Rendre hommage à un auteur, ce n'est pas seulement célébrer ce qu'il fut mais c'est aussi alerter sur ce que son oeuvre apporte au présent et à l'avenir de la connaissance. C'est bien le sens donné à cet hommage à André-Jean Arnaud. Repenser le droit, c'était pou r cet auteur érudit : repenser les lieux, les conditions et les façons de l'étudier en dépassant les frontières géographiques en même temps que les frontières disciplinaires. En montrant en quoi André-Jean (...) class='Hi'>Arnaud fut, hors des sentiers battus et des orthodoxies de la production et de la transmission des savoirs en la matière, un exceptionnel précurseur et l'infatigable artisan d'un nouveau régime de connaissance sur le droit, le présent ouvrage s'adresse à toutes celles et à tous ceux, enseignants, chercheurs, étudiants ou simples citoyens, pou r qui l'étude du droit permet de mieux comprendre ce que sont et ce que sont susceptibles de devenir nos sociétés. (shrink)

Dans l'univers des soins de santé, l'éthique doit se construire D à partir de l'expérience de la personne malade et s'adapter à elle. Mais de quelle éthique parle-t-on au juste? Sur les valeurs qui la fondent – l'autonomie, la bienfaisance, la non-malfaisance et la justice –, tout le monde semble s'entendre. Pourtant, à observer un groupe de médecins ou d'infirmières discuter d'une situation problématique, une autre conclusion s'impose : le rapport à l'éthique change selon la conception qu'on se fait de (...) la tâche clinique. Hubert Doucet, spécialiste reconnu, expose ici les principales théories de l'éthique clinique et cherche à les faire dialoguer, en convoquant au passage la pensée du philosophe Paul Ricoeur. Il en présente les fondements et le vocabulaire, s'attarde à son histoire et pose la résolution de problème au coeur de son action. Ce faisant, il apporte une contribution autant théorique que pratique à tous ceux qui, étudiants et professionnels, veulent en comprendre le sens et en tirer le meilleur parti dans le cadre de leur travail. (shrink)

Prior work on weakness of will has assumed that it is a thoroughly psychological phenomenon. At least, it has assumed that ordinary attributions of weakness of will are purely psychological attributions, keyed to the violation of practical commitments by the weak-willed agent. Debate has recently focused on which sort of practical commitment, intention or normative judgment, is more central to the ordinary concept of weakness of will. We report five experiments that significantly advance our understanding of weakness of will attributions (...) by showing that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is less thoroughly psychological than the philosophical debate has assumed. We begin by showing that a sizable minority of people attribute weakness of will even in the absence of a violated commitment (Experiment 1). We then show that weakness of will attributions are sensitive to two important non-psychological factors. First, for actions stereotypically associated with weakness of will, the absence of certain commitments often triggers weakness of will attributions (Experiments 2–4). Second, the quality of an action’s outcome affects the extent to which an agent is viewed as weak-willed: actions with bad consequences are more likely to be viewed as weak-willed (Experiment 5). Our most important finding is that the ordinary concept of weakness of will is sensitive to two non-psychological factors and is thus much broader than philosophers have thus far imagined. We conclude by suggesting a two-tier model that unites our findings with traditional philosophical theorizing about weakness of will. (shrink)

More than 40 primary studies, and three recent systematic reviews and meta-analyses, have shown a clear association between pharmaceutical industry funding of clinical trials and pro-industry results. Industry sponsorship biases published scientific research in favour of the sponsors, a result of the strong interest commercial sponsors have in obtaining favourable results.Three proposed remedies to this problem are widely agreed upon among those concerned with the level of sponsorship bias: financial disclosure, reporting standards and trial registries. This paper argues that all (...) of these remedies either fail to address the mechanisms by which pharmaceutical companies’ sponsorship leads to biased results—design bias, multiple trials with predictable outcomes, fraud, rhetorical effects and publication bias—or else only inadequately address those mechanisms. As a result, the policies normally proposed for dealing with sponsorship bias are unable to eliminate it. Only completely separating public clinical research from pharmaceutical industry funding can eliminate sponsorship bias. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper considers the question of whether it is possible to be mistaken about the content of our first-order intentional states. For proponents of the rational agency model of self-knowledge, such failures might seem very difficult to explain. On this model, the authority of self-knowledge is not based on inference from evidence, but rather originates in our capacity, as rational agents, to shape our beliefs and other intentional states. To believe that one believes that p, on this view, constitutes (...) one's belief that p and so self-knowledge involves a constitutive relation between first- and second-order beliefs. If this is true, it is hard to see how those second-order beliefs could ever be false.I develop two counter-examples which show that despite the constitutive relation between first- and second-order beliefs in standard cases of self-knowledge, it is possible to be mistaken, and even self-deceived, about the content of one's own beliefs. These counter-examples do not show that the rational agency model is mistaken—rather, they show that the possibility of estrangement from one's own mental life means that, even within the rational agency model, it is possible to have false second-order beliefs about the content of one's first-order beliefs. The authority of self-knowledge does not entail that to believe that one believes that p suffices to make it the case that one believes that p. (shrink)

