An intertemporal bargaining model of commitment does not entail the interaction of parts within the person as Rachlin claims, and is needed to explain properties of self-control that his molar generalization model does not predict.

Abilities are in many ways central to what being an agent means, and they are appealed to in philosophical accounts of a great many different phenomena. It is often assumed that abilities are some kind of dispositional property, but it is rarely made explicit exactly which dispositional properties are our abilities. Two recent debates provide two different answers to that question: the new dispositionalism in the debate about free will, and virtue reliabilism in epistemology. This paper argues that both answers (...) fail as general accounts of abilities, and discusses the ramifications of this result. (shrink)

In times of global economic and political crises, the notion of solidarity is gaining new currency. This book argues that a solidarity-based perspective can help us to find new ways to address pressing problems. Exemplified by three case studies from the field of biomedicine: databases for health and disease research, personalised healthcare, and organ donation, it explores how solidarity can make a difference in how we frame problems, and in the policy solutions that we can offer.

It is a familiar point that many ordinary dispositions are multi-track, that is, not fully and adequately characterisable by a single conditional. In this paper, I argue that both the extent and the implications of this point have been severely underestimated. First, I provide new arguments to show that every disposition whose stimulus condition is a determinable quantity must be infinitely multi-track. Secondly, I argue that this result should incline us to move away from the standard assumption that dispositions are (...) in some way importantly linked to conditionals, as presupposed by the debate about various versions of the ‘conditional analysis’ of dispositions. I introduce an alternative conception of dispositionality, which is motivated by linguistic observations about dispositional adjectives and links dispositions to possibility instead of conditionals. I argue that, because of the multi-track nature of dispositions, the possibility-based conception of dispositions is to be preferred. (shrink)

Combining knowledge of social policy and practice with insights from poststructural and feminist theory, the text demonstrates how democratic citizens and the political are continually recreated.

