This is a fluently written history of ancient Greece seen from the perspective of localism and the origins of the Greek City-State. Much like our own time, from the 8th century BCE until and even beyond its imperial end, the Greek world was constantly expanding and experiencing growing connectivity with the world at large. Conquest, exploration and exchange all grew Greece's global presence and helped develop an expanded world where a need to define and cherish the local would (...) inevitably arise. Beck draws on a breathtaking range of materials: texts, some of them rare, by both well-known and obscure writers; numismatics, visual culture, pottery analysis, landscape and traditional field archaeology. He brings all this together in developing fine-grained case studies about tensions between metropolis and local communities such as Miletus, Ithaca, and rural Attica in relation to Athens and other major centers. (shrink)

The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case (...) in favor of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work. (shrink)

The majority of Kant scholars has taken it for granted that for Kant the soul is in some sense present in space and that this assumption is by and large unproblematic. If we read Kant’s texts in the context of debates on this topic within 18th century rationalism and beyond, a more complex picture emerges, leading to the somewhat surprising conclusion that Kant in 1770 can best be characterised as a Cartesian about the mind. The paper first develops a (...) framework for describing the various positions on the place of the soul in space as varieties of ‘localism’, since German philosophers of the 18th century all agreed on the fact that the soul is in some sense present in space. Strong localists (Crusius, Knutzen) maintain that the soul occupies a place that cannot at the same time be occupied by a material substance. The Königsberg Wolffian Christian Gabriel Fischer is an ‘epistemic localist’ defending the view that our knowledge about the presence of the soul in space is limited. Bilfinger holds that the soul only represents itself as being present in space, he is a ‘representational localist’. The Cartesians, including Leonhard Euler and his teacher Samuel Werenfels, assume that the soul is effective in a region of space without truly being present there. They are ‘virtual localists’. Kant’s attitude towards this problem before the 1760s is a bit unclear. But his writings in this period are at least compatible with the strong localism defended by Knutzen. In the Herder transcripts (1762-1764) and other texts after 1760, Kant begins to distance himself from this view, but he does not articulate clearly his own position. This trend culminates in Dreams of a Spirit Seer (1766), where Kant oscillates somewhat uneasily between epistemic and virtual localism and criticises explicitly the Cartesian thesis that the soul’s presence in the body is limited to a determinate region. The dissertation from 1770 marks another radical change in Kant’s views on the place of the soul. Here, he subscribes to virtual localism and its concomitant thesis that the soul itself is, properly speaking, nowhere. Together with the thesis that the soul knows that it belongs to the mundus intelligibilis this makes Kant in 1770 a Cartesian about the mind. (shrink)

This article engages the global displacement crisis by rendering the concept of ‘home’ as a theological problem for politics, linking contemporary geopolitical conflict to broader issues of forced migration. For help, we engage Simone Weil's theopolitical critique of domination‐based political organising, Hannah Arendt's insights into the texture of political space and belonging, and Jodi Dean's concept of a ‘collective desire for collectivity’ to propose a lateral, connective politics of home that secures local communities while also fostering global connection. Our constructive (...) theological proposal is that the power of love for home entails the embrace of neighbour (near and far) that moves beyond the usual options of liberal cosmopolitanism, communitarian localism, and the Realpolitik of geopolitical alliances. By reconsidering and intensifying the Christian concept of neighbour‐love and linking it to the common reality of displacement and the common longing for home, we take the first steps towards illuming and unveiling a political theology of home that is neither preferential nor naively inclusive. (shrink)

The sharp polarisation of left and right is commonly dwelt on as the big political handicap of our times. Angry divisions on the right itself get less attention. Conservatism fills that gap. Across Europe and the US, a liberal right is at war with an illiberal right. As the leading force in politics, it is vital to understand the roots of the right's struggle with itself, how it stands and how it is likely to come out. From its early 19th-century (...) origins to now, conservatism never finally settled on how far to compromise with liberalism, democracy and the capitalist world out of which both grew. By the late 19th century, the mainstream right had come to terms with all three. Its reward was lasting success in the next century and beyond. On the political fringes and among ethical-cultural critics, a recalcitrant right, unreconciled to liberal democracy, never died. Resistance to liberal democracy is seen today in the hard right, a strange but potent alliance of hyper-liberal globalists and anti-liberal localists. Conservatism focuses on an exemplary core of France, Britain, Germany and the United States. It describes the parties, politicians and thinkers of the right, bringing out strengths and weaknesses in conservative thought. An appendix includes definitions of leading terms, a brief account of conservatism's philosophical origins and mini-lives of more than 200 conservatives. Historical and topical, neither celebration nor caricature, Conservatism is a unique, panoramic survey of the Western world's dominant political tradition. (shrink)

