The founder of American pragmatism, C.S. Peirce, lived as an eccentric, but thought as a dedicated communitarian. In Reading Peirce Reading, Richard Smyth demonstrates that Peirce's early essays presuppose a very distinctive perspective on the history of philosophy. One important mark of a major philosopher, Smyth argues, is that the philosopher causes us to read the history of thought in new ways. Smyth shows not only that Peirce passes that test, but that Peirce's philosophical practice actually did (...) conform to his communal ideal for inquiry. Students and scholars interested in the history of philosophy and pragmatism will want to read this book. (shrink)

Smythe and Murray presented the basic ethical issues in narrative research in a comprehensive, well-reasoned, and direct manner. In this critique, we highlight 3 issues. Two matters appear to challenge the internal inconsistency of the assumptions of NR: privileging some voices over others and a potential inherent conflict of interest for some researchers. We also examine some issues regarding the protection of research participants and conclude with modest recommendations.

Late last year the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the common law definition of marriage and the statutory marriage formula was unconstitutional as it violated the rights of such couples to equality. The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to enact new legislation to correct the defects, failing which certain words would be read into the legislation to accommodate same-sex marriage. A single judge dissented on the (...) issue of remedy, finding that the Court should have developed the common law to include same-sex couples within the definition of marriage and read the necessary wording into the legislation with immediate effect. The decision is the culmination of a legal struggle by gays and lesbians for recognition of their relationships and the protection of their rights. While the scope of the right to marry may have been extended, the rights of domestic partners lag behind, often to the detriment of women in these relationships. (shrink)

Nearly every edition of Aeschylus published between 1782 and 1852 contained readings from what were called ‘Askew's collations’ or the ‘Askew MSS.’—usually referred to as Ask. A, Ask. B, Ask. C, Ask. D, Ask. a, Colb. 1, and Colb. 2. These MSS., which were very briefly described, were stated in these editions to be Paris MSS. which had been collated by Askew. Blomfield, however, discovered that Askew had transcribed all the collations from a note-book that had belonged to Needham, and (...) Pierron accused Askew of deliberate plagiarism and unscrupulous dishonesty. The late Prof. H. W. Smyth in a recent note on the subject attempted to identify the ‘Askew MSS.’, and maintained the charge of plagiarism; but his conclusions were based on inadequate evidence, and were consequently partly incorrect. A full study of all the available evidence, a summary of which I give below, not only clears Askew's name of any plagiarism, but also establishes the identity of the MSS. (shrink)

