Gathers the pre-Sand Country Almanac writings of Aldo Leopold, showing that he was not born an ecologist, but evolved over time through experimentation and thought.

Baker claims to provide an example of mathematical explanation of an empirical phenomenon which leads to ontological commitment to mathematical objects. This is meant to show that the positing of mathematical entities is necessary for satisfactory scientific explanations and thus that the application of mathematics to science can be used, at least in some cases, to support mathematical realism. In this paper I show that the example of explanation Baker considers can actually be given without postulating mathematical objects and thus (...) cannot be used by the mathematical realist. I also show that, despite this, mathematics keeps playing an important methodological role in the explanation and does not reduce to a merely computational or descriptive framework. (shrink)

In a recent paper (Okasha, Mind 120:83–115, 2011), Samir Okasha uses Arrow’s theorem to raise a challenge for the rationality of theory choice. He argues that, as soon as one accepts the plausibility of the assumptions leading to Arrow’s theorem, one is compelled to conclude that there are no adequate theory choice algorithms. Okasha offers a partial way out of this predicament by diagnosing the source of Arrow’s theorem and using his diagnosis to deploy an approach that circumvents it. In (...) this paper I explain why, although Okasha is right to emphasise that Arrow’s result is the effect of an informational problem, he is not right to locate this problem at the level of the informational input of a theory choice rule. Once the informational problem is correctly located, Arrow’s theorem may be dismissed as a problem. (shrink)

Peano's axiomatizations of geometry are abstract and non-intuitive in character, whereas Peano stresses his appeal to concrete spatial intuition in the choice of the axioms. This poses the problem of understanding the interrelationship between abstraction and intuition in his geometrical works. In this article I argue that axiomatization is, for Peano, a methodology to restructure geometry and isolate its organizing principles. The restructuring produces a more abstract presentation of geometry, which does not contradict its intuitive content but only puts it (...) into a particular form. (shrink)

Throughout his work, John Dewey seeks to emancipate philosophical reflection from the influence of the classical tradition he traces back to Plato and Aristotle. For Dewey, this tradition rests upon a conception of knowledge based on the separation between theory and practice, which is incompatible with the structure of scientific inquiry. Philosophical work can make progress only if it is freed from its traditional heritage, i.e. only if it undergoes reconstruction. In this study I show that implicit appeals to the (...) classical tradition shape prominent debates in philosophy of mathematics, and I initiate a project of reconstruction within this field. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that mapping-based accounts of applications cannot be comprehensive and must be supplemented by analyses of other, qualitatively different, forms of application. I support these claims by providing a detailed discussion of the application of mathematics to a problem of election design that is prominent in social choice theory.

If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on (...) many grounds ever since it was first proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on specific features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justifications of the principle of indifference. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justifications and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. This leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws. (shrink)

In this paper I examine some difficulties with the argument presented as a topological sorites in Z. Weber and M. Colyvan, ‘A topological sorites’, Journal of Philosophy 107, 311–325. In particular, I suggest that the argument may be used to support the claim that sorites-type paradoxes cannot arise in a cohesive environment.

The introduction of information technology in the society and its pervasiveness in every aspect of citizens' daily life highlight societal stakes related to the goals regarding the uses IT, such as social networks. This paper examines two cases that lack a straightforward link with privacy as addressed and protected by existing law in Europe and the United-States , but whose characteristics, we believe fall on other privacy function and properties. In Western societies, individuals rely on normative discourses, such as the (...) legal one, in order to ensure protection. Hence, the paper argues that other functions of privacy need either further framing into legislation or they need to constitute in themselves normative commitments of an ethical nature for technology development and use. Some initiatives at the EU level recall such commitments, namely by developing a normative discourse based on ethics and human values. We argue that we need to interrogate society about those normative discourses because the values we once cherished in a non-digital society are seriously being questioned. (shrink)

When a law court makes a decision based on the individual deliberation of each judge, a case of judgment aggregation occurs. The possibility that the aggregation's outcome be logically inconsistent, even though it is based on consistent individual judgments, arises relatively easily and has been the subject of several investigations. In this paper I show that this paradoxical behaviour is the effect of decision procedures that are unable to discriminate between logically consistent and logically inconsistent individual judgments. The paradoxes can (...) be resolved by selecting procedures that are not affected by this limitation. (shrink)

In this paper I raise some objections to Field’s characterization of applied mathematics, showing, by means of three examples, that it is too restrictive. While doing so, I articulate a different and wider account of applicability. I conclude with an argument supporting its compatibility with an anti-realistic view on the existence of mathematical entities.

