BackgroundYouth are increasingly aware of the negative effects of climate change on the planet and human health, but this knowledge can often come with significant affective responses, such as psychological distress, anger, or despair. Experiencing major “negative” emotions, like worry, guilt, and hopelessness in anticipation of climate change has been identified with the term eco-anxiety. Emerging literature focuses on adults' experience; however, little is known about the ways in which children and youth experience eco-anxiety.ObjectivesThe aim of this review was to: (...) identify the available evidence on the topic of eco-anxiety in children, clarify the mental health consequences brought by the awareness of climate change in this population, and identify knowledge gaps in the literature and considerations for future research.MethodsGiven that the research on the topic of eco-anxiety in children is limited, that there are very few randomized controlled trials, and that the goal is not to analyze individual studies in-depth, a scoping review was used. Keywords pertaining to the themes of eco-anxiety, climate change and children were used as search terms in five databases. Journal articles using qualitative and quantitative methods, as well as gray literature were examined by two independent reviewers. A descriptive-analytical method was used to chart the data that emerged from the literature. Eighteen articles were considered in the final analysis.ResultsEvidence confirms that children experience affective responses and eco-anxiety in reaction to then awareness of climate change. Mental health outcomes include depression, anxiety, and extreme emotions like sadness, anger, and fear. Youth from vulnerable communities, like indigenous communities, or those who have strong ties to the land are often identified as being emotionally impacted by climate change. The literature analyzed also describes how children and youth are coping with eco-anxiety, including maladaptive and adaptive responses. Preliminary considerations for parents, teachers and educators, mental health care providers, school systems, adults and people of power include adding age-appropriate climate education to the school curriculum, considering youth's emotions, and promoting healthy coping through empowerment. Important gaps exist in the definition of eco-anxiety in youth, as various characterizations of this emerging concept are found across articles. (shrink)

Edward Craig and Michael Hannon agree that the function of knowledge is to enable us to identify informants whose word we can safely take. This requires that knowers display a publicly recognizable mark. Although this might suffice for information transfer, I argue that the position that emerges promotes testimonial injustice, since the mark of a good informant need not be shared by all who are privy to the facts we seek. I suggest a way the problem might be alleviated.

Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint addresses in a novel format the major topics and themes of contemporary metaethics, the study of the analysis of moral thought and judgement. Metathetics is less concerned with what practices are right or wrong than with what we mean by 'right' and 'wrong.' Looking at a wide spectrum of topics including moral language, realism and anti-realism, reasons and motives, relativism, and moral progress, this book engages students and general readers in order to enhance their (...) understanding of morality and moral discourse as cultural practices. Catherine Wilson innovatively employs a first-person narrator to report step-by-step an individual's reflections, beginning from a position of radical scepticism, on the possibility of objective moral knowledge. The reader is invited to follow along with this reasoning, and to challenge or agree with each major point. Incrementally, the narrator is led to certain definite conclusions about 'oughts' and norms in connection with self-interest, prudence, social norms, and finally morality. Scepticism is overcome, and the narrator arrives at a good understanding of how moral knowledge and moral progress are possible, though frequently long in coming. Accessibly written, Metaethics from a First Person Standpoint presupposes no prior training in philosophy and is a must-read for philosophers, students and general readers interested in gaining a better understanding of morality as a personal philosophical quest."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

The nursing profession has a responsibility to ensure that nursing goals and perspectives as these have developed over time remain the focus of its work. Explored in this paper is the potential problem for the nursing profession of recognizing both the promises and pitfalls of informational technologies so as to use them wisely in behalf of ethical patient care. We make a normative claim that maintaining a critical stance toward the use of informational technologies in practice and in influencing the (...) thought patterns of the younger generations of nurses is a moral imperative of the discipline, because without this practice can become subverted from professional goals in various ways. We use a synthesized concept we call “intentional authenticity” derived from the writing of Heidegger and Feminist care ethics to provide a foundation for the development of nurses who understand the importance of the nurse‐patient relationship and how the unthoughtful use of informational and other technologies can militate against effective or good nursing care. (shrink)

