Abstract:Organizational justice is a behavioral science concept that refers to the perception of fairness of the past treatment of the employees within an organization held by the employees of that organization. These subjective perceptions of fairness have been empirically shown to be related to 1) attitudinal changes in job satisfaction, organizational commitment and managerial trust beliefs; 2) behavioral changes in task performance activities and ancillary extra-task efforts to assist group members and improve group methods; 3) numerical changes in (...) the quantity, quality and efficiency of divisional outputs; and—though this is far more tentative—4) eventual changes in the competitive advantage and financial performance of the full organization. The authors propose that these constructs can be applied to all stakeholders, rather than just to the current employees of the firm, and that objective determinations of fairness by the managers can be related to subjective perceptions of fairness by the stakeholders that will result in the sequential series of attitudinal, behavioral and numerical changes that will lead to performance improvements. In short, the authors propose a normative stakeholder theory of the firm, based upon ethical principles, that will have testable descriptive hypotheses derived from the behavioral constructs. (shrink)

Unlike physics and chemistry, the behavioral sciences are historical sciences that explain the fuzzy complexity of social life through historical narratives. Unifying the behavioral sciences through evolutionary game theory would require a nested hierarchy of three kinds of historical narratives: natural history, cultural history, and biographical history. (Published Online April 27 2007).

My response to commentators includes a suggestion that an additional principle be added to the list presented in the target article: the notion of human society as a complex adaptive system with emergent properties. In addition, I clear up several misunderstandings shared by several commentators, and explore some themes concerning future directions in the unification of the behavioral science. (Published Online April 27 2007).

ABSTRACT:Bioethicists today are taking a greater role in the design and implementation of emerging technologies by "embedding" within the development teams and providing their direct guidance and recommendations. Ideally, these collaborations allow ethical considerations to be addressed in an active, iterative, and ongoing process through regular exchanges between ethicists and members of the technological development team. This article discusses a challenge to this embedded ethics approach—namely, that bioethical guidance, even if embraced by the development team in theory, is not easily (...) actionable in situ. Many of the ethical problems at issue in emerging technologies are associated with preexisting structural, socioeconomic, and political factors, making compliance with ethical recommendations sometimes less a matter of choice and more a matter of feasibility. Moreover, incentive structures within these systemic factors maintain them against reform efforts. The authors recommend that embedded bioethicists utilize principles from behavioral science (such as behavioral economics) to better understand and account for these incentive structures so as to encourage the ethically responsible uptake of technological innovations. (shrink)

There are many methodological considerations that adversely affect external validity as much as, or even more than, unrepresentative sampling does. Among suspect applications, especially worrisome is the incorporation of WEIRD-based findings regarding moral reasoning and retribution into normative expectations, such as might be held by international criminal tribunals in war-torn areas.

Evolutionary science (ES) and contextual behavioral science (CBS) have developed largely independently during the last half century. However, the earlier histories of these two bodies of knowledge are thoroughly entwined. ES provides a unifying theoretical framework for the biological sciences, and is increasingly being applied to human-related sciences. Meanwhile, CBS is concerned with influencing human behavior in a practical sense. This groundbreaking volume seeks to integrate ES and CBS to promote real, positive change in peoples' lives. Evolution (...) and Contextual Behavioral Science offers a unique glimpse into the histories of ES and CBS, shows how they are intrinsically linked, and outlines why their integration--or, reunification--is essential. By examining these two schools of thought side by side, you'll gain an understanding of why functional and contextual approaches in CBS need to be combined with ES for both fields to advance more rapidly. Finally, rather than the sequential relationship that is typically imagined between ES and CBS, you'll discover how an integrated relationship between these two sciences will result in a better framework for understanding predicting, and influencing human behavior--back cover. (shrink)

Advocates of the self-corrective thesis argue that scientific method will refute false theories and find closer approximations to the truth in the long run. I discuss a contemporary interpretation of this thesis in terms of frequentist statistics in the context of the behavioral sciences. First, I identify experimental replications and systematic aggregation of evidence (meta-analysis) as the self-corrective mechanism. Then, I present a computer simulation study of scientific communities that implement this mechanism to argue that frequentist statistics may (...) converge upon a correct estimate or not depending on the social structure of the community that uses it. Based on this study, I argue that methodological explanations of the “replicability crisis” in psychology are limited and propose an alternative explanation in terms of biases. Finally, I conclude suggesting that scientific self-correction should be understood as an interaction effect between inference methods and social structures. (shrink)