The concepts of Fundierung (“foundation” or “founding”) and Stiftung (“institution” or “instituting”) play a prominent role in the work of Edmund Husserl, who employs Fundierung to describe relations of essential necessity in “static” analyses of intentional consciousness, and Stiftung to describe movements of sedimentation and reactivation in “genetic” analyses of the co-advent of consciousness and the world. Martin Heidegger, meanwhile, employs the notion of Stiften (“establishing”) in his ontological questioning of the disclosure of the truth of beings. It is, therefore, (...) surprising that scholars tend to assume, if not explicitly assert, that Merleau-Ponty treats Fundierung and Stiftung as synonyms. I argue, on the contrary, that Fundierung and Stiftung take on increasingly divergent functions over the course of Merleau-Ponty’s writings, with Stiftung ultimately giving voice to the “ontological operations” of individuation through intertwining whereby sensible and sentient beings, qua flesh, give birth to sense. In particular, I take seriously Merleau-Ponty’s account of Stiftung – from Institution and Passivity onward – as a “double relation of Fundierung”; given that Fundierung is already a “double relation” between the founding and the founded term, Stiftung must be conceived as a “fourfold” relation, wherein each term is simultaneously founding and founded, relative to the other. This fourfold structure articulates the relation of “simultaneity” or “existential eternity” between beings and sense in their advent. By tracing the development of the concept of Stiftung in Merleau-Ponty’s work, I attempt to show that interpreting his thinking of la chair as an “ontology of institution” – in the sense of an articulation of the movement of existence as relations of Stiftung – highlights the originality of his ontologization of Husserlian phenomenology, and thereby his status as a “foundational” thinker in his own right, rather than a merely regional thinker of embodiment.Les concepts de Fundierung (fondation) et de Stiftung (institution) jouent un rôle central dans l’oeuvre d’Edmund Husserl, qui emploie Fundierung pour décrire des relations de nécessité essentielle dans les analyses « statiques » de la conscience intentionnelle, et Stiftung pour décrire les mouvements de sédimentation et de réactivation dans les analyses « génétiques » de l’avènement concomitant de la conscience et du monde. Martin Heidegger, de son côté, emploie la notion de Stiften (instituer, établir) dans son questionnement ontologique du dévoilement de la vérité de l’être. C’est pourquoi il est surprenant que les commentateurs tendent à supposer, sinon à affirmer, que Merleau-Ponty traite Fundierung et Stiftung comme des synonymes. Je soutiens au contraire que ces deux notions exercent des fonctions de plus en plus divergentes dans ses écrits, où la Stiftung exprime au fond les « opérations ontologiques » de l’individuation à travers l’entrelacement par lequel les êtres sensibles et sentants (en tant que chair) donnent naissance au sens. En particulier, je prends au sérieux la conception merleau-pontienne de la Stiftung – à partir des cours sur L’Institution et la passivité – comme « une double relation de Fundierung » ; étant donné que la Fundierung est déjà une « double relation » entre le terme fondant et le terme fondé, la Stiftung doit être conçue comme une relation « quadripartite » dans laquelle chaque terme est simultanément fondant et fondé, relatif à l’autre. Cette structure quadripartite articule la relation de « simultanéité » ou d’« éternité existentielle » entre les étants et le sens dans leur avènement. En retraçant le développement du concept de Stiftung dans les travaux de Merleau-Ponty, je tente de montrer que l’interprétation de sa pensée de la chair comme une « ontologie de l’institution » – au sens d’une articulation du mouvement de l’existence comme relations de Stiftung – souligne l’originalité de son ontologisation de la phénoménologie husserlienne, et par là son statut comme penseur « fondationnel » de plein droit, plutôt qu’un penseur simplement régional de l’incarnation.I concetti di Fundierung (fondazione) e di Stiftung (istituzione) ricoprono un ruolo centrale nell’opera di Edmund Husserl, che si serve del termine Fundierung per descrivere le relazioni di necessità nelle analisi “statiche” della coscienza intenzionale, e di Stiftung per descrivere i movimenti di sedimentazione e di riattivazione nelle analisi “genetiche” del co-avvento di coscienza e mondo. Inoltre, Martin Heidegger usa il termine Stiften (istituire, stabilire) nella sua interrogazione ontologica dello svelamento della verità dell’essere. Per questo, risulta sorprendente che i commentatori di Merleau-Ponty tendano a supporre, se non ad affermare, che il filosofo tratti Fundierung e Stiftung come dei sinonimi. Ritengo al contrario che queste due nozioni rivestano funzioni progressivamente divergenti nei suoi scritti, dal momento che la Stiftung viene ad esprimere le “operazioni ontologiche” dell’individuazione attraverso l’intreccio per cui gli esseri sensibili e senzienti (in quanto carne) permettono la nascita del senso. In particolare, prendo in considerazione la concezione merleau-pontiana della Stiftung – a partire dai corsi sull’istituzione e la passività – come una “doppia relazione di Fundierung”. Nella misura in cui la Fundierung è già una “doppia relazione” tra termine fondante e termine fondato, la Stiftung deve essere pensata come una relazione “quadripartita” in cui ogni termine è simultaneamente fondante e fondato, relativamente all’altro. Questa struttura quadripartita articola la relazione di “simultaneità” o d’“eternità esistenziale” tra gli enti e il senso nel loro avvenimento. Ritracciando lo sviluppo del concetto di Stiftung nei testi di Merleau-Ponty, tento dunque di mostrare come un’interpretazione della sua filosofia della carne come “ontologia dell’istituzione” – nel senso di un’articolazione del movimento dell’esistenza come relazione di Stiftung – metta in luce l’originalità della sua ontologizzazione della fenomenologia husserliana. Ne emerge dunque a pieno titolo un pensatore “fondazionale”, piuttosto che un pensatore semplicemente regionale dell’incarnazione. (shrink)