I first demonstrate that certain process philosophers and Aquinas hold extremely similar notions of evil. Whitehead and Hartshorne parallel Aquinas in understanding evil as relational, as a conflict of goods, and as a necessary element in a larger good. On this last point, process philosophers contend that traditional theists must either reject the claim of God’s omnipotence or admit that an omnipotent God would be responsible for evil, including moral evil. I respond that Aquinas’s distinction between physical and moral evil (...) moves beyond the process position and avoids the conclusion that God’s omnipotence must be abandoned. I argue that the process position does not take proper account of Aquinas’s claim that the cause of evil is a negation and the initial criticism relies on a distinction between moral and physical evil that process philosophy cannot make. (shrink)

There are several good reasons for the UK Department of Health to recommend the appraisal of bevacizumab for the treatment of eye conditions by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence. These reasons will extend to other drugs when similar situations arise in the future.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rhetorical Circulation in Late CapitalismNeoliberalism and the Overdetermination of Affective EnergyCatherine ChaputIn the world we have known since the nineteenth century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge each other, and struggle with each other: art of government according to truth, art of government according to the rationality of the sovereign state, and art of government according to the rationality of economic agents, and more (...) generally, according to the rationality of the governed themselves. And it is all these different arts of government, all these different types of ways of calculating, rationalizing, and regulating the art of government which, overlapping with each other, broadly speaking constitute the object of political debate.Michel Foucault, The Birth of BiopoliticsCritical rhetoricians interested in the power dynamics between rhetoric and capitalism have established for themselves the ambitious task of explaining how multiple, intertwined rationalities govern individual and collective [End Page 1] behavior in relationship to the ever-shifting logics of capitalism. Approaches to this complicated directive frequently envision rhetoric as a mediating force among agentive subjects who act within well-defined political economic landscapes. Wedded to a political-communicative model wherein appropriate rhetorical choices persuade those with authority to distribute disputed political and economic rights, rhetorical theory becomes a sophisticated handbook for discovering topoi and executing decorous statements. This focus, according to Ronald Walter Greene, results in a "permanent anxiety over the meaning and potential of rhetorical agency" that positions rhetoricians as "moral entrepreneurs scolding, correcting, and encouraging the body politic" (2004, 188, 189). Committing themselves to endless debates about correct responses in situated spaces, rhetorical theories that underscore agency lose site of the world in flux and of our participation in that world's unpredictable unfoldings. Alternatively, Greene suggests rethinking rhetorical theory through a materialist-communicative model wherein the immaterial labor of communication produces value. Conceptualizing discursive practices as a form of labor rather than a form of political signification sidesteps anxiety about well-chosen language and emphasizes the life-affirming activity involved in deciphering issues, inventing paths through those issues, and communicating new ideas to others. In short, Greene's materialist model challenges critical rhetoricians to end their perennial search for a discursive key to the storehouse of political economic goods (a practice propelled by liberal democratic hopes) so that they can begin to invent analyses and modes of production better suited to the contours of contemporary neoliberalism.Unlike liberalism's clearly assigned spaces for public life and private life or work time and leisure time, neoliberal spaces bear few obvious markers. The neoliberal landscape consists of blurred boundaries that fold into one another: information flows almost instantaneously, commodities and people transgress national boundaries, time accelerates, space collapses, and distinctions between such classic demarcations as agent and subject or politics and economics erode. Facilitated by dramatic changes in our sociopolitical boundaries, economic neoliberalism, what James Arnt Aune calls "economic correctness" (2001), reigns throughout vast uneven terrains opened up from the imploded borders of our liberal world. While economics does indeed rule the neoliberal landscape, it does not do so according to uncompromising rationalism. Political and cultural practices flowing into the previously segregated spaces of economics enable market rule through logics that operate entirely outside the rational-irrational divide. Economic neoliberalism moves from situation to situation, disregarding spatial boundaries between the political, economic, [End Page 2] and cultural realms as well as their attendant modes of persuasion, wearing away at the rhetorical linkages between appropriate discursive choices and agentive power.Regardless of the particularities of neoliberalism's spaces, structures, and governing practices, many rhetoricians continue to mediate among different worldviews based on outmoded liberal gauges. Some rhetorical theorists, for instance, maintain that the problematics of neoliberalism result from an imbalance between reason and passion. Even though the most ardent supporters of neoliberal practices hold firmly to a belief in its scientific rationality, rhetorical theorists often argue that passion overpowers reason in neoliberal discourse. The rhetorical form that sustains this disequilibrium is, according to Bradford Vivian, neoliberal epideictic. Based on an impassioned identification, epideictic texts "unite an otherwise fractured citizenry in a dynamic affective experience" (Vivian 2006, 15). Epideictic rhetoric functions didactically to unite the public... (shrink)

