This article suggests itself as a movement towards a theory of thinking in photography – that is to say, of thinking photographs. The notion of art as related to thinking is by no means a contemporary one. Within this tradition that has its roots in the advent of modernity, artworks – and particularly paintings – have long been viewed as a form of both thought and thinking. Photography’s place within this tradition, however, is not an easy one. Many of the (...) philosophical accounts surrounding thinking in painting focus on the devices through which painting is said to be thinking. Hubert Damisch and Gilles Deleuze offer the two most comprehensive accounts on this topic, but are the thinking devices proposed by them applicable to photography? Through the discussion of these theories, this article maps the existing philosophical landscape vis-à-vis the thinking image: locating photographic thought within that landscape is the first step towards understanding the peculiarities of photographic thinking. (shrink)

We show, first, that the normalization procedure for S4 modal logic presented by Dag Prawitz in [5] does not work. We then develop a new natural deduction system for S4 classical modal logic that is logically equivalent to that of Prawitz, and we show that every derivation in this new system can be transformed into a normal derivation.

Organizations are increasingly looking for ways to reap the benefits of cognitive diversity for problem solving. A major unanswered question concerns the implications of cognitive diversity for longer-term outcomes such as team learning, with its broader effects on organizational learning and productivity. We study how cognitive style diversity in teams—or diversity in the way that team members encode, organize and process information—indirectly influences team learning through collective intelligence, or the general ability of a team to work together across a wide (...) array of tasks. Synthesizing several perspectives, we predict and find that cognitive style diversity has a curvilinear—inverted U-shaped—relationship with collective intelligence. Collective intelligence is further positively related to the rate at which teams learn, and is a mechanism guiding the indirect relationship between cognitive style diversity and team learning. We test the predictions in 98 teams using ten rounds of the minimum-effort tacit coordination game. Overall, this research advances our understanding of the implications of cognitive diversity for organizations and why some teams demonstrate high levels of team learning in dynamic situations while others do not. (shrink)

We show, first, that the normalization procedure for S4 modal logic presented by Dag Prawitz in [5] does not work. We then develop a new natural deduction system for S4 classical modal logic that is logically equivalent to that of Prawitz, and we show that every derivation in this new system can be transformed into a normal derivation.

Hydrogen is a very important industrial gas in chemical processes. It is very volatile; therefore, it can escape from the process units and its mass balance is not always correct. In many industrial processes where hydrogen is reacted, kinetics are often related to hydrogen pressure. The right thermodynamic properties of hydrogen can be found for a process simulation and optimization; they can be estimated by the Grayson-Streed model. In the case studied, a methanol plant with a capacity of 150,000 tons/year, (...) the flow rate of hydrogen (H2) can be optimized using nonlinear programming, but good estimates of thermodynamic properties of hydrogen had to be found. In the case study, the model is in relatively good agreement with experimental measurements in the existing methanol production plant. An additional flow rate of hydrogen can increase the methanol production by 1.2%. Total potential profit increase of the additional methanol production was estimated to be 30 kEUR/a (or 103 euros/year). (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um exame da crítica proposta por Morton White em seu artigo “Valor e obrigação em Dewey e Lewis”, em particular, a aquela voltada para o conceito de normatividade e valoração de C.I. Lewis. A crítica afirma que Lewis, ao oferecer um caráter normativo dos juízos éticos, malogra ao articular consistentemente a sua concepção ética com a sua teoria do conhecimento. Isso leva White a concluir que o pragmatista não possui uma solução para o problema fundamental da ética. (...) Argumentarei que tal conclusão é equivocada. O núcleo da minha argumentação repousa na tese de que a crítica de White se origina de uma interpretação incorreta do pragmatismo conceitualista de Lewis, falhando em reconhecer que o apriorismo pragmático é a chave para o entendimento adequado de teoria do conhecimento e para uma explicação da conexão e articulação entre valoração e normatividade no interior da abordagem de Lewis. Nesta linha, mostrarei que, muito pelo contrário, a epistemologia de Lewis destaca os desenvolvimentos éticos e normativos, revelando uma teoria naturalística de valoração que é a base na qual a normatividade emerge pragmaticamente. Sustentarei, também, que essa perspectiva oferece uma concepção profícua de valores e normas que não têm sido suficientemente exploradas; algo que confronta o ceticismo ético, podendo levar em conta o status cognitivo de valores e normas, e que recupera o caráter racional da valoração não apenas para a ética, mas, também, para o conhecimento e a ciência. (shrink)

