Many word forms in natural language are polysemous, but only some of them allow for co-predication, that is, they allow for simultaneous predications selecting for two different meanings or senses of a nominal in a sentence. In this paper, we try to explain (i) why some groups of senses allow co-predication and others do not, and (ii) how we interpret co-predicative sentences. The paper focuses on those groups of senses that allow co-predication in an especially robust and stable way. We (...) argue, using these cases, but focusing particularly on the multiply polysemous word ‘school’, that the senses involved in co-predication form especially robust activation packages, which allow hearers and readers to access all the different senses in interpretation. (shrink)

Event semantics is concerned with the formal structure of sentences which appear to describe an event of some kind, e.g. ‘Brutus kills Caesar,’ or ‘My tooth fell out.’ Phenomenologists should be interested in work in this field, if they hope to rescue Husserl’s phenomenology of judgment from its narrow focus on copular judgments of the form ‘S is p.’ An adequate phenomenology of judgment must ultimately develop an account of judgments whose intentional correlates seem to be events, rather than states (...) of affairs, since such judgments are ubiquitous. For this endeavor, existing work on the formal structure of event sentences provides a crucial foothold. However, phenomenologists cannot simply import semantic theories for their own use, without first evaluating them for phenomenological plausibility. This concern is particularly acute in the case of the widely-adopted “Davidsonian” approach, according to which the logical structure of event sentences diverges radically from natural language syntax. The Davidsonian form introduces a “covert” variable, which stands in for an event. Thus, the sentence ‘Brutus kills Caesar’ becomes, ‘There is an event e that is a killing of Caesar by Brutus.’ Such a theory, if correct, would have decisive consequences for the phenomenology of event sentences, and even of events themselves. Yet the introduction of covert variables in turn introduces—I argue—a covert intentional object, without assessing this idea for phenomenological plausibility. Building on Husserl’s phenomenology of predication, I develop a criterion for evaluating this hypothesis, and argue that the Davidsonian approach, as it stands, is phenomenologically untenable. (shrink)

This article provides a critical and philosophical assessment of arguments invoked for and against the constitutional protection of commercial expression and the regulation of commercial speech with a focus on the commercialization of unhealthy food products.

This article addresses the importance of passions and their component of pain and pleasure in Aristotle's ethical reflection. Then, and assuming these antecedents, it analyzes anger and calm from the point of view of Rhetoric, to finally deal with the other painful passions described in this work in a broader way, in search of common aspects. He argues that Rhetoric provides important tools not only to provoke or mitigate a passion, but also to be able to redirect it in a (...) way that is useful for a good speaker in the face of citizen improvement. This implies conceiving the passions, which have an eminently individual character at their origin, also as shared by a community. From the analysis of these texts and the consequences that derive from the study of painful passions, it is possible to extract valuable elements that allow us to enrich our understanding of those aspects that influence community and political life, especially in consideration of the forefront that such passions are acquiring in difficult historical conditions, as it occurs in practice with the current pandemic situation that we have had to face globally. (shrink)

It is not unusual for Aristotelian scholars to claim that Aristotle does not have a notion of authority. The argument that insurmountable conceptual-historical barriers make it impossible for a Greek thinker to have something even similar to authority is usually put forward to deny the existence of such a concept in Aristotle. This chapter argues that this type of objection often mistakes the existence of a concept for the existence of a single word or expression used to convey such concept (...) and that Aristotle’s texts are no stranger to a discernible concept of political authority. The claim that Aristotle does not have the notion of political authority is often tied in with a misunderstanding of the concept of authority itself. Once we get to the bottom of the concept of authority as employed by contemporary jurisprudence, it is fairly clear that Aristotle does accommodate such notion. Special consideration is given to the bearing of Hobbesian and Lockean accounts of authority upon Aristotle’s politics. (shrink)

Value is an inescapable part of the human experience and what life must be like for a conscious and feeling person. Philosophical questions about value are therefore naturally invited: What sort of thing would value be if it were part of the furniture of the world? How should we understand the relations that value is thought to stand in to other things? In a broad sense, these are formal questions calling for philosophical studies into the understanding of value notions. The (...) following work represents one such study. Its main concern lies specifically with the notion of final value, the idea that things can be good or bad for their own sakes. (shrink)

