We leverage insights and theories from the extensive inter-firm alliance literature to explore the effect of the sector of the partners on Firm–NGO alliance governance. Our analysis suggests that the sector of the partners has an important impact on alliance governance, not only because it constrains the availability of some governance mechanisms but also because it makes alternative mechanisms available or relevant to the partners. Specifically, we predict that B2N alliances will rely on contracts, a restricted scope, and non-equity hostages, (...) such as reputational hostages and stakeholder involvement, rather than equity, leading to limited protection against opportunism. As a consequence, B2N alliance partners will need to rely on trust-based governance mechanisms to a greater extent than B2B alliance partners, although trust will be harder to build in B2N alliances. (shrink)

This book introduces readers to central concepts and ideas in Mexican philosophy. Couched in stories and anecdotes from the author's life, the book offers these concepts and ideas as orientations, recommendations, or exhortation for navigating today's world. The structure and the style of the book aims at making these accessible to both specialists and non-specialist or anyone who may have had some experience with contemporary forms of marginalization, alienation, objectification, or any of the various forms of dread and accidentality familiar (...) to modern life. This, the author thinks, is most of us. Narrowing down the scope of the tradition, the author draws from the history of Mexican philosophy in the 20th century, as it is at this time that Mexican philosophy comes into its own. The book begins with two short introductions, one is an introduction philosophy in Mexico, the other to Mexican philosophy. Here, readers are introduced to Alfonso de la Veracruz, who offered the first philosophy course in the Americas in 1540 in the monastery of a small town in Michoacán, Mexico. From there, it presents four main themes from Mexican philosophy that recur in the philosophical literature. The remainder of the book serves as a "guide" for living a better, more fulfilling life. The main characters in what the author considers an uncontroversial retelling of Mexican philosophy are Antonio Caso, Samuel Ramos, Emilio Uranga, Leopoldo Zea, Jorge Portilla, Rosario Castellanos, Elsa Cecilia Frost, and, of course, persons in the author's own life. (shrink)

How can evil exist in a world governed by providence? That is the main question addressed in this chapter. To answer it, the author first sets out Proclus’ defence of providence, which combines the gods’ transcendence with their sharing goodness. The next step is to show that despite providence, evils have reality as well. There is, however, no substance or principle of evil, and only human and irrational souls and material bodies are susceptible to it. Evil’s having a ‘parhypostasis’ is (...) explained as its existing upon and alongside real existents; uncaused because a result of weakness, not power; not pure privation because parasitic on good existents, and hence a ‘subcontrary’ of the good. Finally, the author returns to the relation between providence and evil, showing that bodily evil fits the good of the universe, and that providence will punish evil souls in due course. (shrink)

As much in the processes of education of sciences like in the methodological and epistemological analyses, usually are not examples of social theories that they allow to show how they are resisted with the experience. This work tries to show not only the methodological skeleton used by E. Durkheim i..

Este trabajo defenderá la universalidad de la metáfora en arte (Arthur Danto), contra quienes piensan (Davidson, Carrol, Vilar) que en él la atribución de propiedades expresivas es literal y no metafórica. Se defiende la tesis de que la metáfora artística es como un símbolo tensivo que apunta a significados (epífora) y al mismo tiempo crea presencia (diáfora). Gracias a ambos elementos el arte crea presencia, crea realidad o transfigura lo usual y le otorga súbitas y asombrosas posibilidades de presencia, a (...) las cuales se corresponde no sólo con los sentidos, sino también con el afecto, el entendimiento y la imaginación. (shrink)

The purpose of the paper is to present a logical framework that allow to formalize a kind of prima facie duties, defeasible conditional duties, indefeasible conditional duties and actual (indefeasible) duties, as well as to show their logical interconnections.

The existence of sovereign rights over genetic resources is today well recognized in international law. However, the legal status of such resources in terms of property rights is still unclear. The consideration of this issue requires a clear distinction between physical and intangible property. Legislation in developed countries has extended patent protection to genetic resources, in addition to the protection of plant varieties via breeders' rights. The extension of protection and the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement may have important implications (...) for breeding programs and trade in seeds. While intellectual property protection of genetic resources is rapidly advancing, considerable work is still to be done to ensure the compensation for the informal innovations made by local and indigenous communities. (shrink)

