Bd. 1. Acht Bücher Physik.--Bd. 2. Vier Bücher über das Himmelgebäude und zwei Bücher über Entstehen und Vergehen.--Bd. 3. Fünf Bücher von der Zeugung und Entwickelung der Tiere.--Bd. 4. Über die Dichtkunst. 2. Aufl.--Bd. 5. Vier Bücher über die Teile der Tiere.--Bd. 6. Politik Teil 1, Text und Übersetzung.--Bd. 7. Politik, Teil 2, Inhaltsübersicht und Anmerkungen.

In der überarbeiteten Fassung seiner Wiener Dissertation von 1999 legt Rhoby (= R.) zunächst in einer sehr knappen Einleitung (19–23) eine Arbeitsdefinition des zentralen Begriffes einer geographischen ‚Reminiszenz‘ vor. Er gewinnt seine Definition primär aus dem ausgewerteten Material selbst. Bei Reminiszenzen handele es sich um „eine Erwähnung eines antiken Ortes, die innerhalb eines byzantinischen Textes nebenbei geschieht bzw. in einen längeren Handlungsablauf ergänzend eingearbeitet ist“ (19). Als bewußt hervorgeholte Erinnerung aus dem traditionellen literarischen Bildungsgut eines Autors hebt sich die Reminiszenz (...) von der Mimesis und dem Plagiat ab. Der Begriff bleibt jedoch bei R. etwas unbestimmt. Reminiszenz habe „eigentlich in jedem der folgenden Kapitel eine jeweils etwas andere Bedeutung“ (22). Auf die aktuelle Diskussion über Zitate, Anspielungen, Reminiszenzen und verwandte rhetorisch-stilistische Termini und Techniken in der Philologie, Literatur- und Kulturwissenschaft geht R. weder in seiner Einleitung (siehe 20 und Anm. 6) noch in der abschließenden Analyse (237–257) ausführlich ein. Für R.s Untersuchung bietet sich eine Vielzahl von Gattungen der mittel- und spätbyzantinischen Literatur als Textgrundlage an. Zu Recht schließt er Textsorten aus, in denen die Antike oder antike Themen ganz offen im Mittelpunkt stehen, z.B. Kommentare, Paraphrasen zu antiken Autoren, Progymnasmata und Übungsreden über antike Themen, auch den in der Antike spielenden byzantinischen Liebesroman. Denn in solchen Texten kann man offenkundig nicht von Reminiszenzen in R.s Verständnis sprechen. Es verbleiben aber weiterhin zahlreiche Werke aus verschiedenen Gattungen und von unterschiedlichen Autoren. Dies erschwert methodisch R.s Untersuchung. (shrink)

Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines Semesters (...) in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

Die Qualität dieser Bonner katholisch-theologischen Dissertation des Jahres 2002, die für die Drucklegung noch erweitert und auf den neuesten Stand gebracht wurde, wird schon daraus ersichtlich, daß sie von Walter Brandmüller in die von ihm herausgegebene Konziliengeschichte aufgenommen wurde. Das Ziel der Studie ist ein primär theologisches, das den Horos des VII. Ökumenischen Konzils „als das zur Entscheidung in der Ikonenfrage vorgelegte amtliche Dokument … ernstnehmen“ will. „Dies bedeutet einerseits, den Horos in seiner Binnenstruktur zu erschließen und ihn andererseits auf (...) philologisch-hermeneutischem Weg im Licht gattungsverwandter Texte früherer Konzilien und der Akten des Zweiten Konzils von Nizäa als Ergebnis eines Meinungsbildungsprozesses zu interpretieren“ (S. XVIII). Leider schließt der Verf. bei seinem an erster Stelle genannten Anliegen alle politischen und kirchenpolitischen Aspekte, zum Beispiel die Zielstellungen der Kaiserin Eirene und die bedeutsame Rolle des Patriarchen Tarasios, um nur einiges zu nennen, bei der Interpretation aus und verschließt sich so notwendigen Ansätzen für ein tieferdringendes und umfassenderes Verständnis. Denn beider Bemühen um den Erhalt der Einheit der Kirche bestimmten Planung, Verlauf und Ergebnisse des Konzils in entscheidender Weise. Das kommt in dieser Studie nicht zum Ausdruck, worunter dann natürlich auch die Interpretation der einzelnen behandelten Texte leidet. Immer noch lesens- und bedenkenswert sind zu diesem Problemkreis die Ausführungen von P. Speck, Kaiser Konstantin VI., München 1978, 135–179. Es ist eben nicht mehr ausreichend, wenn der Verf. für diese Zusammenhänge auf die in dieser Hinsicht unzureichende Darstellung von G. Dumeige, Nizäa II, Mainz 1985, verweist (S. XIX Anm. 9), die ja aus heutiger Sicht auf fragwürdigem Textfundament errichtet ist. Das betrifft dann auch einen Teil des zweiten Anliegens des Verf., nämlich die Beurteilung der Überlieferung der Akten des VII.Ökumenischen Konzils. Paul Specks Frontalangriff auf die Zuverlässigkeit der Akten, der ja „in der Tat an die Grundlagen“ der Ausführungen von Uphus rührt, pariert dieser völlig unzureichend, wenn er ohne eine rechte Begründung nur von erheblichen Zweifeln an den Hypothesen Specks spricht (S. 38 Anm. 1, etwas ausführlicher S. 331f.). Noch gewichtiger ist die neuerdings von Erich Lamberz, der eine kritische Edition der Akten des Konzils vorbereitet, geäußerte Warnung: „Eine Darstellung des Konzils, die den überlieferten Text der Akten – und das gilt erst recht für den bei Mansi abgedruckten Text – als selbstverständliche Grundlage der Forschung nimmt, sollte in Zukunft wohl nicht mehr möglich sein.“ (E. Lamberz, Die Bischofslisten des VII. Ökumenischen Konzils [Nicaenum II], München 2004, 37). (shrink)

