that a classical foundationalist conception of rationality is correct. It is the contention of this dissertation that all of these assumptions are incorrect. All of the major interpretations of the probability calculus are examined and it is argued that there are either no interpretations for the probability assignments or no interpretations which will advance an argument for or against the existence of God. It is also argued that the usual methods for interpreting the explanatory power of theism will not determine any non-zero probabilities; however, density measuring will provide a non-zero interpretation. In the final chapter it is argued that a subjective Bayesian conception of rationality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of rationality and that classical foundationalism is self-referentially inconsistent. An alternative approach to the rationality of religious belief is offered that proceeds along Reidian and Plantingan lines, belief in God is properly basic. (shrink)

Using an economic bargaining game, we tested for the existence of two phenomena related to social norms, namely norm manipulation – the selection of an interpretation of the norm that best suits an individual – and norm evasion – the deliberate, private violation of a social norm. We found that the manipulation of a norm of fairness was characterized by a self-serving bias in beliefs about what constituted normatively acceptable behaviour, so that an individual who made an uneven (...) bargaining offer not only genuinely believed it was fair, but also believed that recipients found it fair, even though recipients of the offer considered it to be unfair. In contrast, norm evasion operated as a highly explicit process. When they could do so without the recipient's knowledge, individuals made uneven offers despite knowing that their behaviour was unfair. (shrink)

The efforts to prove God's existence in the history of thought have been one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and theology, and even the most important one. The evidences put furword to prove the existence of God constitute the center of philosophy of religion’s problems not only philosophy of religion, but also the disciplines such as theology-kalam and Islamic philosophy are also seriously concerned. When we look at the history of philosophy, it is clear that almost all (...) philosophers are interested in the evidence in favour of and against the existence of God. Especially in recent times, religious experience has often been regarded as evidence of the existence of God. Studies in the field of religious and mystical experience have put forward many arguments concerning the use of religious experience as evidence. However, this study has been limited to experience of sense and pure consciousness claims rather than examining all of these arguments. In this study firstly, the analogy between experience of sense and religious experience will be deal with, and then claims that conciousness can be emptied by a number of methods which are defended by mystics. In addition, it will be tried to defend the opinion that the mystical experiences which are the common point of the two approaches are valid. The main emphasis of the article will be that these arguments can be used as evidence for the existence of God.Summary: Religious experience - which has not been considered as one of the classical evidences regarding the existence of God before being popular by recent studies – is started to be called one of the arguments. The most important reason for not arguing religious experience among the evidences of God’s existence is that it is a personal experience and therefore contains subjective perspectives. However, many researchers, who refuse to accept the criticism raised against religious experience with restricting to subjectivity, emphasized the importance of religious experience by highlighting the objective aspects of such experiences. This emphasis was not only on its significance, but also on the fact that it had a cognitive feature and thus it could provide evidence for the existence of God. The argument of religious experience is generally defined as an effort for demonstrating to existence of God with reference to several feelings such as spiritual experiences of human in face of creator and sacred Being, encounter with God, uniting, and annihilating selfness in Him. The emergence of such efforts, especially after the XVIIIth century, indicates that the history of the evidence does not go back much earlier. However, even if notas evidence, it is possible to extend the traces of religious and mystical experience to the history of religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Considering a great amount of the previous literature focused on religious experience in the West, It is easily seen that such research is still new. The main purpose in addressing such a controversial issue is to make the argument on the religious experience more current and to show whether the religious experience would be able to use as evidence for the existence of God.First title of this study comprises many different claims such as Walter T. Stace’s The Argument from Unanimity Richard Swinburne’s The Principle of Credulity, William P. Alston’s Perceiving God, John Hick’s Experience-as. However, instead of briefly giving out very different claims, the study chooses to focus on two arguments which are less discussed and can be given in more detail. The first is the argument based on the analogy between the religious experience and the sense experience. The fundamental point of this argument is sense experience. With reference to the similarities between the sense experience and the religious experience, it can be argued that religious experience is also cognitive and may function as an evidence for the existence of God. In other words, being perceptual and noetic, namely cognitive, of sense experience is addressed as a similar side of religious experience. Whether it is imaginary or real, eventually, it is necessary for an experience to have an object and being experience of something. Therefore, the religious experience includes the perception of a Transcendent Being that is beyond and in excess of the individual who experiences. Perception of the sense experience will definitely be different from the perception of religious experience. Researchers who think that the five sense organs do not run the perception of Sacred Beings, identified broader and various meanings for the perception. Thereby, in this approach, where the semantic field of perception is expanded, it was contended that human beings were able to perceive the transcendent, eternal, and unlimited God, and this can be explained in the epistemological sense. In order to use religious experiences as an evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary to determine whether such experiences are caused by God rather than something else. This raises the issue of the validity of religious experience. The researchers in this area have propounded various criteria to identify whether religious experience is existed or not. Experiences, which do not meet the criteria, are not considered existed even if they claim to be religious experience.The second is the argument that discusses whether it is possible to suggest an evidence for the existence of God by utilizing pure consciousness events. In general, this argument claims that the consciousness gets clear, and thus, mystic or Sufi experiences the Divine One with pure consciousness by discharging consciousness from all sensual contents and removing it from secular desire and wishes. The argument, which claims the experience of Divine One is direct, therefore uninterpretable, and experienced by pure consciousness, believes clearing the consciousness of mystics from sensual qualities such as seeing, hearing, and tasting. It is stated that it is possible for mystics to empty their sensory images and get rid of them, and thus, their desires and wishes could be lost. Especially, the thinkers who are connected with the philosophy of perennialism and defend this approach, thought that people, who have distinct religion, culture, and beliefs in different parts of the world and in various time periods, had the same experience and considered such experiences were universal by suggesting that this similarity could be called as common essence.Even though the claim which offers that the events of pure consciousness are the same everywhere have been criticized in many respects, the advocates of this approach have argued that the experience has the common essence, but the interpretation is different. This relationship, which was tried to be established between experience and commentary, caused a lot of work for both the thinkers who put forward the claims of pure consciousness and the researchers who opposed it. However, examining the relationship between experience and interpretation requires serious studies in socio-psychological, cultural and religious fields. Therefore, in order not to exceed the limits of the article, the relationship between experience and interpretation is briefly mentioned.While discussing two arguments, the main claims of the arguments were addressed, and the criticisms directed to this argument were not discussed as much as possible. However, some fundamental criticisms have been mentioned shortly for a better understanding of the discussion. Since such western-oriented claims mostly were deployed in a western context, the study excluded the comparison of the claims across different cultures. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that discovering that our universe is fine-tuned should make us more confident that other universes exist. My defense exploits a distinction between ideal and non-ideal evidential support. I use that distinction in concert with a simple model to disarm the most influential objection—the this-universe objection—to the view that fine-tuning supports the existence of other universes. However, the simple model fails to capture some important features of our epistemic situation with respect to fine-tuning. To capture (...) these features, I introduce a more sophisticated model. I then use the more sophisticated model to show that, even once those complicating factors are taken into account, fine-tuning should boost our confidence in the existence of other universes. (shrink)