La logique spécifique des jugements de valeur est à chercher dans le discours rhétorique. Cette thèse développée par Ch. Perelman dans L'Empire rhétorique (1977) nous rappelle l'introduction à l'éthique de Jean Buridan (XIVe s.). Selon Buridan la philosophie morale ne peut se contenter d'appliquer la logique générale: elle a besoin d'une logique spéciale, une „logique morale” qui n'est rien autre que la technique persuasive qu'on étudie dans la Rhétorique. Roger Bacon (XlIIe s.) a même essayé d'intégrer cette rhétorique dans l'éthique (...) : elle est la partie pratique de la science morale. Bien que leur textes rappellent parfois les considérations de la ‘nouvelle rhétorique’, la relation entre l'éthique et la rhétorique y est envisagée d'une manière toute différente. Pour les auteurs médiévaux la rhétorique est une science auxiliaire de l'éthique : elle sert de liaison entre la théorie et la pratique. Dans la partie théorétique de l'éthique la logique ‘générale’ reste en vigeur. Ce n'est que pour mettre en pratique les règles et valeurs qui ont été ‘démontrées’ par la théorie qu'on a recours à la technique persuasive et sa logique ‘spéciale’. La rhétorique n'a donc qu'une fonction subsidaire. On retrouve la même conception au début des temps modernes chez Francis Bacon qui attribue à la rhétorique la fonction d'appliquer le dictamen rationis à l'imagination pour exciter ainsi la volonté. Une tout autre conception est défendue par l'humaniste Lorenzo Valla qui essaie de réintégrer l'argumentation morale dans le discours rhétorique où elle trouve sa place originaire. Notre propre point de vue est développé en confrontation avec Aristote, de qui nous avons hérité le projet d'une ‘science pratique’ et l'ambiguité qui en est inhérente 1° La rhétorique présuppose l'éthique. 2° L'éthique qui se veut epistème, ne relève pas de la rhétorique qui n'est qu'une technè. Elle se présente comme une science à caractère dialectique. 3° Les difficultés arrivent dès qu'on exalte la fonction pratique de cette science (cf. récemment R. Hare). Dès que l'éthique veut être efficace dans la vie concrète, elle devient une argumentation qui relève plutôt du discours épidectique (Weltanschauung). Notre société, en pleine crise morale, a certainement besoin d'un tel discours qui essaie d'intensifier l'adhésion à des valeurs morales. Mais il nous semble qu'il reste à côté d'un tel discours - en pleine expansion des nos jours - une place bien discrète pour une reflection critique qui en analyse les raisons : qui n'est pas inutile, bien que peu efficace. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to point out significant and meaningful overlapping between several styles of scientific thinking, as they were proposed by Crombie (1981) and discussed by Hacking (1985; 2009). This paper is divided in four sections. First, I examine an interpretation made by Barnes (2004) about the incompatibility among scientific styles. As explained by its author, this interpretation denies any possibility of similarities between styles of scientific reasoning. In opposition, the following sections of this paper include explanations (...) of relevant characteristics of Geometry, as stated in Euclid's Elements, which are also present in other three scientific styles: modeling, experimental exploration and taxonomic style (and some of the shared characteristics are even used to define such styles). By stressing out these characteristics I argue that these four styles discussed by Hacking are not so different from each other, in fact, they overlap and may even be abridged into one foundational style: geometric. El objetivo de este artículo consiste en explicar traslapes importantes y significativos entre varios estilos de pensamiento científico, tal como fueron propuestos por Crombie (1981) y discutidos por Hacking (1985; 2009). El presente artículo está dividido en cuatro secciones. Primero, se examina la interpretación de Barnes (2004) sobre la incompatibilidad entre diversos estilos. Según este autor, no existe posibilidad alguna de encontrar similitudes en los estilos de razonamiento científico. En oposición a esta interpretación, las siguientes secciones explican características relevantes de la Geometría, tal como fueron plasmadas en Los Elementos de Euclides, y que están presentes en otros tres estilos: de modelación, de experimentación y taxonómico (las características compartidas incluso definen algunos de estos estilos). Destacar estas características me permite argumentar que estos cuatro estilos discutidos por Hacking no son tan diferentes entre sí, de hecho, se traslapan e incluso pueden ser condensados en un estilo fundacional: el geométrico. (shrink)

Even though Pato ka never acheived a critique of the political limits of Husserl´s and Heidegger´s philosophies, he did clearly set the limits of those philosophies, limits after which the phenomenological philosophy of Patocka adopts a new dimension. En this paper we argue that vis-a-vis Husserl´s ..