Die Wissenschaftstheorie der letzten Jahrzehnte sah sich nur allzu leicht und oft zu Recht dem Verdacht ausgesetzt, sie wolle den Wissenschaften Vorschriften machen. Ist die Wissenschaftstheorie ein letzter Versuch der Philosophie, die ihr langst entwachsenen Einzelwissenschaften zu nor­ mieren? Strukturalistische Rekonstruktionen sind der Weg einer Wissenschaftstheorie, die sich deskriptiv versteht und die einen Wissenschaftsbegriff allererst zu gewinnen hofft. (Die Bezeichnung "Strukturalismus" hat sich in der Wissen­ schaftstheorie der letzten Zeit - besonders seit Wolfgang StegmUllers "The Structuralist View of Theories" (1979- (...) fUr den mengentheoretischen Ansatz von Patrick Suppes, Joseph Sneed u.a. eingebUrgert; vgl. Anm. 1 zu Kap. 1.) Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt sich zum Ziel, die Tragweite dieses neuen Ansatzes zu erproben. Dabei richtet sich das Hauptinteresse auf die interdisziplinare Anwendung des strukturalistischen Theorienkonzepts bei der Rekonstruk­ tion empirischer Theorien (Kap. 4 - 6). Die dafUr notigen Mittel werden in Kap. 3 bereitgestellt. Die einleitenden ersten beiden Kapitel sollen den strukturalistischen An­ satz mit moglichst geringem formalen Aufwand verstandlich machen und die Bedeutung abschatzen, die ihm innerhalb der gegenwartigen Wissenschaftsphilosophie zukommt. (shrink)