No poco se habrá meditado acerca del poema “Todtnauberg” de Paul Celan (1967), publicado en Lichtzwang (1970). Poco o casi nada, en cambio, acerca de su “respuesta poética” (si cabe la expresión) por parte de Martin Heidegger: “Vorwort” (1971). En lo que sigue nos limitamos a puntear algunas de las circunstancias tal vez más marcantes de esta suerte de “correspondencia” heideggeriana y eventual “familiar” (y tal vez inmortal) micro-bolero. Palabras clave: Todtnauberg - Paul Celan - Vorwort - Martin Heidegger - (...) grotesco. (shrink)

This article focuses on the figure of the garden in a selection of novels and urban chronicles by José Donoso. A study of these works reveals that the garden fosters the legibility of subjects and urban landscapes within a space of power where aesthetic and political discourses confront each other/are debated. The figure of the garden emerges as a milestone in a written and urban landscape that attracts the vigilant gaze of strategists and the communal aspirations of dissidents.

The T lymphocyte receptor for antigen, which operates in conjunction with gene products of the major histocompatibility complex (MHC), is a molecular complex comprised of five polypeptide chains. Both the 49 kDa alpha and 43 kDa beta chains are immunoglobulin‐like and thus contain variable domains responsible for ligand binding. In contrast, the 20–25 kDa T3 gamma, delta and epsilon chains are monomorphic structures presumably involved in transmembrane signalling. The alpha and beta subunits are disulfide bonded to each other and held (...) in noncovalent association with the T3 chains. T3‐Ti receptor crosslinking leads to conformational modification of a second T lineage specific molecule, termed the 50 kDa T11 structure which in turn leads to protein kinase C activation, elevation in intracytoplasmic free calcium and Na+/H+ antiport stimulation. (shrink)

Education is a fundamental pillar in human development, and its evolution throughout history has been influenced by a variety of factors, including imaginative culture and human nature. In this study, we explore how educational methods have evolved in response to the interaction between these two aspects. We look at how human creativity, imagination, and adaptation have influenced the way we teach and learn, from early forms of knowledge transmission to more contemporary approaches focused on active student engagement and the development (...) of practical skills. Our research is based on a comprehensive review of the academic literature in the fields of education, evolutionary psychology, cultural anthropology, and imagination studies. We explore how societies have used imagination as a tool to transmit knowledge and values, as well as to foster creativity and individual expression. We also examine how adaptive aspects of human nature, such as the ability to learn collaboratively and adapt to changing environments, have influenced the way educational methods are designed. Our results show a clear evolution in educational methods over time, from approaches focused on the one-way transmission of knowledge to more interactive and participatory models that encourage exploration and discovery. We identify common patterns in the way societies have used imagination and adaptation to promote learning and socialization and discuss the implications of these findings for contemporary education. In conclusion, this study highlights the importance of understanding the relationship between imaginative culture, human nature, and education. It provides a solid foundation for the design of educational methods that harness the innate creativity and adaptability of human beings and offers guidance for educators and policymakers on how to promote meaningful and lasting learning in today's world. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the search for explainable models and interpretable decisions in AI must be reformulated in terms of the broader project of offering a pragmatic and naturalistic account of understanding in AI. Intuitively, the purpose of providing an explanation of a model or a decision is to make it understandable to its stakeholders. But without a previous grasp of what it means to say that an agent understands a model or a decision, the explanatory strategies will (...) lack a well-defined goal. Aside from providing a clearer objective for XAI, focusing on understanding also allows us to relax the factivity condition on explanation, which is impossible to fulfill in many machine learning models, and to focus instead on the pragmatic conditions that determine the best fit between a model and the methods and devices deployed to understand it. After an examination of the different types of understanding discussed in the philosophical and psychological literature, I conclude that interpretative or approximation models not only provide the best way to achieve the objectual understanding of a machine learning model, but are also a necessary condition to achieve post hoc interpretability. This conclusion is partly based on the shortcomings of the purely functionalist approach to post hoc interpretability that seems to be predominant in most recent literature. (shrink)