Practice commonly develops independent of theory: only rarely does some heritable informational structure knowingly emerge. With this in mind, Biosemiotic theory is well served by an informed synthesis with Constantin Stanislavski’s theatrical technique. For it is not enough merely to catalog signage by studying the consequence of its function, we also seek to generate signs with knowing intent. This implies more than the strategic use of signs, which all complex living things do, and of which our many subjective selves emerge. (...) It calls for an objective artifice of signs, that is, some set of techniques competent to produce subjectivity, and capable of being objectified such that it can become a knowable standard. This is precisely what Stanislavski offers, ways of knowingly creating novel, actual, believably generative, signs. Within the realm of human action and in terms of human knowing, he positively exemplifies applied semiotic theory: his approach to dramatizing fictional characters also expresses how self-consciousness comes to be. What Stanislavski implies, Charles Tilly presumes and this essay asserts: our own biotic evolution has been influenced by post-biotic or metaphoric evolution, which results from the ‘living’ interaction of certain classes of non-living things. These derive from the pragmatic a priori made implicit by Chauncey Wright, which is the motivation of living things to act on specific needs within specific situations. The need to breathe is one example; the need to make competent use of existing epistemic structures is another. But such structures have their own needs, and ‘act’ to fill them. When this is compounded culturally, it may result in self-consciousness – a self-constructed artifice of semiosis with great consequence to biotic processes. Tilly supplies evidence that such compounding happens within human society, as well as a theoretical basis for its expression as a semiotic sociology. This essay uses pragmatic semiotics to explore the strong parallels that exist between the deliberately objective motivations upon which science, sanity and self-consciousness all depend, Stanislavski’s practicable artifice of signaling pathways and social emergence, and Tilly’s approach to society as ongoing performance. (shrink)