In recent decades it has become increasingly clear that a substantial amount of cognitive work goes on independent of consciousness. The research has been carried out largely under two rubrics, implicit learning and implicit memory. The former has been concerned primarily with the acquisition of knowledge independent of awareness and the latter with the manner in which memories not readily available to conscious recall or recognition play a role in behavior; collectively these operations comprise the essential functions of the cognitive (...) unconscious. This paper reviews the recent history of work on these issues, identifies some of the problems confronting researchers, and introduces a theoretical framework based on principles of evolutionary biology within which to view them. The argument is that the cognitive unconscious, despite its apparent sophistication, is of considerable evolutionary antiquity and antedates conscious cognitive systems by a considerable amount of time. Various entailments of this evolutionary perspective are explored including such issues as phylogeny and ontogeny of implicit processes, the robustness of the implicit functions as displayed by the capacity to resist disruptions from psychological and neurological disorders, the relationship between implicit cognition and intelligence, and individual differences in implicit cognitive abilities. (shrink)

This paper constructs two classes of models for the quantum correlation experiments used to test the Bell-type inequalities, synchronization models and prism models. Both classes employ deterministic hidden variables, satisfy the causal requirements of physical locality, and yield precisely the quantum mechanical statistics. In the synchronization models, the joint probabilities, for each emission, do not factor in the manner of stochastic independence, showing that such factorizability is not required for locality. In the prism models the observables are not random variables (...) over a common space; hence these models throw into question the entire random variables idiom of the literature. Both classes of models appear to be testable. (shrink)

Can a supercompact cardinal κ be Laver indestructible when there is a level-by-level agreement between strong compactness and supercompactness? In this article, we show that if there is a sufficiently large cardinal above κ, then no, it cannot. Conversely, if one weakens the requirement either by demanding less indestructibility, such as requiring only indestructibility by stratified posets, or less level-by-level agreement, such as requiring it only on measure one sets, then yes, it can.

We use a creature construction to show that consistently $$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak d=\aleph _1= {{\mathrm{cov}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{cof}}} < 2^{\aleph _0}. \end{aligned}$$The same method shows the consistency of $$\begin{aligned} \mathfrak d=\aleph _1= {{\mathrm{cov}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{non}}}< {{\mathrm{cof}}} < 2^{\aleph _0}. \end{aligned}$$.

In the contemporary discussion of hidden variable interpretations of quantum mechanics, much attention has been paid to the “no hidden variable” proof contained in an important paper of Kochen and Specker. It is a little noticed fact that Bell published a proof of the same result the preceding year, in his well-known 1966 article, where it is modestly described as a corollary to Gleason's theorem. We want to bring out the great simplicity of Bell's formulation of this result and to (...) show how it can be extended in certain respects. (shrink)

The Cellular Basis of Consciousness theory places the first appearance of sentience at the emergence of life. It makes the radical, and previously unexplored, claim that prokaryotes, like bacteria, possess a primitive form of consciousness. The implications of the theory for the philosophy of mind, cell-biology, and cognitive neurosciences are explored.

I WISH to defend the claim that imagining what it would be like to be in "someone else's shoes" can serve to explain that person's actions. This commonsense view has considerable plausibility, but requires clarification to be philosophically defensible; discussions of explanation often assume that understanding requires a theory of the thing understood. If understanding requires a theory, then however much imagining what it would be like to be in another person's situation might sooth one's curiosity, it cannot provide real (...) understanding. I shall argue that imagining oneself in someone else's situation does more than that: it allows actions to be explained without recourse to a theory of human behavior. The resulting explanations are real explanations, not just some reassuring facsimile thereof. (shrink)

Narrative ethics holds that if you ask someone what goodness is, as a basis of action, most people will first appeal to various abstractions, each of which can be defined only by other abstractions that in turn require further definition. If you persist in asking what each of these abstractions actually means, eventually that person will have to tell you a story and expect you to recognize goodness in the story. Goodness and badness need stories to make them thinkable and (...) to translate them into individual and collective actions. Yet after more than two decades of considering the issue, I do not believe that a collection of stories can by itself guide actions in ways that are sufficient to respond to ethical troubles in institutional settings. The question will always remain open for me, but my present belief is that narrative bioethics is always hyphenated, in the sense that guidance from stories needs to be allied with other ethical guidance. Each side of the hyphen qualifies the other side. The hyphenation I will argue for in this essay is “narrative-deontology.”. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis paper argues that Einstein subscribed to three distinct kinds of interpretations of the quantum theory: subjective, instrumental, and hidden variables interpretations. We explore the context and ihe content of Einstein's thinking over these interpretations, emphasizing Einstein's conception of his role not only as a critic of the new quantum theory but also as a guide pointing the way to better physics.

One of the foremost contributions to the study of the history of ideas. Examines ancient sources pertaining to the original condition of mankind.

