Some philosophers claim that there are certain laws that restrict what kinds of things we can perceptually represent. Those laws do not apply, however, to beliefs. To be a representationalist is to hold that there is a similarity between perception and belief. If this is the case, why do the laws apply to one kind of mental state, but not the other? I argue that the puzzle is not a puzzle for representationalists in general, but only for some forms of (...) representationalism that hold excessive analogies between perception and belief. I will consider three kinds of views: a view that identifies perception with belief; a view that claims that perception and belief share the same kind of content, viz. propositions; and the view that belief and perception are both intentional states, but do not share the same type of content. I will argue that the laws of appearance rule out views that identify perception with belief, and that consider propositions to be the contents of perception. (shrink)

Part one : early translations of fundamental words -- Introduction -- Mistranslations in the early critical literature (1929-1949) -- The first Heidegger in English -- Part two : hermeneutics and philosophy of translation -- Elements of a theory of translation -- Paratactic method : translating parmenides, fragment VI -- Bibliography -- Part I : works by Heidegger cited in the text -- Part II : other sources -- A research bibliography of Heidegger in English translation.

Translation is an early and ongoing, but as yet for the most part unexamined, theme of Heidegger's lecture courses and essays. According to Heidegger, translation became a central philosophical issue in the Western tradition soon after its beginnings when a number of the basic words of the early Greek thinkers were sometimes mistranslated into Latin and that, as a result, the thought of the pre-Socratics and the classic Greek philosophers, especially Aristotle, has remained obscure. ;For Heidegger, because of the relation (...) between thinking and translating, and the relation of both to language, it is not a thinker's words, but rather the translator's thought, that is translated when he attempts to render a text in his own native language. The resulting text is a recomposition of the original text, not the exchange of words between the vocabularies of two natural languages. Translation also goes on within the same language whenever one speaks and writes. ;I first present the principles of Heidegger's philosophy of translation and present them as ontological, hermeneutic and methodological elements. Next, I examine Heidegger's rendering of Parmenides' Fragment VI as an example of his method of paratactic translation, in which each word of an utterance, rather than the syntactic ensemble, initially guides the rendering. Finally, I apply Heidegger' s own principles to a translation of Was ist Metaphysik? and argue on philosophical grounds for new renderings of Heidegger's basic words, including Sein, Seiende, Dasein and Existenz. I also explore the relation of Heidegger's view of translation to the question about the meaning of Sein and the relation of Sein and thinking. ;Heidegger's hermeneutics complements interpretation theory since Schleiermacher, but in suggesting that thinking does not occur in words, Heidegger also challenges that view. (shrink)

An encounter with R.D. Laing at a lecture he gave towards the end of his life in New York. The personality of this existential psychotherapist was powerful even in a large venue. His approach to psychotherapy is discussed.

This is the much anticipated publication of Joan Stambaugh’s translation of Martin Heidegger’s major work. As the translator notes in her preface: “This translation was begun some time ago and has undergone changes over the years as colleagues have offered suggestions”. An earlier version of the translation was privately circulated among scholars during the nearly twenty years that passed before SUNY Press was able to make available the work, which is based on the seventh edition of Sein und Zeit. The (...) translation includes Heidegger’s marginalia to his copies of the book which have been part of the published German text since 1977. An earlier version of Professor Stambaugh’s translation of the “Introduction” of the work was published that same year. The text is equipped with a lexicon prepared by Theodore Kisiel, a leading American Heidegger scholar and champion of a critical edition of Heidegger in German and, one hopes, in English as well. (shrink)

During the summer semester of 1941 Martin Heidegger gave a course of lectures on Grundbegriffe at the University of Freiburg. The German text was first published in 1981 as volume 51 of the Gesamtausgabe of Heidegger's writings. Each of the first five lectures is followed by a "review" which further illuminates the lecture itself. The titles of the subsections of the work have been provided by the editor, Petra Jaeger.

Some of the interest of philosophers of mind in the results of recent research in the social sciences, including especially cognitive science and developmental psychology, is reflected in this anthology of eleven essays on the long-standing discussion about how minds understand other minds. In a few of the essays, enthusiastic and often seemingly uncritical acceptance of the empirical findings of contemporary psychological research may cause some readers well-warranted concern. Taken together, these essays are welcome additions to the discussion of an (...) important problem of epistemology. (shrink)