Zum I. Kapitel 1 Diesen hier nur skizzierten Strukturzusammenhang von Fragehinsichten und Sachbezügen, innerhalb dessen die Politische Philosophie ihren Ort gewinnt, hat der Verf des näheren darzulegen versucht in einem Aufsatz Die Staatsphilosophie im Verhältnis zur Politik als Wissenschaft, in: Dieter Oberndörfer (Hrsg.), Wissenschaftliche Politik. Eine Einführung in Grundfragen ihrer Tradition und Theorie. Freiburg i. Br. 1962, S. 153-195. Vgl. dazu insbesondere auch Arnold Bergslraesser, Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung. Schriften und Reden. Freiburg i. Br. 1961, S. 17-29 (Die Stellung (...) der Politik unter den Wissen schaften); Dieter Oberndärfer, Politik als praktische Wissenschaft, in dem oben angeführten Band, S. 9-58, bes. S. 37ff. ; Olto Heinrich von der GablenlZ, Politische Wissenschaft und Philosophie, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 1, 1960/61, S. 4-11; H.R.G. Greaves, Grundlagen der Politischen Theorie. Neuwied-Berlin 1960 sowie die Arbeiten von Hans Barlh, Helmut Kuhn, Max Müller (vgl. Anm. 6, Nr. 7), Joachim Ritter (zu Aristoteles) und Leo Slrauss, die zu den wenigen gehören, die heute noch von der Philosophie selbst aus den Problembereich der Praktischen und Politischen Philosophie in einem unserem Ver ständnis verwandten Sinne zu erörtern und grundzulegen suchen (s. Lit.-Verz.). Es sei auch auf die unter diesem Betracht in Frage kommenden Publikationen Hannah Arendts hingewiesen. Siehe außerdem unsere Angaben unter Anm. 4 und 5.-In ein analoges Ver hältnis setzt Helmut Schelsky (Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie. Düsseldorf Köln 1959) Soziologie, philosophische Theorie der Gesellschaft und allgemeine Philosophie zueinander. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Zur Zahlenlehre im Platonismus (Neuplatonismus) und " lm Yezzra PHILIP MERLAN VOR MEHRERENJahrzehnten hat Baeck die These aufgestellt, dass die Philosophie yon Proclus die Quelle yon Sefer Yezira ist. 1 Diese These ist yon Hebr~iisten abgelehnt worden~(eigentlich ohne Angabe yon Grfinden), yon Griizisten unbeachtet geblieben. Der vorliegende Aufsatz unternimmt es, dieselbe yon gr~zistischer Seite zu stfitzen. Doch geschieht dies in strikter Beschr~nkung auf die Zahlenlehre des 1. Kapitels yon (...) Sefer Yezira, d.h. des :Kapitels, worin die Lehre yon der allumgreifenden Wirkung der ersten zehn Ziffern8 vorgetragen wird. Von den Themen von Plotins Enn. VI 6 sind einige yon besonderem Interesse fiir unser Problem. Vor allem beweist Plotin, dass Zahlen nicht etwa das Produkt unseres Abstrahierens yon gez~ihlten Dingen oder das des z~ihlenden Subjekts sind, dass sie vielmehr vor den geziihlten Dingen und unabhiingig yon ihrem Gedachtwerden existieren~--genau so wie die iibrigen Intelligibilien, gleich Ideen. ~ Auch diese existieren ~a~,, nicht ~,vol~. Zweitens beweist Plotin, dass der 'Ort' an dem diese Zahlen existieren, im Bereich des Intelligiblen liegt. Dabei spaltet aber Plotin diesen Bereich dreifach. Sonst ist ibm der Bereich des Intelligiblen einfach gleichbedeutend mit dem der Intelligenz; in anderen Worten, sonst ist ihm der Bereieh des Intelligiblen einfach gleiehbedeutend mit der zweiten Hypostase. Und sonst bleibt ihm diese zweite Hypostase ungespalten. Hier unterscheidet aber Plotin drei Unterbereiche des Intelligiblen. Der oberste ist das Seiende; der mittlere ist Intelligenz; der unterste ist Lebewesen. 6 1Leo Baeck, "Zum Sepher Jezira," Monatsschrift fiir Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums 70 ~TN. F. 34 (1926),S. 371-376;78 = N. F. 42 (1934), S. 448-455. So von G. ~ajda, Introduction a la pens$ejuive du Moyen Age (Paris, 1947), S. 17, Anm. 1; G. Scholem, Ursprung und Anfdnge der Kabbala (Berlin, 1962),S. 24, Anm. 42. Immerhin gibt Scholem zu, dass Sefer Yezira yon grieehischen Quellen beeinflusst ist. So iibersetze ich sephiroth, um an die MSgliehkeit zu erinnern, dasses sich um dasselbe Wort handeln mag, dessen arabische Form (sift, sefr) in so viele Sprachen als Ziffer eingegangen ist. 4Zun~chst wehrt Plotin eine Plato-Interpretation ab, die aus ihm (offenbar aus Epinomis 978C-D) herauslesen wfirde, dass er die Zahl nur als Produkt des Z~ihlensyon ala~r& angesehen hat (4, 11-20). Er rut es, indem er Plato unterschiebt, er habe vom aX,10Lvb~~m0~6~gesprochen, der realiter existiert und an den die Seele sich erinnert, wean sie a'LaO~r&wahrnimmt (20-24). 5 6, 5-19. Cf. 9, 5-6. e el ~ rSO~V7rp~rov ~e~ ~afle~v ~rp~vov 5v, civetvo~z~, e~ra v5 ~ov... (8, 17-18; of. 1-2; 15, 2-3). Diese Triade ist offenbar aus Platos Sophistes 248 E-249 B und Timaeus 39 E abgeleitet. [167] 168 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Was wir vor uns haben ist natiirlich die Triade Sein-Intelligieren-Leben, die im sp~iteren Neuplatonismus immer wieder, bei Plotin aber, wenn auch unmissverst ~indlich, doch nur gelegentlich auftaucht. Und die Zahl hat ikren Oft im obersten dieser drei Bereiche, dem des Seienden/ Die Zahl schw~ngert nun sozusagen das Seiende und ist so Ursache yon dessen Geburtswehen, unter denen das Seiende die Vielheit der seienden 'Dinge' zur Welt bringt, d.h. sich in seiende 'Dinge' vervielf~ltigt.8 So geht also die Zahl der 'Ents~ehung '9 der seienden 'Dinge' voran. Und die seienden 'Dinge' (gleich Ideen; siehe unten) habe Plato deswegen als Henaden und Zahlen bezeichnet.1~ Daher bezeichnet Plotin die Zahlen als Fundament, Quelle, Wurzel, Prinzip der seienden Dinge. n Dutch die Zahlen oder durch das zur Zahl gewordene Seiende sind die seienden 'Dinge' mit dem Seienden verknfipft.~2 Die Zahlen, yon denen bisher gesprochen wurde, sind natfirlich nicht Zahlen im gewShnlichen Wortsinn. Vielmehr unterscheidet sie Plotin als erste, wahrhafte, wesentliche Zahlen yon monadischen Zahlen?3 In diesem Zusammenhang aber bezeichnet 'monadisch' Zahlen, die aus Einheiten zusammengesetzt sind. Im Unterschied yon ihnen sind die wesentlichen (ersten, wahrhaften) Zahlen nicht aus Einheiten zusammengesetzt. Es scheint demnach, dass Plotin den ZaMen weder Priorit~tt noch Posterioritiit dem Seienden gegenfiber zuschreibt (er bezeichnet gelegentlieh das Seiende einfach Ms ZaM).14Sowie das Seiende aus dem Ureinen (so wird hier Plotins oberstes Prinzip bezeichnet werden) entspringt und zu sich kommt... (shrink)

