This is the précis of Artūrs Logins book Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (Logins 2022).

Початок повномасштабного російського вторгнення в 2022 році викликав значні зміни в українській національній ідентичності. Соціологічні опитування демонструють трансформацію цінностей та повсякденних практик українців. Вони почали частіше вживати українську мову, змінили історичні та конфесійні вподобання. Необхідним є отримання об’єктивного соціологічного знання стосовно причин та наслідків цих змін. Передумовою цього є дослідження існуючих робіт по даній тематиці. Метою статті є систематизація та критичне узагальнення наукових праць по тематиці української національної ідентичності у вітчизняній науці. Автор розглядає роботи по цій темі, написані дослідниками в (...) галузі різних наук: історії, філософії, політології, філології, соціології. Особливу увага приділяється огляду дисертацій. Узагальнюються основні ідеї праць, даються авторські висновки по можливості їх використання в майбутньому. Показується, що автори зачіпають широке коло питань, що стосуються національної ідентичності: її історична ґенеза, трансформації, фактори мови та історичної пам’яті, відображення ідентичності в мистецтві та медіа, вплив на неї глобалізації та російської агресії. Автор констатує, що дана проблематика поки що слабо розвинута в рамках соціологічної науки. У відкритому доступі відсутні значні теоретичні роботи, здебільшого соціологи займаються виключно емпіричними дослідженнями. Також відсутні теоретичні роботи, присвячені аналізу трансформацій національної ідентичності, що стались з початку повномасштабної російської агресії в лютому 2022 році. Це пояснюється недостатнім проміжком часу, що пройшов на даний момент. Також складності додає швидка зміна політичних та військових реалій. Враховуючи значну суспільну значимість, автор робить висновок про необхідність посилення соціологічного осмислення цієї тематики. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it is the explicativecharacter of Tarski's semantic definition of truth given in his study of 1933 that allows forconsideration of a philosophical background of this definition in the proper sense. Given the explicativecharacter of this definition it is argued that the philosophical tradition that should be taken intoaccount with regard to this philosophical background is the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw Schoolin its connections with the School of Brentano. As an example of (...) the explanatory power ofconsidering this tradition as far as Tarski's philosophical choices are concerned I use here thenotion of sentence-inscription, i.e., the notion of that entity of which truth is predicated inthe definition in question. One of the consequences of these statements is that philosophicaldiscussions concerning the semantic definition of truth can be regarded from two points ofview. On the one hand, they may take the perspective of its explicational function, i.e., theperspective of its philosophical background. On the other hand, they might consider the philosophicalconsequences of the definition with respect to the goal of the explication, i.e., they may considerits philosophical content independently of its historical background. (shrink)

We start by introducing the idea of echo chambers. Echo chambers are social and epistemic structures in which opinions, leanings, or beliefs about certain topics are amplified and reinforced due to repeated interactions within a closed system; that is, within a system that has a rather homogeneous sample of sources or people, which all share the same attitudes towards the topics in question. Echo chambers are a particularly dangerous phenomena because they prevent the critical assessment of sources and contents, thus (...) leading the people living within them to deliberately ignore or exclude opposing views. In the second part of this paper, we argue that the reason for the appearance of echo chambers lies in the adoption of what we call ‘epistemic vices’. We examine which vices might be responsible for their emergence, and in doing so, we focus on a specific one; ‘epistemic violence’. In assessing and evaluating the role of this epistemic vice, we note that it can be triggered by epistemic contexts characterized by high stakes that may turn ordinary intellectual virtues (such as skepticism) into vices (such as denialism). In the third part of this contribution, we suggest a way to deal with echo chambers. The solution focuses on advocating a responsibilist pedagogy of virtues and vices that -we claim- might be capable of preventing their emergence. (shrink)

Knowledge, certainty, and understanding are all plausible candidates for constituting aims and setting the norms for genuine inquiry. However, a mere pluralist account of aims and norms of inquiry that lacks a more fundamental theoretical motivation might strike us as ad hoc. The aim of this paper is to provide further motivation for a pluralist approach. The key to the solution is to regard finding sufficient reasons to believe as a more general, indeed unifying, aim of theoretical inquiry.