The eleven essays collected here include three papers, written in the 1980s, on the influence of Hegel on Heidegger’s thinking by Jacques Taminiaux, Dominique Janicaud, and Michel Haar, respectively; a paper on Heidegger’s several readings of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit by Robert Bernasconi ; two papers on Hegel’s aesthetics by Martin Donougho and John Sallis; a paper on Hegel’s philosophy of history by David Kolb; two papers on Hegel, Heidegger, and Antigone by Dennis J. Schmidt and Kathleen Wright; an essay (...) on unpublished notes by Friedrich Hölderlin, with references to Heidegger’s philosophy by David Farrell Krell; and a general introduction to the volume by one of its editors, John McCumber. The French papers, which are in the background of many of the remaining papers, have been previously published, as has the contribution by Krell, which is reprinted from an earlier volume with a few minor changes and the addition of a short paragraph. The paper by Sallis is based on a chapter from a previously published book that has been expanded to include a discussion of Hegel’s aesthetics. (shrink)

The present volume consists of the protocols of twenty séances held between 1966 and 1973 in which Heidegger was the central figure. They occurred as four seminars, the first three of which were given in Provence, the last one having taken place in Heidegger’s home in Zähringen, a suburb of Freiburg im Breisgau, three years before his death in 1976. Appended to the protocols are two brief texts, the first written in the winter of 1972–73 on part of Parmenides’ Fragment (...) 1 which Heidegger read during the last session of the fourth seminar, on 8 September 1973, and an introduction to the Parmenides interpretation called “The Provenance of Thinking”, which was written at some point between 1973 and the spring of 1976. The two texts were added by the editor of the Gesamtausgabe edition of Heidegger’s Seminare in 1986. The five pages on which they appear contain the only sentences composed by Heidegger himself and are therefore the only ones, in fact, from Heidegger’s own German in Four Seminars. (shrink)

The present study compares the philosophy of Leibniz with Heidegger’s thought, in particular his analysis of the principium reddendae rationis sufficientis, the so-called principle of reason: nihil est sine ratione. Early on, the author notes that this version of what Leibniz referred to, in 1686, in a letter to Antoine Arnauld as “my great principle” was for Leibniz merely a “vulgar axiom,” the fundamental form of which “[is that] whereby one can always account for why something has happened this way (...) rather than in some other way”. Heidegger, for his part, finds philosophical meat precisely in the modifying phrase “[in] this way rather than in some other way,” not in the traditional “axiom” that “nothing is without a reason”. Although Leibniz does not give the principium in its pure form in the text cited by Cristin, we are to understand that it is a metaphysical principle, not a logical principle. It is not, however, the principle of causality, which demands an answer to the question about why things are, but rather an ontological principle, which shows that and how things are as they are and not otherwise. The foundation of things, which is expressed in Leibniz’s “great principle,” is like the rose spoken of in a line from Johannes Scheffler’s Cherubinischer Wandersmann that Heidegger admired so much: “The rose is without a ‘why’; it blooms because [weil] it blooms”. Like the rose, the nature of the foundation is not gained by asking “Why?” Yet how can that be? What is more fundamental than asking about etiology, reasons, or grounds? In Der Satz vom Grund [The Principle of Ground], a lecture course from 1955/56, Heidegger replies: “The Why [Warum] looks for [sucht] the foundation. The While [Weil] brings about [bringt] the foundation”. Incidentally, when Heidegger makes a noun from the adverb “weil” in this text, he restores the original meaning of the adverb, which is an abbreviated form of “dieweil,” meaning a span of time. In so doing, he points to the temporal nature of the foundation. We can now better understand how, for Heidegger, the principle of the foundation should not be understood as a proposition or utterance, but rather as something like a tempo marking that leads thinking along its path. (shrink)

Heidegger scholars have sometimes assumed that Heidegger’s experience of thinking was unprecedented and that the peculiarity of his idiom was related to the novelty of that experience. Reinhard May’s study suggests that Heidegger’s thought is fundamentally indebted to his early familiarity with Zen Buddhist ideas and to his reading of Taoist classics, including the Tao te Ching of Lao Tse and the works of Chuang Zu, in German translations Heidegger knew by Victor von Strauss, Martin Buber and Richard Wilhelm, and, (...) later, to his contact with Chinese and Japanese philosophers studying in Germany with Rickert, Husserl and Heidegger himself. Many European artists and intellectuals were engrossed by East Asian ideas, of course, but May’s conclusion is that Heidegger was in a sense a Taoist philosopher, and that the peculiarities of his philosophy are the same as those which inhere in East Asian philosophy, which prizes silence and rejects the hegemony of Western logic. While Heidegger’s appreciation for East Asian philosophy and his influence on modern Japanese thinkers have been noted often enough, the suggestion that the heart of Heidegger’s thought was profoundly oriented in the early 1920s by Taoist and Zen Buddhist ideas is provocative. The translator, Graham Parkes, who has supplemented his translation with an essay detailing Heidegger’s contact with Japanese philosophers, was among the first to suggest a deeper connection between Heidegger and East Asian philosophy in a series of essays he edited on Heidegger and Asian Thought, which includes contributions by Japanese and Chinese philosophers who knew Heidegger and were in contact with him for many years. (shrink)

