Wenn das klassische Argument des Skeptizismus wahrhaftig ist, dann können wir nicht behaupten, dass wir etwas wissen, und dies beeinflusst unsere täglichen Aussagen über das Leben, die Natur und uns selbst. DeRose schlägt eine neue kontextualistische Lösung vor. Shiffer bringt Argumente gegen DeRoses Erklärungen über die Stärke der epistemischen Position vor. Für problematisch hält er auch die Behauptung der Kontextualisten, dass in Wissenssätzen ohne indexikalische Ausdrücke ein skeptisches Paradoxon auftritt. In meinem Beitrag versuche ich für die Notwendigkeit des Inbetrachtziehens von (...) Beispielen zu argumentieren, die dasselbe Objekt, verschiedene Personen und verschiedene Wissensstandards einbeziehen. In diesem Fall wird man sowohl Shiffers als auch DeRoses Lösungen kaum zustimmen können. (shrink)

Symbol Grounding Problem is commonly considered one of the central challenges in the philosophy of artificial intelligence as its resolution is deemed necessary for bridging the gap between simple data processing and understanding of meaning and language. SGP has been addressed on numerous occasions with varying results, all resolution attempts having been severely, but for the most part justifiably, restricted by the Zero Semantic Commitment Condition. A further condition that demands explanatory power in terms of machine-to-human communication is the Non-Stupidity (...) Condition that demands an SG approach to be able to account for plausibility of higher-level language use and understanding, such as pragmatics. In this article, we undertake the endeavour of attempting to explain how merging certain early requirements for SG, such as embodiment, environmental interaction, and compliance with the Z-Condition with symbol emergence rather than direct attempts at symbol grounding can help emulate human language acquisition. Along with the presumption that mind and language are both symbolic and computational, we argue that some rather abstract aspects of language can be logically formalised and finally, that this melange of approaches can yield the explanatory power necessary to satisfy the Non-Stupidity Condition without breaking any previous conditions. (shrink)

The revolution of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly generative AI, and its implications for human–robot interaction (HRI) opened up the debate on crucial regulatory, business, societal, and ethical considerations. This paper explores essential issues from the anthropomorphic perspective, examining the complex interplay between humans and AI models in societal and corporate contexts. We provided a comprehensive review of existing literature on HRI, with a special emphasis on the impact of generative models such as ChatGPT. The scientometric study posits that due to (...) their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior, generative AIs like ChatGPT will continue to grow in popularity in pair with human rational empathy, tendency for personification and their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior. As they blur the boundaries between humans and robots, these models introduce fresh moral and philosophical dilemmas. Our research aims to extrapolate key trends and unique factors in HRI and to elucidate the technical aspects of generative AI that enhance its effectiveness in this field compared to traditional rule-based AI systems. We further discuss the challenges and limitations of applying generative AI in HRI, providing a future research agenda for AI optimization in diverse applications, including education, entertainment, and healthcare. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential for psychic conflict within Seneca's moral psychology. Some scholars have taken Seneca's explicit claim in De Ira that the soul is unitary to preclude any kind of simultaneous psychic conflict, while other interpreters have suggested that Seneca views all cases of anger as instances of akrasia. I argue that Seneca's account of anger provides the resources for accommodating some types of simultaneous psychic conflict; however, he denies the possibility of psychic conflict between two action-generating impulses, (...) thus rejecting the phenomena of genuine akrasia and enkrateia. Although superficially counterintuitive, Seneca's cognitivist account of anger, according to which anger is complex and requires assent to the propositions that ‘I have been wronged’ and ‘I ought to seek revenge’, renders his denial of akrasia and enkrateia more plausible. (shrink)

This article considers the functionality, method and import of the critical theorist Slavoj Žižek’s engagement with theology against the wider intellectual backdrop of the relationship between an idea and its cultural context. I propose that his engagement can be better understood and interpreted with reference to how Christian theology has historically come to understand its own cultural context. When Žižek’s appropriation of theology is read alongside theology’s appropriation of classical philosophy in the patristic period, a distinctly speculative understanding of theology (...) as an idea developing through a dialectical process of determinate negation in its various contexts. (shrink)

Friendship (philia) plays a prominent role in Aristotle’s ethical thought. It is only within the context of his discussions of philia that Aristotle explicitly mentions acting for the sake of another’s good: friends, he claims, wish and do good things for one another for the sake of the friend. However, it is not clear whether Aristotle limits disinterested wishing well to the complete friendships of virtuous agents. I argue that he does not; friends of all varieties, to the extent that (...) they are friends at all, wish and act well for the friend’s sake. I also consider whether Aristotle’s remarks on self-love and friendship might provide reason for thinking that love for others is and ought to be an extension of self-love. I reject the idea that love for a friend is justified by self-love: the virtuous agent does not care about the good of her friends only insofar as she sees those friends as her other selves. (shrink)