The present special issue of Utopian Studies is devoted to utopia and solidarity considered from philosophical, sociopolitical, cultural, and literary perspectives. It was inspired by the 18th Utopian Studies Society Conference "Solidarity and Utopia," which took place in Gdańsk in July 2017. As the papers presented at that conference clearly demonstrated, the most immediate connotations of the word solidarity used in different contexts tend to be positive, invariably inducing utopian or messianic thinking, despite the fact that solidarity is "not morally (...) good per se, it is good only to the extent that its inclusiveness, goal and implications for the individual are morally acceptable."1 Unless it concerns deviant... (shrink)

Focusing on the broadly conceived principle of hospitality, the essay offers an analysis of Joshua Barnes's Gerania, a highly original but little-studied late seventeenth-century utopia set in India and featuring the Pygmies as utopians and Homer as their lawgiver. It is argued that Barnes's utopia offers a radical alternative to the policy of closure and isolation adopted in early modern utopian commonwealths. Its peculiar construction results in the unique openness of the narrator's discourse to an alien word and of the (...) ideal world to outsiders, their outlandish beliefs, rules and artifacts. (shrink)

A 27 de Outubro comemora a Igreja os santos Vicente, Sabina e Cristeta. Conhecidos como os Mártires de Évora, a eles foi erguida no século XV na cidade alentejana, no local onde se dizia terem nascido, uma ermida, ampliada no século seguinte já à conta do Município, que ainda hoje mantém a propriedade. Era-lhes também dedicada, na nave direita da Sé de Évora, uma das capelas laterais desaparecidas após a intervenção da Direcção-geral dos Monumentos Nacionais na década de 40 do (...) século XX.A naturalidade dos santos irmãos, embora assumida pelos eborenses, sobretudo após as argumentações de André de Resende, mantém-se de difícil comprovação, sendo por muitos autores atribuída não à cidade alentejana, mas a Talavera de la Reina (Toledo). Martirizados no século IV na cidade espanhola de Ávila, São Vicente e suas irmãs aí foram sepultados e em sua honra construída uma grande basílica, expressão do reconhecimento e devoção aos chamados Santos de Ávila. Da descrição legendária das suas vidas e martírios decorre a respectiva iconografia. Tudo aconteceu em tempo do governador Daciano, enviado à Península Ibérica pelo imperador Diocleciano, que promoveu uma intensa perseguição aos cristãos. O jovem Vicente, que poderia servir de incentivo aos pagãos pelo seu comportamento cristão exemplar, foi chamado à presença de Daciano que o pretendeu convencer a sacrificar a Júpiter. Perante a recusa, mandou conduzi-lo a uma das praças da cidade e obrigá-lo a executar o sacrifício ou a ser morto. Colocado sobre o altar de pedra, esta tornou-se mole ficando impressas as suas pegadas, prodígio que deixou todos os presentes admirados e convencidos de que o Deus de Vicente era o verdadeiro. Tal facto levou Daciano a suspender temporariamente a condenação, tendo mandado o jovem para a prisão, onde foi visitado por suas irmãs Sabina e Cristeta. Convencido por elas a fugir, foram os três perseguidos e apanhados em Ávila, sendo sujeitos a vários suplícios e finalmente partidas as suas cabeças com paus e pedras. Os seus corpos foram deixados ao abandono para pasto dos animais; todavia apareceu uma enorme serpente que os protegia e que se enroscou à volta de um judeu rico da cidade que pretendia desprezar os santos despojos e que só se viu livre da serpente quando prometeu converter-se ao cristianismo. Os mártires acabaram por ser sepultados pelos cristãos, espalhando-se rapidamente a sua devoção.O repertório iconográfico, muito reduzido no que concerne a arquidiocese de Évora, confina--se praticamente à igreja de São Vicente, onde se encontra a pedra na qual supostamente terá deixado as marcas dos seus pés; alguns painéis do retábulo-mor representam “São Vicente conduzido perante o altar de Júpiter”, “São Vicente na prisão e a visita de suas irmãs”, “o martírio de São Vicente”, e “o judeu impedido pela serpente de ultrajar os corpos dos três santos”. A representação escultórica segue muito de perto a de Ávila. Todos trazem a palma do martírio, São Vicente um livro aberto ou semicerrado. As irmãs Sabina e Cristeta apresentam uma iconografia pouco definida, sendo por vezes necessário, quando não estão inseridas no contexto duma cena conhecida, que o nome lhes seja sotoposto para fácil identificação. (shrink)