A metafísica tradicional, conforme Henri Bergson, via de regra, imobiliza o real tendo por fundamento uma concepção estática do ser. Na contramão dos rastros deixados pelo kantismo, e opondo-se curiosamente à tradição, Bergson pretende recriar a metafísica como experiência imediata de um absoluto movente, a duração. De partida nos deparamos com um problema: em suas obras, a concepção de uma única duração reveste-se de uma aparente ambiguidade, afinal sua filosofia é conhecida por tratar de temas como multiplicidade, diferenças de natureza, (...) continuidade, movimento, todos apontando para uma noção peculiar da realidade como criação. O suposto “monismo bergsoniano” guardaria, então, uma série de incompreensões e inconsistências, cujos textos do filósofo não teriam resolvido a contento e a literatura complementar, por sua vez, parece tratar o assunto insuficientemente. Assim, investigar a questão monismo/pluralismo no pensamento bergsoniano é algo central para a compreensão da proposta de uma nova metafísica. A partir da exegese de passagens da obra de 1907, A evolução criadora, discutiremos a compreensão da duração como totalidade, indagando até que ponto esta ideia remeteria ou não a uma visão monista do real. Afinal, uma leitura de Duração e simultaneidade deixou evidente para nós a defesa de uma duração absoluta, e, como vimos em Matéria e memória, para Bergson, até mesmo a matéria dura. Mas até aí não se constata a tese monista, visto que a duração comporta vários fluxos e o próprio ensaio de 1922 se encarrega de esclarecer essa multiplicidade. (shrink)

A questão do relacionamento entre a normatividade e valoração e sua incorporação no discurso racional é um dos problemas mais relevantes na filosofia contemporânea e é claramente desdobrada em todas as suas complexidades no debate paradigmático mantido entre Hilary Putnam e Jürgen Habermas durante a primeira década do século XXI. A partir dessas posições que reivindicam a tradição do pragmatismo americano, os filósofos discutem a objetividade dos juízos de valor e normativos defendendo, com diferenças significativas, uma posição cognitivista. A presente (...) contribuição aborda essa discussão com o propósito de apresentar o pragmatismo conceitualista de Clarence Irving Lewis como uma alternativa e posição profícua com os recursos para interagir com algumas das principais questões discutidas por Putnam e Habermas. Meu propósito é mostrar o modo como Lewis explica o caráter cognitivo das normas e valores enquanto sustenta, simultaneamente, uma demarcação significativa entre ambos os conceitos. Argumentarei que essa distinção é pragmática – não epistêmica –, e que isso permite ao pragmatista defender um cognitivismo que pode articular um naturalismo não reducionista referente aos valores com um conceito racionalista de normas, uma posição que pode evitar algumas das objeções que enfrentam Putnam e Habermas. (shrink)

Esse estudo apresenta os conceitos de documento e documentação propostos por Paul Otlet (1868-1944) presentes no âmbito da Revista do Serviço Público (RSP). Publicada desde 1937, a RSP contempla artigos nas áreas de Administração e Gestão pública, Políticas públicas e Economia do setor público, sendo considerada um importante veículo de informação no Brasil, contemporâneo ao período de efervescência do pensamento de Otlet. A pesquisa consiste numa Revisão Sistemática de Literatura (RSL) com análise documental da RSP no período entre 1951 e (...) 1975. Como procedimento de seleção dos artigos, utiliza o protocolo de pesquisa RSL elaborado por Valentim (2020). A partir do corpus de análise dos textos recuperados identifica os artigos que apresentam os conceitos de “documento” e “documentação” segundo Otlet, bem como os elementos constitutivos sobre o cenário da documentação no Brasil, na perspectiva da publicação de autores brasileiros na RSP, concluindo que os trabalhos analisados contemplam e ampliam a temática da Documentação com importantes reflexões de Otlet para a Ciência da Informação no Brasil. (shrink)