This is the third and final volume of the author’s “attempt to understand and communicate the insights of Martin Heidegger... the most important philosopher of modern times”. It is a discussion of the “later Heidegger” or “‘finished’ Heidegger,” which Julian Young defines as texts written after 1936 and characterizes as a “complementary mingling of both meditative and poetic thinking, a happy marriage of the two”. He comments: “The ground from which [the texts] spring lies, not in any product of ratiocination, (...) but in, rather, poetic vision”. Professor Young, who teaches at the University of Auckland, sees Heidegger as “the ‘physician’ of modern Western culture” who “identifies three leading symptoms of modernity’s spiritual ‘sickness’: loss of the gods, the ‘violence’ of technology, and loss of ‘dwelling’ or ‘homelessness.’” The pathogen of the sickness is metaphysics, which “is one and the same error as that of believing there to be no more to truth than correspondence”. Like a malignancy that commandeers all of an organism’s energy in servitude to one pathological process, metaphysics “elevates a particular disclosure [of reality] to tyrannical status, a status which allows the possibility of no other reality-revealing horizon”. This small but rich volume concludes with a nuanced discussion of “the therapeutic aspect of Heidegger’s ‘medical’ thinking” on Western culture’s spiritual malady which the philosopher had diagnosed early in the twentieth century. In nine neatly argued chapters, the author offers a number of fresh interpretations of familiar themes in Heidegger scholarship, including the meaning of Sein, the Kehre that affected Heidegger’s way of thinking, Gestell, Wohnen, Ereignis, and the Geviert. (shrink)

"The thesis of the present book is that we all possess, a priori, an awareness, or even understanding, of being that guides our daily practice as well as any subsequent philosophical interpretations". The awareness is preontological, and this "pre-ontological awareness [of being] is what does the philosophizing" in each historical epoch. It has yielded a series of interpretations of being as substance, reality, the Trinity, the principles of symbolic logic, dialectical reason, consciousness--to name the most important--which we recognize as the (...) various major grounding concepts of metaphysics. But the interpretations are merely "illustrations of being." None is fundamental and others are possible. (shrink)

This collection of conference papers is the third in a series of related volumes published under the auspices of the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning, an organization headed by the editor of the collection and based at her home in Belmont, Massachusetts. It was preceded, in 1996, by Life. In the Glory of Its Radiating Manifestations and Life. The Human Quest for an Ideal. The editor, who has assembled nearly all of the fifty-seven volumes of the series (...) Analecta Husserliana published to date, explains that the twenty-one texts included here, all but four of which are in French, “present the work of [the Institute’s] fifth International Phenomenology Congress held in Paris, October 6th to 9th, 1994”, the theme of which was the editor’s own “phenomenology of life as a scientific, integrated philosophy of life”. (shrink)

Like Aristotle’s texts, the present volume consists of logoi, lecture notes Heidegger left behind which later in his life he considered for possible inclusion in his Gesamtausgabe. Omissions in the manuscript amounting to about eleven pages were made good by referring to two transcripts of what was heard, respectively, by Walter Bröcker and Helene Weiss, two of Heidegger’s students at Freiburg University in the summer of 1923, when the course was given. Here and there in the manuscript, Heidegger provided headings (...) for sections of the text and for a number of inserts and supplements added later. The detailed section and subsection headings, which are an outline of the course, were added by the German editor, Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. According to the translator, by Heidegger’s own admission, the text comprises “the first notes for Being and Time”, and therein lies one element of our interest in these logoi, the other being the possibility that “Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity” was “the original form of Heidegger’s ‘original ethics’”. (shrink)

