ABSTRACT The history of spectacle terror lynching remains one of the darkest and least explored political events in American history. In this article, I explore the aesthetic relation of this history to the formation of notions of public action and political assembly. I argue that the history of spectacle terror lynching establishes both a past and present form of public sovereignty. As such, I attempt to examine questions of what public action means with regard to a political context of antiblack (...) violence. I conclude that lynching festivals constitute not only a form of politics but a form of public sovereignty that is still in play in our notion of the public. At heart this notion informs not only antiblack forms of racism but antiblack forms of genocide. (shrink)

Is it permissible to be a fan of an artist or a sports team that has behaved immorally? While this issue has recently been the subject of widespread public debate, it has received little attention in the philosophical literature. This paper will investigate this issue by examining the nature and ethics of fandom. I will argue that the crimes and misdemeanors of the object of fandom provide three kinds of moral reasons for fans to abandon their fandom. First, being a (...) fan of the immoral may provide support for their immoral behavior. Second, fandom alters our perception in ways that will often lead us to be fail to perceive our idol’s faults and even to adopting immoral points of view in order to be able to maintain the positive view we have of them. Third, fandom, like friendship, may lead us to engage in acts of loyalty to protect the interests of our idols. This gives fans of the immoral good reason to abandon their fandom. However, these reasons will not always be conclusive and, in some cases, it may be possible to instead adopt a critical form of fandom. (shrink)

What sort of existence does the Sum have? Whether we affirm it to be the conceptual being of thought or the concrete existence of an individual, we will be forced to draw conclusions inimical to the Cartesian philosophy, for the alternative interpretations give rise to a serious dilemma. Jules Lequier states the dilemma in this way: "I think, therefore I am. Now in saying: 'I am,' after having said: 'I think,' either I say less, or I say more. If I (...) say less, I am proceeding with certainty, but backwards; if I say more, I advance indeed, but by what right? What perplexity!...Such are the two aspects of this proposition which is alternately evident and sterile, pregnant and obscure for the mind that examines it. But to the extent it is evident, it is sterile; to the extent that it is fruitful, it is obscure.". (shrink)

This article does not describe die pedagogical history of the reception of Leibniz' way of thinking, but rather inquires into the central motif which was derived from Leibniz' way of thinking and how it was assimilated to pedagogics. Furthermore it wants to make apparent how much modern pedagogics owes to Leibniz, without being aware of the debt. Leibniz' influence on pedagogics, however, is an indirect one, because as a rule pedagogics does not explicidy refer to Leibniz. His specific influence implicidy (...) originates from certain motifs central to his way of thinking. Considering this, it is the Theodizee and the Monadologie, which above all have an important bearing on the current theoretical discussion in pedagogics. (shrink)

A curious feature of the literature on motivational judgement internalism is the absence of a discussion of which moral judgements are expected to motivate and how. This dissertation aims to address this issue by investigating what account an internalist can give of judgements of supererogation. This investigation will proceed in three stages. First I will investigate the difference between judging that something is a moral obligation and judging that it is supererogatory. I will argue that, unlike judgements of obligation, there (...) is no reliable connection between judgements of supererogation and motivation. Next I will look at what account a judgement internalist can give of the necessary connection between moral judgements and motivation that is compatible with existence of moral judgements that we do not expect people to be motivated by. I will argue that an all things considered reasons internalism is able to give such an account but cannot explain the motivational power of judgements of supererogation. I will then argue that positing an internal connection between judgements of supererogation and feelings of admiration allows for an internalist account that is capable of explaining the ability of judgements of supererogation to motivate. (shrink)