An analysis of Jonas' thought, focusing on three major themes: technique, vulnerability and ontology of life. Hans Jonas proposes a critique of traditional ethical approaches, which have proven incapable of dealing with the complex long-term effects of technological innovations. He suggests the "Responsibility Principle" as a new ethical paradigm, centered on considering the future consequences of human actions. In this sense, Jonas emphasizes the need for future-oriented ethics, which includes the preservation of life and the environment, ensuring that technological development (...) does not compromise future generations. The relevance of the "Responsibility Principle" lies in its ability to offer an adequate response to technological transformations and the threats they pose to planetary sustainability. Jonas highlights that the power acquired by humanity over nature, due to technological advances, requires ethical reflection that goes beyond classical paradigms such as utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. He criticizes the lack of guidance in previous approaches to dealing with long-term implications, proposing an ethics that considers the impact of current actions on future generations. (shrink)

This research evaluates the improvements that the use of Active Teaching and Learning Methodologies entails regarding the acquisition of professional skills of future graduates of the Masters dealing with intervention in Architectural Heritage, including product and resource improvements. The objectives address students’ training, oriented toward professional activity, determining the effectiveness of innovation. The real problems were exposed to be faced at a professional level and were solved through different parts, which were developed in different phases. The results obtained allowed us (...) to conclude that teaching and performing practical tasks related to professional competencies are verified as an advance in the subject. (shrink)

Ma is a curriculum. The Japanese concept of ma refers to the interval between two markers. In a dialectic exploration, the spaces between--private/public, teacher/student, old/new, self/other, among others are probed in ways that contribute to the significant research in teaching and learning that has been undertaken in the last decades.

The aim of the present paper is to evaluate the notion of collective guilt feeling both in the light of research in affectivity and in collective intentionality. The paper is divided into an introduction and three main sections. Section 1) highlights relevant features of guilt‐family emotions such as the relation between feeling guilt and objective guilt, the relation between feeling guilt and its content, and the relation between feeling guilt and the ‘self’. Moreover, the distinction between feeling guilt and feeling (...) regret is given due attention. Section 2) examines Margaret Gilbert's arguments in favor of a collectivist view of collective guilt feeling , according to which groups do genuinely feel guilt. Against the collectivist position I argue for an individualist ‘membership account’ of collective guilt feeling in terms of individual members' we‐feeling of guilt. The membership account of collective guilt feeling is vindicated on grounds of a naturalist and non‐judgmentalist understanding of emotions, as well as on the logic of personal pronouns. It combines individualism regarding the subject of the feeling with collectivism regarding the irreducibility of we‐feelings and provides, as I further argue, the required moral force attributed to collective guilt feeling. The concern of section 3) is the question of the appropriate emotional response to collective wrongdoing. I argue against the view that group members are categorically ‘committed to feel guilt as a body’ for wrongdoings committed by the group. Given that individual members often do not participate in their groups' wrongdoings, it seems unjust to impose a requirement for feeling guilt upon them. I suggest that in a general account of the appropriate assessment of collective wrongdoing, feeling regret is the better candidate than feeling guilt for the role of the minimally required emotional response.For us collectively to feel guilt over our action A is for us to be jointly committed to feeling guilt as a body over our action A. [. . .] The parties [. . .] constitute, as far as possible, a single subject of guilt feelings .[A] collective cannot respond affectively [. . .], only its constitutive members can. The lack of an affective counter‐response is troubling, because the efficacy of responses of accountability partially depends upon affect. The response of shame, guilt, and regret help to register the significance of the harm. (shrink)