ABSTRACTAnxious individuals report disproportionately negative expectations concerning the future, termed the negative expectancy bias. In contrast, ageing is associated with an inflated expectancy for positive future events. A recent study [Steinman, S. A., Smyth, F. L., Bucks, R. S., MacLeod, C., & Teachman, B. A.. Anxiety-linked expectancy bias across the adult lifespan. Cognition and Emotion, 27, 345–355. doi:10.1080/02699931.2012.711743] found using an interpretation bias task, a negative expectancy bias in young adults and positive expectancy bias in older adults with high (...) trait anxiety. Extending this, the current study examined expectancy bias for positive, negative and ambiguously emotionally toned information in younger and older adults with clinical levels of depression and anxiety to community control groups, thus allowing examination of both disorder status and age on biases. Clinical participants reported a pervasive tendency to expect negative events relative to positive regardless o... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE FATHER ROBERT WARNER St. Joseph's University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania I. Introduction Y ANY MEASURE, Karl Rahner was one of the principal architects of the renascence of trinitarian theology that has marked the last half of this century. Rahner found that in their pract:icail lives Christians were "a1most mere' monotheists'" 1 while :in speculative endeavors the treatise on the Trinity stood " isofoted in the structriwe of (...) dogmatic theology as a whoile," 2 and so he devoted himself toov ;ereoming both the priadicaJ irre~evance and the theoretical isolation of the doctrine. He p:mposeid as a methodologicaJ Grunda:dom the dictum that " the ' 1econom~c' Trinity is the 'immanent ' Trinity and the 'immanent ' Trinity is the 'economic ' Trinity," 3 in 011der to preclude any sharp disjunction between how God is in se and how God is ad extra, between theofogy and the,economy. He al:so developed a techn~cal concept of self-communication, inscribed it within the heart of his trinitarian theology, amd materiaily recast the traditional account of the Trinity to wccm~d with that notion. H1s account of the 1dentity and roil.e of God the Father is a striking, although littiie noted, feature of Rahner's thought. His trinitarian theofogy trumpets the primacy of God the Father: this is evident in his oft-stated resolve to begin the 1Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 10. Hereafter cited as Trinity. 2" Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate '," in Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations IV, trans. Kevin Smyth (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 78. Hereafter cited as "Remarks." a Trinity, p. 22. 569 570 ROBERT WARNER ;theological entel'prise, in consort with Scripture and the Greeks, with God Father, rather than the one divine es-,senoe shared by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.4 And that primacy, in tum, is secured by an extra.ordinary emphasis on the urnoriginatedness trruditionaUy,ascribed to the Father. 'What unoriginatedness involves and how unoriginatedness and fatherhood bear on the identity of the Father become cmci.ail questions within Rahner's trinitarian theology. This is no bit of trinitarian arteana, no subtlety of interest only to a scholastic mindset, but an issue whose consequenee1 s reverberate throughout Rahner's Two e:mmples will suffice. Insofar as Rahner on the notion of self-communicatfon, he riegufar~y identifies the F1ather as the origin of the self-communication. Divinity is communicated rbo the Son 1:the HoJy Spi:cit. Issues regacvding the id.entity of the Father impinge, therefore, on questions the seH-communication p11eioise[y because upon the identity of the self that is communicated. In 1addition, Rahner works out the identification of being of God and the triune being of God in the person of Father. Thel'eby the question arbout ifhe :identity the Father becomes important in sett1ing the ontological status of immanent the sense in which God is 1anteoedently trinity se. This essay examine Rahner's rich and compfox a1C1count of the identity of Father. It be necessary, firis:t of all, to situate that teaching, to clarify Rahner means by un-.origina.tedness, and to determine how he understands unorigifatherhood to be interr1 elat1ed constituting the identity of the the essay will argue that Rahner's account not, fo fact, succeed and,this his theology. Rahne'l.''s position can thus: be seen a,s an attempt to identify a philosophically colJJceiv;ed,abyss the Father trinitarian doctrine by reworking the unoriginatedness tr:aditionaHy ascribed to the Father. 4 Trinity, p. Hl. RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE FATHER 571 II. 'O 8e6c; and the Father In an essay that appears early on in the Theological Investigations, "Theos in the New Testament", Rahner outlines the content of the New Testament conception of God under seveml heaidings.5 He notes, first of 1all, the New Testament's imperious claim that its God is the one true God, o 8e6c;. Rahner describes this as the New Testament"s doctrine of God',s uniqueness. Under a second rubric, God as person, Rmmer ranges several topics. Aocording to Rahner, as personal, God is (1) an agent who.wets (2) freely in (3... (shrink)

What is the function of morality? On this question, something approaching a consensus has recently emerged. Impressed by developments in evolutionary theory, many philosophers now tell us that the function of morality is to reduce social tensions, and to thereby enable a society to efficiently promote the well-being of its members. In this paper, I subject this consensus to rigorous scrutiny, arguing that the functional hypothesis in question is not well supported. In particular, I attack the supposed evidential relation between (...) an evolutionary genealogy of morals and the functional hypothesis itself. I show that there are a great many functionally relevant discontinuities between our own culture and the culture within which morality allegedly emerged, and I argue that this seriously weakens the inference from morality’s evolutionary history to its present-day function. (shrink)