This article integrates previously missing components of government quality into the governance-piracy nexus in exploring governance mechanisms by which global obligations for the treatment of IPRs are effectively transmitted from international to the national level in the battle against piracy. It assesses the best governance tools in the fight against piracy and upholding of intellectual property rights (IPRs). The instrumentality of IPR laws (treaties) in tackling piracy through good governance mechanisms is also examined. Findings demonstrate that: (1) while all governance (...) tools under consideration significantly decrease the incidence of piracy, corruption-control is the most effective weapon; (2) but for voice and accountability, political stability and democracy, IPR laws (treaties) are instrumental in tackling piracy through government quality dynamics of rule of law, regulation quality, government effectiveness, corruption-control, and press freedom. Hence, the need for a policy approach most conducive to expanding development is to implement an integrated system of both IPRs and corollary good governance policies. Moreover, our findings support the relevance of good governance measures in developing countries wishing to complement their emerging IPR regimes. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the notion of ‘artifact’ and related notions in the dominant version of extended cognition theory grounded on extended functionalism. Although the term is ubiquitous in the literature, it is far from clear what ECT means by it. How are artifacts conceptualized in ECT? Is ‘artifact’ a meaningful and useful category for ECT? If the answer to the previous question is negative, should we worry? Is it important for ECT to have a coherent theory of artifacts? (...) And what are the demands and constraints that ECT imposes on this theory? I distinguish between two aspects of ECT, one narrow, aligned with extended functionalism ; and one broad or pluralistic, in which EF is combined with other theoretical resources in the context of diverse research programs. I begin by determining the problems in conceptualizing artifacts from EF. Then I address the question of why a concept of artifact may be relevant to ECT. Next, I examine the efforts of Richard Heersmink to combine ECT with dominant theories of artifacts in the philosophy of technology. I argue that both approaches fail to yield a meaningful notion of artifact, let alone one of ‘cognitive’ artifact. Finally, I argue that narrow ECT places rather strong constraints on a theory of artifacts, since it locates the specificity of ‘artifact’ in material aspects of realization that are, by definition, outside its theoretical purview. I examine, then discard, the possibility that a materialist and objectivist theory of artifacts may be of help. And finally I briefly explore some ways in which a broad, pluralistic ECT may address some of these shortcomings. (shrink)

Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. (...) The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes. (shrink)

Moral motivation refers to the psychological causes that motivate or explain moral action. Moral action refers to action that complies with the requirements of morality. In this essay, I lay out alternative views on moral motivation, giving particular attention the way each view conceives of the explanatory link between practical reasoning and moral conduct. In trying to understand this link, philosophers look to moral judgment. The main rival accounts of the relationship between practical reasoning, moral judgment, and moral motivation can (...) be distinguished according to the way in which they respond to two questions: (1) Can a cognitive (i.e., belief-like) state produce in an agent a motivation at time t, without being accompanied by an affective (i.e., emotional or desire-like) state which exists prior to t? (2) Are moral judgments cognitive states or affective states? -/- I shall defend the Humean theory of motivation, or HTM, as the best account of moral motivation. HTM is often called the belief-desire model of action because it explains behavior by citing a combination of a desire for some end and a belief that a certain action is a means to satisfying that desire. The Humean answer to the first question above is that any process of practical reasoning which generates a motivation is necessarily linked to a non-cognitive state. Regarding the second question, Humeans are split between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. Anti-Humeans, on the other hand, hold that moral judgments express cognitive states, and that cognitive states can independently produce motivations via practical reasoning. -/- I offer two arguments in favor of HTM. First, I suggest that Humeanism meets one criterion of theory choice better than anti-Humeanism. This is the continuity constraint. Given that humans and non-humans evolved common ancestors, the continuity constraint advises us to prefer an account of human psychology which can explain how complex human traits evolved from simpler antecedents resembling the traits of non-human animals. Non-human primates, in particular, are capable of acting altruistically toward con-specifics. Altruistic behavior in primates can shed light on an evolutionary precursor to moral action in humans, since morally significant action often involves altruism. I maintain that a Humean theory of motivation offers the best explanation of altruistic behavior in non-human primates. Therefore, by the continuity constraint, HTM should be the preferred model of the psychological mechanisms underlying human moral motivation, unless empirical evidence strongly suggests otherwise. -/- To ward off the objection that anti-Humeanism is warranted due to the vast differences between humans and non-human primates, I offer a second argument for HTM. This is an argument from a criterion of theory choice called Morgan’s Canon. Morgan’s Canon is a standard of theoretical parsimony according to which a psychological mechanism should be attributed to an organism only if it’s the sole mechanism which can cause some behavior. I argue that HTM meets this criterion much better than anti-Humeanism. This is because the special psychological mechanisms which anti-Humeans postulate to explain moral action are not the sole mechanisms which could produce such action. Rather, the Humean belief-desire model could easily be recruited to explain moral action, as well as a broad variety of non-moral actions. (shrink)