The standard Kratzerian analysis of modal auxiliaries, such as ‘may’ and ‘can’, takes them to be univocal and context-sensitive. Our first aim is to argue for an alternative view, on which such expressions are polysemous. Our second aim is to thereby shed light on the distinction between semantic context-sensitivity and polysemy. To achieve these aims, we examine the mechanisms of polysemy and context-sensitivity and provide criteria with which they can be held apart. We apply the criteria to modal auxiliaries and (...) show that the default hypothesis should be that they are polysemous, and not merely context-sensitive. We then respond to arguments against modal ambiguity. Finally, we show why modal polysemy has significant philosophical implications. (shrink)

Fundamental to spatial knowledge in all species are the representations underlying object recognition, object search, and navigation through space. But what sets humans apart from other species is our ability to express spatial experience through language. This target article explores the language ofobjectsandplaces, asking what geometric properties are preserved in the representations underlying object nouns and spatial prepositions in English. Evidence from these two aspects of language suggests there are significant differences in the geometric richness with which objects and places (...) are encoded. When an object is named (i.e., with count nouns), detailed geometric properties – principally the object's shape (axes, solid and hollow volumes, surfaces, and parts) – are represented. In contrast, when an object plays the role of either “figure” (located object) or “ground” (reference object) in a locational expression, only very coarse geometric object properties are represented, primarily the main axes. In addition, the spatial functions encoded by spatial prepositions tend to be nonmetric and relatively coarse, for example, “containment,” “contact,” “relative distance,” and “relative direction.” These properties are representative of other languages as well. The striking differences in the way language encodes objects versus places lead us to suggest two explanations: First, there is a tendency for languages to level out geometric detail from both object and place representations. Second, a nonlinguistic disparity between the representations of “what” and “where” underlies how language represents objects and places. The language of objects and places converges with and enriches our understanding of corresponding spatial representations. (shrink)

This paper, which is based on an extensive analysis of the literature, gives a brief overview of the main ways in which solidarity has been employed in bioethical writings in the last two decades. As the vagueness of the term has been one of the main targets of critique, we propose a new approach to defining solidarity, identifying it primarily as a practice enacted at the interpersonal, communal, and contractual/legal levels. Our three-tier model of solidarity can also help to explain (...) the way in which crises of solidarity can occur, notably when formal solidaristic arrangements continue to exist despite ‘lower tiers’ of solidarity practices at inter-personal and communal levels having ‘broken away’. We hope that this contribution to the growing debate on the potential for the value of solidarity to help tackle issues in bioethics and beyond, will stimulate further discussion involving both conceptual and empirically informed perspectives. (shrink)

This paper examines the efforts of contractualists to develop an alternative to aggregation to govern our duty not to harm (duty to rescue) others. I conclude that many of the moral principles articulated in the literature seem to reduce to aggregation by a different name. Those that do not are viable only as long as they are limited to a handful of oddball cases at the margins of social life. If extended to run-of-the-mill conduct that accounts for virtually all unintended (...) (in the sense of undesired) harm to others—noncriminal activities that impose some risk of harm on others—they would rule out all action. Moreover, because such conduct poses an irreducible conflict between freedom of action and freedom from expected harm, it can be regulated only by principles that accept the necessity of making precisely the sorts of interpersonal trade-offs that contractualism is foundationally committed to reject: trade-offs in which the numbers count, such that a risk of serious harm to one person can be justified by small benefits to the many. (shrink)

Over the past two decades, modal epistemology has turned its attention to ordinary modal knowledge. This paper brings to the fore a neglected but central form of ordinary modal knowledge: knowledge of agentive modality, and in particular of our own abilities, which I call ‘ability knowledge’. I argue that modal epistemology as it is does not account for ability knowledge, by looking at the most promising candidate theories: perception-based, counterfactual-based, and similarity-based modal epistemologies. I then outline a more promising epistemology (...) for our ability knowledge, which relies on the experience of our own agency, and draw out some lessons for modal epistemology in general. (shrink)

