It is argued, on the basis of ideas derived from Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Husserl's Logical Investigations, that the formal comprehends more than the logical. More specifically: that there exist certain formal-ontological constants (part, whole, overlapping, etc.) which do not fall within the province of logic. A two-dimensional directly depicting language is developed for the representation of the constants of formal ontology, and means are provided for the extension of this language to enable the representation of certain materially necessary relations. The (...) paper concludes with a discussion of the relationship between formal logic, formal ontology, and mathematics. (shrink)

Current approaches to formal representation in biomedicine are characterized by their focus on either the static or the dynamic aspects of biological reality. We here outline a theory that combines both perspectives and at the same time tackles the by no means trivial issue of their coherent integration. Our position is that a good ontology must be capable of accounting for reality both synchronically (as it exists at a time) and diachronically (as it unfolds through time), but that these are (...) two quite different tasks, whose simultaneous realization is by no means trivial. The paper is structured as follows. We begin by laying out the methodological and philosophical background of our approach. We then summarize the structure and elements of the Basic Formal Ontology on which it rests, in particular the SNAP ontology of objects and the SPAN ontology of processes. Finally, we apply the general framework to the specific domain of biomedicine. (shrink)

83. It should now be apparent that the familiar problems of reference and modality can be satisfactorily resolved without either abandoning substitutivity of identity in modal contexts or invoking an intensional ontology. It might be argued, however, that the suggested resolution avoids invoking an intensional ontology only because the modal predicates, e.g. Nec and Believes, are left unanalysed. This may well be true but it should be appreciated that the analysis of modal predicates is an issue which is independent of (...) both the problem of reference in modal contexts and the problem of the logical structure of propositions containing such contexts. These problems can be settled, as we have seen, without also settling how the modal predicates are to be analysed. Hence, if an intensional ontology is in the end required, it is required to analyse the modal predicates, not to solve the problems of reference and logical structure. This, we suggest, is an interesting and perhaps unexpected result. (shrink)

We construct a presentist semantics on which there are no truth-makers for past and future tensed statements. The semantics is not an expressivist or projectivist one, and is not susceptible to the semantical difficulties that confront such theories. We discuss how the approach handles some standard concerns with presentism.

It is a truism that the attitude of deference to the text plays a lesser role in Anglo-Saxon philosophy than in other philosophical traditions. Works of philosophy written in English have, it is true, spawned a massive secondary literature dealing with the ideas, problems or arguments they contain. But they have almost never given rise to works of commentary in the strict sense, a genre which is however a dominant literary form not only in the Confucian, Vedantic, Islamic, Jewish and (...) Scholastic traditions of the past, but also in relation to more recent German-language philosophy (thus for example in work on Hegel, Heidegger or Wittgenstein). Moreover Anglo-Saxon philosophers have themselves embraced the commentary form when dealing with Greek or Latin philosophers outside their own tradition. The paper seeks to establish the reasons for this imbalance by examining those factors which might be conducive to the growth of a commentary literature in a given culture. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 223 - 230 I here offer a discussion of some of Penelope Maddy’s responses to philosophical scepticism in her recent book, _What Do Philosophers Do?_ Among other things, I suggest that philosophers who take an interest in human knowledge are not primarily concerned with _whether_ anyone knows anything about the world, but rather with understanding _how_ we know the things we do in the face of the difficulties that seem naturally to arise in (...) the explanations they come up with. (shrink)

Scholars and policy-makers have expressed concerns about the crediting of coauthors in research publications. Most such problems fall into one of two categories, excluding deserving contributors or including undeserving ones. But our research shows that there is no consensus on “deserving” or on what type of contribution suffices for co-authorship award. Our study uses qualitative data, including interviews with 60 US academic science or engineering researchers in 14 disciplines in a set of geographically distributed research-intensive universities. We also employ data (...) from 161 website posts provided by 93 study participants, again US academic scientists. We examine a variety of factors related to perceived unwarranted exclusion from co-author credit and unwarranted inclusion, providing an empirically-informed conceptual model to explain co-author crediting outcomes. Determinants of outcomes include characteristics of disciplines and fields, institutional work culture, power dynamics and team-specific norms and decision processes. (shrink)

This paper examines three approaches to the relationship between our moral reasons to bear costs for others’ sake before and beyond the call of duty. Symmetry holds that you are required to optimise your beneficial sacrifices even when they are genuinely supererogatory. If you are required to bear a cost C for the sake of a benefit B, when they are the only costs and benefits at stake, you are also conditionally required to bear an additional cost C, for the (...) sake of an additional benefit B, when enough other costs and benefits are at stake that both of your alternatives are presumptively supererogatory. Disconnection rejects the requirement to optimise when your options are presumptively supererogatory and maintains that you have an entirely free hand to choose as you will among them. Asymmetry holds that when acting beyond the call of duty you are entitled to a measure of additional freedom compared to when you are not taking on supererogatory costs—you can prioritise your own well-being and reasons to a greater degree—but places constraints on the options that you may permissibly choose. We defend a version of Asymmetry and explore its implications for recent debates on charitable giving. (shrink)

This important new work is a major analysis of the foundation of Eric Voegelin's political science.

