Movements tend to employ instituent practices and to acquire constitutive characteristics when they set up the material foundations of their collective autonomy, i.e. when they establish socially reproductive commons, democratically producing forms of life that respond to basic needs of the participants to the commons. The legal recognition of the sphere of the commons and the freedom of people to share, co-establish and self-regulate whole infrastructures of their social production is therefore not a negligible change but a complete reversal of (...) the logic currently underlying our legal order. It is, therefore, clear that to the end of multiplying and expanding the sphere of the commons we need to invent a new theory of a law of the commons and a hybrid and transitional semi-state ius communis, which will be capable of incorporating the acquis of social movements and receptive to emerging forms of life of the oppressed. (shrink)

Is attention both necessary and sufficient for consciousness? Call this central question of this treatise, “Q.” We commonly have the experience of consciously paying attention to something, but is it possible to be conscious of something you are not attending to, or to attend to something of which you are not conscious? Where might we find examples of these? This treatise is a quest to find an answer to Q in two parts. Part I reviews the foundations upon which the (...) discourse on Q is built. Different inputs to Q produce different answers. After consideration of the many ways “attention” and “consciousness” have been defined, I settle upon phenomenal consciousness and Executive Attention (defined as a suite of strategies for structuring cognition for further processing implemented by the executive of working memory) as the most interesting inputs to Q, and the ones on which Part II focuses. Attention without consciousness seems relatively easy to establish empirically, but consciousness without attention is much harder. The putative candidates all seem to have major problems, but I build a strong abductive case for the hitherto ignored case of foveal phenomenal overflow. We consciously see far more detail in our foveal fields than we can Executively Attend, although there is a serious obstacle to our ever confirming that empirically—identifying conscious content relies on Executive Attentional report. Triangulating the capacity limitations of attention, consciousness, and working memory strengthens this case for consciousness without attention, and suggests that cognition must work something like my “Witches’ Hat Model,” on which content can become conscious outside of Executive Attention or working memory. I conclude with some reflections on the implications of my arguments for the discourse on Q, and for other discourses such as the ontologies of attention and consciousness, theories of consciousness, some other cognitive concepts, and ethical considerations in humans, animals, and machines. A conclusive answer to Q continues to elude us. It may perhaps be an ultimately insoluble conundrum. But it is the very essence of humanity to seek an answer, and in so doing, to improve our understanding of our own nature: “The proper study of mankind is man.”1. (shrink)

The term attention has been used to mean so many different things that some have despaired of it being useful at all. This paper is devoted to bringing a modicum of order to the chaos through the time-honored device of categorization. The chief purpose of this paper is to introduce a comprehensive descriptive taxonomy of the nuanced ways the term attention may be employed. It is presented in table form, followed by elucidations and illustrations of each of its items. But (...) first, I offer reasons why a taxonomy of attention is needed and explore some of its possible benefits. After presenting the taxonomy, I sketch by way of example how it might be applied to two interesting questions: is the umbrella term attention still useful?; and, what is it that ties the subdefinitions of attention together yet distinguishes them from other kinds of cognition? (shrink)

John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of (...) rationality requirements: consistency requirements, completeness requirements, and closedness requirements. Many standard rationality requirements fall under this typology. Based on three theorems, we argue that reasoning is successful in achieving closedness requirements, but not in achieving consistency or completeness requirements. We assess how far our negative results reveal gaps in Broome's theory, or deficiencies in choice theory and behavioral economics. (shrink)

Using a conviction-based measure, we find that local public corruption exerts a negative effect on the lending activity of US banks. Our baseline estimations show that the difference in public corruption between, for example, Alabama, where corruption is high, and Minnesota, where corruption is low, implies that banks headquartered in the former state grant 0.55% less credit ceteris paribus. Using proxies for relationship lending and monitoring, we also find that these bank characteristics weaken the negative effect of public corruption on (...) lending. These results are robust to tests that address endogeneity, to the use of perception-based measures of corruption, and after controlling for credit demand conditions. In further analysis, we show that these effects are more evident for smaller banks and banks operating in a single state. These findings provide evidence that public corruption could facilitate information asymmetry in the lending market and, thus, could hinder local development by reducing bank credit. (shrink)