Die „Bürden des Urteilens anzuerkennen und ihre Konsequenzen zu akzeptieren“ (Rawls 1998, 120 Anm.) stellt für Rawls, neben der Bereitschaft zur fairen Kooperation, eine der zwei grundlegenden Tugenden des öffentlichen Vernunftgebrauchs dar. Die Bürden des Urteilens oder der Urteilskraft repräsentieren die epistemischen Voraussetzungen eines vernünftigen Pluralismus. Sie sollen erklären, warum ein Pluralismus von Überzeugungen nicht nur wahrscheinlich, sondern geradezu erwartbar und unvermeidlich ist.

This essay surveys the main objections to aesthetic hedonism, the view that aesthetic value is reducible to the value of aesthetic pleasure or experience. Hedonism is the dominant view of aesthetic value, but a spate of recent criticisms has drawn its accuracy into question. I introduce some distinctions crucial to the criticisms, before using the bulk of the essay to identify and review six major lines of argument that hedonism's critics have employed against it. Whether or not these arguments suffice (...) to refute hedonism decisively, I argue that its privileged status, as the sole contender in aesthetic value theory, is detrimental to downstream research on aesthetic phenomena. The essay concludes with an overview of current work and promising avenues of inquiry into non-hedonic alternatives. (shrink)

The goal of the book is to present the latest research on the new challenges of data technologies. It will offer an overview of the social, ethical and legal problems posed by group profiling, big data and predictive analysis and of the different approaches and methods that can be used to address them. In doing so, it will help the reader to gain a better grasp of the ethical and legal conundrums posed by group profiling. The volume first maps the (...) current and emerging uses of new data technologies and clarifies the promises and dangers of group profiling in real life situations. It then balances this with an analysis of how far the current legal paradigm grants group rights to privacy and data protection, and discusses possible routes to addressing these problems. Finally, an afterword gathers the conclusions reached by the different authors and discuss future perspectives on regulating new data technologies. (shrink)

William Whewell’s philosophy of science is often overlooked as a relic of 19th century Whiggism. I argue however that his view – suitably modified – can contribute to contemporary philosophy of science, particularly to debates around scientific progress. The reason Whewell’s view needs modification is that he makes the following problematic claim: as science progresses, it reveals necessarily truths and thereby grants a glimpse of the mind of God. Modifying Whewell’s view will involve reinventing his notion of necessary truth as (...) the pragmatist notion of superassertibility. And, if scientific progress does not uncover necessary truths, then it does not reveal the mind of God. The result is an outline of an account of scientific progress that is piecemeal and fallibilist in nature, yet at the same time maintains key Whewellian themes of consilience and the unity of science. (shrink)

