McGee argues that it is sometimes reasonable to accept both x and x-> without accepting y->z, and that modus ponens is therefore invalid for natural language indicative conditionals. Here, we examine McGee's counterexamples from a Bayesian perspective. We argue that the counterexamples are genuine insofar as the joint acceptance of x and x-> at time t does not generally imply constraints on the acceptability of y->z at t, but we use the distance-based approach to Bayesian learning to show that applications (...) of modus ponens are nevertheless guaranteed to be successful in an important sense. Roughly, if an agent becomes convinced of the premises of a modus ponens argument, then she should likewise become convinced of the argument's conclusion. Thus we take McGee's counterexamples to disentangle and reveal two distinct ways in which arguments can convince. Any general theory of argumentation must take stock of both. (shrink)

Inquiry, Volume 55, Issue 6, Page 563-566, December 2012.

Kripke’s theory of truth is arguably the most influential approach to self-referential truth and the semantic paradoxes. The use of a partial evaluation scheme is crucial to the theory and the most prominent schemes that are adopted are the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme. The strong Kleene scheme is attractive because it ensures the compositionality of the notion of truth. But under the strong Kleene scheme classical tautologies do not, in general, turn out to be true and, as a (...) consequence, classical reasoning is no longer admissible once the notion of truth is involved. The supervaluation scheme adheres to classical reasoning but violates compositionality. Moreover, it turns Kripke’s theory into a rather complicated affair: to check whether a sentence is true we have to look at all admissible precisification of the interpretation of the truth predicate we are presented with. One consequence of this complicated evaluation condition is that under the supervaluation scheme a more proof-theoretic characterization of Kripke’s theory becomes inherently difficult, if not impossible. In this paper we explore the middle ground between the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme and provide an evaluation scheme that adheres to classical reasoning but retains many of the attractive features of the strong Kleene scheme. We supplement our semantic investigation with a novel axiomatic theory of truth that matches the semantic theory we have put forth. (shrink)

This study examined parents’ implicit theories of intelligence and self-regulation from a person-centered perspective using latent profile analysis. First, we explored whether different belief profiles exist. Second, we examined if the emergent belief profiles differ by demographic variables and are related to parents’ failure beliefs, goal orientation, and co-regulatory strategies. Data were collected from N = 137 parents of preschoolers who answered an online survey comprising their implicit theories about the malleability and relevance of the domains intelligence and self-regulation. We (...) identified three belief profiles: profile 1 displayed an entity theory, profile 2 showed a balanced pattern of both domains of implicit theories, and profile 3 was characterized by high incremental self-regulation theories. Analyses showed that parents differed significantly in education and their perception of child self-regulatory competence depending on profile membership, with parents in profile 1 having the lowest scores compared to parents of the other profiles. Differences in parents’ failure beliefs, goal orientation, and co-regulatory strategies were also found depending on profile membership. Parents in profile 3 reported failure-is-enhancing mindsets, and mastery-oriented strategies significantly more often than parents in profiles 1 and 2. The results provide new insights into the interplay of important domains of implicit theories, and their associations with parents’ failure beliefs, goal orientation, and co-regulatory strategies. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction: Baker on the Private Language Argument Strawson's and Malcolms Interpretations of the Beetle Story Pitcher's, Cook's, and Donagan's Interpretations of the Beetle Story Cohen's Repudiation of the Beetle Story Hacker's and Baker's Interpretations of the Beetle Story.

