The monograph Drei Wurzeln des Krieges. Und warum nur eine nicht ins Verderben führt by Bernhard Taureck was published in 2019. It is one of the few current philosophical contributions on the theory of war that is not limited to the question of the moral justification of war (such as Michael Walzer’s work). Instead, the book contains not only various references to the war discourses of antiquity and their multiple references to actuality, but also a detailed examination of the (...) question of how radically war determines our history, present and future. In this book, interdisciplinary statements on Taureck’s concisely summarised approach make critical reference to this question in the common interest of finding ways out of this situation. With contributions by Lothar Brock, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Martin Kahl, Wolfgang Knöbl, Barbara Kuchler, Ishay Landa, Burkhard Liebsch, Herfried Münkler, Max Mutschler, Norman Paech, Christopher Pollmann, Bernhard H. F. Taureck and Pascal Weitmann. (shrink)

This paper examines and compares the ways in which intentions of the singular kind and the plural kind are subjective. Are intentions of the plural kind ours in the same way intentions of the singular kind are mine? Starting with the singular case, it is argued that “I intend” is subjective in virtue of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is special in that it is self-identifying, self-validating, self-committing, and self-authorizing. Moving to the plural form, it is argued that in spite of apparent differences, (...) attitudes of the form “we intend” are subjective in the same way. The self-knowledge at work here is plural rather than singular. This supports a plural subject account of collective intentionality. It is argued that the worries sometimes raised in the literature against the metaphysical “spookiness” of plural subjects are due to a fundamental misconception of the way in which attitudes of either kind –singular and plural – are subjective. (shrink)

Suppose you’d like to believe that p, whether or not it’s true. What can you do to help? A natural initial thought is that you could engage in Intentionally Biased Inquiry : you could look into whether p, but do so in a way that you expect to predominantly yield evidence in favour of p. This paper hopes to do two things. The first is to argue that this initial thought is mistaken: intentionally biased inquiry is impossible. The second is (...) to show that reflections on intentionally biased inquiry strongly support a controversial ‘access’ principle which states that, for all p, if p is part of our evidence, then that p is part of our evidence is itself part of our evidence. (shrink)

Good’s theorem is the apparent platitude that it is always rational to ‘look before you leap’: to gather information before making a decision when doing so is free. We argue that Good’s theorem is not platitudinous and may be false. And we argue that the correct advice is rather to ‘make your act depend on the answer to a question’. Looking before you leap is rational when, but only when, it is a way to do this.

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN-account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue (...) that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context-sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context-sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context-sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail. (shrink)

Instead of essentializing and defining what CSR “is”, we analyze CSR as a political discourse in which different actors struggle to fill the empty shell of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) with a legitimate interpretation. In this paper we take the current debate on CSR in Austria as an example to demonstrate how this debate is shaped by changes in the greater socio-economic environment. We suggest that this debate might be paradigmatic for the development of CSR in the European/International context. We (...) argue that the debate and the political moves concerning an implicit or an explicit concept of CSR are rooted in a more fundamental question: the societal (re-)embedding or disembedding of companies. (shrink)

The status of the knowledge iteration principles in the account provided by Lewis in “Elusive Knowledge” is disputed. By distinguishing carefully between what in the account describes the contribution of the attributor’s context and what describes the contribution of the subject’s situation, we can resolve this dispute in favour of Holliday’s claim that the iteration principles are rendered invalid. However, that is not the end of the story. For Lewis’s account still predicts that counterexamples to the negative iteration principle ) (...) come out as elusive: such counterexamples can occur only in possibilities which the attributors of knowledge are ignoring. This consequence is more defensible than it might look at first sight. (shrink)

We use the normality framework of Goodman and Salow (2018, 2021, 2023b) to investigate of dynamics of rational belief. The guiding idea is that people are entitled to believe that their circumstances aren’t especially abnormal. More precisely, a rational agent’s beliefs rule out all and only those possibilities that are either (i) ruled out by their evidence or (ii) sufficiently less normal than some other possibility not ruled out by their evidence. Working within this framework, we argue that the logic (...) of rational belief revision is much weaker than is usually supposed. We do so by isolating a natural family of orthodox principles about belief revision, describing realistic cases in which these principles seem to fail, and showing how these counterexamples are predicted by independently motivated models of the cases in question. In these models, whether one evidential possibility counts as sufficiently less normal than another is determined by underlying probabilities (together with a contextually determined question). We argue that the resulting probabilistic account of belief compares favorably with other such accounts, including Lockeanism (Foley, 1993), a ‘stability’ account inspired by Leitgeb (2017), the ‘tracking theory’ of Lin and Kelly (2012), and the influential precursor of Levi (1967). We show that all of these accounts yield subtly different but similarly heterodox logics of belief revision. (shrink)

In the current debate on economic rationality, Amartya Sen's analysis of the structure of commitment plays a uniquely important role . However, Sen is not alone in pitting committed action against the standard model of rational behavior. Before turning to Sen's analysis in section 2 of this paper, I shall start with an observation concerning some of the other relevant accounts.