We present an abstract model of rationality that focuses on structural properties of attitudes. Rationality requires coherence between your attitudes, such as your beliefs, values, and intentions. We define three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. They parallel the familiar logical conditions on beliefs, but contrast with standard rationality conditions like preference transitivity. We establish a formal correspondence between our logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. Addressing John Broome's programme 'rationality through reasoning', we formally characterize how you can (...) (not) become more logical by reasoning. Our analysis connects rationality with logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology. (shrink)

People reason not only in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on. This often involves choosing between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (Rationality through reasoning, Hoboken, Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088, 2013) and Dietrich et al. (J Philos 116:585–614. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161138, 2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes, with or without facing choices in reasoning. We give different accounts of choosing, in (...) terms of a conscious activity or a partly subconscious process. Reasoning in attitudes differs fundamentally from reasoning _about_ attitudes, a form of theoretical reasoning in which one discovers rather than forms attitudes. We show that reasoning in attitudes has standard formal properties (such as monotonicity), but is indeterministic, reflecting choice in reasoning. Like theoretical reasoning, it need not follow logical entailment, but for a more radical reason, namely indeterminism. This makes reasoning in attitudes harder to model logically than theoretical reasoning. But it can be studied abstractly, using indeterministic consequence operators. (shrink)

Gilles de la Tourette syndrome (TS) is a childhood neuropsychiatric disorder characterised by the presence of motor and vocal tics. Patients with malignant TS experience severe disease sequelae; risking morbidity and mortality due to tics, self-harm, psychiatric comorbidities and suicide. By definition, those cases termed ‘malignant’ are refractory to all conventional psychiatric and pharmacological regimens. In these instances, deep brain stimulation (DBS) may be efficacious. Current 2015 guidelines recommend a 6-month period absent of suicidal ideation before DBS is offered to (...) patients with TS. We therefore wondered whether it may be ethically justifiable to offer DBS to a minor with malignant TS. We begin with a discussion of non-maleficence and beneficence. New evidence suggests that suicide risk in young patients with TS has been underestimated. In turn, DBS may represent an invaluable opportunity for children with malignant TS to secure future safety, independence and fulfilment. Postponing treatment is associated with additional risks. Ultimately, we assert this unique risk-benefit calculus justifies offering DBS to paediatric patients with malignant TS. A multidisciplinary team of clinicians must determine whether DBS is in the best interest of their individual patients. We conclude with a suggestion for future TS-DBS guidelines regarding suicidal ideation. The importance of informed consent and assent is underscored. (shrink)

Jaswal & Akhtar in their target article convincingly argue that subjects with autism do not have diminished social motivation. However, they still recognize that autistic people behave socially in an unusual way. Why? Here we suggest that these behaviours are the results of a multisensory integration deficit. Viewed from this perspective, the assumption that autistic people's unusual behaviours indicate diminished social motivation has to be replaced by the one that they have diminished social prediction skills.

According to conceptual reductive accounts, if properties of one domain can be conceptually reduced to properties of another domain, then the former properties are ontologically reduced to the latter properties. I will argue that conceptual reductive accounts face problems: either they do not recognise that many higher-level properties are correlated with multiple physical properties, or they do not clarify how we can discover new truthmakers of sentences about a higher-level property. Still, there is another way to motivate ontological reduction, the (...) truthmaker reductive explanations (TRE). TRE can be given by using resources from John Heil’s truthmaker theory and the a priori entailment view or the a posteriori entailment view. I will argue that we can give these truthmaker reductive explanations if there are various less-than-perfectly similar physical properties that can be the truthmakers of sentences about higher-level properties and the physical similarity between them can explain why an irreducible higher-level property is not needed. (shrink)