The idea of reserve against brain damage stems from the repeated observation that there does not appear to be a direct relationship between the degree of brain pathology or brain damage and the clinical manifestation of that damage. The literature suggests that both brain reserve and cognitive reserve are not entirely determined at birth but are influenced by experiences and environmental factors throughout the lifespan. Recently, investigators have been looking at the possibility of imparting reserve via lifestyle enrichment, cognitive training, (...) exercise, and other interventions. This article reviews the concept of CR and then discusses the potential ethical implications connected with this concept. The key conceptual point is that there is a disconnection between the underlying Alzheimer's disease pathology and the clinical expression of that pathology. This provides an effective research setting for exploring the severity of brain insult that is required before cognitive networks change. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to consider one of Peirce's criticisms of Hegel, namely, that Hegel was a nominalist. Of the various criticisms of Hegel that Peirce offers, this has been little discussed, perhaps because it is puzzling to find Peirce making it at all. For, Peirce also criticises Hegel for his overzealous enthusiasm for Thirdness, where it is then hard to see how Hegel can have both faults: how can anyone who acknowledges the significance of Thirdness in Peirce's (...) sense also fail to be a realist? I will begin by setting out this difficulty and showing how it can be resolved, and will then consider the justice of Peirce's criticism once we have a clear idea of what it amounts to. I will suggest that this criticism is unwarranted, and that in some respects it is curious to find Peirce making it, when he could just as easily have treated Hegel as an ally in the bmggle with nominalism. The issue therefore takes us to the heart of Peircean and Hegelian metaphysics, and in a way that relates to questions that are central to contemporary philosophical debates concerning the nature of realism, idealism, and anti-realism. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and theatre is a central theme in the writings of Plato and Aristotle and of dramatists from Aristophanes to Stoppard. Where Plato argued that playwrights and actors should be banished from the ideal city for their suspect imitations of reality, Aristotle argued that theatre, particularly tragedy, was vital for stimulating our emotions and helping us to understanding ourselves. Despite this rich history the study of philosophy and theatre has been largely overlooked in contemporary philosophy. This is (...) the first book to introduce philosophy and theatre. It covers key topics and debates, presenting the contributions of major figures in the history of philosophy, including: what is theatre? How does theatre compare with other arts? theatre as imitation, including Plato on mimesis truth and illusion in the theatre, including Nietzsche on tragedy theatre as history theatre and morality, including Rousseau’s criticisms of theatre audience and emotion, including Aristotle on catharsis theatre and politics, including Brecht’s Epic Theatre. Including annotated further reading and summaries at the end of each chapter, Philosophy and Theatre is an ideal starting point for those studying philosophy, theatre studies and related subjects in the arts and humanities. (shrink)

We introduce a notion of complexity for interpretations, which is used to prove some new results about interpretations of sequential theories. In particular, we give a new, elementary proof of Pudlák's theorem that sequential theories are connected. We also demonstrate a counterexample to the infinitary distributive law $a \vee \bigwedge_{i \in I} b_i = \bigwedge_{i \in I} (a \vee b_i)$ in the lattice of chapters, in which the chapters a and b i are compact. (Counterexamples in which a is not (...) compact have been found previously.). (shrink)

Contrary to stockholder theories that place the interests of profit-seeking owners above all else, stakeholder theorists argue that corporate executives have moral and ethical obligations to consider equally the interests of a wide range of stakeholders affected by the actions of a corporation. This paper argues that the stakeholder approach is particularly appropriate for the governance of news media companies and outlines an ethical framework to guide news company executives.

Since Montague’s work it is well known that treating a single modality as a predicate may lead to paradox. In their paper “No Future”, Horsten and Leitgeb show that if the two temporal modalities are treated as predicates paradox might arise as well. In our paper we investigate whether paradoxes of multiple modalities, such as the No Future paradox, are genuinely new paradoxes or whether they “reduce” to the paradoxes of single modalities. In order to address this question we develop (...) a notion of reducibility based on a version of Smoryński Diagonalized Operator Logic. We show that there are reducible multimodal paradoxes as well as irreducible paradoxes of interaction. In particular, we show the No Future paradox to be an irreducible paradox according to our notion of reducibility. (shrink)

From Kierkegaard’s famous polemic against Hegel’s system, and Marx’s rejection of the “mysticism” of reason, to Heidegger’s claim that Hegel completes the tradition of western metaphysics, and contemporary critics’ identification of Hegel as the authoritative spokesman — the “Master” — for the principles of unity and identity, a standard view has governed interpretations and evaluations of Hegel’s philosophy. Though familiarity with the positions just cited reveals considerable disparity, one does not need an especially discerning eye to recognize the common features (...) of the figures drawn. Hegel is, in all of them, the philosopher of the Absolute, the proponent of metaphysics without equal in the modern world. (shrink)

The paper explores applications of Kripke's theory of truth to semantics for anti-luck epistemology, that is, to subjunctive theories of knowledge. Subjunctive theories put forward modal or subjunctive conditions to rule out knowledge by mere luck as to be found in Gettier-style counterexamples to the analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. Because of the subjunctive nature of these conditions the resulting semantics turns out to be non-monotone, even if it is based on non-classical evaluation schemes such as strong Kleene (...) or FDE. This blocks the usual road to fixed-point results for Kripke's theory of truth within these semantics and consequently the paper is predominantly an exploration of fixed point results for Kripke's theory of truth within non-monotone semantics. Using the theory of quasi-inductive definitions we show that in case of the subjunctive theories of knowledge the so-called Kripke jump will have fixed points despite the non-monotonicity of the semantics: Kripke's theory of truth can be successfully applied in the framework of subjunctive theories of knowledge. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

O’Meara’s translation and commentary of Ennead 19 (Sur les Vertus) is a short and elegant book: the style is sparse, the meaning limpid, and the thesis skilfully developed. The translation meticulously follows the movement of Plotinus’ argumentation. Ample cross references are made to other tractates, and helpful mentions abound of secondary literature in languages other than French. The historical sections are short: Middle Platonist antecedents of Plotinus’ theory of virtue are occasionally...