Moral case deliberation (MCD) is a specific form of clinical ethics, aiming to stimulate ethical reflection in daily practice in order to improve the quality of care. This article focuses on the implementation of MCD in nursing homes and the questions how and where to organize MCD. The purpose of this study was to evaluate one way of organizing MCD in two Dutch nursing homes. In both of these nursing homes the MCD groups had a heterogeneous composition and were organized (...) apart from existing institutional communication structures. As part of a naturalistic evaluation, systematic observations, interviews and focus groups were completed. The findings indicate that the heterogeneous composition and MCD meetings separate from existing structures have benefits. However, the participants also reported negative experiences. This gives rise to the question whether a mixed MCD group which meets separately is an effective way to embed MCD as an instrument for reflection on moral issues in daily practice. We conclude that there is no single answer to that question. In the end, the two implementation strategies (i.e. within existing communication structures and a mixed MCD group) can be complementary to each other. (shrink)

Branching-time temporal logics have proved to be an extraordinarily successful tool in the formal specification and verification of distributed systems. Much of their success stems from the tractability of the model checking problem for the branching time logic CTL, which has made it possible to implement tools that allow designers to automatically verify that systems satisfy requirements expressed in CTL. Recently, CTL was generalised by Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman in a logic known as Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL). The key insight (...) in ATL is that the path quantifiers of CTL could be replaced by cooperation modalities, of the form , where is a set of agents. The intended interpretation of an ATL formula is that the agents can cooperate to ensure that holds (equivalently, that have a winning strategy for ). In this paper, we extend ATL with knowledge modalities, of the kind made popular in the work of Fagin, Halpern, Moses, Vardi and colleagues. Combining these knowledge modalities with ATL, it becomes possible to express such properties as group can cooperate to bring about iff it is common knowledge in that . The resulting logic — Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) — shares the tractability of model checking with its ATL parent, and is a succinct and expressive language for reasoning about game-like multiagent systems. (shrink)

This paper investigates how human interactions with AI-powered chatbots may offend human dignity. Current chatbots, driven by large language models (LLMs), mimic human linguistic behaviour but lack the moral and rational capacities essential for genuine interpersonal respect. Human beings are prone to anthropomorphise chatbots—indeed, chatbots appear to be deliberately designed to elicit that response. As a result, human beings’ behaviour toward chatbots often resembles behaviours typical of interaction between moral agents. Drawing on a second-personal, relational account of dignity, we argue (...) that interacting with chatbots in this way is incompatible with the dignity of users. We show that, since second-personal respect is premised on reciprocal recognition of second-personal moral authority, behaving towards chatbots in ways that convey second-personal respect is bound to misfire in morally problematic ways, given the lack of reciprocity. Consequently, such chatbot interactions amount to subtle but significant violations of self-respect—the respect we are dutybound to show for our own dignity. We illustrate this by discussing four actual chatbot use cases (information retrieval, customer service, advising, and companionship), and propound that the increasing societal pressure to engage in such interactions with chatbots poses a hitherto underappreciated threat to human dignity. (shrink)

Prima facie, we make successful decisions as we act on and intervene in the world day-to-day. Epistemologists are often concerned with whether rationality is involved in such decision-making practices, and, if so, to what degree. Some, particularly in the post-structuralist tradition, argue that successful decision-making occurs via an existential leap into the unknown rather than via any determinant or criterion such as rationality. I call this view radical voluntarism (RV). Proponents of RV include those who subscribe to a view they (...) call Critical Complexity (CC). In this paper, I argue that CC presents a false dichotomy when it conceives of rationality in Cartesian – i.e. ideal and transcendental – terms, and then concludes that RV is the proper alternative. I then outline a pragmatist rationality informed by recent work in psychology on bounded rationality, ecological rationality, and specifically embodied rationality. Such a pragmatist rationality seems to be compatible with the tenets of post-structuralism, and can therefore replace RV in CC. (shrink)

Several complexity theorists draw a sharp and ontologically robust distinction between (merely) complicated systems and (genuinely) complex systems. I argue that this distinction does not hold. Upon fine-grained analysis, ostensibly complicated systems turn out to be complex systems. The purported boundary between the complicated and the complex appears to be vague rather than sharp. Systems are complex by degrees.

Douglas Edwards is arguably the most prominent contemporary advocate of moderate alethic pluralism. Significantly influenced by Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch, his work on the nature of truth has become widely discussed in the topical literature. Edwards labels his version of moderate alethic pluralism determination pluralism. At first blush, determination pluralism appears philosophically promising. The position deserves thoughtful consideration, particularly because of its capacity to accommodate the scope problem. I argue, however, that upon analysis the view is better understood as (...) a form of metaphysical dualism or what I will call meta-dualism. Furthermore, determination pluralists face a dilemma; there appears to be an instability at the core of their dualistic model. On the one horn of the dilemma, they need a clear metaphysical demarcation at the interface of their two necessary domains. On the other horn, they seem to need to a metaphysically vague boundary at the interface of their two necessary domains. Determination pluralism needs substantial revision. (shrink)

This paper is on the update semantics for might of Veltman. Threeconsequence relations are introduced and studied in an abstract setting.Next we present sequent-style systems for each of the consequence relations.We show the logics to be complete and decidable. The paper ends with asyntactic cut elimination result.