A collection of stories by bioethicists writing about their own illnesses displays the importance of microethics. From this perspective, ethics happens not in the application of principles to specific decisions, but rather in the moment-to-moment flow of clinical interaction, as healthcare workers and patients make decisions, especially in their use of language. Microethical issues that are common to multiple stories are described as dense junctures of ethical concern. Three junctures are discussed in detail: conflicts between medical and patient rationalities, issues (...) of how clinicians represent patients, and practices of truth telling. These junctures are illustrated with examples from the bioethicists’ personal stories of treatment. (shrink)

In 1924, Bohr, Kramers and Slater tried to introduce into microphysics conservation principles that hold only on the average. This attempt was abandoned in the light of the Compton-Simon experiment. Since that time, except for a moment of doubt in 1936, it has been thought that the classical conservation laws hold in quantum theory for each individual interaction, in a way that yields the classical exchange-and-balance of momentum familiar from the laws of elastic collisions. It has been thought, that is, (...) that in each individual “collision” what one part of the total system loses in linear momentum another part gains, so as to maintain the same total amount afterwards as before. To those familiar with discussions of the interpretation of quantum theory, however, it will be apparent that the very concepts needed to express this idea of an elastic collision are generally not admitted in the theory. For one needs the idea that both before and after collision the total system has a well-defined value for the conserved quantity and, moreover, that the various component parts of the system have well-defined values for those quantities out of which the conserved one is composed. But in the case of spin, for example, it is customary to say that although total spin may be conserved in certain interactions one cannot attribute values to the separate components of spin because the associated operators do not commute. Moreover, one does not generally refer to the values of quantities except in eigenstates. Hence, in general, one would not refer to the value of the conserved quantity before and after interaction, except for interactions initiated in eigenstates. (shrink)

The proposed model is put forward as a template for the dynamical systems approach to embodied cognition. In order to extend this view to cognitive processing in general, however, two limitations must be overcome. First, it must be demonstrated that sensorimotor coordination of the type evident in the A-not-B error is typical of other aspects of cognition. Second, the explanatory utility of dynamical systems models must be clarified.

DUALISM AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD 257 IX. THE NATURE OF KNOWING AS A NATURAL EVENT . . 303 INDEX 323 PREFACE The principal purpose of this volume is not to present ...

... or political office or scientific research tends to think everything small which does not visibly contribute to money-getting, or political influence, ...

Asl. Atthasalinl of Buddhaghosa, ed. PTS. 1897. BB. Bibliotheca Buddhica, Petrograd. BC. Buddhacarita, ed. Cowell, Oxford, 1893. BCA. ...

Pierson et al. (2024) surveyed 824 U.S. bioethicists on a wide range of ethical issues, including topics related to abortion, medical aid in dying, and resource allocation, among others. They conte...

When clinician‐patient relationships go wrong, the problem may not be merely that one person is knowingly mistreating the other. More likely, they are caught up in different stories, and animated by different moral visions. The task is for each to see the point of the other's story.

Proletarian journalists are ?professionals?; in America's news factories. Their ?conversion downward?; took place over several ?long waves?; of capitalist development that linked commerce to ideology and legitimated marketplace practices. ?Independence,?; ?objectivity,?; and ?social responsibility?; emerged as ideological corollaries of commercial strategies deployed to stabilize marketplace crises and class conflicts within journalism.

Originally published in 1963. The essays in this volume are critical and, with one exception, directed against the philosophic movement of pragmatism. "The Thirteen Pragmatisms" is an exercise in logical analysis and is a challenge to a group of philosophers who have taken on a collective name to show how their apparent diversities are to be reconciled. Few philosophers would call themselves orthodox followers of this train of thought, so these essays can be studied without a sense of personal injury (...) that deadens the critical faculty and obscures insight. In The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays, logical technique is on display: the author's keenness in spotting double meanings and his ability to rephrase them in univalent form. This collection of essays should afford students of philosophy a set of cases in which they need not take sides but which give them an analytical method they can practice themselves on contemporary issues. The fact that these essays are on the whole critical gives them a heuristic value that dogmatic or expository essays would not have. (shrink)

Matthew Lipman’s Thinking in Education develops an approach to philosophical inquiry with children (PwC) that claims to develop critical, creative and caring thinking. With Lipman, these kinds of thinking are primarily tied to analytic-logical commitments, and as such, his approach concerns only one way to conceptualize thinking. To address this issue and create space for another understanding, I introduce the concept of affect based on the work of the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze. From a theoretical perspective, affect helps to deepen (...) the relationship between thinking, the body and experience in PwC; in addition, from a practical standpoint, it expands and enriches facilitation practices and curriculum design. To explore affect, I first show why PwC would benefit from such a theoretical expansion while also looking at connections already present within the literature on PwC. After a brief overview of affect theory and some of its initial applications to education, I propose a reading of Deleuzian affect augmented by thinkers like Claire Colebrook and Brian Massumi. Finally, I explore philosophical inquiry through affect and suggest how facilitation practices and curriculum design can respond in lieu of this conceptualization. This response examines several areas: inquiry, concepts, the community and ethical-political engagement. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

The weather can be very cold at Dachau concentration camp, but Dachau was apparently not cold enough for some Nazi purposes. A camp doctor named Rascher wrote to Heinrich Himmler in February 1943, asking to be transferred to Auschwitz to continue his experiments—which involved freezing live prisoners. The letter reads: “Auschwitz is more suitable [than Dachau] as it is colder there and the camp itself is much larger, thereby attracting less attention to the test persons, who tend to scream while (...) freezing.”. (shrink)

Most areas of the cognitive and social sciences assume that knowledge representations are constructed and used during communication and that much of its content is social. Those of us who build computer models of comprehension and conversation are forced to be explicit about the nature of these knowledge representations and affiliated processes. There are some conditions when knowledge is not sufficiently social, and other conditions when knowledge is overly grounded in social mechanisms. The argument is advanced that constraints, coherence, and (...) precision are very much at the heart of an explanation of the nature and amount of social knowledge. Asocial content reigns supreme when the referential world knowledge is highly constrained, coherently structured, and precisely specified. The social context of knowledge construction becomes progressively more influential to the extent to that world knowledge is vague, open-ended, imprecise, underspecified, and fragmentary. (shrink)