This dissertation examines the conceptual limitations of Kant's ethical theory with the purpose of assessing its suitability as a model of practical philosophy based upon the idea of autonomy. My aim is not only to exhibit the specific weaknesses in Kant's treatment of morality, but also to explore a contrast between two different approaches in ethical theory. This contrast can be characterized in terms of an opposition between a 'formal-individualistic' and a 'social-historical' model for the analysis and derivation of ethical (...) principles. The crucial problem here is whether an ethical theory can be constructed on the exiguous basis of concepts such as the 'rationality' or 'freedom' of the will, or whether it requires an insight into the connection between moral principles and specific conditions of historical and social life that constitute the real foundation of moral judgment. ;The dissertation is composed of four chapters. In Chapter One I consider the deficiencies in Kant's treatment of the historical and temporal dimensions of moral volition. I focus especially upon his neglect of the conditions of historical genesis that underlie the framework of moral concepts he analyzes. In the second and third chapters I examine Kant's failure to attend to the social dimension of morality and distinguish two separate parts to this objection: difficulties resulting from his restriction of the scope of moral freedom to the domain of an agent's inner intentions, so that a consideration of the consequences of action is excluded, and problems arising from his monological interpretation of the universalization procedure. Finally, in Chapter Four I argue that Kant's neglect of the historical and social dimensions of morality is by no means accidental. Rather, it is a function of his reliance upon a two-world metaphysical framework in which moral principles are understood essentially as the laws governing a purely rational, non-natural order. The dependence of Kant's ethical theory upon 'problematic' metaphysical premises--particularly in his justification of the moral law--suggests that the two dimensions he excludes from his analysis--history and society--must be integrated within it in order to yield a more convincing elaboration of the basic concepts of morality. (shrink)

Rent-control laws limiting the rents private landlords can charge tenants are controversial in the United States. Critics have condemned rent control’s mandated wealth transfer from landlords to tenants, and economists have decried its negative effects on rental supply and quality. With the advent of the sharing economy, rent-controlled tenants can rent out their below-market units for short durations at market-level or premium prices, a practice I term “rent control sharing.” The reaction to rent-controlled tenants pocketing money from Airbnb and other (...) homesharing sites at the expense of their hapless landlords has been negative. Yet, the sharing economy has not changed an essential feature of rent control: the redistribution of wealth from landlord to tenant. Instead, Airbnb and similar platforms have altered the form of the redistribution and the legal relations between landlord and tenant, and increased the salience of the wealth transfer from landlord to tenant. As a result, rent control sharing collides with public preferences for in-kind redistribution and stronger legal protections for property used personally or intimately. This Article explores how rent control sharing accentuates some of the flaws of rent control and fuels the debate over rent control’s future. (shrink)

This issue of Narrative Inquiry in Bioethics explores the concerns and point of view of parents who have had to confront the devastating diagnosis of a pediatric brain tumor. This commentary, written by a general pediatrician, is a synthesis of several narrative themes which touch on a range of topics from relapse to long-term sequelae and other issues that effect a growing population of pediatric brain tumor patients. It offers a glimpse into the problems that need to be addressed by (...) health professionals, educators and support teams who provide short and long term care to these patients and their families. (shrink)

The first section of this chapter presents a close reading of Wittgenstein’s “Remarks on Logical Form”, focusing on the conception of the relationship between language and experience, and the nature of the analysis of immediate experience that are set out there. Section two sets out an interpretation of what Wittgenstein meant when he said that he had rejected “phenomenological language” or “primary language” as his goal. Distinguishing between a weak and a strong sense of these terms shows how he could (...) have given up the goal of formulating a language that would amount to a complete analysis of immediate experience, yet retain the goal of finding ways of clarifying what we say about experience. Section three discusses Wittgenstein’s use of the analogy of the pictures on a roll of film in a movie projector and the pictures on a cinema screen for the relationship between world and experience. The final section analyzes how and why the analogy leads Wittgenstein to a paradoxical conception of immediate experience as a separate realm, “timeless” and “neighborless”, a conception of the “world as idea” that is supposedly inexpressible. (shrink)