The Lockean theory of property licenses unilateral appropriation on the condition that there be ‘enough, and as good left in common for others’. However, the meaning of this proviso is all but clear. This article argues that the proviso is centered around the Lockean theory of freedom. To be free, I argue, we must be ‘non-subjected’ in the exercise of our rights, including our rights to appropriate. We enjoy such freedom only when the ability to exercise our rights does not (...) depend on others. That can obtain if literally enough and as good is left in common. But it can also obtain in other ways, for example through competitive labour markets. The latter offer something as good as ‘enough and as good’. (shrink)

How can a realistic ethical imagination about the future of a technology take shape? This article contains a reflection which is based on the experiences of an embedded ethicist in the context of biophysical research conducive to the development of photoacoustic mammography, which is intended for the non-invasive detection of breast cancer. Imagination in this context already informs the activities of the biophysical researchers, but its role is limited: biophysical future scenarios concentrate on the technological advances that photoacoustics could bring (...) about. In this article it is argued that it is advisable to also consider the medical practice and the ways in which this practice is likely to change as an effect of the introduction of photoacoustic mammography into it. On the basis of this more encompassing imaginative endeavor it is possible to get a clearer idea about how new technologies are able to contribute to human well being, which is informative for the setting of research-goals/priorities and a responsible implementation of new technologies into the world. (shrink)

Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for (...) degrees of wellbeing. This is generally taken to be problematic. However, other subjective theories – namely, desire-satisfaction, judgment- and value-fulfillment theories – do not suffer from the same difficulties. We introduce two models of degrees of wellbeing a subjectivist can employ: the Relative and the Absolute Model, and defend the claim that both models face difficulties. In particular, we argue that a subjectivist theory should describe instances of depression as instances of low degrees of wellbeing. We also argue that a reduction of desires may sometimes improve one’s degree of wellbeing, an idea we call the Epicurean Intuition. We then argue that the Relative Model fails to account for the disbenefit of certain types of depression, while the Absolute Model fails to meet a central commitment of subjectivism – the Resonance Constraint – and is unable to accommodate the Epicurean Intuition. The upshot of the paper is that subjectivist theories cannot account for degrees of well-being in a plausible way. (shrink)

Performance measurement systems have the potential to improve organizational outcomes, but they often come at a cost. This commentary highlights the individual, organizational, and societal costs of performance measurement systems and explores how such costs could be reduced.

One widespread argument against the efficacy of subjective well-being as a measure of well-being is the adaptation problem as formulated by Sen and Nussbaum: the phenomenon that people may adapt to deprivation and find satisfaction or happiness in objectively bad circumstances. It is not generally noticed that there are two distinct arguments for why the phenomenon of adaptation is a problem for subjective well-being as a measure of well-being. The Axiological Adaptation Argument is a counter-example to theories of well-being that (...) rely on mental states. The Epistemic Adaptation Argument illustrates that levels of happiness or satisfaction cannot be measured well when people have adapted. I argue that the most serious threat to subjective well-being measures is not the Axiological Argument, but the Epistemic Argument. I reflect on the implications the epistemic problem has for the empirical literature in general, and for research on the phenomenon of adaptation in particular. (shrink)

Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) poses a significant challenge to an individual’s mental well-being. The obsessive preoccupation with perceived defects in one’s appearance affects individuals’ daily functioning and can result in serious risks, including suicidal ideation and self-surgery. While treatments such as cognitive behavioural therapy and serotonin reuptake inhibitors can provide relief, they do not achieve complete remission. It has been suggested that therapy should not only interrupt the harmful behaviour, but should also address their sense of self, and that after (...) addressing their internalised values, individuals with BDD will be able to incorporate their perceived defect in a manner similar to how individuals with real deformities often do. Phenomenology of psychopathology analyses subjectivity in cases of pathology, and analyses of BDD show that the perceived defect has become a locus of shame. This implies that individuals with BDD have permanently incorporated the gaze of the Other and constantly experience their body as a body-for-others. This paper further explores the sense of self in individuals with BDD through Jenny Slatman’s interpretation of bodily integrity: bodily integrity as a never-ending process of identification. By comparing the experiences of individuals with BDD to those with real deformities and to those who have undergone cosmetic surgery, I will show that re-identification does not occur in individuals with BDD. This suggests that their bodily integrity is fundamentally disturbed and that addressing their internalised values alone will probably not be sufficient for the disorder to go into remission. (shrink)