Analytic moral philosophers have generally failed to engage in any substantial way with the cultural history of morality. This is a shame, because a genealogy of morals can help us accomplish two important tasks. First, a genealogy can form the basis of an epistemological project, one that seeks to establish the epistemic status of our beliefs or values. Second, a genealogy can provide us with functional understanding, since a history of our beliefs, values or institutions can reveal some inherent dynamic (...) or pattern which may be problematically obscured from our view. In this paper, I try to make good on these claims by offering a sketchy genealogy of emancipatory values, or values which call for the liberation of persons from systems of dominance and oppression. The real history of these values, I argue, is both epistemologically vindicatory and functionally enlightening. (shrink)

Recent work on Kant’s conception of space has largely put to rest the view that Kant is hostile to actual infinity. Far from limiting our cognition to quantities that are finite or merely potentially infinite, Kant characterizes the ground of all spatial representation as an actually infinite magnitude. I advance this reevaluation a step further by arguing that Kant judges some actual infinities to be greater than others: he claims, for instance, that an infinity of miles is strictly smaller than (...) an infinity of earth-diameters. This inequality follows from Kant’s mereological conception of magnitudes (quanta): the part is (analytically) less than the whole, and an infinity of miles is equal to only a part of an infinity of earth-diameters. This inequality does not, however, imply that Kant’s infinities have transfinite and unequal sizes (quantitates). Because Kant’s conception of size (quantitas) is based on the Eudoxian theory of proportions, infinite magnitudes (quanta) cannot be assigned exact sizes. Infinite magnitudes are immeasurable, but some are greater than others. (shrink)

"Ethical thought has no chance of being everything it seems." Bernard Williams offered this cryptic remark in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, and in this chapter I argue that understanding it is the key to understanding Williams' skepticism about moral theory and about systematization in ethics. The difficulty for moral philosophy, Williams believed, is that ethics looks one way to embodied, active agents, but looks entirely different when considered from the standpoint of theory. This, in turn, means that following (...) a moral theory is a sure route to practical alienation. I argue that once we see it for what it is, we can see that Williams own skepticism undermines his later attempts to vindicate Truthfulness. Moreover, given the pervasiveness of reflective practical alienation in ordinary life, it leaves us with a difficult question: what would a non-alienated ethical existence even look like for us? (shrink)

David Benatar has argued both for anti-natalism and for a certain pessimism about life's meaning. In this paper, I propose that these positions are expressions of a deeply impersonal philosophical temperament. This is not a problem on its own; we all have our philosophical instincts. The problem is that this particular temperament, I argue, leads Benatar astray, since it prevents him from answering a question that any moral philosopher must answer. This is the question of rational authority, which requires the (...) moral philosopher to say why existing human agents have strong practical reasons to comply with the philosopher's dictates. A purely impersonal ethical system can never do this, and this is why Benatar has no answer to this question. (shrink)

Four decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving (...) this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along. (shrink)

The ethics of biological procreation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Yet, as I show in this paper, much of what has come to be called procreative ethics is conducted in a strangely abstract, impersonal mode, one which stands little chance of speaking to the practical perspectives of any prospective parent. In short, the field appears to be flirting with a strange sort of practical irrelevance, wherein its verdicts are answers to questions that no-one is asking. (...) I go on to articulate a theory of what I call existential grounding, a notion which explains the role that prospective children play in the lives of many would-be parents. Procreative ethicists who want their work to have real practical relevance must, I claim, start to engage with this markedly first-personal kind of practical consideration. (shrink)

The existence of deep and persistent moral disagreement poses a problem for a defender of moral knowledge. It seems particularly clear that a philosopher who thinks that we know a great many moral truths should explain how human populations have failed to converge on those truths. In this paper, I do two things. First, I show that the problem is more difficult than it is often taken to be, and second, I criticize a popular response, which involves claiming that many (...) false moral beliefs are the product of nonmoral ignorance. (shrink)