The initial collaboration and subsequent parting of the ways of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, and the closely related course of the early development of the phenomenological movement, are chronicled in part in the history of a text Husserl wrote for the fourteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The article, “Phenomenology,” which, until 1956, remained an important source of many a general reader’s information about phenomenology, was both one of Husserl’s few attempts to present in a concise way an account (...) of the new fundamental science that he originated and “a programmatic outline for his future endeavors” from 1928 on. The five versions of the article and a set of lectures on phenomenological psychology that Husserl gave in Amsterdam in 1928 are brought together in the present volume. The fifth version of Husserl’s article was finally “done into English” by one of Husserl’s doctoral students, Christopher V. Salmon, whose version was eventually further truncated by the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The actual Britannica text is not reproduced here. The transmogrifications of this ill-fated text are meticulously illuminated by Thomas Sheehan, who has also prepared a complete edition of the marginalia to Husserl’s copy of Sein und Zeit. Richard E. Palmer has edited and translated the Amsterdam Lectures and Husserl’s marginal remarks in his copy of Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. Both sets of marginalia occupy about two-hundred pages of the volume. Also included are several other documents relevant to the history of the philosophical and personal relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, whom Husserl had chosen to be his academic successor and philosophical heir: remarks made by Heidegger in April 1929 on the occasion of Husserl’s seventieth birthday; Husserl’s letter to Alexander Pfänder from January 1931, in which he reveals his disappointment with Heidegger; and a lecture on “Phenomenology and Anthropology,” given by Husserl in June 1931, in which he publicly rejects Heidegger’s philosophy. The editors have worked with and, at times, updated Walter Biemel’s critical edition of Husserl’s texts on phenomenological psychology, as well as other materials available in the Husserl archives, at Louvain. (shrink)

The “dominant feature” of the present volume is an “attempt to introduce realism as a partner in the discussion of phenomenological-transcendental epistemology,” in order to determine “whether realism as such is compatible with phenomenology”. By the term realism, the author means “classical realism of the kind advocated by Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Reid, and contemporary philosophers such as William Alston and Alvin Plantinga” ; namely, the view that “an entity has its own being, no matter whether it is known (...) to have that being or not”. Pietersma wants to show that, in the end, a phenomenological epistemology actually “safeguards the realist mode of thought” by providing a “conceptual framework” that serves as “a kind of accommodation of object and subject”. He believes that the three “phenomenological thinkers” he discusses may be understood as “having freed realism from its own incoherence and restored it to the status of a viable philosophy”. (shrink)

Fewer than half of the fifty-two courses Martin Heidegger gave between 1915 and 1956 have now been translated into English. Twelve of them have not yet appeared in the first Gesamtausgabe of his works. The present volume, which was first published in German in 1977, is the translation of a course given during the winter semester of 1927–8, at Marburg University. As the translators note, with its publication, all of Heidegger’s published texts on Kant are now available in English. The (...) text thus complements Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, What Is a Thing?, and “Kant’s Thesis about Being [Sein]”. (shrink)

This volume is comprised of twenty-two essays on the early writings of Martin Heidegger, including a number of lecture courses he gave at Freiburg University and Marburg University from 1919 until the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927. Four of the essays have already been published in another form. Seven have been translated for the volume, two of them by the authors. In recently published studies, the editors have been responsible in great part for bringing to light the influence (...) of the work of the young Heidegger on the presiding themes of his mature work. Their own essays in Reading Heidegger from the Start, "Heidegger on Becoming a Christian," and "Martin Heidegger: Martin Luther," summarize and supplement selected results of their work, which the present volume complements. (shrink)

With the publication of these lectures, given in the summer semester of 1907 at the University of Göttingen, all of Husserl’s course on the “Main Parts of the Phenomenology and Critique of Reason” is now available. They were preceded by the publication in 1964 of a translation of the first five lectures of the course under the title The Idea of Phenomenology, which was first published in German in 1950. As Husserl wrote in a private notebook, the themes of the (...) course were to be the “problems of a phenomenology of perception, of phantasy, of time, of the thing”. As worked out in the course, the lectures describe the conditions of possibility of the presentation of a thing in visual perception, the role of kinaesthetic experience in the unification of the series of images of the thing presented, and the temporal background of the presentation. (shrink)

Most of Heidegger’s readings of early and classical Greek texts are unconventional by traditional philosophical and philological standards. The present reading of Plato is no exception. Heidegger suggests that the “essence of truth is what first allows the essence of man to be grasped” and “the man whose liberation is depicted in the allegory is set out into the truth.” But since such “setting out” is the very “mode of his existence, the fundamental occurrence of his Dasein,” the allegory is (...) not chiefly about the essence of truth but, as already noted, rather about “an occurrence happening ‘in man’, that is, in his history”. The real novelty of Heidegger’s reading, however, is his conclusion that the “decisive result of the interpretation of the cave allegory... [is] the insight that the question concerning the essence of truth as unhiddenness must be transformed into the question concerning untruth”, that is, “that untruth belongs to the essence of truth”. For this reason Heidegger’s course takes a turn to a passage in the Theaetetus, which he dramatically characterizes as “that stretch of the road of the question concerning untruth which, for the first and last time in the history of philosophy, Plato actually trod”. While the dialogue is generally taken to be about knowledge, for Heidegger it is about untruth. (shrink)