To reduce sex differences in employment outcomes, we must examine them in the context of the sex-gender hierarchy. The conventional explanation for wage gap—job segregation—is incorrect because it ignores men's incentive to preserve their advantages and their ability to do so by establishing the rules that distribute rewards. The primary method through which all dominant groups maintain their hegemony is by differentiating the subordinate group and defining it as inferior and hence meriting inferior treatment. My argument implies that neither sex-integrating (...) jobs nor implementing comparable worth will markedly improve women's employment status because men can subvert these mechanisms or even change the rules by which rewards are allocated. As evidence, I show that occupational integration has failed to advance women appreciably, and I argue that comparable worth is not likely to be much more effective. Instead, we must seek political analyses and political solutions. (shrink)

In this essay I defend functional explanations in sociobiology against the charge that they are exercises in speculative story-telling. I distinguish proximate and ultimate biological functions, and discuss their role in functional explanations. I characterize functional explanations as a kind of "consequence explanation", and argue that sociobiologists need to justify a "functional fact" in addition to a "consequence law". Two methods used to supply evidence for functional hypotheses, the technique of optimality analyses and the comparative method, are discussed and illustrated (...) with examples. I argue that adequate evidence for hypothesis about the function of a trait can be provided by the method of comparison, but not by optimality analyses. The comparative method contains an inductive phase that provides independent warrant for, and so serves to establish the high probability of, functional hypotheses. Independent warrant cannot be provided by optimality analyses alone: the model-building approach itself mandates the sacrifice of the truth of a hypothesis to its predictive power. I conclude that while the sociobiologist may wish to employ the optimality analysis as a heuristic strategy, reliable functional explanations are better sought through the use of the comparative method. (shrink)

The particular design of any technology may have profound social implications. Computing technologies are deeply intermeshed with the activities of daily life, playing an ever more central role in how we work, learn, communicate, socialize, and participate in government. Despite the many ways they have improved life, they cannot be regarded as unambiguously beneficial or even value-neutral. Recent experience shows they can lead to unintended but harmful consequences. Some technologies are thought to threaten democracy through the spread of propaganda on (...) online social networks, or to threaten privacy through the aggregation of datasets that include increasingly personal information, or to threaten justice when machine learning is used in such high-stakes, decision-making contexts as loan application reviews, employment procedures, or parole hearings. It is insufficient to ethically assess technology after it has produced negative social impacts, as has happened, for example, with facial recognition software that discriminates against people of color and with self-driving cars that are unable to cope with pedestrians who jay-walk. Developers of new technologies should aim to identify potential harmful consequences early in the design process and take steps to eliminate or mitigate them. This task is not easy. Designers will often have to negotiate among competing values—for instance, between efficiency and accessibility for a diverse user population, or between maximizing benefits and avoiding harm. There is no simple recipe for identifying and solving ethical problems. -/- Computer science education can help meet these challenges by making ethical reasoning about computing technologies a central element in the curriculum. Students can learn to think not only about what technology they could create, but also whether they should create that technology. Learning to reason this way requires courses unlike those currently standard in computer science curricula. A range of university courses on topics in areas of computing, ethics, society and public policy are emerging to meet this need. Some cover computer science broadly, while others focus on specific problems like privacy and security; typically, these classes exist as stand-alone courses in the computer science curriculum. Others have integrated ethics into the teaching of introductory courses on programming, artificial intelligence, and human-computer interaction. (shrink)

With the advent of legalized medical assistance in dying [MAiD] in Canada in 2016, nursing is facing intriguing new ethical and theoretical challenges. Among them is the concept of conscientious objection, which was built into the legislation as a safeguard to protect the rights of healthcare workers who feel they cannot participate in something that feels morally or ethically wrong. In this paper, we consider the ethical complexity that characterizes nurses' participation in MAiD and propose strategies to support nurses' moral (...) reflection and imagination as they seek to make sense of their decision to participate or not. Deconstructing the multiple and sometimes conflicting ethical and professional obligations inherent in nursing in such a context, we consider ways in which nurses can sustain their role as critically reflective moral agents within a context of a relational practice, serving the diverse needs of patients, families, and communities, as Canadian society continues to evolve within this new way of engaging with matters of living and dying. (shrink)