It is fairly usual to argue or to assume that there is a single pattern of proper scientific endeavor for the behavioral sciences. This is based, one is inclined to say, on the superb model afforded by the natural science successes of the past few hundred years and on the common method which underlies and determines that model. Consequently, a protagonist can argue that within his own science, all opposed modes of thinking are archaic, peripheral, or unscientific, while (...) his own at least prefigures fulfillment of true science. And it may even be claimed that other behavioral fields are special offshoots, subordinate provinces, or particularizations which are reducible to his favored scheme of analysis. Such diversity and disagreement as there is, it can be said, stems from either of two causes. The first is the stubbornness of men, whereby they refuse to face the facts, to employ reasoning processes properly, or to foresake sinister interests. The other is the relative immaturity of behavioral science, an immaturity which will be eliminated by patient progress. (shrink)

The nudge approach seeks to improve people’s decisions through small changes in their choice environments. Nudge policies often work through psychological mechanisms that deviate from traditional notions of rationality. Because of that, some critics object that nudging treats people as irrational. Such treatment might be disrespectful in itself and might crowd out more empowering policies. I defend nudging against these objections. By defending a nonstandard, ecological model of rationality, I argue that nudging not only is compatible with rational agency but (...) can even support it. Accordingly, a concern with rationality speaks for more rather than less public policy nudging. (shrink)

In our target article, we discussed the standards of evidence that could be used to identify adaptations, and argued that building an empirical case that certain features of a trait are best explained by exaptation, spandrel, or constraint requires the consideration, testing, and rejection of adaptationist hypotheses. We are grateful to the 31 commentators for their thoughtful insights. They raised important issues, including the meaning of “exaptation”; whether Gould and Lewontin's critique of adaptationism was primarily epistemological or ontological; the necessity, (...) sufficiency, or utility of design evidence, phylogenetic analyses, homology, and molecular genetics in distinguishing exaptations from adaptations; whether adaptationists accept adaptationist hypotheses too quickly; and the real utility of adaptationism to human behavioral science. We organize our response along the major points of the target article, in some situations defending our original claims and in others modifying them. While debate on these issues will undoubtedly continue, we are cautiously optimistic that the main points of the target article (as modified by our response) will help move the debate in a positive direction. (shrink)

Game theory provides a descriptive or a normative account of an important class of decisions. Given the cognitive sciences' emphasis on explanation, unification with the behavioral sciences under a descriptive model would constitute a step backwards in their development. I argue for the interdependence of the cognitive and behavioral sciences and suggest that meaningful integration is already occurring through problem-based interdisciplinary research programs. (Published Online April 27 2007).

Multimodal prehabilitation is increasingly recognized as an important component of the pre-operative pathway in oncology. It aims to optimize physical and psychological health through delivery of a series of tailored interventions including exercise, nutrition, and psychological support. At the core of this prescription is a need for considerable health behavior change, to ensure that patients are engaged with and adhere to these interventions and experience the associated benefits. To date the prehabilitation literature has focused on testing the efficacy of devised (...) exercise and nutritional interventions with a primary focus on physiological and mechanistic outcomes with little consideration for the role of behavioral science, supporting individual behavior change or optimizing patient engagement. Changing health behavior is complex and to maximize success, prehabilitation programs should draw on latest insights from the field of behavioral science. Behavioral science offers extensive knowledge on theories and models of health behavior change to further advance intervention effectiveness. Similarly, interventions developed with a person-centered approach, taking into consideration individual needs and preferences will increase engagement. In this article, we will provide an overview of the extent to which the existing prehabilitation literature incorporates behavioral science, as well as studies that have explored patient's attitudes toward prehabilitation. We will go on to describe and critique ongoing trials in a variety of contexts within oncology prehabilitation and discuss how current scientific knowledge may be enhanced from a behavioral science perspective. We will also consider the role of “surgery schools” and detail practical recommendations that can be embedded in existing or emerging clinical settings. (shrink)