Excerpt from Conocimiento y AccionY bien: cuando se afirma que el dogmatismo es indis pensable [para laa accion, y que el escepticismo fatalmente la paraliza. no se hara una afirmacion falsa o extre madamente exagerada, basada en lo que podria. Suceder, c en lo que pareceria. Razonable que sucediera, mas que en lo que sucede de hecho; mas en el raciocinio que en la observacion? Es precisamente lo que sostengo.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic (...) books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose that time representation should be classified as agent dependent motor-intentional, agent dependent conceptual and agent independent conceptual. I employ this classification to explain certain features of psychological and cultural time and discuss how biological time constrains such features. The paper argues that motor-intentional time is a crucial psychophysical link that bridges the gap between purely biochemical cycles and conceptual-intentional representations of time, and proposes that the best way to understand the transitions from biological to psychological (...) time is to characterize them as phase transitions that emerge on the global properties of a system regardless of specific aspects of the underlying processing units. With respect to hierarchical models of time, the paper claims that although the hierarchical organization of constraints limits the number of possible instantiations of temporal information, informational phases have principles of organization of their own. Based on these proposals, I conclude that since information assembles itself into the temporal behavior of an agent, it is more accurate to call the principles governing such a behavioral unity a phase, rather than a hierarchy. To support these theses, the paper draws upon research in biology, neuroscience, philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

This chapter subsumes David Marr’s levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science under the framework of mechanistic explanation: Answering the questions that define each one of Marr’s three levels is tantamount to describing the component parts and operations of mechanisms, as well as their organization, behavior, and environmental context. By explicating these questions and showing how they are answered in several different cognitive science research programs, this chapter resolves some of the ambiguities that remain in Marr’s account, and (...) shows that many different areas and traditions of cognitive scientific research can be unified under the mechanistic framework. (shrink)

This commentary focuses on the importance of attention skills in the development of universal associative learning, and it explains why the centrality of attention in UAL presents a considerable difficulty for the UAL approach. Attentional abilities are not just developmentally related to UAL but are in fact explanatory of UAL. The main problem is that all the types of attention involved in UAL can be dissociated from consciousness. This means that while attention skills for UAL might be necessary for consciousness, (...) they are not sufficient because they can all occur unconsciously. Thus, the possibility that UAL capacities might not be sufficient for consciousness cannot be eliminated, thereby challenging the key claim of the UAL approach. (shrink)

In this article, I review a recent book edited by Gregory R. Smulewicz-Zucker that presents novel frameworks and refreshing perspectives on the issue of the ethical treatment of nonhuman animals.

Innovation is often seen as essential for ventures to succeed. High business failure rates in entrepreneurship, however, suggest that innovations are frequently driven by entrepreneurs blinded by overconfidence. Thus, anticipating when and why entrepreneurs will be motivated to innovate is fundamental for entrepreneurial success. Using a large sample obtained from population surveys conducted in 77 countries, this study analyzes the variables that are significantly associated with innovative behaviors. The research tests a model proposing that the joint effects of hubris, growth (...) aspirations, and an entrepreneur’s level of entrepreneurial experience have a crucial impact on innovative endeavors. It finds that hubris is significantly related to entrepreneurs’ growth aspirations and that ambition, in turn, is positively related to innovative behaviors. In addition, the study finds that both relationships are moderated by the level of entrepreneurial experience. These findings highlight the need to wise up amateur entrepreneurs before they embark on innovative endeavors. (shrink)

Este texto explora el sentido y la posibilidad de una teoría del conocimiento de los sistemas complejos no lineales. La tesis defendida aquí afirma que el conocimiento de los sistemas complejos tiene que ver con posibilidades antes que con realidades fácticas. Por tanto, el conocimiento se caracteriza por incompletud, incomputabilidad y aleatoriedad, pero con ello el computador adquiere un papel destacado en el estudio de los sistemas complejos. Al final se considera el lugar y la complejidad misma del ser humano (...) como problema complejo. (shrink)

¿Cómo se forma un sujeto político? En la herencia más antigua de la interrogación filosófica esta pregunta busca recuperar una actitud de asombro suscitada por prácticas diversas de relación consigo y con los otros en las que personas comunes y corrientes ponen en cuestión experiencias sedimentadas sobre el cuerpo y el género, así como fronteras establecidas entre lo natural y lo artificial, lo humano y lo animal, lo común y lo propio. Los artículos aquí reunidos apuntan a mostrar que para (...) pensar estas formas de agencia política es preciso atender a una dimensión amplia de la estética que se refiere al modo en que la materialidad sensorial de la experiencia compartida se ha conformado históricamente y a cómo esta, dada su contingencia, puede reconfigurarse desde ciertas prácticas cotidianas: prácticas de elaboración de sí y de organización colectiva que crean otros escenarios y otras maneras de aparición de los cuerpos, y con esto estrategias de confrontación y antagonismo que atraviesan y afectan lo social. Así, ¿Cómo se forma un sujeto político? es un esfuerzo colectivo de franca resistencia contra la estrechez desde el cual se nos tiende a hacer pensar la política: bien sea desde una política consensual liberal que acaba por neutralizar las diferencias más intratables de nuestra pluralidad, bien sea desde el realismo de una política conflictual y guerrera que funciona desde la polaridad amigo-enemigo. El lector podrá explorar y profundizar, desde otro ángulo, las apuestas epistemológicas, éticas y políticas que resuenan en estas prácticas artísticas y de acción colectiva que nos enseñan hoy, más allá de los paradigmas del "ciudadano" o del "actor racional", cómo se hace un sujeto político. (shrink)