The volume under review contains manuscript-based texts of two courses offered by Martin Heidegger, “The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview” and “Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value,” as well as a student’s transcript of a third course given by Heidegger, “On the Nature of the University and Academic Study,” for which there is no extant autograph manuscript. All of the courses were given in 1919, Heidegger’s first year as a teacher at the University of Freiburg, where he (...) had completed his doctorate six years earlier. The first course was given in place of a previously scheduled course on Kant during the university’s special academic session for returning World War I veterans. The other two courses were part of Freiburg’s regular summer semester offerings. Heidegger wrote out these and all subsequent courses he gave in his career although, as the student transcripts with which the original manuscripts were compared for the first two courses show, he often extemporized in his presentation of the written texts. The manuscript of the text of the second course is incomplete, but the second edition of the book in which these three courses were first published in German in 1987 includes an excerpt of a student’s transcript of the last two lectures of the course. According to the editor of the German edition, for the first two courses “collations of manuscript with transcription have allowed lacunae to be filled and errors to be corrected” in Heidegger’s text. The extensive titles of “divisions and sub-headings [within the texts] were made by the editor.... The overall title of the volume was also provided by the editor”. This follows a practice established by the publisher of the Heidegger Gesamtausgabe that is said to be based on Heidegger’s directives. The translator, Ted Sadler, has added a brief “Foreword” and a short 35-item English-German glossary to this, the first volume of a projected Collected Works of Heidegger in English announced by the publisher. (shrink)

Today, too little is heard about Aron Gurwitsch, who was one of the clearest expositors of Edmund Husserl’s later philosophy and who, like Maurice Merleau-Ponty, brought together in fruitful synthesis the findings of phenomenology and Gestalt psychology. It is therefore timely that the present set of essays should be published. The collection is comprised of versions of papers, most of them by friends and former students of Gurwitsch, given on November 7–9, 1991, at the New School for Social Research, where (...) he had taught. One article, “Gurwitsch’s Interpretation of Kant: Reflections of a Former Student,” by Henry Allison, has already been published. The volume concludes with “A Bibliography for Gurwitsch Studies,” compiled by one of the editors. (shrink)

It may seem remarkable that Professor Kroker also cites with nearly equivalent reverence Bill Gates’s Business @ the Speed of Thought, but the incongruity is eased when one realizes that, for the author, Gates is the living clue to the Heidegger–Marx/heidegger–nietzsche connections he identifies. In Kroker’s analysis, Gates plays the role of both heroic visionary and subtly sinister harbinger of the end of the fully human. Moreover, “[w]hat is disclosed in [Gates’s] book is nothing less than a general political philosophy” (...) that serves as a basis for understanding the construction of the “digital nervous system” in which, Kroker contends, we are all irrecusably implicated and its disembodiment in the first “virtual class”, “the self-realized form of the knowledge theory of value” of which we are all already members and which Heidegger foresaw. The “virtual class is... a specialist class of the digital nervous system.” It is “how the circulation of the digital circuit is deep-time coded into every dimension of human experience.... It is a Heideggerian class working in the practico-inert of Marxist social history”. “Gates as the ascetic priest of the digital world is Nietzsche’s übermensch, the ‘overman’ whose ascetic task lies in establishing the value-direction of the softwaring of human flesh” and “Heidegger is Nietzsche recombinant”. Kroker mines On the Genealogy of Morals for its premonitions of Heidegger’s insights into the impact of technology on human beings, asserting that “Nietzsche is the fatal object of attraction and repulsion around which Heidegger’s thought hovers like a captive moon”. (shrink)

This book is both an intellectual biography and a thematic analysis of Martin Heidegger's "youthful writings" from 1910 to the appearance of Sein und Zeit in 1927. It is nearly contemporaneous with the publication in the first Heidegger Gesamtausgabe of the texts of the lecture courses he gave during his first period at the University of Freiburg and while he taught at the University of Marburg, courses which figure prominently in the book. Van Buren's analysis covers early articles Heidegger wrote (...) for the Catholic journal Der Akademiker, his doctoral dissertation, "Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus", the dissertation that qualified him to teach at the university level, "Die Kategorien-und [[sic]] Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus", book reviews, public lectures, and his first lecture courses, several of which have been reconstructed from students' transcripts by the editors of the Gesamtausgabe. Many of the early lecture courses are currently being translated into English. The Habilitationsschrift was translated as a doctoral dissertation in 1978 but is not readily available. As a result, The Young Heidegger will serve many as a temporary substitute for reading the original texts. (shrink)