Despite their distinct objects of study, the human behavioral sciences all include models of individual human behavior. Unity in the behavioral sciences requires that there be a common underlying model of individual human behavior, specialized and enriched to meet the particular needs of each discipline. Such unity does not exist, and cannot be easily attained, since the various disciplines have incompatible models and disparate research methodologies. Yet recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for (...) unity in the behavioral sciences, incorporating core principles from all fields, and based upon theoretical tools (game theory and the rational actor model) and data gathering techniques (experimental games in the laboratory and field) that transcend disciplinary boundaries. This article sketches a set of principles aimed at fostering such a unity. Key Words: behavioral science • game theory • experimental economics • rational actor model. (shrink)

This excellent outline of evolutionary hypotheses is compromised by severe reductionism. Other writings succeed in granting theism ontological significance without compromising rigor. The discussion of counterintuitiveness neglects coherence in memory. Bearing in mind our severely limited working memory capacity, susceptibility to religious mythologies may comprise an adaptive heuristic approach to summarizing the contingencies of the most far-reaching of life's problems.

Chater & Loewenstein thoughtfully express their disillusionment with contemporary applied behavioral science, particularly as it pertains to public policy. Although they fault an overemphasis on i-frame approaches, their proposed alternatives leave doubt regarding whether behavioral science has much, if anything, useful to offer policy. We offer two critical principles to guide and motivate more relevant behavioral science.

In his inaugural lecture, Peter Mascini takes issue with the goal of scientific purity in the behavioral study of law conceived as the deliberate choice to postulate a limited number of universally applicable behavioral principles. The guiding principle of behavioral sociology is that law behaves in correspondence to social space, while the guiding principle of law and economics is that individuals behave rationally. Behavioral economics has challenged the principle of the rational actor and, consequently, has also (...) challenged the desire for scientific purity in law and economics. Peter Mascini defends a two-fold thesis: first, that the purification of sociology proposed by behavioral sociology is a blind alley that can only be exited by allowing impurity. Second, that the behavioral economics movement has offered law and economics an opportunity to reinvigorate by embracing impurity. The combination of the two parts of his thesis lead him to the claim that we need less purity in the behavioral study of law rather than more. He ends his lecture by stating that the introduction of impurity that has been started by behavioral economics needs to be extended in several respects. He proposes to replace the behavioral study of law by an approach that not only takes empirical research seriously, but also adopts a modest attitude by surrendering the ambition to come up with universally applicable predictions and by taking seriously meaningful behavior. (Series: Erasmus Law Lectures, Vol. 41) [Subject: Behavioral Sociology, Law and Economics, Behavioral Economics, Private Law]. (shrink)

This is an intelligently designed collection of essays dealing with a variety of key issues that are in the foreground of reflection on the social and behavioral sciences. The format followed is an ideal one: a key paper, a comment by a critic, and a reply. Thus, for example, Charles Taylor explains and defends teleological explanation of behavior and engages in an exchange with Robert Borger; and Noam Chomsky reviews the problems of explanation in linguistics and is challenged (...) by Max Black. The quality of this volume is quite high and the contributors are leaders in their fields of inquiry. Not only are there explorations by philosophers but also by practicing behavioral scientists. This is therefore an excellent way of gaining an overview of some of the key issues concerning explanation in the behavioral sciences. But the volume is disappointing in breaking new ground. Many of the points and counterpoints made here can be found in other places, and frequently they are explored in greater detail in other places. The collection also reflects an Anglo-Saxon bias for there is little attempt to include any confrontations with the continental concern with the nature of explanation in the social sciences. A detailed bibliography might have helped to direct the reader to further discussion of the issues involved. But despite these limitations, this is an impressive series of confrontations.--R. J. B. (shrink)

We applaud Gintis's attempt to provide an evolutionary-based framework for the behavioral sciences, and note a number of similarities with our own recent cultural evolutionary structure for the social sciences. Gintis's proposal would be further strengthened by a greater emphasis on additional methods to evolutionary game theory, clearer empirical predictions, and a broader consideration of cultural transmission. (Published Online April 27 2007).