The article is concentrated on three major concepts in the Hegelian System, namely: Begriff (notion), Schein (appearance), and Erscheinung (phenomenon). It reveals the interrelationship of this terms and unveils them by showing their triadic notion-elements – their abstracts, negations and concretes (sometimes called "thesis, antithesis and synthesis").

The aim of the present article is to accomplish two things. The first is to show that given some further plausible assumptions, existing challenges to the indispensability of knowledge in causal explanation of action fail. The second is to elaborate an overlooked and distinct argument in favor of the causal efficacy of knowledge. In short, even if knowledge were dispensable in causal explanation of action, it is still indispensable in causal explanation of other mental attitudes and, in particular, some reactive (...) attitudes and factive emotions. Taking into account this sort of causal efficacy in determining which mental states are genuine mental states opens up new perspectives for defending the view that knowledge is the most general factive and genuine mental state. (shrink)

This paper elaborates a new solution to the lottery paradox, according to which the paradox arises only when we lump together two distinct states of being confident that p under one general label of ‘belief that p’. The two-state conjecture is defended on the basis of some recent work on gradable adjectives. The conjecture is supported by independent considerations from the impossibility of constructing the lottery paradox both for risk-tolerating states such as being afraid, hoping or hypothesizing, and for risk-averse, (...) certainty-like states. The new proposal is compared to views within the increasingly popular debate opposing dualists to reductionists with respect to the relation between belief and degrees of belief. (shrink)

In a recent publication Travis Timmerman has claimed that sometimes it is morally permissible to not prevent something bad from happening, even if it is in one’s power to do so without sacrificing anything nearly as important.1 To defend his point, he has proposed a thought experiment and based his claims on putative common-sense morality intuitions. To aid in the subsequent discussion, Timmerman’s case is reproduced as follows.

In this paper, I argue against recent versions of justification norms of action and practical deliberation . I demonstrate that these norms yield unacceptable results in deception cases. However, a further modification of justification norms in the light of these results appears to be ad hoc. Hence, I claim, we should reject justification norms of action and practical deliberation.

Peter Achinstein has argued at length and on many occasions that the view according to which evidential support is defined in terms of probability-raising faces serious counterexamples and, hence, should be abandoned. Proponents of the positive probabilistic relevance view have remained unconvinced. The debate seems to be in a deadlock. This paper is an attempt to move the debate forward and revisit some of the central claims within this debate. My conclusion here will be that while Achinstein may be right (...) that his counterexamples undermine probabilistic relevance views of what it is for e to be evidence that h, there is still room for a defence of a related probabilistic view about an increase in being supported, according to which, if p > p, then h is more supported given e than it is without e. My argument relies crucially on an insight from recent work on the linguistics of gradable adjectives. (shrink)

In this article I focus on some unduly neglected common-sense considerations supporting the view that one's evidence is the propositions that one knows. I reply to two recent objections to these considerations.

Ethics cannot present a positive judgement for that which there is no consensus within our pluralistic society. As a result, "Do good and avoid evil" is proposed as the orienting principie for action. The later part (of the article) deals whit prenatal diagnostics, specifically the good contribution and bad utilizations of prenatal diagnostics employed by parents.