Digital preservation has significantly expanded over the past few decades, renewing old and creating new challenges related to provenance, integrity, completeness, and context in memory and preservation practices. In this paper we explore how, perhaps counterintuitively, a more extensive digital historical record offers greater opportunities to misrepresent reality. We first review a set of concepts and socio-cultural approaches to memory and preservation. We then focus on the multiplicity of digital memory and preservation practices today, examining their limits, possibilities, and tensions; (...) specifically, we explore the challenges of decontextualized data, personal versus institutional preservation, and?outsider? digital collections that are willingly and/or forcibly excluded from official accounts. Through these discussions, we review examples of what we consider good digital memory and preservation practices that take new approaches to context and collaboration. Lastly, we explore the optimism inherent in seeking to preserve human knowledge over the long term and to make it accessible to all. (shrink)

In her rich and provocative paper, Susan Levin seeks to defend the value of anger against the views of Stoics and transhumanists, both of whom regard anger as irrational and to be eliminated. In her defense, Levin draws on Aristotle, relating his position to contemporary appraisal theorists as well as anti-racism activists and scholars, for Aristotle holds, in contrast with the Stoics, that some cases of anger are justified. The virtuous Aristotelian agent will become angry in response to injustice. I (...) explore the extent to which Levin endorses Aristotle’s account of anger, complicating some of the associations she aims to establish. In particular, while the Stoics and Aristotle disagree about the rationality, morality, and prudential value of anger, they share a very similar conception of the emotion, according to which a desire for revenge partly constitutes anger. By contrast, Levin defends a forward-looking conception of anger, focusing on rectifying current injustice and preventing future injustice. It turns out, then, that Levin’s justified forward-looking anger may have more in common with the spirit of the Stoic response to injustice than with Aristotle’s retributive view. (shrink)

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)

In this article, I argue for an essentialist account of cyborgs. This means that one condition for being a cyborg is to possess phenomenal consciousness, ‘what it feels like’ to undergo an experience. In this context, I make two related claims: (1) the metaphysical claim that it is essential to cyborgs to have phenomenal consciousness due to their being augmented human beings, and (2) the related claim that this metaphysical constraint need not apply to cyborg-like entities, which may or may (...) not be augmented humans and so might not possess phenomenal consciousness. In support of these claims, I argue that cyborgs without phenomenal consciousness would lose information-processing abilities essential to the human condition and would be better understood as androids with biological body parts. First, I briefly characterize phenomenal consciousness in the context of the Mind–Body Problem. Then I introduce the Mind–Technology Problem and claim that it is better suited to frame the relevant discussion. In a second step, I argue that phenomenal consciousness is a vital feature of the human mind as it is fundamental for practices that relate what it feels to have an experience to other minds capable of such experiences, as in the arts. Briefly, thus, I argue that, without phenomenal consciousness, there is no art, and that art involves information-processing abilities essential to the human condition. Then I describe two different kinds of entity that might be considered cyborgs in the context of enhancement, distinguishing between cyborgs and cyborg-like entities. Finally, I argue that entities that do not possess phenomenal consciousness cannot be classified as cyborgs, since without it, an essential capacity of human experience, to be affected by the expressive arts, is absent. (shrink)

In extreme situations such as war, genocide or refugee crises, anthropologists, who are usually closer to afflicted people than other scholars, face the crucial questions of the utility and responsibility of anthropology. However, anthropologists in particular are susceptible to the way of reasoning that concludes that anthropology as a science (or even as a technique or art) does not offer any answers to these questions. Some become engaged trying to help one way or the other, yet not as anthropologists, since (...) they hold that as an anthropologist one is powerless to help …. (shrink)

This paper addresses the nature of the Charter as the basic document of the Institution, that is, the most important document that lends the institution its force. The “and” between Charter and Institution or the conjoining of Charter with Institution has two tasks to perform. Firstly, the Institution needs to be structured and incorporated as a Charter (and conversely, the Charter is the Institution embodied). In this sense, my question is: can the institute of the Charter be the starting point (...) of a potential theory of the institution? Secondly, it is the Charter – and not law, contract, norm, not Searle’s declaration, not Husserl’s Ausweiss – that could improve the theory of documentality and its connection with institutionalism. (shrink)