I pose problems for the views that human nature should be the object of study in the social and behavioral sciences and that a concept of human nature is needed to guide research in these sciences. I proceed by outlining three research programs in the social sciences, each of which confronts aspects of human variation. Next, I present Elizabeth Cashdan and Grant Ramsey’s related characterizations of human nature. I go on to argue that the research methodologies (...) they each draw on are more productive resources for social scientists than their competing characterizations of human nature. (shrink)

With the coronavirus outbreak, new and strengthened norms of plastic dependency emerged in the Middle East and North Africa region through the desperate demand for products like face masks and other personal protective equipment, highlighting the tradeoffs between health and the environment. While the rise in demand has been considered as temporary, behavioral barriers and misperceptions might make these norms particularly sticky and hinder society’s ability to transition to a circular economy. Fortunately, behavioral science offers valuable insights about (...) why the current pandemic can actually be a catalyst to create new eco-conscious behaviors. As some behaviors are often strenuous to change and require enforcement through traditional policy solutions, behavioral science offers complementary tools that will make policies more effective. We have an opportunity to start thinking about ways to leverage behavioral insights to create new norms that promote a circular economy while ultimately ensuring proper adherence to hygiene practices to curb the spread of the virus. (shrink)

The articles comprising this dissertation concern classification and concept formation in the social and behavioral sciences. In particular, the emphasis in the study is on the philosophical analysis of interdisciplinary settings created by the recent intellectual developments on the interfaces between the social sciences, psychology, and neuroscience. The need for a systematic examination of the problems of conceptual coordination and integration across disciplinary boundaries is illustrated by focusing on phenomena whose satisfactory explanation requires drawing together the theoretical (...) resources from a variety of disciplines. In philosophy, questions regarding the nature of scientific concepts have often been framed in terms of theories of natural kinds. For this reason, analysis of the notion of natural kind as well as examination of how theories of natural kinds should be connected to recent philosophical accounts of scientific explanation and mechanisms form the core of the study. Building on contemporary discussions on these topics in the philosophy of biology, the philosophy of cognitive science, and the philosophy of the social sciences, the articles develop a mechanistic theory of natural kinds in the social and behavioral sciences, and scrutinize its applicability and usefulness as a theory of conceptual change in interdisciplinary settings. The study suggests that, although the mechanistic theory cannot account for the functioning of the whole range of scientific concepts, interweaving biological, cognitive, and social mechanisms in the manner suggested by the mechanistic theory offers a naturalistic and non-reductionist basis for conceptualizing epistemic coordination across disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

The dominant paradigm of experiments in the social and behavioral sciences views an experiment as a test of a theory, where the theory is assumed to generalize beyond the experiment's specific conditions. According to this view, which Alan Newell once characterized as “playing twenty questions with nature,” theory is advanced one experiment at a time, and the integration of disparate findings is assumed to happen via the scientific publishing process. In this article, we argue that the process of (...) integration is at best inefficient, and at worst it does not, in fact, occur. We further show that the challenge of integration cannot be adequately addressed by recently proposed reforms that focus on the reliability and replicability of individual findings, nor simply by conducting more or larger experiments. Rather, the problem arises from the imprecise nature of social and behavioral theories and, consequently, a lack of commensurability across experiments conducted under different conditions. Therefore, researchers must fundamentally rethink how they design experiments and how the experiments relate to theory. We specifically describe an alternative framework, integrative experiment design, which intrinsically promotes commensurability and continuous integration of knowledge. In this paradigm, researchers explicitly map the design space of possible experiments associated with a given research question, embracing many potentially relevant theories rather than focusing on just one. Researchers then iteratively generate theories and test them with experiments explicitly sampled from the design space, allowing results to be integrated across experiments. Given recent methodological and technological developments, we conclude that this approach is feasible and would generate more-reliable, more-cumulative empirical and theoretical knowledge than the current paradigm – and with far greater efficiency. (shrink)

In recent years, 'nudge units' or 'behavioral insights teams' have been created in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and other nations. All over the world, public officials are using the behavioral sciences to protect the environment, promote employment and economic growth, reduce poverty, and increase national security. In this book, Cass R. Sunstein, the eminent legal scholar and best-selling co-author of Nudge, breaks new ground with a deep yet highly readable investigation into the ethical issues (...) surrounding nudges, choice architecture, and mandates, addressing such issues as welfare, autonomy, self-government, dignity, manipulation, and the constraints and responsibilities of an ethical state. Complementing the ethical discussion, The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science contains a wealth of new data on people's attitudes towards a broad range of nudges, choice architecture, and mandates. (shrink)