During the last 20 years, knowledge-centered approaches have become increasingly popular in analytic epistemology. Rather than trying to account for knowledge in other terms, these approaches take knowledge as the starting point for the elucidation of other epistemic notions (such as belief, justification, rationality, etc.). Knowledge-centered approaches have been so influential that it now looks like epistemology is undergoing a factive turn. However, relatively little has been done to explore how knowledge-centered views fare in new fields inside and beyond epistemology (...) strictly understood. This volume aims at remedying this situation by putting together contributions that investigate the significance of knowledge in debates where its roles have been less explored. The goal is to see how far knowledge-centered views can go by exploring new prospects and identifying new trends of research for the knowledge-first program. Extending knowledge-centered approaches in this way not only promises to deliver novel insights in these neglected fields, but also to revisit more traditional debates from a fresh perspective. As a whole, the volume develops and evaluates the knowledge-first program in original and fertile ways. (shrink)

According to a widely held view epistemic justification is a normative notion. According to another widely held assumption, epistemic justification comes in degrees. Given that gradability requires a context-sensitivity that normativity seems to lack, these two assumptions stand in tension. Giving up the assumption of gradability of justification represents a lesser theoretical cost.

The dominant theory of judgment in 1870 was one or other variety of combination theory: the act of judgment is an act of combining concepts or ideas in the mind of the judging subject. In the decades to follow a succession of alternative theories arose to address defects in the combination theory, starting with Bolzano’s theory of propositions in themselves, Brentano’s theory of judgment as affirmation or denial of existence, theories distinguishing judgment act from judgment content advanced by Brentano’s students (...) Twardowski, Husserl and Meinong, and finally, Adolf Reinach’s addition of a linguistic dimension to the Brentano-Husserlian theory of judgment – an account of judgments as ways of doing things with words in what Reinach called ‘social acts’. (shrink)

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...) evidence. (shrink)

Human organizations’ adoption of the paradigm of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is associated with the growth of techno-empowerment, which is the process of transferring autonomy in decision-making to intelligent machines. Particular persuasive strategies have been identified that may coax people to use intelligent devices. However, there is a substantial research gap regarding what antecedents influence human intention to assign decision-making autonomy to artificial agents. In this study, ethological and evolutionary concepts are applied to explain the drivers for autonomous assistants’ techno-empowerment. (...) The method used in the study was a 4 × 2 between-subject experiment made with 278 persons. The research tool used to collect the data was an online survey. The results show that more positive attitudes and higher trust, perceived usefulness, and perceived ease of use are correlated with higher intention to allow the autonomous assistant independence in decision-making. Second, the results suggest that the more human-like a non-human agent is, the higher the intention to empower it—but only if this agent simultaneously provides functional and visual anthropomorphic cues explainable by the mimicry effect. (shrink)

According to the good reasoning view of normative reasons, p is a reason to F, just in case p is a premise of a good pattern of reasoning. This article presents two counterexamples to the most promising version of the good reasoning view.

It is well known that environmental burdens are more pronounced in socioeconomically disadvantaged communities, a phenomenon known as environmental injustice. Yet, there have been few studies that have addressed whether the degree of environmental injustice has changed over time. We analyze toxic releases in the United States over the first 26 years of the toxics release inventory and examine whether the decreases in toxic releases differ according to characteristics of the communities in which the emitters reside. We find that decreases (...) over these years are universal but far more substantial in high-income areas. Our results speak to both the nascent literature on information disclosure and that on environmental justice. (shrink)

The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship.

“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”The predilection for idiosyncratic, arbitrary, or even playful use of key concepts of any discipline, attended by the apparently natural tendency toward “humpty-dumptyism,” makes it possible to produce a plethora of brilliant (...) generalizations, paradoxes, bons mots, and suchlike. All these invariably contribute to the successful autopoiesis of that discipline, as there is always something—to quote Bishop Joseph Hall, the author... (shrink)

In this paper we interpret and examine critically John Locke’s ideas on cognitive (intellectual) virtues and values presented in his The Conduct of the Understanding (1697). We believe that the cognitive subject’s virtues discussed by Locke are universal. We believe that knowledge and understanding must and can be guided by the pursuit of truth. But this concerns only the motivation component of knowledge, and not its success which is ultimately determined by the epistemic environment.