This collection of fourteen original essays addresses the seminal contribution of Franz Brentano and his heirs, to philosophy of language. Despite the great interest provoked by the Brentanian tradition and its multiple connections with early analytic philosophy, precious little is known about the Brentanian contribution to philosophy of language. The aim of this new collection is to fill this gap by providing the reader with a more thorough understanding of the legacy of Brentano and his school, in their pursuit of (...) a unique research programme according to which the analysis of meaning is inseparable from philosophical inquiries into what goes on in the mind and what there is in the world. In three parts, the volume first reconstructs Brentano’s pathbreaking thoughts on meaning and grammatical illusions, exploring their strong connections with the Austro-German tradition and analytic philosophy. It then addresses the multifaceted debates on the objectivity of meaning in the Brentano School and its aftermath. Finally, part three explores Brentano’s wider legacy, namely: Husserl’s theory of modification and typicality, Bühler’s theory of linguistic and non-linguistic expressions, and Wittgenstein’s thoughts on guidance and rule-following. The result is a unique collection of essays which shows the significance, originality and timely character of the Brentanian philosophy of language. (shrink)

La publication des Actes du colloque de Bordeaux (16-19 Juin 2010) présente seize communications accompagnées d’une introduction d’E. Bermon, d’une courte préface de R. Williams, d’une bibliographie et de trois index : biblique, œuvres d’Augustin, auteurs anciens et médiévaux. Elle reprend une manière clas­sique de structurer le De Trinitate en trois grands blocs (I-IV ; V-VII ; VIII-XV) dont les intitulés signalent, dès la couverture, l’angle sous lequel ils seront abordés : exégèse, logique...

Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2009-08-31 12:18:30.156.

Table of contents -- Foreword by klaus schwab -- Author biographies -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction - by armand doucet & jelmer evers -- education in a time of unprecedented change by michael soskil -- education today: a collection of snapshots by elisa guerra -- - overcoming equity gaps in and through education by michael soskil -- Teach me: the learner profile by armand doucet -- the power of learning by nadia lopez -- contextualizing personalization in education by armand (...) doucet -- Evolution of technology in the classroom by koen timmers -- flip the system: the networked activist teacher by jelmer evers -- Conclusion- by armand doucet & jelmer evers -- Epilogue by andreas schleicher. (shrink)

The war on drugs is widely criticized as unjust. The idea that the laws prohibiting drugs are unjust can easily lead to the conclusion that those laws do not deserve our respect, so that our only moral reason to obey them flows from a general moral obligation to obey the law, rather than from anything morally troubling about drug use itself. In this paper, I argue that this line of thinking is mistaken. I begin by arguing that the drug laws (...) are indeed unjust. However, so long as they remain prohibited, I argue that we have strong moral reasons to avoid drug use. First, drug users are partly responsible for the violent and exploitative conditions in which many drugs are produced and distributed. Second, the unequal ways in which drug laws are enforced make drug use by many an unethical exercise of privilege. These reasons do not depend on the existence of a general moral obligation to obey the law; we ought to refrain from illegal drug use even if prohibition is unjust and even if we have no general obligation to obey the law. In fact, drug laws turn out to represent an interesting exception case within the broader debate about this obligation, and I argue that it is the very injustice of the law that generates the reasons not to violate it. (shrink)

The past two decades have seen growing calls for the “tobacco endgame.” Its advocates are united by their commitment to two ideas. First, tobacco‐related harms represent a catastrophic health emergency, and second, current tobacco‐control approaches are an inadequate response to the scale of that emergency. To endgame advocates, tobacco policy should have more ambitious goals than merely “controlling” tobacco. Instead, it should aim to bring about a smoke‐free world. While a range of different policies are included under the umbrella of (...) the “tobacco endgame,” the most radical proposal is for a complete ban on tobacco. Its advocates argue that in addition to improving global public health, an effective ban on tobacco would also promote overall autonomy and would have important egalitarian benefits. This article critically examines these arguments for a tobacco ban. I argue that they rely on idealizing assumptions about the likely effects of a ban. Because an effective ban would require robust enforcement to control the illegal market in tobacco, it would be more likely to undermine autonomy and equality than it would be to promote them. By relying on idealizing assumptions and ignoring the likely consequences of a tobacco ban, advocates of a ban obscure, rather than clarify, both the policy debate and the ethical stakes. I conclude by considering the ways that idealizing assumptions should—and should not—play a role in debates about ethical issues in public policy. (shrink)