(2000). CASSIRER, SCHLICK AND ‘STRUCTURAL’ REALISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE EXACT SCIENCES IN THE BACKGROUND TO EARLY LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 71-106.

Gilmore concentrates on two arguments which I took to undermine the claim that introspectibility is necessary for co-consciousness: the.

We present updated estimates of central bank transparency for 100 countries up through 2006 and use them to analyze both the determinants and consequences of monetary policy transparency in an integrated econometric framework. We establish that there has been significant movement in the direction of greater central bank transparency in recent years. Transparent monetary policy arrangements are more likely to be found in countries with strong and stable political institutions. They are more likely to be found in democracies, with their (...) culture of transparency. Using these political determinants as instruments for transparency, we show that more transparency in monetary policy operating procedures is associated with less inflation variability, though not also with less inflation persistence. (shrink)

In this paper, I give an account of the conditions for rationally changing your beliefs that respects three constraints; 1) that rational believing is a matter ofrespecting your evidence, 2) that evidence seems to have both objective and subjective features, and (3) that our set of beliefs seem to rationally commit us to certain propositions, regardless of the evidential support we have for these propositions. On the view I outline, rationally believing or giving up a belief is a matter of (...) your inferences tracking your rational commitments, and that these rational commitments account for the evidence you must respect. These rational commitments are subjective in that they are relative to the totality of your beliefs, but also objective in the sense that what counts as a commitment is true for everyone everywhere. (shrink)

Scholars studying the ethical, legal, and social issues associated with emerging technologies maintain the importance of considering these issues throughout the research and development cycle, even during the earliest stages of basic research. Embedding these considerations within the scientific process requires communication between ELSI scholars and the community of physical scientists who are conducting that basic research. We posit that this communication can be effective on a broad scale only if it links societal issues directly to characteristics of the emerging (...) technology that are relevant to the physical and natural scientists involved in research and development. In this article, we examine nano-ELSI literature from 2003 to 2010 to discern the degree to which it makes these types of explicit connections. We find that, while the literature identifies a wide range of issues of societal concern, it generally does so in a non-specific manner. It neither links societal issues to particular forms or characteristics of widely divergent nanotechnologies nor to any of the many potential uses to which those nanotechnologies may be put. We believe that these kinds of specificity are essential to those engaged in nano-scale research. We also compare the literature-based findings to observations from interviews we conducted with nanoscientists and conclude that ELSI scholars should add technical- and application-related forms of specificity to their work and their writings to enhance effectiveness and impact in communicating with one important target audience—members of the nanoscale science community. (shrink)

See revised version in Barry Smith, Austrian Philosophy, chapter 4; available online at: http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/book/austrian_philosophy/.

Those who believe suitably programmed computers could enjoy conscious experience of the sort we enjoy must accept the possibility that their own experience is being generated as part of a computerized simulation. It would be a mistake to dismiss this is just one more radical sceptical possibility: for as Bostrom has recently noted, if advances in computer technology were to continue at close to present rates, there would be a strong probability that we are each living in a computer simulation. (...) The first part of this paper is devoted to broadening the scope of the argument: even if computers cannot sustain consciousness (as many dualists and materialists believe), there may still be a strong likelihood that we are living simulated lives. The implications of this result are the focus of the second part of the paper. The topics discussed include: the Doomsday argument, scepticism, the different modes of virtual life, transcendental idealism, the Problem of Evil, and simulation ethics. (shrink)

The transcriptional co‐activators YAP (or YAP1) and TAZ (or WWTR1) are frequently activated during the growth and progression of many solid tumors, including lung, colorectal, breast, pancreatic, and liver carcinomas as well as melanoma and glioma. YAP/TAZ bind to TEAD‐family co‐activators to drive cancer cell survival, proliferation, invasive migration, and metastasis. YAP/TAZ activation may also confer resistance to chemotherapy, radiotherapy, or immunotherapy. YAP‐TEAD cooperates with the RAS‐induced AP‐1 (FOS/JUN) transcription factor to drive tumor growth and cooperates with MRTF‐SRF to promote (...) activation of cancer‐associated fibroblasts, matrix stiffening, and metastasis. The key upstream repressor of YAP/TAZ activation is the Hippo (MST1/2‐LATS1/2) pathway and the key upstream activators are mechanically induced Integrin‐SRC and E‐cadherin‐AJUBA/TRIP6/LIMD1, growth factor induced PI3K‐AKT, and inflammation‐induced G‐protein coupled receptor (GPCR) signals, all of which antagonize the Hippo pathway. In this review, strategies to target YAP/TAZ activity in cancer are discussed along with the prospects for synergy with established pillars of cancer therapy. (shrink)