The Gricean account of language is at the center of much current work in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. Anita Avramides maintains that Grice's paradigm can be used to defend very different conceptions of mind and of meaning. In this clearly argued book she describes Grice's analysis of meaning and proposes two interpretations of it, one reductive and one nonreductive. Much current work in cognitive science assumes that the content of words and thoughts can be (...) explained in naturalistic terms. A leading idea (advanced mainly by Stephen Schiffer and Brian Loar) is that the naturalistic account of content will proceed in two stages: a reduction of the semantic features of word; to the contents of propositional attitudes and then a reduction of the latter to physical or functional notions. The appeal of Grice's work on meaning to this two stage reductionist strategy is that Gricean definitions seem to provide the only way of reducing the semantic to the psychological, a reduction that is required for a naturalistic account of intentionality. While Avramides defends the method of analysis as one suited to the concept of meaning, she rejects a reductive interpretation of the analysis. She argues that any attempt to reduce the semantic to the psychological leads to a mistaken conception of mind. She exposes the assumptions behind the reductive interpretation and offers fresh and original arguments for the antireductionist position. Against the reductive Gricean she defends the idea that there is a deep epistemological symmetry between semantic and propositional attitude notions, a result of which is that semantically characterized linguistic behavior is central to our concept of belief. Anita Avramides is Lecturer in Philosophy at The Queens College, The University of Oxfor. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

'Anita L. Allen breaks new ground...A stunning indictment of women's status in contemporary society, her book provides vital original scholarly research and insight.' |s-NEW DIRECTIONS FOR WOMEN.

Anita Chari revives the concept of reification from Marx and the Frankfurt School to spotlight the resistance to neoliberal capitalism now forming at the level of political economy and at the more sensate, experiential level of subjective transformation. Reading art by Oliver Ressler, Zanny Begg, Claire Fontaine, Jason Lazarus, and Mika Rottenberg, as well as the politics of Occupy Wall Street, Chari identifies practices through which artists and activists have challenged neoliberalism's social and political logics, exposing its inherent tensions (...) and contradictions. (shrink)

One of the most intriguing of philosophical puzzles concerns other minds. How do you know there are any? Yes, you're surrounded by living organisms that look and behave much as you do. They even say they have minds. But do they? Perhaps other humans are mindless zombies: like you on the outside, but lacking any inner conscious life, including emotions, thoughts, experiences and even pain. What grounds do you possess for supposing that other humans aren't zombies? Perhaps less than you (...) think. Anita Avramides tackles this fascinating question. (shrink)

How do we acquire knowledge of the thoughts and feelings of others? Knowing Other Minds brings together ten original essays that address various questions in philosophy and in empirical cognitive science which arise from our everyday social interaction with other people.

How do I know whether there are any minds beside my own? This problem of other minds in philosophy raises questions which are at the heart of all philosophical investigations--how it is that we know, what is in the mind, and whether we can be certain about any of our beliefs. In this book, Anita Avramides begins with a historical overview of the problem from the Ancient Skeptics to Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, Reid, and Wittgenstein. The second part of (...) the book investigates the views of influential contemporary philosophers such as Strawson, Davidson, Nagel and Searle. (shrink)

Background: Nursing care is rapidly evolving due to the advanced technological and medical development, and also due to an increased focus on standardization and the logic of production, permeating today’s hospital cultures. Nursing is rooted in a holistic approach with an ethical obligation to maintain and respect the individual’s dignity and integrity. However, working within time limits and heavy workload leads to burnout and ethical insensitivity among nurses, and may challenge nurses’ options to act on the basis of ethical and (...) moral grounds in the individual care situation. Aim: The aim of this study is to describe and discuss ethical dilemmas described and experienced by nurses in clinical practice today. Method: The study was performed as a literature review following the matrix method allowing to synthesize literature across methodological approaches. A literature search was performed, including relevant studies published between 2011 and 2016. A total of 15 articles were included and analyzed focusing on their description of ethical dilemmas. Ethical consideration: We have considered and respected ethical conduct when performing a literature review, respecting authorship and referencing sources. Results: The analysis revealed three themes, relating to important aspects of nursing practice, such as the nurse–patient relationship, organizational structures, and collaboration with colleagues. The findings are summarized in the following three themes: (1) balancing harm and care, (2) work overload affecting quality, and (3) navigating in disagreement. Ethically difficult situations are evident across settings and in very diverse environments from neonatal care to caring for the older people. Organizational structures and being caught in-between professional values, standardization, and busyness was evident, revealing the complexity of nursing practice and the diversity of ethical dilemmas, concerns, and distress experienced by clinical nurses. Conclusion: Nursing practice is challenged by organizational structures and the development of the health care system, inhibiting nurses’ professional decision-making and forcing them to compromise basic nursing values. (shrink)