The main idea of this thesis is multi-descriptional physicalism. According to it, only physical entities are elements of our ontology, and there are different ways to describe them. Higher-level vocabularies (e.g., mental, neurological, biological) truly describe reality. Sentences about higher-level entities are made true by physical entities. Every chapter will develop multi-descriptional physicalism or defend it from objections. In chapter 1, I will propose a new conceptual reductive account that conceptually reduces higher-level entities to physical entities. This conceptual reductive account (...) combines resources from Heil’s truthmaker theory and either a priori physicalism or a posteriori physicalism. In chapter 2, I apply this conceptual reductive account to various debates. Physicalism, the multiple-realisability argument, the prototype theory of concepts, and truthmaker explanations will be discussed. In chapter 3, I will argue that a major aim of metaphysics should be to discover which entities are fundamental and explain why they suffice for the existence of derivative entities. In chapter 4, I will propose a new way to explain why sentences apparently about composite objects are true even though there are no composite objects. It combines resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy. In chapter 5, I will argue that the intuition that the mind and the body are very different does not show that the mind is distinct from the body. This intuition can be explained away by mentioning our dispositions to give non-physical explanations when we are ignorant of physical facts. In chapter 6, I will examine two arguments for the existence of a metaphysically independent level, and I will argue that only a modified version of one of them succeeds. I will argue that methodological principles support the view that there is a metaphysically independent level. (shrink)

During the last decade of the thirteenth and the first of the fourteenth century the Byzantine army relied heavily on large groups of mercenary soldiers, the most important being the Cretans, the Alans and the Catalan Grand Company. By examining the views George Pachymeres, Nikephoros Gregoras and Thomas Magistros express about these groups, the present investigation will examine the impact of mercenaries on the military affairs of the Byzantine state, as well as Byzantine attitudes towards mercenaries.

Syrgiannes Palaiologos Philanthropenos played a leading role in the conflicts between factions of the Byzantine aristocracy in the 1320s and 1330s. The most important historians of the period, Nikephoros Gregoras and John Kantakouzenos, depict a rather negative picture of the personality of Syrgiannes. He is portrayed as an overambitious individual who constantly plots against the throne. He is seen as a perjurer whose actions prove that he has no moral constraints and does not hesitate to betray his friends. This image (...) has influenced modern scholarship which to a large extent uncritically accepts this negative image of Syrgiannes without taking into consideration the biases and contradictions of the narratives of Gregoras and Kantakouzenos. The cross-examination of the information provided by these two historians indicates that a large part of their account of the activities of Syrgiannes and his motives should be treated cautiously. (shrink)

The contemporary physical description of the universe reflects the inanimate world only. Broadening this description by including life may limit the application of well?established physical laws and may find new forces of the universe governing living organizations. This may also require adoption of some new assumptions and methodological principles, such as a broader principle of uncertainty, and recognition of the fact that humans? ability to manifest biofield communication is distributed very unevenly in the population. Based on available body of scientific (...) literature it is suggested that at this time, before the theoretical basis of the biofield is developed, it is important to conduct a broad experimental study of highly psi?gifted individuals in order to accumulate scientific knowledge of humans? ability to interact with matter, i.e., known physical fields and living organisms by intent. One can expect that current studies of organisms? genomes and attempts to utilize stem cells in medicine will call for the recognition of the biofield and its operative control function in organisms. However, developing a from?the?top?down view on the organism by the suggested approach will shorten this process and it deserves appropriate investment of social resources. (shrink)