Chronic and current epistemological controversies, with particular attention to the development of pragmatist/historicist/constructivist reconceptions of knowledge and science in the 20th century and the scandalized responses to them by defenders of more traditional rationalist/objectivist/realist conceptions. Individual chapters deal with complex and confused relations among epistemic skepticism, relativism, and constructivist epistemology ; 20th-century "postmodern" relativism and anti-relativism; Ludwik Fleck and constructivist views of truth, science, and knowledge; attacks on and disavowals of constructivism and/or relativism by established and feminist philosophers; the Science (...) Wars and fraught relations between the humanities and the sciences; the problematic claims of Evolutionary Psychology; and chronic problems and contemporary views of animal-human relations. (shrink)

Music can be described as sequences of events that are structured in pitch and time. Studying music processing provides insight into how complex event sequences are learned, perceived, and represented by the brain. Given the temporal nature of sound, expectations, structural integration, and cognitive sequencing are central in music perception (i.e., which sounds are most likely to come next and at what moment should they occur?). This paper focuses on similarities in music and language cognition research, showing that music cognition (...) research provides insight into the understanding of not only music processing but also language processing and the processing of other structured stimuli. The hypothesis of shared resources between music and language processing and of domain-general dynamic attention has motivated the development of research to test music as a means to stimulate sensory, cognitive, and motor processes. (shrink)

It has been a commonplace from the beginnings of philosophical thought that what distinguishes humans from other species is the ability to reason; reason- ing is held to be an essential characteristic of the species and one that is unique to it. The essence condition requires that all humans possess at least the capacity for reasoning and that it be exercised in many of the ordinary cases of acquiring beliefs. And uniqueness entails that non-humans cannot reason, no matter how much (...) their behavior resembles that of humans. I think that a certain specific model of reasoning has been presupposed by proponents of these claims. And there are grounds to believe that this model is inaccurate in essential respects: if reasoning does correspond to it, then few human beliefs are acquired through reason. However, given a more accurate description of what goes on in normal human reasoning, it is no longer plausible to think that only humans reason. So either the essence or the uniqueness claim must be given up. In this paper I argue for the second option. (shrink)

In this thesis, I develop a nonreductive and general conception of potentiality, and explore the prospects of a realist account of possibility based on this account of potentiality. Potentialities are properties of individual objects; they include dispositions such as fragility and abilities such as the ability to play the piano. Potentialities are individuated by their manifestation alone. In order to provide a unified account of potentialities, I argue in chapter 2 that dispositions, contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, are best understood in (...) terms only of their manifestations (as disposi- tions to ...), rather than in terms of a stimulus and a manifestation condition (as dispositions to ... if ...). Chapter 3 provides some preliminary motivation for a nonreductive and gen- eral account of potentiality, and chapter 4 develops such an account. The guiding question is how far the notion of potentiality can be extended from the initial ex- amples of familiar dispositions and abilities, and it is argued that it can be extended very far. Various features of potentialities are explored, among them extrinsicality, iterations of potentiality, and the behaviour of potentiality with regard to logical equivalence. In chapter 5, the account is set to work in providing the outlines and a defense of a potentiality-based account of possibility. The basic idea of such an account is that it is possible that p just in case some thing has a potentiality for p. The account is defended against the objection that there may not be enough potential- ities to ground all the possibilities that there are. Finally, in chapter 6, a logic of potentiality is formulated and the logic of possibility derived from it, showing that the potentiality-based account of possibility is formally adequate: it provides pos- sibility with the formal features that modal logicians have studied. I conclude that the proposed account of possibility is a promising research programme. (shrink)

This collection breaks new ground in four key areas of feminist social thought: the sex/gender debates; challenges to liberalism/equality; feminist ethics; and feminist perspectives on global ethics and politics in the 21st century. Altogether, the essays provide an innovative look at feminist philosophy while making substantive contributions to current debates in gender theory, ethics, and political thought.

Being White, Being Good focuses on white complicity and white complicity pedagogy. It examines the shifts in our conceptualization of the subject, language and moral responsibility that are required for understanding white complicity and draws out implications for social justice pedagogy.