It has been argued that neural data are an especially sensitive kind of personal information that could be used to undermine the control we should have over access to our mental states, and therefore need a stronger legal protection than other kinds of personal data. The Morningside Group, a global consortium of interdisciplinary experts advocating for the ethical use of neurotechnology, suggests achieving this by treating legally ND as a body organ. Although the proposal is currently shaping ND-related policies, it (...) is not clear what its conceptual and legal basis is. Treating legally something as something else requires some kind of analogical reasoning, which is not provided by the authors of the proposal. In this paper, I will try to fill this gap by addressing ontological issues related to neurocognitive processes. The substantial differences between ND and body organs or organic tissue cast doubt on the idea that the former should be covered by bodily integrity. Crucially, ND are not constituted by organic material. Nevertheless, I argue that the ND of a subject s are analogous to neurocognitive properties of her brain. I claim that s’ ND are a ‘medium independent’ property that can be characterized as natural semantic personal information about her brain and that s’ brain not only instantiates this property but also has an exclusive ontological relationship with it: This information constitutes a domain that is unique to her neurocognitive architecture. (shrink)

How should we respond to individuals with disabilities? What does it mean to be disabled? Over fifty million Americans, from neonates to the fragile elderly, are disabled. Some people say they have the right to full social participation, while others repudiate such claims as delusive or dangerous. In this compelling book, three experts in ethics, medicine, and the law address pressing disability questions in bioethics and public policy. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and Mary B. Mahowald test important theories of (...) justice by bringing them to bear on subjects of concern in a wide variety of disciplines dealing with disability. They do so in the light of recent advances in feminist, minority, and cultural studies, and of the groundbreaking Americans with Disabilities Act. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Nietzsche-Studien Jahrgang: 43 Heft: 1 Seiten: 189-191.

The Swiss photographer and filmmaker Rudolph Burckhardt came to New York City in 1935 and experienced the awe that many first-time visitors to the city share. The grandeur, the energy, the vitality, the sheer movement of this American metropolis all drew Burckhardt in, and he made New York his home for the rest of his life. Equally inflecting his career as a photographer and filmmaker, the city and its vibrant cultural life became Burckhardt's muse. Rudy Burckhardt—New York Moments is a (...) rare collection of his photographs from the 1940s and 1950s. It includes not only street scenes and details of city life—“The tremendous difference in scale between the soaring buildings and the people in the street astonished me,” he wrote—but also the portraits he made of the New York School painters, most notably Jackson Pollock, Mark Rothko, and Willem de Kooning. As a photographer for ArtNews in the 1950s, Burckhardt had an insider’s view of the burgeoning art scene. But he also recognized the limits of photography—“a photograph, when it gets printed and comes out a picture, becomes like a fact, you know”—and turned his hand to filmmaking. For the rest of his career, photography and film would work together to capture his unique vision. Including photographs, film stills, and interpretive essays, Rudy Burckhardt accompanies an exhibition of Burckhardt's work at the Kunstmuseum Basel in Basel, Switzerland, and is a fitting tribute to the Swiss photographer who most poignantly captured the energy of mid-century New York. (shrink)