The interventionist account of causation offers a criterion to distinguish causes from non-causes. It also aims at defining various desirable properties of causal relationships, such as specificity, proportionality and stability. Here we apply an information-theoretic approach to these properties. We show that the interventionist criterion of causation is formally equivalent to non-zero specificity, and that there are natural, information-theoretic ways to explicate the distinction between potential and actual causal influence. We explicate the idea that the description of causes should be (...) proportional to that of their effects. Then we draw a distinction between two ideas in the existing literature, the range of invariance of a causal relationship and its stability. The range of invariance is related to specificity and range of causal values. Stability concerns the effect of additional variables on the relationship between some focal pair of cause and effect variables. We show how to distinguish and measure the direct influence of background variables on the effect variable, and their influence on the relationship between the focal cause and the effect variable. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the information-theoretic approach, and offer prospects for complementary approaches. (shrink)

Running head: Implicit sequence learning ABSTRACT Can we learn without awareness? Although this issue has been extensively explored through studies of implicit learning, there is currently no agreement about the extent to which knowledge can be acquired and projected onto performance in an unconscious way. The controversy, like that surrounding implicit memory, seems to be at least in part attributable to unquestioned acceptance of the unrealistic assumption that tasks are process-pure, that is, that a given task exclusively involves either implicit (...) or explicit knowledge. (shrink)

Le Marx de Michel Henry est un ouvrage paradoxal – comme en témoigne sa conclusion en manière de coup de force, selon laquelle Marx, au motif que sa philosophie contiendrait une « métaphysique de l’individu », est « l’un des premiers penseurs chrétiens de l’Occident » –, et, à ce titre, il ne peut valoir que par l’éclairage inédit qu’il donne aux textes précis qu’il commente. M. Henry procède ainsi en prêtant à Marx une ontologie de la « vie » (...) subjective et monadique, celle-ci étant elle-même déterminée principalement comme « affectivité », tout en cherchant à mettre en lumière les concepts économiques de Marx à partir de cette notion. C’est le double caractère rigoureux et inédit d’un tel éclairage qu’Arnaud François tente de mettre en évidence. (shrink)

The Nobel Laureate Illya Prigogine compares the recent breakthroughs in human biology to the major changes that occurred when the Neolithic period succeeded the Paleolithic, 12,000 years ago. Although there is disagreement about the meaning of these changes, most opposing views recognize that a “major transformation” took place. Some interpret the recent breakthroughs in neuroscience as the first step toward “our posthuman future” whereas others see the consequences of these achievements as the end of humankind. Genomics and neuroscience are the (...) main fields that, at this point, give rise to such a debate, some authors stating that neuroscience raises even greater anthropological and ethical challenges than does genomics. This article focuses on neuroscience. Its main object is to critically assess these diverging opinions on the impact of neuroscience and to determine whether both sides are not telling us something important about ourselves and how neuroscience could enlighten healthcare ethics. (shrink)

In 1952, Heinrich Scholz published a question in The Journal of Symbolic Logic asking for a characterization of spectra, i.e., sets of natural numbers that are the cardinalities of finite models of first order sentences. Günter Asser in turn asked whether the complement of a spectrum is always a spectrum. These innocent questions turned out to be seminal for the development of finite model theory and descriptive complexity. In this paper we survey developments over the last 50-odd years pertaining to (...) the spectrum problem. Our presentation follows conceptual developments rather than the chronological order. Originally a number theoretic problem, it has been approached by means of recursion theory, resource bounded complexity theory, classification by complexity of the defining sentences, and finally by means of structural graph theory. Although Scholz' question was answered in various ways, Asser's question remains open. (shrink)

This schema gives an overview of the main branches and key members of the school of the German philosopher Franz Brentano (1838–1917).

