To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral (...) duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas. -/- . (shrink)

Addressing the matter of attention from a phenomenological perspective as it bears on the problem of becoming aware, I draw on Edmund Husserl''s analyses and distinctions that mark his genetic phenomenology. I describe several experiential levels of affective force and modes of attentiveness, ranging from what I call dispositional orientation and passive discernment to so-called higher levels of attentiveness in cognitive interest, judicative objectivation, and conceptualization. These modes of attentiveness can be understood as motivating a still more active mode of (...) reflective attention, i.e., philosophical attentiveness, and to this extent, even it would be subject to varying influences of affection. What role, if any, does affection play in a peculiar kind of reflective attention that is phenomenological? I conclude by briefly considering phenomenological reflective attentiveness and its relation to affection. (shrink)

Kantian transcendental arguments are aimed at uncovering the necessary conditions for the possibility of thought and experience. If such arguments are to have any force against Cartesian skepticism about knowledge of the external world, then it would seem that the conditions the transcendental argument uncovers must be non-psychological in nature, and their special status must be knowable a priori. In "Transcendental Arguments", Barry Stroud raised the question whether there are any such conditions., He answered that it was very doubtful that (...) one could argue deductively from the premise that there is thought and experience to the conclusion that certain conditions concerning non-psychological, external reality are satisfied. In the intervening 27 years, no one has decisively answered those doubts. No one has succeeded in constructing a convincing Kantian anti- skeptical transcendental argument of the desired kind. In a recent paper, however, Stroud has suggested that things might well be looking up a bit for the transcendental arguer. Stroud now holds that there is a modest variant of the ambitious Kantian anti-skeptical strategy that offers the promise of an answer of sorts to the skeptic that is free of various objectionable Kantian excesses. In this paper, I will describe the more modest sort of transcendental argument that Stroud finds promising, and I will then raise some doubts about the prospects of this modest approach. (shrink)

Introspective evidence is still treated with great suspicion in cognitive science. This work is designed to encourage cognitive scientists to take more account of the subject's unique perspective.

In this paper, I investigate the experience of hope by focusing on experiences that seem to rival hope, namely, disappointment, desperation, panic, hopelessness, and despair. I explore these issues phenomenologically by examining five kinds of experiences that counter hope (or in some instances, seem to do so): first, by noting the cases in which hope simply is not operative, then by treating the significance of both desperation and pessimism, next by examining the experience of hopelessness, and finally, by treating the (...) experience of despair. Here despair is shown to constitute the most profound challenge to hope among these experiences and to be foundational for the others, even though it is disclosed ultimately as founded in hope. (shrink)

Recent legal rulings concerning the status of advance statements have raised interest in the topic but failed to provide any definitive general guidelines for their enforcement. I examine arguments used to justify the moral authority of such statements. The fundamental ethical issue I am concerned with is how accounts of personal identity underpin our account of moral authority through the connection between personal identity and autonomy. I focus on how recent Animalist accounts of personal identity initially appear to provide a (...) sound basis for extending the moral autonomy of an individual - and hence their autonomous wishes expressed through an advance directive - past the point of severe psychological decline. I argue that neither the traditional psychological account nor the more recent Animalist account of personal identity manage to provide a sufficient basis for extending our moral autonomy past the point of incapacity or incompetence. I briefly explore how analogies to similar areas in law designed to facilitate autonomous decision, such as wills and trusts, provide at best only very limited scope for an alternative justification for granting advance statements any legal or moral authority. I conclude that whilst advance statements play a useful role in formulating what treatment is in a patient’s best interests, such statements do not ultimately have sufficient moral force to take precedence over paternalistic best interest judgements concerning an individual’s care or treatment. (shrink)

We investigated the definition, prevalence, perceived prevalence and severity of, as well as justifications for and expected responses to, academic dishonesty at the graduate level in a sample of 246 graduate students, 49 faculty, and 20 administrators. Between 2.5% and 55.1% of students self-reported engaging in academically dishonest behaviors, depending on the nature of the behavior. Students and faculty rated 40 examples of academically dishonest behaviors similarly in terms of severity, but faculty tended to underestimate the prevalence of academic dishonesty. (...) Students and faculty also reported how they would idealistically and realistically expect themselves to respond to cheating situations. Students rated 21 behaviors in terms of their likeliness to increase or decrease academically dishonest behavior. Suggestions are given for developing a climate or culture of academic integrity to address academic dishonesty. (shrink)