Os tempos conjunturais de 1745 a 1818 são, tal como a vida e actuação de António Ribeiro dos Santos, diversificados e dissonantes. Qual o problema de fundo deste artigo? Tentar retraçar e compreender as linhas de um desenho, de componente biográfico-intelectual, em que as cores da paleta do barroco atlântico-joanino paulatina mas persistentemente se tornam mutáveis em luzes enciclopédicas e europeias. O Reino estendia-se em paisagens de senhorios e concelhos, pontuadas por uma rede crescente de espaços urbanos em extensões de (...) império atlântico e olhadas intermitentes ou dependentes da Europa. Os poderes do rei afirmavam-se, mas limitavam-se com o crescimento das estruturas da administração e das justiças. Um instituto jurídico, que se ia tornando distinto, ganhava e afirmava-se sob a designação de Estado. Os privilégios e excepções sentiam o crescimento do Estado, que vivia das leis, perante as quais, cada vez mais, todos se queriam iguais. Nas paisagens, sujeitos àqueles poderes, viviam vassalos. Vassalos que eram uma das preocupações da época. (shrink)

There is wide research about the Philosophy for/with Children program. However, there is not any known attempt to investigate how a philosophical discussion can be implemented through a museum workshop. The present research aims to discuss aesthetic and epistemological issues with primary school children through a temporary art exhibition in a museum in Cyprus. Certainly, paintings have been used successfully to connect philosophical topics with the experiences of the children. We suggest, though, that this is not as innovative as the (...) conduction of a dialogue in a museum. Results were mostly positive. Pupils participated in the discussion and they gave intensive definitions of beautiful paintings and counterexamples for given definitions. The structure of inductive arguments and the difference between belief and knowledge were discussed. Progress in the analysis of inductive arguments was slightly noticeable, but it is likely that this was due to limited time spent on analysing those arguments. Furthermore, more sessions are needed to make generalisations for the effectiveness of the Philosophy for Children program in a museum instead of a traditional classroom. Even though there is discussion about the different stimuli of the discussion, it might be worth considering the effectiveness of different contexts where the discussion can take place. (shrink)

Born in Granada, April 30, 1901, Antonio De Luna was educated in the universities of Granada and of Madrid, continued his studies at Freiburg in Bresgovia, Paris, and Oxford and received the doctorate in law from Bologna. At the age of 27 he was appointed to the chair of natural law at the University of La Laguna in the Canary Isles, and from there went on to Salamanca and Granada. In 1932 he obtained the chair of international public law of (...) the Faculty of Law of the University of Madrid. At this time he began a period of intense professional activity: He was Secretary of the Federation of Spanish Associations of International Studies (1932–1936), founder and director of the Institute of International and Economic Studies (1932–1936), and Secretary of the Juridical Assessory Commission of the Spanish Republic (1931–1934). After the interruption of the Civil War, Luna, with a sense of continuity, resumed his essential tasks. (shrink)

Two experiments were conducted for the derivation of psychophysical scales of the following audio descriptors: spectral centroid, spectral spread, spectral skewness, odd-to-even harmonic ratio, spectral deviation, and spectral slope. The stimulus sets of each audio descriptor were synthesized and independently controlled through appropriate synthesis techniques. Partition scaling methods were used in both experiments, and the scales were constructed by fitting well-behaving functions to the listeners' ratings. In the first experiment, the listeners' task was the estimation of the relative differences between (...) successive levels of a particular audio descriptor. The median values of listeners' ratings increased with increasing feature values, which confirmed listeners' abilities to estimate intervals. However, there was a large variability in the reliability of the derived interval scales depending on the stimulus spacing in each trial. In the second experiment, listeners had control over the stimulus values and were asked to divide the presented range of values into perceptually equal intervals, which provides a ratio scale. For every descriptor, the reliability of the derived ratio scales was excellent. The unit of a particular ratio scale was assigned empirically so as to facilitate qualitative comparisons between the scales of all audio descriptors. The construction of psychophysical scales based on univariate stimuli allowed for the establishment of cause-and-effect relations between audio descriptors and perceptual dimensions, contrary to past research that has relied on multivariate stimuli and has only examined the correlations between the two. Most importantly, this study provides an understanding of the ways in which the sensation magnitudes of several audio descriptors are apprehended. (shrink)