In the late 1940s, a young French philosopher, Jean Beaufret, asked Martin Heidegger when he would write an ethics to complement his ontology of human existence. Now, in Ethics and Finitude, Lawrence Hatab, who teaches philosophy at Old Dominion University, sets out to show that even though Heidegger never published an ethics, “his manner of thinking is well suited to moral philosophy”. Professor Hatab believes it is possible “to speak from the atmosphere of Heidegger’s thinking with the hope of making (...) significant contributions to ethical thought” : “My general aim,” he writes, “is to show how Heidegger’s way of thinking is able to articulate both the claims and the finite complexity of ethical existence”. (shrink)

One may ask why a new translation of Martin Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics is needed. The present volume is the second English version of Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, Einführung in die Metaphysik, the text of which was first published in German only in 1953. An earlier translation appeared in 1959 and has remained in print until the present; now, however, we have a version that the student of twentieth-century Continental philosophy will likely find more congenial than the first, although important (...) problems remain in the translators’ attempt to make Heidegger’s thought accessible. It is well known that Heidegger was in the habit of writing out the lectures for his courses, many of which have appeared posthumously. His Introduction to Metaphysics is no exception, and the text, which includes the author’s marginal notes made between 1935 and 1953, remains as compelling now as it was when Heidegger first presented the course soon after the troubling time of his rectorship at the University of Freiburg. (shrink)

Pathmarks is a collection of translations of the second edition of Wegmarken, an anthology of essays Heidegger published in 1967. Like its predecessor, Holzwege, the essays are, as Heidegger says, traces of the movement of thinking, “a series of sojourns on the way undertaken to the one question about be[ing].” They are not, as the editor translates, “stops under way”, but rather precisely living, moving sojourns with major thinkers in the Western tradition of philosophy.

There are by now a number of detailed expositions of Being and Time and very many studies in which the basic argument of Heidegger's best known work is reconstructed. Seeing the Self is among the latter. As elsewhere in the recent secondary literature, the extreme novelty of Being and Time is challenged. Øverenget goes so far as to say “[i]t may very well be that for the most part there is nothing really new in Heidegger apart from his investigations of (...) Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl, and that his genius was in the way he synthesized the insights of these thinkers”. Seeing the Self is distinctive among the reconstructions of Heidegger's fundamental ontology as it was worked out in Being and Time in being an attempt to show that “the formal structure of Husserl's phenomenology is at work in Heidegger's thinking” in that work. The author believes that Heidegger's project is unthinkable without Husserl’s notion of categorial intuition, which Øverenget claims appears in Heidegger as disclosedness [Ersctdossenheit], his theory of wholes and parts, that is, abstracta and concreta, and his concept of a priorism, which is “the unfolding of the theory of wholes and parts in its full range”. In fact, “the theory of wholes and parts, the interpretation of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, and the phenomeno-logical sense of the apriori are intrinsically related” in Heidegger's existential analytique. To demonstrate this, the author, who teaches at the University of Oslo, closely examines the argument in Being and Time against the background of Heidegger's lecture course “History of the Concept of Time” and other near-contemporary texts, including the “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation”. Øverenget claims that “Dasein is structurally related to Husserl’s notion of pure consciousness because both refer to subjectivity”. He thinks Heidegger's claim to fame may be that he “redefines subjectivity in a phenomenological manner”, since Dasein “designates a new way of interpreting what was traditionally known as the subject”. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that “Dasein not only refers to subjectivity but that this concept in fact designates transcendental subjectivity”. (shrink)

This book is "a series of [eight] philosophical-political essays in which the boundary between philosophy and politics remains hazy and the discussion shifts readily across this disciplinary divide". Four of the essays, all written since 1989, have already appeared in print, and two of those have been revised for this book. Fred Dallmayr, who is Dee Professor of Political Theory at Notre Dame, finds in Heidegger's writings after 1933 "a prolonged struggle to expel or subdue the virus" of fascism, to (...) which Heidegger was exposed during his "encounter" with National Socialism. He aims for "another political reading" of Heidegger's work. These essays are in direct counterpoint to the great many articles and books published during the past few years that explore what is claimed to be Heidegger's life-long fascination with fascism. Dallmayr, by means of a close reading of selected texts, presents the picture of a badly shaken philosopher who sought redemption in an entirely new turn of thought quite opposed to anything at all resembling pedagogic or political authoritarianism. On the question of why Heidegger never fully recanted publicly his affiliation with the Nazis during his rectorate at the University of Freiburg, Dallmayr asks: "But would such a retraction--and I mean a complete reversal, since nothing else would do--really have served anyone's purposes"? As a matter of fact, Heidegger did just that in private. (shrink)