Most offenders, even persistent offenders, eventually desist from crime, and the fastest period of deceleration in the frequency of offending is in the early twenties. This article summarises results from a longitudinal study of desistance from or persistence in crime in this age range, illustrated by three case histories. A key finding is that, because of their deep prior engagement in crime, would-be desisters from repeat offending need to make many adjustments to their patterns of daily life. The authors explain (...) why virtue ethics has been found to be a valuable resource in theorising these results. (shrink)

Keith DeRose discusses 'third-person cases', which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge-attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third-person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third-person cases do not threaten invariantism.

I analyse the concept of sentimental value, with a view to identifying its relations with the notions of intrinsic, final, extrinsic and instrumental value. The analysis explores issues arising in the understanding of an object as sentimentally valuable, and reveals a serious tension in the common sense extrinsic conception of sentimental value.

Giulio Tononi (2008) has offered his integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC) as a “provisional manifesto.” I critically examine how the approach fares. I point out some (relatively) internal concerns with the theory and then more broadly philosophical ones; finally I assess the prospects for IITC as a fundamental theory of consciousness. I argue that the IITC’s scientific promise does carry over to a significant extent to broader philosophical theorizing about qualia and consciousness, though not as directly as Tononi suggests, (...) since the account is much more focused on the qualitative character of experience rather than on consciousness itself. I propose understanding it as “integrated information theory of qualia” (IITQ), rather than of consciousness. (shrink)

This article develops a cross-cultural and historical theory of antifeminist movements. Such movements are composed of two elements, which often involve very different types of people: vested-interest groups and voluntary associations. Five predictions concerning the social composition of antifeminist vested-interest groups and voluntary organizations and antifeminist movement ideology are derived from the theory. Evidence taken from existing literature pertaining to both first-wave and second-wave antifeminist movements in a variety of nations is reviewed. Substantial support is found for all five predictions. (...) We conclude that antifeminist movement adherents are responding to realistic threats. For men and vested-interest groups, the threat is primarily class based, but also extends to their status as family head; for women, it is primarily status based as wives and mothers, but also class-based inasmuch as their husbands' economic interests are threatened. (shrink)

This book develops in detail the simple idea that assertion is the expression of belief. In it the author puts forward a version of 'probabilistic semantics' which acknowledges that we are not perfectly rational, and which offers a significant advance in generality on theories of meaning couched in terms of truth conditions. It promises to challenge a number of entrenched and widespread views about the relations of language and mind. Part I presents a functionalist account of belief, worked through a (...) modified form of decision theory. In Part II the author generates a theory of meaning in terms of 'assertibility conditions', whereby to know the meaning of an assertion is to know the belief it expresses. (shrink)

The contrast between the content of Alcibiades’ speech and the character delivering it is a well-known interpretative difficulty of the last speech of Plato’s Symposium, for Alcibiades reveals important truths about Socrates and his philosophical practice, yet he seems to be the least suited man to do so and praise philosophy. Offering a more positive account of Alcibiades as a character in the Platonic dialogues, I argue that this difficulty can be solved provided one takes into account the political agenda (...) of the Symposium. (shrink)

The first in a new series with Australian Catholic University, this collection of essays deals with two important themes. 'Faith' and 'reason' are heavily weighted words. They point to elemental aspects of human existence. The papers and discussions presented strive to clarify and corelate these basic activities or dimensions of human beings. In all the complexities of the possible relationships and interweaving of faith and reason, two kinds of questions keep recurring. One the one hand, what is the value of (...) human intelligence, and how is it endorsed and supported by faith' On the other hand, what is the distinctive intelligence or rationality of faith, and how does it relate to the perennial search for wisdom represented in it various philosophical forms' Contributors include: Marilyn McCord Adams, Raimond Gaita, John Haldane, John McDermott SJ, Kevin Hart, and Anthony Kelly CSsR. (shrink)