Normative reasons for action are facts or considerations that contribute to the justification of an action. Sometimes, normative reasons for action conflict: one reason may favor doing something, while another may favor not doing it. These conflicts can be so radical that it seems difficult, if not impossible, to judge which reason should ultimately guide one’s actions. According to a theory of practical rationality known as reasons pluralism, there are some radical cases of conflict among normative reasons for action in (...) which there can be no fact of the matter about what one ought to do. This is because normative reasons fall into a plurality of types, and normative reasons of different types are incommensurable with one another. However, reasons pluralism is compatible with a principle that would enable us to judge when a normative reason of one type overrides a normative reason of another type. I will argue that this “Override Principle” is a facet of practical wisdom—an intellectual virtue. Practical wisdom, as Aristotle construed it, involves the ability to order one’s ends into a coherent system that allows for the attainment of a good life. The Override Principle is sure to be one criterion by which those endowed with practical wisdom would order their ends. (shrink)

Este texto busca ahondar en algunos de los ejes que articulan la discusión filosófica sobre la noción de archivo. Dicha discusión se ha subsumido en el denominado “ archival turn ” que recorrería el campo de estudios de las humanidades y las ciencias sociales durante las últimas tres décadas. Sin embargo, en este trabajo mostraremos que la reflexión filosófica previa, llevada a cabo por autores como Walter Benjamin, Michel Foucault y Jacques Derrida, entre otros, transforma el sentido convencional de la (...) noción de archivo en el transcurso del siglo XX, hasta el punto de volver paradójico el propio diagnóstico sobre el actual giro del archivo. A partir de aquí, el texto propone ahondar en cuatro dimensiones que atraviesan, de un modo u otro, la discusión filosófica sobre el archivo: 1) el carácter inorgánico latente en todo archivo; 2) el desbordamiento del lugar del archivo, 3) el vínculo del archivo con una economía general de poder, y 4) el problema del acceso al archivo. El análisis de estas cuatro dimensiones, derivadas de su problematización filosófica, nos obliga a sostener el carácter irresoluble de la propia cuestión del archivo y, al mismo tiempo, el ineludible vínculo entre sus aspectos teóricos y políticos. (shrink)