What interest me are the reasons why?human? or?human rights? could be important or possibly most important in constituting a group? in the subtitle). If I had to justify the existence of the latest debates on nature, justification and universality of human rights, on their distinction from other normative standards, on the philosophy and foundation of human rights, on?Human Rights without Foundations?, then I would immediately conclude that this?process of grandiose concretization? of a complete fabrication is far from over. Despite the (...) innumerable pacts and international conventions established after World War II, the slew of obligations to which states have agreed in the last few decades, the establishment of rights to secession or humanitarian intervention it is as if the constitution of classification of basic human rights and their universality is far from over. (shrink)

The relation between violence and the institution was truly thematized for the first time in the writings of Hume, and in an entirely different way in Saint-Just's texts on the Republic and the institution. Gilles Deleuze's early works represent an original attempt at reconstruction of a possible dialogue between these two dissimilar authors. Regardless of the possibility of reconstruction of Deleuze's own theory of the institution , and analysis of the various combinations of the terms institution and revolution, the intention (...) is above all to examine the link between violence and the institution. Deleuze's attempt to make a preliminary systematic examination of the figure of the institution came about as a result of the conjoining of several fragments of his famous predecessors. (shrink)

This article examines the religious functions of the Dutch performance practice of Johann Sebastian Bach’s St. Matthew Passion. It introduces the phenomenon itself, points out its religious and ritual significance in the post secular Netherlands, and interprets the passion play with Hartmut Rosa’s social theory. A conclusion about resonance as the common third between religious and aesthetic experiences rounds off the study.

Der Autor entwickelt ein Modell des strategischen und operativen Managements in Konzernrechtsabteilungen und richtet dabei den Fokus auf praktische Erkenntnisse, die auf betriebs- und volkswirtschaftlichen Theorien sowie zahlreichen Experteninterviews aufgebaut sind. Ein besonderes Augenmerk legt er auf die Spezifika von Rechtsdienstleistungen im Vergleich zu anderen Leistungen, die in einem Konzern benötigt werden. Die Sichtweise des Leiters einer Rechtsabteilung /General Counsels steht dabei im Vordergrund. Es wird die Frage untersucht, wie dieser die Leitung und Steuerung der gesamten Abteilung am effizientesten und (...) effektivsten ausfüllen kann. (shrink)

This article is an argument for furthering the understanding, role and scope of critical theology in reflection on the act, content and implications of theological thought through appropriation of...

From 1940 to 1945, Kruno Krstić published a series of articles on language in various newspapers and magazines. He approaches the language phenomenonfrom different points of view. In some of the articles he discusses the Croatian literary language and its relation to the Croatian dialects, while in others he considers the relation between the Croatian and Serbian language. At certain times he presents his views on the development of language, whereas at other he explores the relation between language and thought. (...) Krstiæ, regardless of the topic he deals with, is considered to be a predecessor in this field in Croatia: from sociolinguistics and theory of standard to philosophy of language in its narrower sense. On the other hand, Krstić also pays special attention to language and the analysis of meaning when he considers other philosophical problems. Thus he becomes closely associated with a particular approach to philosophy, sometimes also called linguistic philosophy. (shrink)

Uporišta. O Markovićevim filozofskim rukopisima u arhivima HAZU ; O Hondlovu prigovoru Bazalinu tumačenju Spinozine filozofije -- Začetnik filozofije jezika u Hrvatskoj : uz knjigu Kruna Krstića Studije, rasprave, i članci ; Što je činjenica? O Krstićevu poimanju (znanstvene) objektivnosti ; Supek kao filozof ; Supekov odnos prema pojedinim pravcima u suvremenoj filozofiji ; Marijan Cipra : život, misao, radovi -- Hrvatska filozofija i hrvatski jezik. Rječnik hrvatskoga filozofskoga nazivlja ; Filozofija i hrvatski jezik : bibliografija ; Je li suština (...) nužna? O sustavnosti hrvatskoga filozofskoga nazivlja -- Nazivlje u Markovićevoj Etici -- Sutlićev odnos spram jezika -- László i filozofsko nazivlje. (shrink)

The text aims to explore one peculiar practice of translation manifested in the transformation of passion for knowledge into passion for life. More precisely, the issue at stake is the modification of libido sciendi, which occurred during the 20th century, notably in writings inspired by ‘DS’, the shorthand Hélène Cixous uses to refer to ‘sexual difference/différence sexuelle’. The Latin words in the title serve as markers in interpreting politics/poetics of writing, which actively include forms of expression that belong to different (...) disciplines such as philosophy, psychoanalysis and above all, literature. Special attention is paid to Cixous’s early text, Révolutions pour plus d’un Faust, written in 1975, and its attempt to transform/translate energies of destruction into life-respecting creativity. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson?s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second (...) part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum?s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents? emotional judgments. (shrink)