Nursing Ethics has published several pleas for care ethics and/or relationality as the most promising ethical foundation for midwifery philosophy and practice. In this article, we stand by these calls, contributing to them with the identification of the structural form of violence that a care ethical relational approach to reproductive care is up against: that of “maternal separation”. Confronted with reproductive and obstetric violence globally, we show that a hegemonic racialized, instrumentalized, and individualized conception of pregnancy is responsible for a (...) severance of relationalities that are essential to safe reproductive care: (1) the relation between the person and their child or reproductive capabilities; and (2) the relation between the pregnant person and their community of care. We pinpoint a separation of the maternal relation in at least two discursive domains, namely, the juridical-political and the ethical-existential. Consequently, we plea for a radical re-imagination of maternal relationality, envisioning what care ethical midwifery, including abortion care, could be. (shrink)

It is often alleged that Cantor’s views about how the set theoretic universe as a whole should be considered are fundamentally unclear. In this article we argue that Cantor’s views on this subject, at least up until around 1896, are relatively clear, coherent, and interesting. We then go on to argue that Cantor’s views about the set theoretic universe as a whole have implications for theology that have hitherto not been sufficiently recognised. However, the theological implications in question, at least (...) as articulated here, would not have satisfied Cantor himself. (shrink)

Digital farming technologies promise to help farmers make well-informed decisions that improve the quality and quantity of their production, with less labour and less impact on the environment. This future, however, can only become a reality if farmers are willing to share their data with agribusinesses that develop digital technologies. To foster trust in data sharing, in Europe the EU Code of Conduct for agricultural data sharing by contractual agreement was launched in 2018 which encourages transparency about data use. This (...) article looks at the EU Code through the lens of literature on trust and contract agreements. We agree with the makers of the EU Code that a contract can make an important contribution to trust relationships as it is needed to mitigate the detrimental effects of power relationships between experts and non-experts. Building on Onora O’Neills perspective to trust, however, we argued that a contract can only be successful in fostering trust when information is comprehended by the more vulnerable party in this relationship who has to sign the contract, the more powerful partner takes responsibility to provide that information, and information is tailored to the information needs of the party signing the contract, even when data are re-used over a longer period. In addition, we think that differences between trust relationships and relationships of accountability, give reason to add to informed consent other more substantive ethical components in a more encompassing code of conduct. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Over the past few decades the concept of (human) dignity has deeply pervaded medical ethics. Appeals to dignity, however, are often unclear. As a result some prefer to eliminate the concept from medical ethics, whereas others try to render it useful in this context. We think that appeals to dignity in medical ethics can be clarified by considering the concept from an historical perspective. Firstly, on the basis of historical texts we propose a framework for defining the concept in (...) medical debates. The framework shows that dignity can occur in a relational, an unconditional, a subjective and a Kantian form. Interestingly, all forms relate to one concept since they have four features in common: dignity refers, in a restricted sense, to the ‘special status of human beings’; it is based on essential human characteristics; the subject of dignity should live up to it; and it is a vulnerable concept, it can be lost or violated. We argue that being explicit about the meaning of dignity will prevent dignity from becoming a conversation‐stopper in moral debate. Secondly, an historical perspective on dignity shows that it is not yet time to dispose of dignity in medical ethics. At least Kantian and relational dignity can be made useful in medical ethics. (shrink)

Rational agents are important objects of study in several research communities, including economics, philosophy, cognitive science, and most recently computer science and artificial intelligence. Crudely, a rational agent is an entity that is capable of acting on its environment, and which chooses to act in such a way as to further its own best interests. There has recently been much interest in the use of mathematical logic for developing formal theories of such agents. Such theories view agents as practical reasoning (...) systems, deciding moment by moment which action to perform next, given the beliefs they have about the world and their desires with respect to how they would like the world to be. In this article, we survey the state of the art in developing logical theories of rational agency. Following a discussion on the dimensions along which such theories can vary, we briefly survey the logical tools available in order to construct such theories. We then review and critically assess three of the best known theories of rational agency: Cohen and Levesque's intention logic, Rao and Georgeff's BDI logics, and the KARO framework of Meyer et al. We then discuss the various roles that such logics can play in helping us to engineer rational agents, and conclude with a discussion of open problems. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The traditional view holds that political philosophy should aim at the truth. By contrast, Avner de Shalit argues that political philosophers should do something different. According to him, they should work in direct consultation with “the people” in order to think through their theories about political institutions. This article defends the traditional aim of truth-seeking and shows the mistakes in De Shalit’s alternative approach.