In this position paper, we would like to promote the alternative approach positioned between the two extreme positions consisting in refusing any innovation or in adopting technology without questioning it. This approach proposes a reflexive and responsible innovation based on a compromise between industrial and economic potentialities and a common respect of our human rights and values. We argue that the “silence of the chips right” is timely, relevant and sustainable to face ethical challenges raised by IoT such as protecting (...) privacy, trust, social justice, autonomy or human agency. We believe this technical solution may support establishing an ethics of IoT embedded in the technology itself. Our position is not ‘technocratic’: we do not agree with discourses arguing technology can fix problems. Through the responsible research and innovation approach we promote the idea that only human agency and user empowerment constitute a valid answer to the ethical, legal and social issues raised by IoT. (shrink)

Certain mathematical problems prove very hard to solve because some of their intuitive features have not been assimilated or cannot be assimilated by the available mathematical resources. This state of affairs triggers an interesting dynamic whereby the introduction of novel conceptual resources converts the intuitive features into further mathematical determinations in light of which a solution to the original problem is made accessible. I illustrate this phenomenon through a study of Bertrand’s paradox.

In this paper, we continue the study of the Łukasiewicz residuation algebras of order $n$ with Moisil possibility operators initiated by Figallo. More precisely, among other things, a method to determine the number of elements of the $MC_n$-algebra with a finite set of free generators is described. Applying this method, we find again the results obtained by Iturrioz and Monteiro and by Figallo for the case of Tarski algebras and $I\varDelta _{3}$-algebras, respectively.

Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.

Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical pattern in the long run. The explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a 'typical' dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of the explanation of these results might shed some light --a different light-- on philosophical debates on the laws of (...) nature. In the explanation of such patterns, the specific form of the underlying dynamics is almost irrelevant. The conditions required, given a free state-space evolution, suffice to account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such conditions might thus provide a different account of how regular behaviour can occur. This paper focuses on drawing attention to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and discussing its limitations and significance in the tractable setting of classical statistical mechanics. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce a novel strategy to deal with the indiscernibility problem for ante rem structuralism. The ante rem structuralist takes the ontology of mathematics to consist of abstract systems of pure relata. Many of such systems are totally symmetrical, in the sense that all of their elements are relationally indiscernible, so the ante rem structuralist seems committed to positing indiscernible yet distinct relata. If she decides to identify them, she falls into mathematical inconsistency while, accepting their distinctness, (...) she finds herself unable to account for it. I show that the ante rem structuralist has in fact the resources to account for the distinctness of indiscernibles and that these resources come from the very symmetry properties of the mathematical objects that seem to pose problems for her. (shrink)

O artigo aborda o ensino e a aprendizagem de filosofia a partir da noção de criação de conceitos, conforme o entendimento de Deleuze. Para isso, discute o que significa criar conceitos em filosofia, associando essa concepção a uma nova imagem do pensamento que entende a criação de conceitos como o dizer do acontecimento, o sentido incorporal produzido pelo efeito do encontro dos corpos. Depois estabelece os vínculos entre o sentido e o acontecimento com uma nova imagem sobre ensinar e aprender (...) filosofia e conclui com a figura do teatro para compreender esses vínculos. (shrink)

Cet article traite la problématique du facteur humain dans la société en réseau en mettant en évidence que les TIC sont à la fois créatrices et destructrices de lien social. Il propose une approche de la fracture numérique selon deux niveaux: - un accès inégalitaire à Internet et aux TIC; - des savoirs et savoir-faire insuffisants pour communiquer dans une société désormais régie par la manipulation et les mécanismes de génération de la connaissance. Il prend comme exemple référentiel la génération (...) Internet née de la double médiation technique et sociale caractéristique du lien social engendré par l'usage des TIC. Et, il situe ainsi la véritable origine de la fracture numérique dans les inégalités socio-économiques et culturelles qui existaient pour la plupart avant l'introduction des TIC et la mise en réseau de la société.This paper addresses the problem of the human factor in the network society by highlighting that ICTs are both creative and destructive social links. It proposes an approach to the digital divide in two levels: - unequal access to the Internet and ICT - knowledge and skills sufficient to communicate in a society now governed by the manipulation and generation mechanisms of knowledge. He takes as an example the Internet generation born repository of double mediation technical and social characteristics of social ties generated by the use of ICT. And it is thus the true origin of the digital divide in the socio-economic and cultural existed mostly before the introduction of ICT and networking company. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Field’s account of the applicability of mathematics from a measurementtheoretic perspective. Within this context, I object to Field’s instrumentalism, arguing that it depends on an incomplete analysis of applicability. I show in particular that, once the missing piece of analysis is provided, the role played by numerical entities in basic empirical theories must be revised: such revision implies that instrumentalism should be rejected and mathematical entities be regarded not merely as useful tools but also as (...) conceptual schemata by means of which we can articulate our understanding of experience. (shrink)