In addition to its well‐known role as a coenzyme in oxidation–reduction reactions, the distinct role of NAD as a precursor for molecules involved in cell regulation has been clearly established. The involvement of NAD in these regulatory processes is based on its ability to function as a donor of ADP‐ribose; NAD synthesis is therefore required to avoid depletion of the intracellular pool. The rising interest in the biosynthetic routes leading to NAD formation and the highly conserved nature of the enzymes (...) involved prompted us to reconstruct the NAD biosynthetic routes operating in distinct eukaryotic organisms. The evidence obtained from biochemical and computational analysis provides a good example of how complex metabolic pathways may evolve. In particular, it is proposed that the development of several NAD biosynthetic routes during evolution has led to partial functional redundancy, allowing a given pathway to freely acquire novel functions unrelated to NAD biosynthesis. BioEssays 25:683–690, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The lysine demethylase KDM5A collaborates with PARP1 and the histone variant macroH2A1.2 to modulate chromatin to promote DNA repair. Indeed, KDM5A engages poly(ADP‐ribose) (PAR) chains at damage sites through a previously uncharacterized coiled‐coil domain, a novel binding mode for PAR interactions. While KDM5A is a well‐known transcriptional regulator, its function in DNA repair is only now emerging. Here we review the molecular mechanisms that regulate this PARP1‐macroH2A1.2‐KDM5A axis in DNA damage and consider the potential involvement of this pathway in transcription (...) regulation and cancer. Using KDM5A as an example, we discuss how multifunctional chromatin proteins transition between several DNA‐based processes, which must be coordinated to protect the integrity of the genome and epigenome. The dysregulation of chromatin and loss of genome integrity that is prevalent in human diseases including cancer may be related and could provide opportunities to target multitasking proteins with these pathways as therapeutic strategies. (shrink)

Acquaintance with the Absolute is the first collected volume of essays devoted to the thought of Yves r. Simon, a thinker widely regarded as one of the great teachers and philosophers of our time. Each piece in this collection of essays thoughtfully complements the others to offer a qualifiedly panoramic look at the work and thought of philosopher Yves R. Simon. The six essays presented not only treat some major areas of Simon’s thought, pointing out their lucidity and originality, but (...) also his underpinning metaphysics, so central to his thought. Rather than attempt to present all aspects of this patient, careful, and penetrating thinker, these essays select enough to situate Simon’s philosophical excavations – especially his moral, political and action theory – among contemporary Thomistic philosophy. In defending philosophy as a valid way of knowing, Simon gives us an approach we can use to avoid contemporary dilemmas in the philosophy of science. Simon holds that philosophical truths both justify scientific method as a way of knowing the real and provide a basis for distinguishing what is ontologically significant in a scientific theory from what is not. This view allows us to avoid the apparently irrational conclusions of quantum mechanics without reducing scientific theories to being mere projections of our conceptual systems. Though aspects of some of the essays are suited for students of Simon’s thought, the essays as a whole introduce the less familiar reader to this great thinking and, further, invite him or her to pursue Simon’s own texts. The volume is enhanced by the inclusion of a definitive Yves R. Simon bibliography 1923-1996. The annotated bibliography is cross-reference in detail, revealing the astonishing variety of topics Simon treated. (shrink)

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INTRODUCTION The materialism which informs Diderot's political thought throughout the period with which we are concerned can be traced back to the Pensees ...

In this article I offer a critical analysis and evaluation of Thomas Fuchs' concept of corporealization, as well as the Leib/Körper distinction (i.e. the distinction between the lived and corporeal body) that it is founded upon. First, I show that the foundational concepts -- Leib and Körper -- are problematically heterogeneous, each including a diverse set of phenomena requiring further delineation and clarification. Second, I consider the historical origins of this heterogeneity and ambiguity within Fuchs' work. I show that Fuchs' (...) Leib/Korper distinction, while owing more to Plessner than Merleau-Ponty, is to a great extent his own development. Third, I delineate five senses of the body, or of embodiment. These senses of the body are meant to (1) clarify the diverse phenomena included under Fuchs' label of corporealization and (2) offer examples of features of embodiment that challenge Fuchs' Leib/Körper polarity. Fourth, I argue that the concepts of Leib, Körper, and corporealization will need to be more rigorously defined before they can adequately illuminate the phenomena to which they are applied. (shrink)