A veritable cookbook for individuals or corporations seeking funding from the federal government, The Complete Writing Guide to NIH Behavioral Science Grants contains the latest in technical information on NIH grants, including the new electronic submission process. Some of the most successful grant writers in history have contributed to this volume, offering key strategies as well as tips and suggestions in areas that are normally hard to find in grant writing guides, such as budgeting, human subjects, and power analysis. (...) A "who's who" among grant reviewers, this guidebook provides "inside" information as to why some grants are scored well while others flounder during review. A must-read for both entry level grant writers making headway in the complex NIH grant system for the first time as well as more seasoned investigators who can't seem to break the barrier to funded research grants, Drs. Scheier and Dewey's comprehensive volume provides simple and clear explanations into the reasons why some grants get funded, and a step-by-step guide to writing those grants. (shrink)

An often-cited convention for discovery-oriented behavioral science research states that the general relative seriousness of the antecedently accepted false positive error rate of α = 0.05 be mirrored by a false negative error rate of β = 0.20. In 1965, Jacob Cohen proposed this convention to decrease a β-error rate typically in vast excess of 0.20. Thereby, we argue, Cohen (unintentionally) contributed to the wide acceptance of strongly uneven error rates in behavioral science. Although Cohen’s convention can appear (...) epistemically reasonable for an individual researcher, the comparatively low probability that published effect size estimates are replicable renders his convention unreasonable for an entire scientific field. Appreciating Cohen’s convention helps to understand why even error rates (α = β) are “non-conventional” in behavioral science today, and why Cohen’s explanatory reason for β = 0.20—that resource restrictions keep from collecting larger samples—can easily be mistaken for the justificatory reason it is not. (shrink)

Behavioral science research in American universities was promoted and influenced by philanthropic foundations. In the 1920s and 1930s, Rockefeller philanthropies in particular financed behavioral science research projects that promised to fulfill their mandates to `improve mankind', mandates that foundation officers transformed into an informal, loosely defined human engineering effort. Controlling behavior, especially sexual and social `dysfunction', was a major priority. The behavioral scientists at Yale University, led by president James R. Angell and `psychobiologist' Robert M. Yerkes, tapped (...) into foundation largesse by crafting research programs that promised to contribute to the `welfare of mankind' through the investigation and control of sexual and social behavior. Foundation officers supported Yerkes' primate research because they accepted his premise that analyzing chimpanzee sexual behavior would yield valuable insights into the evolutionary underpinnings of human development and would thus give investigators the necessary information to ameliorate dysfunction. Between 1925 and 1940, philanthropic foundations contributed approximately $7 million to support the Yale Institute of Human Relations and the affiliated Yerkes Laboratories of Primate Biology. Yet, disappointment with the results of the Yale appropriations ultimately contributed to foundation officers turning away from behavioral sciences and toward biological sciences as they continued their efforts to improve mankind through human engineering. This article examines the interaction between foundation officers and Yale behavioral scientists to illustrate how scientific entrepreneurs successfully crafted rationales about human sexuality to solicit funds, how philanthropic foundation officers became enmeshed in the behavioral science research projects that they funded, and how a cooperative human engineering effort at Yale developed in the 1920s and unraveled in the 1930s. (shrink)

Scientific realism is usually a thesis or theses advanced about our best natural science. In contrast, this book defends scientific realism applied to the social and behavioral sciences. It does so, however, by applying the same argument strategy that many have found convincing for the natural sciences, namely, by arguing that we can only explain the success of the sciences by postulating their approximate truth. The particular success that Trout emphasizes for the social sciences is (...) the effective use of statistical testing. Social scientists apply diverse statistical measurement tools to social reality; they are able to refine and improve those measurements over time. The best explanation for such success is that the social sciences give us an approximately true account of some of the laws and entities of the social world. (shrink)