Pragmatic Genealogy involves constructing fictional, quasi-historical models in order to discover what might explain and justify our concepts, ideas or practices. It arguably originated with Hume, but its most prominent practitioners are Edward Craig, Bernard Williams and Mathieu Queloz. Its defenders allege that the method allows us to understand “what the concept does for us, what its role in our life might be” (Craig, 1990), and that this in turn can ground practical reasons to preserve or further a conceptual practice. (...) In this paper, I argue that none of this is true, and that only a turn to the actual recent history of such practices can reveal those sorts of practical reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that in order to explain our own moral reliability, we must provide a theory of error for those who disagree with us. Any story that seeks to vindicate our own reliability must also explain how so many others have gone wrong, otherwise it is not actually a vindicatory story. Thus, we cannot claim to have vindicated our own moral reliability unless we can explain the unreliability of those who hold contrary beliefs. This, I show, requires (...) us to engage directly with cultural history, a topic which has been unfortunately obscured by the meta-ethicist’s near-exclusive focus on evolutionary challenges to moral belief. (shrink)

In this paper, I clarify and defend a provocative hypothesis offered by Bernard Williams, namely, that modern people are much more likely to speak in terms of master-concepts like “good” or “right,” and correspondingly less likely to think and speak in the pluralistic terms favored by certain Ancient societies. By conducting a close reading of the Platonic dialogues Charmides and Laches, I show that the figure of Socrates plays a key historical role in this conceptual shift. Once we understand that (...) our narrow, reductionist focus on “thin” ethical concepts is a contingent historical development, we are, I claim, in a much better position to evaluate it. (shrink)

I advance a novel interpretation of Kant's argument that our original representation of space must be intuitive, according to which the intuitive status of spatial representation is secured by its infinitary structure. I defend a conception of intuitive representation as what must be given to the mind in order to be thought at all. Discursive representation, as modelled on the specific division of a highest genus into species, cannot account for infinite complexity. Because we represent space as infinitely complex, the (...) spatial manifold cannot be generated discursively and must therefore be given to the mind, i.e. represented in intuition. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception - a canonical text of twentieth-century philosophy - concludes with an appeal to 'heroism' by citing a series of enigmatic sentences drawn from Saint-Exupe;ry's Pilote de guerre. Surprisingly, however, these lines are antithetical to the philosophical thrust of Merleau-Ponty's project. This book aims to explain this situation. Foregrounding liminal themes in Merleau-Ponty's thought that have been largely overlooked - e.g., sacrifice, death, myth, faith - and showing how these themes support Merleau-Ponty's reinterpretation of Husserlian phenomenology, (...) class='Hi'>Smyth shows that Merleau-Ponty's appeal to 'heroism' represents an extra-philosophical appeal to a historical purposiveness as a universal feature of human nature, and that Merleau-Ponty makes this appeal in virtue of his recognition of the intrinsic methodological limitations of philosophy as a theoretical endeavor. The book thus recovers the 'militant' dimension of Merleau-Ponty's thought. This sheds considerable new light on his work. It does so in a way that challenges some of the basic parameters of existing Merleau-Ponty scholarship by illuminating the intrinsic normativity of his existential phenomenology, and its epistemic reliance on forms of non-reason such as faith and myth. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2, Page 255-272, Summer 2022.

ABSTRACT The idea of “critical phenomenology” is premised on the belief that there is a radically critical political impetus intrinsic to phenomenology as such. This belief is sound, but its grounds are unclear. This article clarifies the sense of critical phenomenology by showing how it is based in the methodological need for a generative apprehension of nature as the outermost horizon of experience, that this horizon is pregiven in the mythic Urdoxa of the lifeworld, and that critical phenomenology ultimately goes (...) beyond traditional phenomenology precisely by engaging in a moment of critical mythopoetic praxis, what Hans Blumenberg termed “work on myth,” at this level. This is highly counterintuitive but fundamental to the theoretical coherence of critical phenomenology and crucial to its viability as a transformative political practice in terms of navigating the ideological landscape of the contemporary world. (shrink)