Uno de los principios éticos mencionados más frecuentemente en los lineamientos para el desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial (IA) es la transparencia algorítmica. Sin embargo, no existe una definición estándar de qué es un algoritmo transparente ni tampoco es evidente por qué la opacidad algorítmica representa un reto para el desarrollo ético de la IA. También se afirma a menudo que la transparencia algorítmica fomenta la confianza en la IA, pero esta aseveración es más una suposición a priori que una (...) tesis basada en evidencia empírica. Tampoco se discute mucho hasta qué punto es técnicamente posible volver transparente la caja negra de la IA a través de los métodos de explicabilidad. En este capítulo haré un análisis de la interrelación entre los conceptos de transparencia, explicabilidad y confianza. Inicialmente, analizaré los diferentes tipos de opacidad algorítmica para entender mejor cuál es el problema al que nos enfrentamos. En las secciones subsiguientes trazaré la relación entre explicabilidad y transparencia, y presentaré los límites de los métodos actuales de explicabilidad. En la sección final, examinaré la evidencia empírica acerca de la relación entre transparencia y confianza en las decisiones automatizadas basadas en sistemas de IA. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the idea that there is a sense in which it is meaningful and useful to talk about objective understanding, and that to characterize that notion it is necessary to formulate an account of explanation that makes reference to the beliefs and epistemic goals of the participants in a cognitive enterprise. Using the framework for belief revision developed by Isaac Levi, I analyze the conditions that information must fulfill to be both potentially explanatory and epistemically valuable (...) to an inquiring agent and to a scientific community. To be potentially explanatory, the information must state the relations of probabilistic relevance that the explanans bares to the explanandum. But a potential explanation con only be a bona fide explanation if it becomes part of inquiry, that is, if an agent or a group of agents can see any value in it for their cognitive purposes. I provide a way to evaluate the epistemic value of a potential explanation as a function of its credibility and its informational content. (shrink)

It is still an open question how senses of inherent polysemous words are represented and interpreted. Empirical results are not conclusive about the representation of polysemy. Therefore, different representation models try to give an answer about the puzzle of representation of polysemous words in general and of inherent polysemous words in particular. Inherent polysemous words are those that have several related senses that allow copredication, which occurs when one polysemous word is used to express simultaneously two related senses in a (...) sentence. Ortega-Andrés and Vicente, 2019) propose a rich semantic approach that explains the interpretation of copredicative sentences. This chapter has three goals: I discuss and classify underspecification approaches about the representation of polysemous words; I analyze some empirical results and their contributions to the debate about the representation of polysemy and inherent polysemy; and I argue that the rich account that Ortega-Andrés and Vicente give a plausible explanation about the representation of inherent polysemous words. (shrink)

Aristotle’s philosophy of law does not make sense if read as a plea for, or as taking for granted, unconditional political obligation. To be sure, he subscribes to the view that some unjust laws are to be put up with in the face of the consequences of disobedience for the common good. But this should not prevent us from seeing that Aristotle does defend the view not only that government is limited but also that there is a right of resistance (...) against oppression. Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship in terms of parts and wholes, Spartan constitutional law, and tyranny reveals that he is more than willing to acknowledge that, in some cases, the very failure of political authority in fulfilling its morally justified tasks releases citizens from their duty to obey the government. (shrink)

The existence of causal explanations in science has been an issue of interest in Western philosophy from its very beginnings. That is the reason this work, following an idea of Mario Bunge, makes a historical review of this matter. The modern treatment of this subject takes place since the postulation by Popper and Hempel of the D-N model of scientific explanation, whose viability is scrutinized here from different points of view in the current philosophy of science. The main object of (...) this paper is to present two arguments against the possibility of causal explanations in theoretical physics. The first one concerns the existence, in certain cases, of inter-theoretical incompatibilities, and the second refers to the need to resort, in other cases, to concatenations of laws of different theories and disciplines. The final conclusion will be the defence of a form of theoretical explanation, which follows the Popper-Hempel model, but devoid of any ontological and metaphysical connotations. (shrink)

I argue that there can be value relations without individual values to support them. The fact that an item is better than another item does not have to be explained by reference to the values of the individual items. Instead, value relations can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive facts about their relata. I show that my suggestion fits well with plausible perspectives on the nature of values and reasons, respectively. One of them is the fitting‐attitudes view, according to (...) which facts about value and value relations are facts about reasons for attitudes. The other is the descriptive view, according to which facts about reasons for attitudes can be grounded directly and exhaustively in descriptive considerations. (shrink)