Can the government stick us with privacy we don't want? It can, it does, and according to this author, may need to do more of it. Privacy is a foundational good, she argues, a necessary tool in the liberty-lover's kit for a successful life. A nation committed to personal freedom must be prepared to mandate inalienable, liberty-promoting privacies for its people, whether they eagerly embrace them or not. The eight chapters of this book are reflections on public regulation of privacy (...) at home; isolation and confinement for punitive and health reasons; religious modesty attire; erotic nudity; workplace and professional confidentiality; racial privacy; online transactions; social networking; and the collection, use and storage of electronic data. (shrink)

The extent to which English law remedies injury to autonomy as a stand-alone actionable damage in negligence is disputed. In this article I argue that the remedy available is not only partial and inconsistent but also gendered and discriminatory against women. I first situate the argument within the broader feminist critique of tort law as failing to appropriately remedy gendered harms, and of law more broadly as undervaluing women’s interest in reproductive autonomy. I then show by reference to English remedies (...) law’s first principles how imposed motherhood cases—Rees v Darlington and its predecessor McFarlane v Tayside Health Board—result in gender injustice when compared with other autonomy cases such as Chester v Afshar and Yearworth v North Bristol NHS Trust: A minor gender-neutral ITA is better remedied than the significant gendered harm of imposing motherhood on the claimant; men’s reproductive autonomy is protected to a greater extent than women’s; women’s reproductive autonomy is protected by an exceptional, derisory award. Worst of all, courts refuse to recognise imposed motherhood as detriment; and the deemed, mansplained, nonpecuniary joys of motherhood are used to offset pecuniary upkeep costs, forcing the claimant into a position she sought to avoid and thus further undermining her autonomy. The recent Singaporean case ACB v Thomson Medical Pte Ltd, awarding compensation for undermining the claimant’s genetic affinity in an IVF wrong-sperm-mix-up demonstrates some improvement in comparison to English law, and some shared gender injustices in the context of reproductive autonomy. ACB’s analysis is oblivious to the nature of reproductive autonomy harm as gendered; and prioritises the father’s interest in having genetic affinity with the baby over a woman’s interest in not having motherhood imposed upon her. (shrink)

One of the most prominent ethical concerns regarding emerging neurotechnologies is mental privacy. This is the idea that we should have control over access to our neural data and to the information about our mental processes and states that can be obtained by analyzing it. A key issue is whether this information needs more stringent protection than other kinds of personal information. I will articulate and support the view, underlying recent regulatory frameworks, that mental privacy requires a special treatment because (...) of its relation to relevant aspects of personal identity. It has been suggested that this approach could be supported by the idea that mental privacy constitutes a fundamental psychological dimension of privacy. The connection between this psychological view of privacy and identity can be traced back to Irwin Altman’s idea that privacy is an interpersonal boundary regulation process. However, it is not clear whether this notion of privacy can be associated with a conception of identity that is relevant in contemporary neuroethics. I will suggest that the narrative and relational approach to identity, a prominent view in recent ethical discussions of neurotechnology, lines up with key aspects of Altman’s proposal. I suggest that if mental privacy is an essential component of identity, the latter could be affected by technological mind-reading. (shrink)

A feminist ethics that bases morality on dependence or vulnerability challenges the moral priority of uniform over disparate treatment. Persons with disabilities resist equality's homogenization of moral personhood. But displacing equality in favor of caring or trust reprises the repression of those already marginalized. The ethics of difference proves an ineffective remedy for the negative consequences attendant on how historically marginalized groups are different. An historicized conception of equality resolves the dilemma.

Accountability protects public health and safety, facilitates law enforcement, and enhances national security, but it is much more than a bureaucratic concern for corporations, public administrators, and the criminal justice system. In Why Privacy Isn't Everything, Anita L. Allen provides a highly original treatment of neglected issues affecting the intimacies of everyday life, and freshly examines how a preeminent liberal society accommodates the competing demands of vital privacy and vital accountability for personal matters. Thus, "None of your business!" is (...) at times the wrong thing to say, as much of what appears to be self-regarding conduct has implications for others that should have some bearing on how a person chooses to act. (shrink)