This article argues that traditional, regulative principles of research ethics offer insufficient guidance for research in the narrative study of lives. These principles presuppose an implicit epistemology that conceives of research participants as data sources, a conception that is argued not tenable for narrative research. The case is made by drawing on recent discussions of research ethics in the qualitative and narrative research literature. This article shows that narrative ethics is inextricably entwined with epistemological issues--namely, issues of narrative ownership and (...) the multiplicity of narrative meaning. Finally, practical recommendations are made for the ethical treatment of research participants in narrative research. The article concludes by situating our approach with respect to the broad range of contemporary perspectives on research ethics. (shrink)

A great deal of ink has been spilled trying to define political conservatism. Yet, far too many of these definitions have failed to isolate a unified and distinctive set of normative commitments that conservatives can be said to share. This has led some critics to allege that the view has no definition. In this paper, I show that there are in fact two perfectly comprehensible conceptions of the theory that meet these criteria. However, I argue that, given some fairly uncontroversial (...) facts about human institutions, neither version represents a believable political philosophy. I conclude that there are legitimate and distinctive conservative political reasons, but that any attempt to describe these as our sole or primary political reasons is doomed to fail. (shrink)

This volume examines various points of contact between Marxism and phenomenology. Although these traditions can appear conceptually incompatible, the contributors reveal productive complementarities on themes such as alienation, reification, and ecology, which illuminate and can help to resolve the crises of contemporary capitalism.

In this paper we critically evaluate an argument put forward by William Lane Craig for the existence of God based on the assumption that if there were no God, there could be no objective morality. Contrary to Craig, we show that there are some necessary moral truths and objective moral reasoning that holds up whether there is a God or not. We go on to argue that religious faith, when taken alone and without reason or evidence, actually risks undermining morality (...) and is an unreliable source of moral truths. We recommend a viewpoint on morality that is based on reason and public consensus, that is compatible with science, and that cuts across the range of religious and non-religious positions. (shrink)

Whereas Phenomenology of Perception concludes with a puzzling turn to “heroism,” this article examines the short essay “Man, the Hero” as a source of insight into Merleau-Ponty’s thought in the early postwar period. In this essay, Merleau-Ponty presented a conception of heroism through which he expressed the attitude toward post-Hegelian philosophy of history that underwrote his efforts to reform Marxism along existential lines. Analyzing this conception of heroism by unpacking the implicit contrasts with Kojève, Aron, Caillois, and Bataille, I show (...) that its philosophical rationale was to supply experiential evidence attesting to the latent presence of human universality. It is a mythic device intended to animate the faith necessary for Marxist politics by showing that universal sociality is possible, and that the historically transformative praxis needed to realize it does not imply sacrifice. This sheds considerable light on Merleau-Ponty’s early postwar political thought. But inasmuch as the latter cannot be severed from his broader philosophical concerns, the prospect is raised that his entire phenomenological project in the early postwar period rested on a myth. Not necessarily a bad myth, but a myth nonetheless. (shrink)

This paper sketches a new approach to the critical-theoretic problem of reification understood as a normatively problematic form of naturalizing or dehistoricizing entifcation. Entifcation in general is approached phenomenologically in terms of the mythic outer horizonality of the lifeworld, and reification is shown to stem from the dichotomy between nature and history which, along with a corresponding dichotomy between myth and reason, is characteristic of Enlightenment rationality. Dereification necessitates overcoming these dichotomies, and this implies a critical embrace of myth and (...) mythopoesis in the sense of instituting more normatively appropriate lifeworld horizons. While classical Marxism and radical social theory have typically adhered to the standard model of Enlightenment thought, with the result that the critique of naturalization backfires by reinforcing the dichotomy between nature and history, Luxemburgian spontaneism, rethought through a phenomenology of embodied enaction, is shown to ofer a more viable way of understanding reification and its solution. (shrink)

This study locates what is happening to teachers' work in the global economy. Two case studies show how teachers are simultaneously experiencing significant changes to their work, and responding in ways that actively shape these process.