The origins of Vico's social theory : Vichian reflections on the Neapolitan Revolt of 1701 and the politics of the metropolis -- Vico's cosmopolitanism : global citizenship and natural law in Vico's pedagogical thought -- Vico's social theory : the conundrum of the Roman metropolis and the struggle of humanity for natural rights -- From social theory to philosophy : Vico's disillusions with the Neapolitan magistracy and the new frontier of philosophy.

"Advocates of the evolutionary analogy claim that mechanisms governing scientific change are analogous to those at work in organic evolution - above all, natural selection. By referring to the works of the most influential proponents of evolutionary analogies (Toulmin, Campbell, Hull and, most notably, Kuhn) the authors discuss whether and to what extent their use of the analogy is appropriate. A careful and often illuminating perusal of the theoretical scope of the terms employed, as well as of the varying contexts (...) within which the analogy is appealed to in contemporary debates, leads to the conclusion that such general theories of selective processes are either too sketchy or eventually not persuasive, if not altogether based on flawed views of evolutionary biology. By clarifying what is at stake, the analysis carried out in the book sheds new light on one of the dominant theories of scientific progress. It also invites criticism, of course - but that is the very fuel of philosophical confrontation." - Stefano Gattei, IMT Institute for Advanced Studies, Lucca "This book presents a serious challenge to those, like David Hull, who seek to model scientific change as an evolutionary process. The authors point out that although there are similarities between the processes of scientific change and organic evolution, the dissimilarities present formidable difficulties to construing the relation as anything more than a weak analogy. Their argument employs what they call a 'type hierarchical' approach that promises to be a powerful tool for the classification of similarities between theories in all fields." - Michael Bradie, Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University "This is a most interesting discussion of the analogy between biological and scientific change. Particularly commendable is the close attention paid to the thinking of the late David Hull and his pathbreaking work on this issue." - Michael Ruse, History and Philosophy of Science, Florida State University. (shrink)

The theme of this special issue is Post-truth. No doubt it was my exasperation with the terminological state of our collective situation that incited me in the spring of 2017 to settle upon it. What, exactly, does the hyphenated couplet mean or to what does it refer? What is its significance or sense? How is it being used, by whom, for what purpose, and with what consequences—for whom? And if, as was being asserted on nearly every side, we currently find (...) ourselves in post-truth, how might we ever get out, presuming we may one day want as much? The original contributions by Sarah Burgess, James Crosswhite, Jason David Myres, Bradford Vivian, and Eric King Watts published herein go a long way toward answering these... (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical analysis and a new edition of an anonymous Epitome of John Dumbleton’s solution to the semantic paradoxes. The first part of this paper briefly presents Dumbleton’s cassationist solution to the semantic paradoxes, which the English philosopher proposes in his Summa Logicae, written in the 1330s–40s. The second part investigates the solution to various types of insolubles proposed by the anonymous author of the Epitome. The third part provides a new critical edition of the Latin text (...) – a first edition was edited by Bottin in 1978 – and an English translation. (shrink)

Décroissance has established itself in Southern Europe as a significant and heterogeneous societal movement, which fosters a renaissance of traditional streams of thought in social and political philosophy while opening a field for new actualisations. While the term Décroissance can be traced back to an authorised translation of Georgescu-Roegen’s ‘declining state’, the idea of Décroissance – as it is widely employed by social movements – encompasses more than the critique of GDP as a measure for well-being. It embodies a radical (...) questioning of the way social reproduction is intended and frames a multifaceted vision for a post-growth society. The aim of this paper is the reconstruction and critical examination – from the point of view of social and political philosophy – of the main conceptual roots of Décroissance and its visions for a radical transformation of society. (shrink)