Idipsum est une locution qu'Augustin utilise pour désigner Dieu. Elle signifie littéralement "cela même". Ce minimalisme sémantique ne laisse pas de la rendre mystérieuse. Faut-il y voir un emprunt à certains textes bibliques qui déjà en font usage? Dans ce cas, idipsum, tel un nom propre vide de toute signification, se bornerait à indiquer Dieu en tant qu'il échappe à toute définition rationnelle. Ou bien faut-il rattacher idipsum à la tradition platonicienne qui recourt à des locutions grecques similaires pour désigner (...) la réalité intelligible qui est " elle-même en elle-même "? Idipsum serait alors la trace d'un héritage philosophique conduisant Augustin à une définition métaphysique de Dieu comme Etre absolu. Cependant, cette alternative entre origine biblique et tradition platonicienne néglige la diversité des usages philosophiques des locutions formées sur auto puis ipsum: elles expriment d'abord l'identité et le fait d'être soi, puis la réflexivité, au croisement des champs dialectique, pratique et ontologique. Cet ouvrage explore la façon dont ces aspects de l'identité se sont construits, du autos grec à l'idipsum latin, à travers des études portant sur Homère, Platon, Aristote, le stoïcisme, le néoplatonisme grec puis latin, Augustin. (shrink)

This study aims to show the contribution of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach to professional mental health practice. To do so, the text first clarifies the transformation that has occured in the mental health field over the last 50 years. The “recovery”, with its emphasis on the empowerment of the user, testifies to this renewal. In a second part, the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen is presented. If its aim is to strengthen the power of individuals to choose the life they (...) aspire to lead, there is then the problem of people who are deprived of the freedom to choose. Here then is the issue of justice that is inseparable from freedom. The third part of the study addresses the contribution of Sen’s thinking to professional practice in mental health. What more does it offer than what recovery already brings with the valorisation of the autonomy of the subject? Here is discussed its anthropological foundation, as well as the implications for the practice of caregivers. Thus, in conclusion, the reader can see that Sen’s approach modifies the classical bioethics perspective in force since the 1980s. (shrink)

RésuméSi on la compare avec l’habituelle coercition infligée au condamné à mort dans le monde romain, la peine réservée au parricide ne manque pas de surprendre par son originalité. Le coupable est chaussé de sabots de bois, sa tête est ensuite recouverte d’une cagoule en peau de loup et il sera ensuite flagellé à l’aide de verges sanguines. Pour finir, le contrevenant prend place dans un sac de cuir qui sera cousu après l’intromission d’un bestiaire composé d’un chien, d’un coq, (...) d’une vipère et d’un singe d’après la description donnée par Modestin au Digeste 48.9.9 pr., ceci avant que l’ensemble ne soit jeté à l’eau. Même si la symbolique précise de chaque élément est difficile à saisir en raison de leur origine diffuse, car issue de l’imagination populaire mêlée à divers substrats religieux imbriqués, cette procédure punitive forme un tout cohérent qui ne constitue pas un châtiment politisé au sens strict, c’est-à-dire déployé dans le cadre juridique de la cité. La justice humaine se borne surtout à établir la faute gravissime incombant au contrevenant, laquelle remet en cause le socle de l’organisation romaine, ainsi qu’à préparer son rejet total de la communauté humaine et du droit qui y standardise les rapports. En ce sens, l’homme se garde de donner directement la mort au parricide et la procédure d’expulsion n’est pas sans rappeler celle d’autres individus dits «monstrueux» parce que frappés d’anormalité physique, notamment sexuelle, car ceux-ci remettaient en cause le principe même de l’existence sociale. Cette priorité absolue que constitue la sauvegarde du groupe social dans le traitement du crime a pu servir de point d’ancrage à certaines positions contemporaines qui commandent d’extraire le contrevenant de l’ordre légal, afin de traiter efficacement un acte considéré comme abominable dans l’absolu. C’est l’exemple de la théorie du droit pénal de l’ennemi dont les lointaines racines peuvent être repérées dans les procédés d’expulsions socio-juridiques qui trouvaient à se déployer dans l’Antiquité romaine. (shrink)

The Corporate Social Performance (CSP) model (Wood, Acad Manag Rev 164:691–718, 1991) assesses a firm’s social responsibility at three levels of analysis—institutional, organizational and individual—and measures the resulting social outcomes. In this paper, we focus on the individual level of CSP, manifested in the managerial discretion of a firm’s principles, processes, and policies regarding social responsibilities. Specifically, we address the human resources management of employees as a way of promoting CSR values and producing socially minded outcomes. We show that applying (...) the humanist philosophy to the managerial discretion of a business organization leads to the creation of an “autonomy supportive work environment”—as defined by the self-determination theory—which in turn, facilitates the internalization of social values, citizenship behaviors, and cooperation. The objective of promoting self-determination at work (i.e., the core of a humanist management) fits well with the ontology of social responsibility since autonomy and consideration of individuals as moral actors are central tenets. Furthermore, we show that applying humanistic management philosophy to the discretion of managers can lead to socially responsible outcomes. First, intra-organizational stakeholders (e.g., employees) are treated with respect and focus is put on their well-being, satisfaction, and self-actualization at work. Second, as employees’ need of self-determination is addressed by managers, it is likely that pro-social behaviors toward other stakeholders of the organization will be adopted, leading to socially responsible outcomes for extra-organizational stakeholders (Gagné, Motiv Emot 77:58–75, 2003). Thus, this paper ultimately posits that humanistic management applied to the HRM can be a solution for developing and maintaining socially responsible outcomes as determined at the individual level of the CSP model, through managerial discretion. (shrink)