In the natural and social sciences, it is common to use toy models—extremely simple and highly idealized representations—to understand complex phenomena. Some of the simple surrogate models used to understand opaque machine learning (ML) models, such as rule lists and sparse decision trees, bear some resemblance to scientific toy models. They allow non-experts to understand how an opaque ML model works globally via a much simpler model that highlights the most relevant features of the input space and their effect on (...) the output. The obvious difference is that the common target of a toy and a full-scale model in the sciences is some phenomenon in the world, while the target of a surrogate model is another model. This essential difference makes toy surrogate models (TSMs) a new object of study for theories of understanding, one that is not easily accommodated under current analyses. This paper provides an account of what it means to understand an opaque ML model globally with the aid of such simple models. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the impact that Lamarckian evolutionary theory had in the scientific community during the period between the advent of Zoological Philosophy and the publication Origin of Species. During these 50 years Lamarck’s model was a well known theory and it was discussed by the scientific community as a hypothesis to explain the changing nature of the fossil record throughout the history of Earth. Lamarck’s transmutation theory established the foundation of an evolutionary model introducing a new way to research (...) in nature. Darwin’s selectionist theory was proposed in 1859 to explain the origin of species within this epistemological process. In this context, Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology and Auguste Comte’s Cours de Philosophie Positive appear as two major works for the dissemination of Lamarck’s evolutionary ideology after the death of the French naturalist in 1829. (shrink)

Twenty years ago John Worrall offered an alleged non-standard viable form of scientific realism under the name structural realism. Structural realism was supposed to be both an alternative to standard scientific realism and a viable form of realism. The central questions addressed in this paper are what I call the two dogmas of structural realism: the idea that there is structure retention across theory change, and the idea that theoretical structures describe the world. Arthur Fine proclaimed that scientific realism was (...) dead. I claim that Worrall's attempt to bring scientific realism back to life has failed. John Worrall ofreció hace veinte años una forma no típica, supuestamente viable, de realismo científico a la que llamó realismo estructural. Se suponía que éste era una alternativa al realismo típico y una forma viable de realismo. Las cuestiones principales que discuto en este artículo son lo que denomino los dos dogmas del realismo estructural: la idea de que hay retención de estructura en el cambio teórico, y la idea de que las estructuras teóricas describen el mundo. Arthur Fine proclamó que el realismo científico había muerto. Yo afirmo que el intento de Worrall de resucitar el realismo científico ha fracasado. (shrink)

A partir de un estudio longitudinal sobre cultura política en chilenos, discutimos la paradojal evidencia encontrada en la literatura que plantea que, por un lado, las actitudes políticas más pro-democráticas y anti-autoritarias se observarían en sectores sociales acomodados y, por otro lado, las actitudes más pro-conservadoras y anti-igualitaristas se observarían en grupos sociales dominantes. Nuestros datos muestran que el patrón de actitudes políticas (autoritarismo, apoyo a la democracia, conservadurismo y nacionalismo) es similar entre personas de derecha de estrato alto, izquierda (...) de estrato bajo, y centro de estrato medio. En cambio, quienes manifiestan una orientación política incongruente con su condición socioeconómica presentan actitudes políticas diferenciadas del patrón predominante. Concluimos que la paradoja puede resolverse explicando el patrón de actitudes políticas de un grupo en función del (des)ajuste de la orientación política a sus condiciones socioeconómicas. (shrink)

RESUMEN La teleosemántica es el intento de naturalizar el contenido mental mediante el recurso al concepto de función biológica. En el presente artículo se argumenta que la teleosemántica carece de los recursos necesarios para hacer frente a tres problemas: la indeterminación del contenido, el carácter abstracto de este y la inutilidad biológica de algunas de las representaciones que pueden albergar organismos como los humanos. ABSTRACT Teleosemantics is the attempt to naturalize mental content by resorting to the concept of biological function. (...) The article argues that teleosemantics lacks the necessary resources to solve three problems: the indeterminacy of content, its abstract nature, and the biological uselessness of some of the representations of certain organisms such as human beings. (shrink)

Here the point of departure of Being and Time is criticized, i.e. the priority of Dasein in the determination of the meaning of being. An overview of Heidegger’s doctrine is offered, his concern for intentionality is acknowledged, then it takes place a critique of his starting point, and finally a Thomistic alternative account of intentionality is proposed.