In recent years, the public sector in many countries has had difficulty keeping abreast of social problems due to restricted financial resources and limited organizational capacities. As a consequence, entrepreneurs have started to address social welfare issues that the public sector has been unable to tackle with an innovative approach called social enterprise. The authors present research on the future prospects of social enterprise as a sustainable business model for industrialized countries. As there is a lack of historical and current (...) data, the authors aim to contribute to and structure the debate about the potential of the concept. Therefore, the authors provide initial data from a Delphi survey on the future development of social enterprise in a multistakeholder environment. Experts from academia, business, nongovernmental and governmental organizations, social enterprise investors, and social entrepreneurs evaluated 16 projections for the year 2030. Based on these results, the authors present comprehensive scenarios of four different possible developments of the future of social enterprise in Germany. (shrink)

Bas van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism (CE) has been much discussed. There is, however, a curious feature of van Fraassen’s writings that has been overlooked up until now. This is that he sometimes capitalises certain key terms, notably “Induction”. This is done to differentiate a pragmatic small ‘i’ induction (which has epistemic import) from a rule-bound capital ‘I’ induction (which does not). In this paper, I argue that van Fraassen’s small letter/capital letter distinction reveals an underlying dualism, one that is reminiscent (...) of the notoriously problematic semantic dualism in Logical Positivism (between a theoretical language and an observation language). Despite partly developing CE to overcome Logical Positivism’s kind of dualism, van Fraassen seems to have tacitly endorsed it anyway. If so, then CE requires revision. It is, however, not clear how to conduct such a revision. It is not clear what the way forward should be once CE is understood as innately dualistic. (shrink)

Four experiments examined the strategies that individuals develop in sentential reasoning. They led to the discovery of five different strategies. According to the theory proposed in the paper, each of the strategies depends on component tactics, which all normal adults possess, and which are based on mental models. Reasoners vary their use of tactics in ways that are not deterministic. This variation leads different individuals to assemble different strategies, which include the construction of incremental diagram corresponding to mental models, and (...) the pursuit of the consequences of a single model step by step. Moreover, the difficulty of a problem (i.e. the number of mental models required by the premises) predisposes reasoners towards certain strategies. Likewise, the sentential connectives in the premises also bias reasoners towards certain strategies, e.g., conditional premises tend to elicit reasoning step by step whereas disjunctive premises tend to elicit incremental diagrams. (shrink)

In this paper I critically reflect on the sustainability potential of biomimetic technologies by focusing on writings of the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk. Although I agree with Sloterdijk that biomimetic technologies – or, as he calls them, ‘homeotechnologies’ – offer specific opportunities for a more peaceful co-existence of humans and nature, I will argue that his reflections are based on a series of problematic assumptions. I will conclude by arguing that the ‘homeotechnological turn’ can be effected only if it is (...) developed within the context of a different ecological ethos from the technocentric ethos that currently dominates our attitude towards nature. (shrink)

Welfare in economics is generally conceived of in terms of the satisfaction of preferences, but a general, comparable index measure of welfare is generally not taken to be possible. In recent years, in response to the usage of measures of subjective well-being as indices of welfare in economics, a number of economists have started to develop measures of welfare based on preference-satisfaction. In order to evaluate the success of such measures, I formulate criteria of policy-relevance and theoretical success in the (...) context of preference-satisfaction measures of welfare. I present a detailed case study of the methodological choices put forward in a prominent generalized proposal for measuring welfare through preferences recently published in the American Economic Review. I contrast this with an alternative welfare measure which also uses preferences to weight aspects of welfare: the ICECAP-A measure. I assess the methodology of both approaches in detail and argue that the two goals of a preference... (shrink)

The idea that law claims authority (LCA) has recently been forcefully criticized by a number of authors. These authors present a new and intriguing objection, arguing that law cannot be said to claim authority if such a claim is not justified. That is, these authors argue that the view that law does not have authority viciously conflicts with the view that law claims authority. I will call this the normative critique of LCA. In this article, I assess the normative critique (...) of LCA, focusing predominantly on the arguments presented by its most incisive proponent Philip Soper. I defend a twofold conclusion. First, LCA, understood roughly along the lines put forward by Joseph Raz, is part of the most attractive analysis of law. Second, proponents of the normative critique, and in particular Soper, are committed to accepting LCA. (shrink)

This article aims to provide some insight into the nature and content of the theory of associative political obligation. It does this by first locating the view in the wider debate on political obligation, analyzing the view in terms of four central elements that are shared by many of its versions, and then discussing important criticisms that have been made of each of these, as well as some rejoinders by defenders of the theory.