In this paper I study the activity of mathematical problem-solving in scientific practice, focussing on enquiries in mathematical social science. I identify three salient phases of mathematical problem-solving and adopt them as a reference frame to investigate aspects of applications that have not yet received extensive attention in the philosophical literature.

With the aid of a non-standard (but still first-order) cardinality quantifier and an extra-logical operator representing numerical abstraction, this paper presents a formalization of first-order arithmetic, in which numbers are abstracta of the equinumerosity relation, their properties derived from those of the cardinality quantifier and the abstraction operator.

In this paper I study how divergent mathematical treatments affect mathematical modelling, with a special focus on utility theory. In particular I examine recent work on the ranking of information states and the discounting of future utilities, in order to show how, by replacing the standard analytical treatment of the models involved with one based on the framework of Nonstandard Analysis, diametrically opposite results are obtained. In both cases, the choice between the standard and nonstandard treatment amounts to a selection (...) of set-theoretical parameters that cannot be made on purely empirical grounds. The analysis of this phenomenon gives rise to a simple logical account of the relativity of impossibility theorems in economic theory, which concludes the paper. (shrink)

In this chapter, it is argued on two different grounds that sentences in natural languages can be seen as systems. First, beyond their linear order, sentences exhibit a syntactic hierarchical structure. Therefore, they are structured entities. Although this structure is usually interpreted as independent of meaning, many semanticists believe that syntactic structure indicates the order in which the meanings of the parts are combined. Second, although the principle of compositionality—which states that the meaning of a sentence is a function of (...) the meanings of the parts of that sentence—is valid in general for natural languages, this principle has been shown to have many exceptions, where interpretation does not proceed bottom-up but top-down, from the meaning of the whole to the meaning of the parts. For this reason, a radical version of the principle of compositionality is untenable; if the whole depends on its parts and the parts on the whole, then the sentence is a system that cannot be dissected into separate parts without losing something essential. (shrink)

The Königsberg bridge problem has played a central role in recent philosophical discussions of mathematical explanation. In this paper I look at it from a novel perspective, which is independent of explanatory concerns. Instead of restricting attention to the solved Königsberg bridge problem, I consider Euler’s construction of a solution method for the problem and discuss two later integrations of Euler’s approach into a more structured methodology, arisen in operations research and genetics respectively. By examining Euler’s work and its later (...) developments, I achieve two main goals. First, I offer an analysis of the role played by mathematics as a problem-solving instrument within scientific enquiry. Second, I shed light on the broader significance of well known contributions to the debate on mathematical explanation. I suggest that these contributions, which are tied to a localised explanatory context, achieve a greater relevance and attain a sharper formulation when they are referred to scientific enquiry at large, as opposed to its possible explanatory outcomes alone. (shrink)

Measurement is a process aimed at acquiring and codifying information about properties of empirical entities. In this paper we provide an interpretation of such a process comparing it with what is nowadays considered the standard measurement theory, i.e., representational theory of measurement. It is maintained here that this theory has its own merits but it is incomplete and too abstract, its main weakness being the scant attention reserved to the empirical side of measurement, i.e., to measurement systems and to the (...) ways in which the interactions of such systems with the entities under measurement provide a structure to an empirical domain. In particular it is claimed that (1) it is on the ground of the interaction with a measurement system that a partition can be induced on the domain of entities under measurement and that relations among such entities can be established, and that (2) it is the usage of measurement systems that guarantees a degree of objectivity and intersubjectivity to measurement results. As modeled in this paper, measurement systems link the abstract theory of measuring, as developed in representational terms, and the practice of measuring, as coded in standard documents such as the International Vocabulary of Metrology. (shrink)