Over the years, metaethicists have witnessed the rise of a cottage industry devoted to claiming that expressivist analyses cannot capture some allegedly important feature of moral language. In this paper, I show how Simon Blackburn's pragmatist method enables him to respond decisively to many of these objections. In doing so, I hope to call into question some prevailing assumptions about the linguistic phenomena that a metaethical theory should be expected to capture.

This paper takes up the question as to what has primacy within Merleau-Ponty’s existential phenomenology as a way to provide insight into the relation between empirical science and transcendental philosophy within his account of embodiment. Contending that this primacy necessarily pertains to methodology, I show how Kurt Goldstein’s conception of biology provided Merleau-Ponty with a scientific model for approaching human existence holistically in which primacy pertains to the transcendental practice of productive imagination that generates the eidetic organismic Gestalt in terms (...) of which sense is made of empirical facts. Considering the analogous role played by imagination in Merleau-Ponty’s account of perceptual synthesis in the form of what he called projection, I argue that his account of embodiment is, parallel to Goldstein, grounded methodologically on the projection of an organismic Gestalt, and that as a form of operative-intentional praxis projection is the site of primacy in his phenomenology overall. In terms of the relation between natural science and transcendental philosophy in Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment, while the theoretical dimension of the latter—the eidetic apriority of the organismic Gestalt—is coupled dialectically with empirical facts on an epistemically coeval basis, these are jointly subordinated to the normative commitments implied by the imaginative projection of that Gestalt. The primacy of the latter is transcendental but in a distinctly practical sense, such that any substantive discrepancy between natural science and Merleau-Pontian phenomenology reflects metaphilosophical, not theoretical, disagreement. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically analyze the notion that self-interest distorts moral belief-formation. This belief is widely shared among modern moral epistemologists, and in this paper, I seek to undermine this near consensus. I then offer a principle which can help us to sort cases in which self-interest distorts moral belief from cases in which it does not. As it turns out, we cannot determine whether such distortion has occurred from the armchair; rather, we must inquire into mechanisms of social (...) power and advantage before declaring that some moral position is distorted by self-interest. (shrink)

Many philosophers have recently become interested in conceptual engineering, or the activity of producing better conceptual schemes in human populations. But few, if any, are asking the question: what would it mean for actual human agents to possess the social authority to modify a conceptual scheme in this way? This paper argues for a deontological approach to conceptual engineering, wherein we have to secure social authority qua engineers before attempting to modify social concepts. I show that the dominant, consequentialist conception (...) of engineering violates basic rights that concept-users have, particularly over their own identity-constituting concepts. Using examples from the philosophy of race and sexuality, I show that conceptual engineers cannot authoritatively modify social concepts if they employ consequentialist reasoning about those concepts. (shrink)

It is one thing to read about the methodology and methods of Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenological research, the ontic description. It is quite another thing to be faced with an interview transcript. This article draws on a study that asked doctoral students about their experience of doing such research. How did they become “phenomenological/hermeneutic” in their thinking and writing? What helped them to find their way? We offer this article as a means of letting others learn from our own experiences. We (...) support our insights with the writings of Heidegger and Gadamer to show the methodological congruence that is essential to Heideggerian phenomenological hermeneutic research. (shrink)

Heidegger’s philosophy is a significant contribution to understanding the meaning of lived experience. Recognizing this, nurses and other health professionals have taken on the research approach of Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology. This requires reading the writing of Heidegger. Philosophers themselves acknowledge this writing is dense, difficult to grasp, uses language for which there is no easy translation, and leaves the reader with more questions than answers. Drawing on commentary from philosophers who seek to read Heidegger and from a research study which (...) interviewed doctoral students who were “reading Heidegger,” we seek to show the nature of the experience of pursuing such a challenging quest. (shrink)

This article deploys critical sociology to examine institutions of higher learning, worldwide, within a context of a more utopian set of possibilities. The article contests the idea of univ...