The present volume is a translation of Volume 60 of the Collected Edition of Heidegger’s works, Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, which was first published in 1995 edited by Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly and Claudius Strube. It consists of three parts: an “approximation of the train of thought and articulation” of a course of lectures Heidegger gave in the winter semester 1920–21 entitled “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” edited by Jung and Regehly; the actual text of his summer semester 1921 (...) course, “Augustine and Neo-Platonism”, edited by Strube; and a “fascicle,” also edited by Strube, “Phenomenology of Religious Life,” which comprises the “first notes” for “The Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism,” a course scheduled for Winter Semester 1919–20 but not given. Strube suggests that the first two parts may be construed as “the high point, and at the same time the end, of [Heidegger’s] studies in the phenomenology of religion”, which, he says, “constitutes the background against which Heidegger will develop his ‘hermeneutics of facticity’”. (shrink)

Unless the public comes to agree that the benefits of food biotechnology are desirable and the associated risks are acceptable, our society may fail to realize much of the potential benefits. Three historical cases of major technological innovations whose benefits and risks were the subject of heated public controversy are examined, in search of lessons that may suggest a path toward consensus in the biotechnology debate. In each of the cases—water fluoridation, nuclear power and pesticides—proponents of the technology gathered scientific (...) evidence that they believed established that the innovations were safe. In each case, the federal government was heavily involved in oversight, safety regulation, and in the first two cases, active promotion of the technology. Supporters of the technologies employed a variety of communications strategies, ranging from massive “educational” campaigns (e.g. “Our Friend The Atom”) to vituperative ad hominem attacks on leading opponents. None of these strategies succeeded in achieving broad societal acceptance of the technologies. Fluoridation today is opposed as vigorously by activist groups as it was when first introduced around 1950; it has not been universally adopted even in the U.S., and it has been rejected in most other countries. The American nuclear power industry is moribund, and the public has essentially rejected the technology. The pesticide industry is thriving, with new generations of products succeeding older more hazardous chemicals in a constant cycle. However, strong regulation has failed to prevent adverse health and ecological effects, which have been empirically associated with pesticide uses after the chemicals were dispersed in the environment. Debate over whether risks of such effects are acceptable has been heated for four decades, with scientists and the public divided. None of these cases offers an ideal model for the biotechnology revolution, though they do reveal many strategies that have not worked. The biotechnology debate is also taking place at a time when our concepts of risk communication have improved, and when many consumers are more actively concerned with buying products perceived to be less likely to harm the environment. Based on the three case histories and more recent trends, some characteristics of a process for seeking a societal consensus are described. They include explicitly defining the subjects for consensus; including all stakeholders in a respectful dialogue; confronting value issues, such as acceptability of risks and ethical perceptions; listening to others’ perspectives, and being willing to change one’s own point of view. If activists on all sides of the food biotechnology debate are willing to commit to such a consensus-building process, there is hope that the U.S. national debate can be resolved in a manner satisfactory to essentially all parties. (shrink)

A series of essays on Martin Heidegger's thought. An early iteration of the author's comprehensive bibliography of Heidegger translation in English.

The paper develops a framework to evaluate a network's stakeholders' perceptions concerning an issue which is highly relevant for all stakeholders. The framework helps us to understand how stakeholder networks impact perceptions and vice versa, which will result in a better understanding of the interrelatedness of a network. On the other hand, it helps corporations to become more effective increating wealth with and for their stakeholders.