This paper proposes an approach to narrative deixis which offers a coherent analysis of the respective roles of proximal and distal deictic expressions. The paper starts by arguing that fictional narratives require an approach to deixis which modifies a number of broadly held assumptions, especially as regards the interaction between tense and other deictic forms. It then considers the widely discussed instance of the temporal adverb now in the context of Past Tense. The second part of the paper gives special (...) focus to demonstratives in narrative fiction, showing their role in temporal construals. It argues that both temporal and demonstrative expressions are primarily used to serve narrative viewpoint construction. Examples from several novels are then used to show how the proximal and distal choices of demonstratives, temporal adverbs and locative adverbs structure narrative viewpoint, including narrative representation of character experience. The paper concludes by proposing that in the context of fictional narratives the proximal/distal contrast is more relevant to meaning emergence than individual aspects of deixis, and that the construal of time can be achieved through the whole spectrum of deictic forms, not just tense and temporal adverbs such as now and then. (shrink)

In this article, I revisit Landau and Jackendoff's () paper, “What and where in spatial language and spatial cognition,” proposing a friendly amendment and reformulation. The original paper emphasized the distinct geometries that are engaged when objects are represented as members of object kinds, versus when they are represented as figure and ground in spatial expressions. We provided empirical and theoretical arguments for the link between these distinct representations in spatial language and their accompanying nonlinguistic neural representations, emphasizing the “what” (...) and “where” systems of the visual system. In the present paper, I propose a second division of labor between two classes of spatial prepositions in English that appear to be quite distinct. One class includes prepositions such as in and on, whose core meanings engage force-dynamic, functional relationships between objects, with geometry only a marginal player. The second class includes prepositions such as above/below and right/left, whose core meanings engage geometry, with force-dynamic relationships a passing or irrelevant variable. The insight that objects’ force-dynamic relationships matter to spatial terms’ uses is not new; but thinking of these terms as a distinct set within spatial language has theoretical and empirical consequences that are new. I propose three such consequences, rooted in the fact that geometric knowledge is highly constrained and early-emerging in life, while force-dynamic knowledge of objects and their interactions is relatively unconstrained and needs to be learned piecemeal over a lengthy timeline. First, the two classes will engage different learning problems, with different developmental trajectories for both first and second language learners; second, the classes will naturally lead to different degrees of cross-linguistic variation; and third, they may be rooted in different neural representations. (shrink)

This paper aims to show that—and how—Plato’s notion of the receptacle in the Timaeus provides the conditions for developing a mathematical as well as a physical space without itself being space. In response to the debate whether Plato’s receptacle is a conception of space or of matter, I suggest employing criteria from topology and the theory of metric spaces as the most basic ones available. I show that the receptacle fulfils its main task–allowing the elements qua images of the Forms (...) to exist as sensible things by being that in which the elements appear, change and move–in virtue of being pure continuity. All further qualifications required for a full notion of space are derived solely from the content of the receptacle. (shrink)

In a highly original rereading of the writings and seminars of Jacques Lacan, together with works of Freud and others, Cassin shows how psychoanalysis, like the sophists, challenges the very foundations of scientific rationality. In taking seriously equivocations, jokes, and unfinishable projects of interpretation, the analyst, like the sophist, allows performance, signifier, and inconsistency to reshape truth.

Nous n'avons pas choisi d'etre aristoteliciens. Nous ne le sommes pas moins que les autres. Le livre Gamma de la Metaphysique accomplit la relegation de la sophistique qui n'a jamais ete achevee par Platon, en instaurant un regime de discours qui fera loi pour toute l'histoire de la metaphysique. Regime que nous appelons semantique, en reference au geste decisif d'Aristote qui fait equivaloir dire et signifier quelque chose. Il faut et il suffit qu'un sophiste lui dise Bonjour! pour qu'Aristote demontre, (...) que bon gre mal gre, il se place sous la juridiction de ce qu'on appelle depuis lors le principe de non-contradiction. La mise en demeure de parler fait office d'arme absolue, et la decision du sens est le foyer de la science de l'etre en tant qu'etre. Pas d'instauration du principe sans adversaire, donc sans stategie: cela suffit pour jeter le soupcon sur l'impression que donne Gamma d'une evidence definitive. (shrink)