The place of evidence regarding joint commitment and plural action is mostly reserved for documents and explicit linguistic expressions. This paper considers the problem of evidence in cases of engaged (jointly committed) social acts where there is no explicit expression or binding document, yet can still be ascribed to a plural subject. The argument rests on the double meaning of the term factum as fact (factum brutum) and deed (factum practica), as well as contemporary debates about the topic of fact (...) of reason in Kant. The text seeks to show that in certain cases, the execution of an act or the obligation produced by it can be considered evidence of a plural subject. Thus, these facts deserve a special position in relation to scientific evidence. (shrink)

In recent years we have seen the rise of a new framework within the study of the mind, namely Predictive Processing. This framework essentially holds that the brain is a prediction machine constantly postulating perceptual models which are tested against incoming information. At the same time, the notion of the minimal or core self has become very influential as a way of explaining, or explaining away, pre-reflective self-awareness. The four most widely discussed alternatives for thinking through the metaphysical implications the (...) pre-reflective sense of self are the standard phenomenological view, the substance view, the no-self view and by now the relational view. In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework. (shrink)

The majority of contemporary models of wisdom define it in terms of a cognitive ability that is located in an agent’s mind. Even those models that include emotions, affective states, gut feelings etc. hardly recognise the relation between those non-cognitive dimensions, agents’ bodies and how they shape the content of experiences and how social practices of wisdom enfold. This paper will address this gap by providing a phenomenological account that depicts wisdom not as generated by wise individuals but as being (...) produced by and within embodied practices of agents relating to other people, artefacts, concepts, and ways of using others and things. It is argued that management should aim at building facilitative contexts that afford people to make use of and exploit the embodied dimension of wise practices. Exemplary strategies and tools that establish such sites, where embodied social practices of wisdom happen, are described. (shrink)

The article deals with the development of the philosophy of France Veber, the pupil of Meinong and a main Slovene philosopher. One of the most important threads of Veber’s philosophy is the consideration of knowledge and factuality, which may be seen as a driving force of its development. Veber’s philosophical development is usually divided into three phases: the object theory phase, the phase when he created his philosophy of a person as a creature at the crossing of the natural and (...) the spiritual world, who as an active, not merely passive subject possesses her own causal powers, and the third phase, when he supplemented his earlier philosophy with the theory of a special side of our experience which he called hitting-upon-reality. It is a direct experience of reality, a special kind of intentionality, which is however fundamentally different from presentational intentionality, which alone is taken into account by object theory or phenomenology. The questions of knowledge and factuality are closely connected in Veber’s philosophy since, pace Veber, knowledge is a kind of, we may say, justified experience the object of which is a factual entity. Hence, if we want to understand what knowledge is, we must face the challenge of comprehending factuality. There are five stages to be noted in the development of his epistemology. The first two belong to his object theory phase, the third to his person phase, the fourth is characterised by his distinguishing and exploring truth and validity with regard to the thought about God, and the basis of the fifth phase lies in his theory of hitting-upon-reality. In Introduction to Philosophy and The System of Philosophy, that is in the year 1921, Veber believed that factuality was a property of the object, which we do present, but we do not present the factuality of this factuality. In 1923, in The Problems of Contemporary Philosophy and in the work Science and Religion, he already rejected such a view. There is something that makes things factual, but that is a complete unknown X. Therefore we cannot even say what kind of an entity this factuality is. Some people would probably demand the following formulation: if X is an ultimate mystery, we should not claim even that it is an entity. In The Problems of Presentation Production Veber claimed that factuality is not a property since this would lead to a regressum ad infinitum. Philosophy related internally correct experience to personal will. In T he Book about God he developed the thesis that factuality depends on the act of God. In The Question of Reality he importantly modified, developed and enriched the thesis that we do not present reality with his theory of immediate experience of factuality. (shrink)

Our main goal is to describe the structure of engaged acts and compassion and their constitutive interrelation to explicate the key role of engaged and compassionate acts for group constitution. In the first part of the paper, we formulate our guiding idea: the key to understanding compassion lies in understanding engagement and vice versa. We then consider the problematic nature of engaged acts: On the one hand, they do not meet the conditions to be attributed to the plural subject; on (...) the other hand, they cannot be understood without presupposing the plural subject. To understand this, we rely primarily on Helm’s theory of emotions and the classical phenomenological analyses of the constitution of the plural subject, but we also point out the limitations of the latter. In the last two sections, we build on Nussbaum’s theory of compassion to describe the parallelism in the structure of compassion and engagement and to show their constitutive connection. Finally, we examine the specific way in which engaged acts “place burden” and transform a group into an institution. (shrink)