The valuing process characterizes man's conscious or unconscious striving in both personal and institutional contexts. Education helps learners to clarify, analyze, and modify their valuing processes. Therapy unifies value thinking with expressions of feeling in the therapist-client relationship.A more comprehensive value theory is provided by the converging perceptions of several leading thinkers. Both valuing (the process) and values (the goals, outcomes, or products) emerge as the bedrock of humanistic studies. A list of categories in which to classify human valuing events (...) aids the researcher or practitioner by providing a common framework and vocabulary which can bring more comprehensive coverage yet precision of analysis.A general methodology for unifying the behavioral sciences, including education, is indicated in the following generalizations:A general method assists in discovering who has access to values through institutional or personal strategies.A general method may permit the observer to gather data on comparative value profiles which would suggest or predict differentiated behaviors.A general method can indicate when a personality is self-actualizing in and congenial to a context of democracy.A general method involves setting in motion a systematic technique of thinking with values (problem-solving).A general method focuses on the individual's self-esteem, which can be appraised by systematic analyses of his value deprivations and indulgences. as a key factor in the realization of his potential as a human being.A general method would provide maximum opportunity for unlike learners to realize potential in a social context where creative and responsible use of difference makes a richer world.The challenge to education and to the behavioral sciences is to innovate techniques within this configuration as a test of its power to unify, to promote keener communication, and to open the floodgates of creativity in an age of catastrophic crises produced by man's inhumanity to man. (shrink)

Interpretações históricas do percurso científico inicial de Skinner destacam as inovações teóricas, empíricas e instrumentais de seu esboço de uma ciência do comportamento. Apesar desse empenho historiográfico, um aspecto tem sido tratado de modo secundário na análise dessa fase da carreira de Skinner, a saber, os impactos dos contextos institucionais da universidade de Harvard nos rumos de sua trajetória e ciência. O objetivo deste artigo é investigar esse aspecto por meio da apreciação das práticas institucionalizadas dos Departamentos de Psicologia e (...) de Fisiologia Geral daquela universidade, e suas relações com a emergência da proposta científica de Skinner e suas peculiaridades teóricas e metodológicas. De acordo com nossa interpretação, singularidades dos primórdios da ciência skinneriana são compreendidas de modo mais amplo quando identificadas as condições institucionais que permitiram a Skinner se distanciar do mainstream da psicologia experimental estadunidense. Por fim, sugerimos que embora este estudo refira-se à história de um eminente cientista, em um momento e cenário histórico específicos, ele serve para ilustrar o papel de controles sociais, inerentes à prática científica, nos rumos da carreira de cientistas e suas produções intelectuais. Historical interpretations of the initial career of B. F. Skinner include theoretical and empirical innovations of his stub of a behavioral science. Despite this historiographical commitment, one aspect has been treated as secondary in the analysis of this phase of Skinner's career, namely, the impacts of institutional context of Harvard University. The purpose of this article is to explore this aspect through the analysis of the institutionalized practices of the departments of psychology and general physiology of that university, and its relations with the emergence of the scientific proposal of Skinner and its peculiarities. According to our interpretation, some singularities of this proposal are more broadly understood as institutional conditions that enabled Skinner to distance himself from the mainstream of American experimental psychology. Finally, we suggest that even though this study refers to an eminent scientist at a specific historical context, it offers the possibility to illustrate the role of social controls inherent to scientific practices in the course of scientific careers. (shrink)

Functionalism about kinds is still the dominant style of thought in the special sciences, like economics, psychology, and biology. Generally construed, functionalism is the view that states or processes can be individuated based on what role they play rather than what they are constituted of or realized by. Recently, Weiskopf has posited a reformulation of functionalism on the model-based approach to explanation. We refer to this reformulation as ‘new functionalism’. In this paper, we seek to defend new functionalism and (...) to recast it in light of the concrete explanatory aims of the special sciences. In particular, we argue that the assessment of the explanatory legitimacy of a functional kind needs to take into account the explanatory purpose of the model in which the functional kind is employed. We aim at demonstrating this by appealing to model-based explanations from the social and behavioral sciences. Specifically, we focus on preferences and signals as functional kinds. Our argument is intended to have the double impact of deflecting criticisms against new functionalism from the perspective of mechanistic decomposition while also expanding the scope of new functionalism to encompass the social and behavioral sciences. (shrink)