This book focuses on the emerging scientific discipline of astrobiology, exploring the humanistic issues of this multidisciplinary field. To be sure, there are myriad scientific questions that astrobiologists have only begun to address. However, this is not a purely scientific enterprise. More research on the broader social and conceptual aspects of astrobiology is needed. Just what are our ethical obligations toward different sorts of alien life? Should we attempt to communicate with life beyond our planet? What is “life” in the (...) most general sense? The current volume addresses these questions by looking at different perspectives from philosophers, historians, theologians, social scientists, and legal scholars. It sets a benchmark for future work in astrobiology, giving readers the groundwork from which to base the continuous scholarship coming from this ever-growing scientific field. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene la finalidad de discutir el papel de los intelectuales, su importancia como críticos de la sociedad en que viven y, por lo tanto, su participación miitante. No obstante, esa figura del intelectual, aliada y nacida con la modernidad, va perdiendo espacio con el intelectual-investigador que está más preocupado con la producción científica dentro de los claustros universitarios como de los grandes centros de investigación. Para el caso, se tomó como referencia dos figuras paradigmáticas de la intelectualidad argentina (...) como José Aricó y Beatriz Sarlo. (shrink)

Las reflexiones de Pascal sobre la diversión, que arrojan luces sobre las complejas singularidades de la condición humana, destacando su precariedad, ¿son pertinentes para la sociedad actual? Esa es la pregunta a la que intenta responder este artículo. En el mundo actual estamos inmersos en una paradoja donde divertirse es un régimen de elementos dispersos, que se traduce en la cultura de lo efímero, a la que hay que renunciar para restaurar algo consistente; pero, gran paradoja, mientras uno se divierte (...) no deja de involucrarse, en un mundo al revés, en caminos laterales, luchando por crear nuevas formas de diversión, por el miedo o la incapacidad para enfrentarse a sí mismo. Pascal nos ayuda a encontrar luces para salir de esa disyuntiva. (shrink)

Dentro de la obra de Zubiri pueden distinguirse varias posiciones en torno al problema de la psique, indudablemente incompatibles, fruto de la evolución de su pensamiento. En sentido general, el hombre es una sustantividad o un sistema de notas que debido a su unidad posicionalmente interdependiente en forma de clausura posee suficiencia constitucional. Pero la conceptuación de esta suficiencia puede resultar problemática en función de cómo se articule la psique dentro de la sustantividad humana.

Name der Zeitschrift: Semiotica Jahrgang: 2018 Heft: 224 Seiten: 1-17.

Thought and Social Engagement in the Mexican-American Philosophy of John H. Haddox : A Collection of Critical Appreciations.

In this book, authors from a variety of disciplines examine how the interpretative disciplines deal with the lack or loss of certainty for their signs and texts.

In this essay I expose two historical examples of the ambivalence of the place of philosophical knowledge in society. The symptomatic starting point is Aristotle’s characterization of the philosopher. Then, through the specification of Descartes’s views on philosophy, culture, the human and the artificial, I will show that there exists certain tension between the development of philosophy as a free knowledge available to everyone and philosophy as a specialized knowledge only suitable for initiates. Nowadays, when philosophy is in a critical (...) situation maybe because of that ambivalence, the need arises to overcome this problem and democratize it. (shrink)

Multisensory Experiences: Where the senses meet technology takes you on a journey that goes from the fundamentals of multisensory experiences, through the relationship between the senses and technology, to what the future of those experiences may look like, and our responsibility in it.

One can intend the actions of others, even when one believes such actions are not under one’s control. Call the objects of intentions “ends”; the ends that consist of other people’s actions “social”; and the ends that consist of things one believes one cannot control “recalcitrant”. The thesis, then, is that one can intend recalcitrant social ends. I present a positive argument in favor of this idea, and then argue against some purported conditions on the possible content of intentions that (...) would rule out the possibility of intending such ends. The positive argument is the following: intentions are realized by a certain cluster of dispositions. One can come to be so disposed towards recalcitrant social ends. So one can come to be disposed toward such ends in the manner that realizes an intention. So one can intend recalcitrant social ends. The conditions against which I argue are known in the literature as the Own Action Condition, the Control Condition, and the Settle Condition. I present cases where, intuitively, agents genuinely intend ends that would be ruled out by these conditions. (shrink)