In the second book of theConfessions, Augustine flabbergasts his interpreters by exaggerating an adolescent escapade (a pear theft) and making it a monstrosity. He conjectures that the pear thieves might have commited the theft purely for the sake of thieving, and thus, that they displayed a kind of evil that is not even presented by the arch-villain of Ciceronian antiquity, the conspirer Catilina. Following Aquinas’ interpretation this comparison has been considered a reductio in most of the relevant literature up to (...) now. This paper presents a different interpretation: Augustine is mostly serious about his claim–and there might be more to his argument than meets the eye. The interpretation developed in the present paper is based on a construal of the pear theft as collective agency. (shrink)

In Roman literature, the Argo commonly ranks as the first ship. The Flavian poet Valerius Flaccus seems to place himself in this line of tradition too by constantly stressing the Argo’s pioneer status. Yet it has rightly been noted that nowhere in the Argonautica is the Argo explicitly said to be the first ever ship. Her exceptional role is based rather on her status as the first sea-going ship to sail across the open sea from Europe to Asia, opening the (...) seas to global marine trade. From this perspective, the hitherto inadequately explained mentions of ships in the Phlegyas simile (3,124–132) and the Lemnos episode (2,107–114; 285–305) can also be analysed as only apparent inconsistencies. The interpretive effort required here draws the attention of the reader or audience, which is called upon to compare the earlier ships to the Argo. In this, the poet suggests a pessimistic judgement: a consequence of the opening of the seas was shipping disasters and human tragedies. Also, it did not only lead to the expansion of civilising achievements, but also held the danger that rituals and customs of a periphery which is read as barbaric would penetrate into the cultural space of the Mediterranean world. (shrink)

A "concept" in the sense favoured by Wittgenstein is a paradigm for a transition between parts of a notational system. A concept-determining sentence such as "There is no reddish green" registers the absence of such a transition. This suggests a plausible account of what is perceived in an experiment that was first designed by Crane and Piantanida, who claim to have induced perceptions of reddish green. I shall propose a redescription of the relevant phenomena, invoking only ordinary colour concepts. This (...) redescription is not ruled out by anything the experimenters say. It accounts for certain peculiarities in both their descriptions and their subjects', and suggests that instead of discovering forbidden colours the experimenters introduced a new use of "-ish". Still, there is a point in speaking of "reddish green" in their context, which can be motivated by invoking what Wittgenstein calls a "physiognomy". (shrink)

Inhaltsübersicht: Dankwort, Vorwort, In jedem Augenblick kann ich entscheiden, wer ich bin. Was im Kopf eines anderen vorgeht, können wir nie wissen. Das Erkennen des Erkennens verpflichtet. Wahr ist, was funktioniert. Wir selbst sind Konstrukte. Wir beginnen nie am Anfang. Die Freiheit, das Neue zu wagen. Wir können von der Wirklichkeit nur wissen, was sie nicht ist. Ausgewählte Literaturhinweise. Register. Über den Autor.

This is an English translation of Waldenfels' German essay: Equality and inequality are basic elements of law, justice and politics. Equality integrates each of us into a common sphere by distributing rights, duties and chances among us. Equality turns into mere indifference as far as we get overintegrated into social orders. When differences are fading away experience loses its relief and individuals lose their face. Our critical reflections start from the inevitable paradox of making equal what is not equal. In (...) various ways they refer to Nietzsche’s concept of order, to Marx’s analysis of money, to Lévinas’s ethics of the Other, and to novelists like Dostoevsky and Musil. Our critique turns against two extremes, on the one hand against any sort of normalism fixed on functioning orders, on the other hand against any sort of anomalism dreaming of mere events and permanent ruptures. Responsive phenomenology shows how we are confronted with extraordinary events. Those deviate from the ordinary and transgress its borders, without leaving the normality of our everyday world behind. The process of equalizing moves between the ordinary and the extraordinary. What makes the difference and resists mere indifference are creative responses which are to be invented again and again. (shrink)

We have developed a first generation tool for the unbiased identification and characterization of human pluripotent stem cells, termed PluriTest. This assay utilizes all the information contained on a microarray and abandons the conventional stem cell marker concept. Stem cells are defined by the ability to replenish themselves and to differentiate into more mature cell types. As differentiation potential is a property that cannot be directly proven in the stem cell state, biologists have to rely on correlative measurements in stem (...) cells associated with differentiation potential. Unfortunately, most, if not all, of those markers are only valid within narrow limits of specific experimental systems. Microarray technologies and recently next‐generation sequencing have revolutionized how cellular phenotypes can be characterized on a systems‐wide level. Here we discuss the challenges PluriTest and similar global assays need to address to fulfill their enormous potential for industrial, diagnostic and therapeutic applications. (shrink)

The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that (...) only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism. (shrink)