The various behavioral disciplines model human behavior in distinct and incompatible ways. Yet, recent theoretical and empirical developments have created the conditions for rendering coherent the areas of overlap of the various behavioral disciplines. The analytical tools deployed in this task incorporate core principles from several behavioral disciplines. The proposed framework recognizes evolutionary theory, covering both genetic and cultural evolution, as the integrating principle of behavioral science. Moreover, if decision theory and game theory are broadened to (...) encompass other-regarding preferences, they become capable of modeling all aspects of decision making, including those normally considered “psychological,” “sociological,” or “anthropological.” The mind as a decision-making organ then becomes the organizing principle of psychology. (Published Online April 27 2007) Key Words: behavioral game theory; behavioral science; evolutionary theory; experimental psychology; gene-culture coevolution; rational actor model; socialization. (shrink)

Although its roots can be traced to the 19th century, progress in the study of nonlinear dynamical systems has taken off in the last 30 years. While pertinent source material exists, it is strewn about the literature in mathematics, physics, biology, economics, and psychology at varying levels of accessibility. A compendium research methods reflecting the expertise of major contributors to NDS psychology, Nonlinear Dynamical Systems Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences Using Real Data examines the techniques proven to be (...) the most useful in the behavioral sciences. The editors have brought together constructive work on new practical examples of methods and application built on nonlinear dynamics. They cover dynamics such as attractors, bifurcations, chaos, fractals, catastrophes, self-organization, and related issues in time series analysis, stationarity, modeling and hypothesis testing, probability, and experimental design. The analytic techniques discussed include several variants of the fractal dimension, several types of entropy, phase-space and state-space diagrams, recurrence analysis, spatial fractal analysis, oscillation functions, polynomial and Marquardt nonlinear regression, Markov chains, and symbolic dynamics. The book outlines the analytic requirements faced by social scientists and how they differ from those of mathematicians and natural scientists. It includes chapters centered on theory and procedural explanations for running the analyses with pertinent examples and others that illustrate applications where a particular form of analysis is seen in the context of a research problem. This combination of approaches conveys theoretical and practical knowledge that helps you develop skill and expertise in framing hypotheses dynamically and building viable analytic models to test them. (shrink)

For two decades, the integrated causal model of evolutionary psychology (EP) has constituted an interdisciplinary nucleus around which a single unified theoretical and empirical behavioral science has been crystallizing – while progressively resolving problems (such as defective logical and statistical reasoning) that bedevil Gintis's beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) framework. Although both frameworks are similar, EP is empirically better supported, theoretically richer, and offers deeper unification. (Published Online April 27 2007).

It is commonly held that research efforts in the cognitive and behavioral sciences are mainly directed toward providing explanations and that phenomena figure into scientific practice qua explananda. I contend that these assumptions convey a skewed picture of the research practices in question and of the role played by phenomena. I argue that experimental research often aims at exploring and describing “objects of research” and that phenomena can figure as components of, and as evidence for, such objects. I (...) situate my analysis within the existing literature and illustrate it with examples from memory research. (shrink)

Behavioral science, unified in the way Gintis proposes, should affect ethics, which also finds itself in “disarray,” in three ways. First, it raises the standards. Second, it removes the easy targets of economic and sociobiological selfishness. Third, it provides methods, in particular the close coupling of theory and experiments, to construct a better ethics. (Published Online April 27 2007).

Causal inference plays a central role in behavioral science. Historically, behavioral science methodologies have typically sought to infer a single causal relation. Each of the major approaches to causal inference in the behavioral sciences follows this pattern. Nonetheless, such approaches sometimes differ in the causal relation that they infer. Incremental causal inference offers an alternative to this conceptualization of causal inference that divides the inference into a series of incremental steps. Different steps infer different causal relations. (...) Incremental causal inference is consistent with both causal pluralism and anti-pluralism. However, anti-pluralism places greater constraints the possible topology of sequential inferences. Arguments against causal inference include questioning consistency with causation as an explanatory principle, charging undue complexity, and questioning the need for it. Arguments in favor of incremental inference include better explanation of diverse causal inferences in behavioral science, tailored causal inference, and more detailed and explicit description of causal inference. Incremental causal inference offers a viable and potentially fruitful alternative to approaches limited to a single causal relation. (shrink)