The coterie of commentators represented in the present volume include some of the clearest voices for Heidegger’s way of thinking among the second and third generations of American Heidegger scholars. Two of the contributors, who are also the volume’s editors, have just published a new translation of Einführung in die Metaphysik, an event that would appear to be one of the reasons for the project published here. Its thirteen essays are organized under three headings: the question of being, Heidegger and (...) the Greeks, and Politics and Ethics. The first part begins with Thomas Sheehan’s “prolegomenon to a fresh reading of Introduction to Metaphysics ” from the perspective of Heidegger’s later ruminations on Ereignis, “what brings about being,” that is “the opening of a clearing in which entities can appear as this or that”. Professor Sheehan’s discussion is both comprehensive of Heidegger’s major concepts and comprehensible to the beginning student. For specialists, the essay challenges the standing interpretation of one of the recurring topics in Heidegger scholarship, the so-called Kehre in which his way of thinking is said to have been implicated. According to Charles Guignon, Introduction to Metaphysics “undertakes the task of recovering the earliest ways of understanding Being for the purpose of revitalizing our contemporary understanding” of Being. He distinguishes in Heidegger’s thinking an “event ontology” that contrasts with the “ substance ontology” of metaphysics in effect since the classic Greek philosophers. Professor Guignon’s comments focus on Heidegger’s understanding of the early Greek concept of phusis and “how such a notion is illuminating in trying to make sense of things that the substance ontology fails to make intelligible”. He observes that history “provides a prime example of an entity whose Being is that of phusis”. Such an interpretation of phusis is in striking contrast to the standard understanding of phusis as physical nature. Later, in part 2, Susan Schoenbohm continues the discussion of Heidegger’s interpretation of phusis, noting that, according to Heidegger, in its fundamental sense, phusis does not mean nature but rather “the emerging, for the fist time, of something out of no determination at all.” It is “a name for the emerging of the originary difference of determination and no determination”, and, as such, must for certain reasons itself be “determinately ambiguous”. For Heidegger, she observes, phusis and Being are the same. Richard Polt, who is one of the volume’s editors, attempts “to lay the foundation for an adequate interpretation of Heidegger’s ‘Nothing’” in the context of the question brought into philosophical focus and prominence by Lebiniz: Why is there something instead of nothing? He notes that “the closest antecedents of Heidegger’s Nothing are to be found in nineteenth-century thought”, but that there are resonances of the topic as Heidegger treats it to be found in Eastern thought as well. In both traditions, “the question of Nothing forms part of the question of Being”, and that “precisely because Nothing is Being’s other, the question of Nothing is included in the question of Being”. Professor Polt points out the rich history of the notion of Nothing in Heidegger’s way of thinking. “We have found,” he writes, “that Heidegger uses ‘Nothing’ to refer to a wide variety of phenomena, including inauthenticity, uncanniness, death, guilt, meaninglessness, and the withdrawal of Be-ing”. He concludes that Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics does not contain a “‘doctrine’ of Nothing,” but rather should be understood as “a voyage and a provocation, not a treatise”, adding that “Heidegger himself did not always view the text as a success”, which may account for why he chose not to publish it for nearly twenty years after first presenting it in public. Daniel Dahlstrom sees Heidegger’s text as “an introduction to the end of metaphysics and [the] beginning of a new way of thinking.” He suggests that Heidegger is in search of understanding “what it means to say that something is at all”. The author’s focus is on Heidegger’s interpretation of the sense of logos in pre-Socratic philosophy. Professor Dahlstrom examines what he terms the “logical prejudice” in Western philosophy as Heidegger construes it and attempts to show why, for Heidegger, such a way of understanding the relation between thinking and being “is understandable but not inevitable”, but, regrettably, “disables thinking about being”. According to the author, Heidegger discovers among the pre-Socratics an understanding of thinking that is “more rigorous and original than judgmental or propositional thinking”. On Dahlstrom’s assessment, Introduction to Metaphysics is, in fact, an introduction to logic. Part 1 of the Companion concludes with a refreshingly challenging analysis of “a complication in Heidegger’s theory of language and its consequences” for his way of thinking about being as a whole. In his text, Dieter Thomä sets out to “turn the tables and claim that shortcomings in both the early and late thinking of Heidegger can be pointed out by means of the Introduction to Metaphysics … in the respective conceptions of language”. He uses “an approach that takes Heideggerian arguments as incentives for a way of thinking that leads beyond him”. Focusing on the philosophical possibility of the declaration “I am,” that is “indexical being”, Professor Thomä discusses changes in Heidegger’s view of language from Being and Time to the Introduction, which he claims, by the way, “is not to be regarded as one of Heidegger’s strongest texts,” in particular “[i]n terms of systematic cohesion and unity”: “The tone of the book is uneven, changing among bold appeals, philological details, simple mistakes and bold arguments”. Thomä’s discussion of Heidegger’s concept of naming is respectful of and fully conversant with the texts, without, however, being reverential in tone, a feature that unaccountably has characterized so much Heidegger scholarship. (shrink)

Cancer cells accumulate widespread local and global chromatin changes and the source of this instability remains a key question. Here we hypothesize that chromatin alterations including unscheduled silencing can arise as a consequence of perturbed histone dynamics in response to replication stress. Chromatin organization is transiently disrupted during DNA replication and maintenance of epigenetic information thus relies on faithful restoration of chromatin on the new daughter strands. Acute replication stress challenges proper chromatin restoration by deregulating histone H3 lysine 9 mono‐methylation (...) on new histones and impairing parental histone recycling. This could facilitate stochastic epigenetic silencing by laying down repressive histone marks at sites of fork stalling. Deregulation of replication in response to oncogenes and other tumor‐promoting insults is recognized as a significant source of genome instability in cancer. We propose that replication stress not only presents a threat to genome stability, but also jeopardizes chromatin integrity and increases epigenetic plasticity during tumorigenesis. (shrink)