In this paper we aim to show an intrinsic contradiction of contemporary Metaphysical Realism by focusing on the relation between the subject and the object. Metaphysical Realism considers facts and objects as being empirical, and therefore they are considered in relation to the subject, while at the same time facts are assumed to belong to an autonomous and independent reality. However, if a real object is considered to be independent from the subject, once it enters in a relation with the (...) latter, a real object must undergo an intrinsic transformation. However, since an object cannot avoid this transformation then recovering the real or “absolute” object from the perceived object is not possible. In this way, the inherent contradiction of the “absolute” as being determined, i.e., defined by virtue of a limit, is revealed. (shrink)

English summary: Aldo Giorgio Gargani innovates in his use of Wittgensteinian concepts to argue that the formation of scientific and philosophical knowledge is not a linear progression, but a collection of instruments or conceptual and behavioral models, decisional procedures that are born of the different forms of human life as extensions of their anthropological contexts. Through this book Gargani demonstrates how Wittgensteins thinking can be used a truly efficient toolbox. French description: Aldo Giorgio Gargani (1933-2009) fait dans ce (...) livre un usage novateur des concepts wittgensteiniens pour soutenir que la formation du savoir scientifique et philosophique n'est pas une progression lineaire, cumulative et definitive de techniques cognitives: le savoir est plutot un recueil d'instruments, d'habitus conceptuels, de modeles comportementaux, de conduites operationnelles et de procedures decisionnelles qui naissent des formes de vie des hommes, en tant qu'extensions de leurs contextes anthropologiques. Si l'expression savoir sans fondements est maintenant tres repandue dans les sciences humaines, c'est Gargani qui a magistralement elabore toutes les consequences de cette idee, et son livre est l'analyse la plus riche de ces rituels epistemologiques qui decoulent de notre agir humain, lui-meme depourvu de fondements. A travers ce livre on voit comment la pensee de Wittgenstein peut etre utilisee comme une boite a outils veritablement efficace. (shrink)

Can stable regularities be explained without appealing to governing laws or any other modal notion? In this paper, I consider what I will call a ‘Humean system’—a generic dynamical system without guiding laws—and assess whether it could display stable regularities. First, I present what can be interpreted as an account of the rise of stable regularities, following from Strevens [2003], which has been applied to explain the patterns of complex systems (such as those from meteorology and statistical mechanics). Second, since (...) this account presupposes that the underlying dynamics displays deterministic chaos, I assess whether it can be adapted to cases where the underlying dynamics is not chaotic but truly random—that is, cases where there is no dynamics guiding the time evolution of the system. If this is so, the resulting stable, apparently non-accidental regularities are the fruit of what can be called statistical necessity rather than of a primitive physical necessity. (shrink)

This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical necessity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antirealist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity. In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields (...) that have not been appealed to so far in discussions about the metaphysics of laws. Namely, I recur to complex systems’ theory, and to the foundations of statistical mechanics. The explanation proposed is inspired by how complex systems’ theory has elucidated the way patterns emerge, and by the probabilistic explanations of the 2nd law of thermodynamics. More specifically, this thesis studies how some constraints that make no direct reference to the dynamics can be a sufficient condition for obtaining in the long run, with high probability, stable regular behavior. I hope to show how certain metaphysical accounts of laws might benefit from the insights achieved in these other fields. According to the proposal studied in this thesis, some regularities are not accidental not in virtue of an underlying physical necessity. The non-accidental character of certain regular behavior is only due to its overwhelming stability. Thus, from this point of view the goal becomes to explain the stability of temporal patterns without assuming a set of pre-existent guiding laws. It is argued that the stability can be the result of a process of convergence to simpler and stable regularities from a more complex lower level. According to this project, if successful, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) intermediate category between logical necessity and pure contingency. Similarly, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) set of pre-existent governing laws. Part I of the thesis motivates part II, mostly by arguing why further explanation of the notions of physical necessity and governing laws should be welcomed (chapter 1), and by studying the plausibility of a lawless fundamental level (chapters 2 and 3). Given so, part II develops the explanation of formation of simpler and stable behavior from a more complex underlying level. (shrink)

SEXTO EMPÍRICO. Contra os Retóricos. Introdução, Tradução e notas de Rodrigo Brito e Rafael Huguenin. Marília: UNESP, 2013.

Neste artigo, faremos uma análise da noção socrática de technê, que se desdobra em dois sentidos: uma sabedoria instável, humana e crítica (uma sophia de Dédalo), e uma sabedoria estável, divina e ideal. Ambas seguem o critério racional, o que implica uma concepção da alma segundo a qual as motivações são estritamente racionais.