Call metaphysical optimism the view that this world is the best of all possible worlds. This article addresses Franz Brentano’s case for metaphysical optimism. I argue that, although Brentano does not offer any conclusive argument in favour of the latter, he disentangles many related issues which are interesting in their own right. The article has five sections corresponding to five claims, which I argue are central to Brentano’s view, namely: metaphysical optimism is best spelled out as the view that this (...) world is the only good among all possible worlds; the notion of “correct”—or “fitting”—love offers a criterion of the good and the test of inverted love offers a means to identify that which is good; pessimism has to be distinguished from pejorism, viz. the view that the non-existence of this world is preferable to its existence; there is something good involved in every “bad” thing, to the effect that pejorism is false; it is wrong to consider the value of something in isolation. (shrink)

Arnaud Milanese | : La philosophie pratique de Hobbes est problématique parce que son déterminisme ne semble pas permettre une théorie de l’action : comment penser l’imputation des actes, si l’on soutient que le libre-arbitre n’existe pas ? 1) Son analyse se construit à travers la critique de la théorie scolastique du libre arbitre (dans la controverse avec Bramhall), et, à cette fin, Hobbes semble puiser dans l’analyse d’Aristote pour y reprendre sa distinction entre actions volontaires et involontaires. 2) (...) Mais il ne peut penser cependant la spécificité des actions humaines, comme d’Aristote, par la contingence. 3) Il ne lui reste alors, pour penser l’imputation dans une ontologie déterministe, qu’à constituer une conception de l’individualité de l’agent qui repense le motif aristotélicien de la détermination intérieure à agir, mais sans libre-arbitre ni contingence. 4) Si les difficultés théologiques subsistent, c’est parce que, pour Hobbes, aucune philosophie ne peut résoudre les mystères de la foi. | : The hobbesian philosophy of action is problematical because his determinism seems unable to frame a theory of action : how could it be possible to conceive imputation of actions, if free will does not exist ? 1) This analysis is built on a criticism of scholastic theory of free will (in controversy with Bramhall), and, to this end, Hobbes seems to draw in the aristotelian analysis and makes use of his distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions. 2) But however, he cannot conceive the specificity of human actions the same way Aristotle did, that is, by the concept of contingency. 3) So, the only remaining way of thinking imputation in his determinist ontology seems to suppose a certain conception of the individuality of agents, and to rethink this way the aristotelian concept of inner determination to act, but without free will nor contingency. 4) Theological difficulties remains, of course, but only because, according to Hobbes, philosophy cannot solve the mysteries of faith. (shrink)

On the basis of neuroiinaging studies, Posner & Raichle summarily report that the prefrontal cortex is involved in executive functioning and attention. In contrast to that superficial view, we briefly describe a testable model of the kinds of representations that are stored in prefrontal cortex, which, when activated, are expressed via plans, actions, thematic knowledge, and schemas.

We compare two different elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes on a sample of French farmers. We consider the lottery tasks initially proposed by Holt and Laury (Econ Rev 92:1644–1655, 2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (Evol Hum Behav 23:281–295, 2002; J Econ Behav Org 68:1–7, 2008). The main empirical result from this within-subject study is that risk preference measures are affected by the type of mechanism used. We first show that this risk preference instability can be related to non-expected (...) utility preferences of farmers. Using a risk-taking psychometric questionnaire, we then demonstrate that risk preferences of farmers are context-dependent. This may be another explanation of the observed risk preference instability. (shrink)

Franz Brentano’s works are not just full of deep and innovative insights into mind, world and values. His views also turned out to be highly influential upon several generations of students, who made them the basis of their own philosophical investigations, giving rise to what is known as the Brentano School (Albertazzi et al. 1996; Fisette & Fréchette 2007). In this chapter, I give a bird’s eye view of the Brentano School from a rather historical perspective. My leading hypothesis is (...) that one crucial factor explaining the rise of the school is Brentano’s unique strategy, within the academic context of the time, to promote the revival of philosophy as a rigorous science. After a brief introduction, I reconstruct the three main phases in the school’s development, namely Brentano’s teaching in Würzburg (1866-73), his teaching in Vienna (1874-95), and Anton Marty’s teaching in Prague (1880-1913). (shrink)