An attempt to represent the major conflicts in discussions of the status of behavioral science as science. Most of these conflicts involve the question of just how "scientific method" is to be construed. The author suggests that many traditional bifurcations in such discussion tend to mislead rather than enlighten. An extensive treatment of the relation between natural and behavioral sciences is presented. A general sense of "scientific method" is proposed, and in that context it is concluded that (...) there are no inherent difficulties and many advantages in treating the behavioral sciences as true sciences.—L. C. (shrink)

Scientific realism has been advanced as an interpretation of the natural sciences but never the behavioral sciences. This book introduces a novel version of scientific realism, Measured Realism, that characterizes the kind of theoretical progress in the social and psychological sciences that is uneven but indisputable. It proposes a theory of measurement, Population-Guided Estimation, that connects natural, psychological, and social scientific inquiry. Presenting quantitative methods in the behavioral sciences as at once successful and regulated (...) by the world, the book will engage philosophers of science, historians of science, sociologists of science, and scientists interested in the foundations of their own disciplines. Part I introduces measured realism beginning with a novel realist theory of measurement (Population-Guided Estimation, or PGE). It examines two other versions of scientific realism — minimal (Hacking) and robust (Boyd, Putnam, and Newton-Smith) — and advances measured realism as best supported by the evidence in the behavioral sciences. It also critically evaluates the anti-realist arguments of van Fraassen, Laudan, and Fine. Part II formulates and develops a version of epistemological naturalism most appropriate to measured realism. Drawing upon the realist theory of measurement developed earlier, it favorably appraises a variety of statistical methods in the behavioral sciences against selected criticisms. It concludes that traditional, narrative methods in the behavioral and social sciences are unreliable by the measures of epistemological naturalism. (shrink)

The cognitive psychology of judgment and decision making helps to elaborate Gintis's unified view of the behavioral sciences by highlighting the fact that decisions result from multiple systems in the mind. It also adds to the unified view the idea that the potential to self-critique preference structures is a unique feature of human cognition. (Published Online April 27 2007).

There is a persistent methodological problem in primate mindreading research, dubbed the 'logical problem,' over how to determine experimentally whether chimpanzees are mindreaders or just clever behavior-readers of a certain sort. The problem has persisted long enough that some researchers have concluded that it is intractable. The logical problem, I argue, is tractable but only with experimental protocols that are fundamentally different from those that have been currently used or suggested. In the first section, I describe what the logical problem (...) is and how it can, in principle, be solved. In the second section, I illustrate how a well-known experimental protocol by Hare et al. fails to solve the logical problem. In the third section, I do the same for a protocol by Heyes . .) In the fourth section, I describe a novel experimental protocol for visual perspective-taking and argue that it succeeds to discriminate between the relevant mindreading and behavior-reading hypotheses. In addition, this new experimental protocol employs procedures that are realistic enough to suppose that chimpanzees might very well succeed in passing them. (shrink)

Cross-cultural research provides invaluable information about the origins of and explanations for cognitive and behavioral diversity. Interest in cross-cultural research is growing, but the field continues to be dominated by WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic) researchers conducting WEIRD science with WEIRD participants, using WEIRD protocols. To make progress toward improving cognitive and behavioral science, we argue that the field needs (1) data workflows and infrastructures to support long-term high-quality research that is compliant with open-science frameworks; (2) (...) process and participation standards to ensure research is valid, equitable, participatory, and inclusive; (3) training opportunities and resources to ensure the highest standards of proficiency, ethics, and transparency in data collection and processing. Here we discuss infrastructures for cross-cultural research in cognitive and behavioral sciences which we call __Cross-Cultural Data Infrastructures (CCDIs).__ We recommend building global networks of psychologists, anthropologists, demographers, experimental philosophers, educators, and cognitive, learning, and data scientists to distill their procedural and methodological knowledge into a set of community standards. We identify key challenges including protocol validity, researcher diversity, community inclusion, and lack of detail in reporting quality assurance and quality control (QAQC) workflows. Our objective is to help promote dialogue and efforts towards consolidating robust solutions by working with a broad research community to improve the efficiency and quality of cross-cultural research. (shrink)

We support the ambitious goal of unification within the behavioral sciences. We suggest that Darwinian evolution by means of natural selection can provide the integrative glue for this purpose, and we review our own work on selective investment theory (SIT), which is an example of how other-regarding preferences can be accommodated by a gene-centered account of evolution. (Published Online April 27 2007).