The world is swimming in misinformation. Conflicting messages bombard us every day with news on everything from politics and world events to investments and alternative health. The daily paper, nightly news, websites, and social media each compete for our attention and each often insist on a different version of the facts. Inevitably, we have questions: Who is telling the truth? How would we know? How did we get here? What can we do? Beyond Fake News answers these and other (...) queries. It offers a technological and market-based explanation for how our informational environment became so polluted. It shows how purveyors of news often have incentives to mislead us, and how consumers of information often have incentives to be misled. And it chronicles how, as technology improves and the regulatory burdens drop, our information-scape becomes ever more littered with misinformation. Beyond Fake News argues that even when we really want the truth, our minds are built in such a way so as to be incapable of grasping many facts, and blind spots mar our view of the world. But we can do better, both as individuals and as a society. As individuals, we can improve the accuracy of our understanding of the world by knowing who to trust and recognizing our limitations. And as a society, we can take important steps to reduce the quantity and effects of misinformation. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a pluralistic view of phenomenological method which will provide evidence for particular accounts of experience without relying exclusively on the reflective method or on intuition as a criterion for truth. To this end, I discuss the prospects for indirect phenomenology. I argue that phenomenology ought to be defined by its object of investigation, first-person experience, and not by any particular method of gaining access to this object of investigation. On this view, an integration of naturalized (...) phenomenology into the cognitive sciences is far more feasible than we might have expected. (shrink)

Intuitive-automatic processes are crucial for making judgements and decisions. The fascinating complexity of these processes has attracted many decision researchers, prompting them to start investigating intuition empirically and to develop numerous models. Dual-process models assume a clear distinction between intuitive and deliberate processes but provide no further differentiation within both categories. We go beyond these models and argue that intuition is not a homogeneous concept, but a label used for different cognitive mechanisms. We suggest that these mechanisms have to (...) be distinguished to allow for fruitful investigations of intuition. Specifically, we argue that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition before making strong claims about its performance. We summarise current models for intuition and propose a categorisation according to the underlying cognitive processes: (a) associative intuition based on simple learning-retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumulative intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d) constructive intuition based on construction of mental representations. We discuss how this differentiation might help to clarify the relationship between affect and intuition and we derive a very general hypothesis as to when intuition will lead to good decisions and when it will go astray. (shrink)

Philosophers have recently come to focus on explaining the phenomenon of ​bad beliefs,​ beliefs that are apparently true and well-evidenced but nevertheless objectionable. Despite this recent focus, a consensus is already forming around a particular explanation of these beliefs’ badness called ​moral encroachment​, according to which, roughly, the moral stakes engendered by bad beliefs make them particularly difficult to justify. This paper advances an alternative account not just of bad beliefs but of bad attitudes more generally according to which bad (...) beliefs’ badness originates not in a failure of sufficient evidence but in a failure to respond adequately to reasons. I motivate this alternative account through an analogy to recent discussions of moral worth centered on the well-known grocer case from Kant’s ​Groundwork​, and by showing that this analogy permits the proposed account to generalize to bad attitudes beyond belief. The paper concludes by contrasting the implications of moral encroachment and of the proposed account for bad attitudes’ blameworthiness. (shrink)

"This is a daring, inventive, and engagingly written book. Tomasi escapes the current liberal fixation with justice and legitimacy by asking searching questions about how truly good lives can be led under a just liberal regime.

Volume 20, Issue 4, May 2020, Page 30-33.

When Husserl speaks of the so-called ‘transcendental reduction’ or ‘phenomenological epochē’ many believe that he is eschewing the question of truth or existence. Two reasons are given for this: First, Husserl explicitly states that when we perform the reduction, we should no longer naively ‘accept [the world] as it presents itself to me as factually existing’ (Id I §30, p. 53) and should suspend our judgement with regard to ‘the positing of its actual being’ (Id I §88, p. 182). Second, (...) Husserl seems to have no problem in referring to an ‘object’ of thought even when we refer to non-existent, hallucinatory or indeed impossible objects. This seems to suggest that he is not interested in the question whether or not there is a corresponding ‘ordinary’ object. The paper seeks to question this and will show that his inquiry never loses sight of the questions of truth and existence but rather brings them into the foreground. (shrink)

This book is a systematic analysis of John R. Searle's philosophy of mind. Searle's view of mind, as a set of subjective and biologically embodied processes, can account for our being part of nature qua mindful beings. This model finds support in neuroscience and offers reliable solutions to the problems of consciousness, mental causation, and the self.

Narratives of human-induced environmental effects such as climate change and biodiversity decline have long been dominated by narratives of loss in which humankind is concep­tualized as a destructive force. But in addition to narratives of loss, there is a narrative of gain and resilience in nonfiction books intended for a general audience. Books employing this narrative emphasize that nature is dynamic and that some species are adapting to and flourishing thanks to human-induced changes. This review essay discusses two new books (...) in this vein: Chris D. Thomas’s Inheritors of the Earth and Menno Schilthuizen’s Darwin Comes to Town. I argue that these two books, besides being interesting in their own right, are important contributions to the popular literature on climate change and the Anthropocene because they denaturalize dominant apocalyptic narratives of nature. However, they underestimate the severity of human effect on the biosphere and advocate a form of anthropocentrism that may be misguided if our goal is to maintain a functioning biosphere for the future. (shrink)

This article is an assessment of the moral problems that beset cultural relativism, that is, the belief that the nature of human existence and value is strictly dependent on, and therefore autonomously proper to, each particular culture. According to this view, the human experience never transcends its native ground. It is, hence, no use judging one form of the human experience against another since no universal non-local yardstick exists to measure them by. After exposing the flaws and contradictions inherent in (...) this view, the author draws a picture of the consequences of upholding cultural relativism, particularly as it shapes the moral self-understanding of its followers in this instance and, for illustrative purpose, Richard Rorty. Finally, the article sketches an argument for a humanistic understanding of culture, a theory that allows us to hold that human existence does vary according to local and historical communities, and yet holds to a moral centre valid across all human culture. (shrink)