Power is classically understood as the playing out of relations between the ruler and the ruled. Political impasse is often viewed as a moment in which no clear-cut delineation of power exists, resulting in an overwhelming sense of frustration or feeling stuck in a no-win situation. The new globalised world has produced a real shift in how power works: not only has power been concentrated in the hands of very few while many millions become more oppressed by radical shortages and (...) growing costs, but we also have a new category of political subjectivity in which many find themselves neither rulers nor radically oppressed. Those who live the neither/nor of contemporary power live the new global impasse. For those of us who are stuck and compelled to wait for dominant power to break, this book uncovers possibilities in thought, imagination, and self-appropriation through oikeiosis, that is, making oneself at home in oneself, and constancy. (shrink)

A compositional nihilist believes that the only objects that exist are simples. However, a non-nihilist believes in the existence of composite objects and challenges the nihilist to explain why there are true sentences about chairs, tables, etc., if composite objects do not exist. Different nihilist views have been suggested to explain this (the paraphrase strategy and the truthmaker theory), but I believe that they are unsuccessful (either they do not successfully paraphrase every sentence apparently about composite objects, or they are (...) not precise about the truthmakers of those sentences). I will suggest that a new truthmaker theory, which uses resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy, can give such an explanation and does not face the problems of other theories. Therefore, we have a good reason to accept this truthmaker theory as the best nihilist way to accommodate sentences apparently about composite objects. (shrink)

This article examines the Byzantine responses to the battlefield tactics followed by the armies of the Turkoman chiefdoms during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The most characteristic example reflecting the difficulties faced by the Byzantine army when confronted by the Turkomans is the battle of Pelekanos, in the gulf of Nikomedia. It was fought in 1329 between the Byzantines under the command of the emperor Andronikos III (1328–1341), and the Ottomans whose leader was Orhan (1326–1362). The outcome of this battle (...) typifies the inability of the late Byzantine armies to deal effectively with the Turkoman cavalry archers, despite the instructions given by the military treatises which were compiled in the earlier periods of Byzantine history, despite the experience of fighting against enemies of similar nature in the past, and despite the fact that generals such as Kantakouzenos possessed a good knowledge of the fighting methods of the Turkomans. This article argues that the inability of the Byzantines to adjust to the demands of the battlefield tactics of the Turkoman warriors was a combination of many factors. The loss of Asia Minor deprived Byzantium of its main source of competent archers. The Byzantines relied on heavy cavalry which, although it proved ineffective against the Turkomans, was the symbol of exalted status of members of the aristocracy. Moreover, stereotyped views about the Turkomans affected the performance of the Byzantines on the battlefield. It seems that Byzantine generals, even if they knew the fighting methods of the Turkomans, very often could not fully understand the strength of their armies. This article concludes that the failure to react successfully to the battlefield tactics of the Turkomans could be partly described as a failure of cultural adaptation, reinforced by stereotypes about ‘barbarians.’. (shrink)

Concerns over the carbon footprint resulting from the manufacturing, usage and disposal of hardware have been growing. The right-to-repair legislation was introduced to promote sustainable utilisation of hardware by encouraging stakeholders to prolong the lifetime of products, such as electronic devices. As there is little empirical evidence from a consumer perspective on exercising the right to repair, this study aims firstly to examine the factors that underpin consumers’ intention to repair their hardware and secondly to investigate the perceived outcomes of (...) repair practices. Based on 510 responses, the results showed that intention to repair is dependent on three groups of factors, namely the facilitators of pro-environmental behaviour, repair-related factors and beliefs about legislation. If consumers have a stronger intention to repair, they have a stronger feeling of emotional self-assurance, satisfaction with the repair decision and the technology manufacturer, an intention to engage with the manufacturer and a positive perception of a repaired device’s performance. The findings contribute to the literature on sustainable behaviour and the right to repair, offering insight for policymakers and manufacturers about the strategies facilitating the wider adoption of repair practices. (shrink)