David Wootton’s latest book is an attempt to show how “Power, Pleasure and Profit” – each related in turn to Machiavelli, Hobbes and Smith’s works – have shaped our modern world because they are “three goods which can be pursued without limits”. Based on a series of six Carlyle Lectures entitled “Power and Pleasure, 1513-1776”, given at the University of Oxford in 2014, the book attempts a major reinterpretation of the ideas of the thinkers of the period from 1500 to (...) 1800. David Woot... (shrink)

Beginning from the apocalyptic work, Hardboiled Wonderland and the End of the World, this article explores the Christian Apocalypse through dream-reading the imagery in the context of American responses to 9/11. The apocalyptic figures of the Whore, the Messiah and the Beast appear in interaction with each other. Apocalyptic language, like the tension between nationalism and globalization, both deterritorializes and reterritorializes, unleashing the total destructive power of Armageddon on whole populations through war or torture, legitimized through the notions of absolute (...) good and evil. The article ends with ‘Earth Dreams’, an attempt to deconstruct apocalyptic ideas with a theopolitics of ‘just love’. (shrink)

Peter Geach claims in Good and Evil that there can never be “just good or bad, there is only being a good or bad so-and-so” and thereby denies that goodness can ever be used in a non-relative sense. Although his rejection of absolute goodness might initially seem to be a startling and mistaken departure from the Thomistic understanding, I argue that an examination of Thomas’s texts reveal a strong agreement between them, one grounded in a common rejection of univocal goodness. (...) For both, “good” is relative to the nature of a being. To defend the relativity of goodness, I consider two objections: first, that relativizing goodness leads to subjectivism. Second, that divine goodness is absolute and non-relative. In answering these objections, I show that in both Thomas’s medieval and Geach’s modern accounts “good” is an analogical perfection relative to a nature. In this way, then, goodness is objectively relative. (shrink)

This article explores how Mia Hansen-Løve's cinema thinks about the experience of a life in which God is absent, and yet his ghost continues to haunt us. It suggests links between her films and pos...

Early artificial intelligence research was dominated by intellectualist assumptions, producing explicit representation of facts and rules in “good old-fashioned AI”. After this approach foundered, emphasis shifted to deep learning in neural networks, leading to the creation of Large Language Models which have shown remarkable capacity to automatically generate intelligible texts. This new phase of AI is already producing profound social consequences which invite philosophical reflection. This paper argues that Charles Peirce’s philosophy throws valuable light on genAI’s capabilities first with regard (...) to meaning, then knowledge and truth. Firstly, I explore how Peirce’s icon/index/symbol distinction illuminates the functioning of genAI. I argue that genAI’s engineers have skilfully captured a form of symbolicity, but no other sign-kind. In lacking indexical signs, LLMs lack connection with, and accountability to, particular worldly objects. In lacking iconic signs, LLMs are insufficiently disciplined by structural – most notably logical – relationships. Then I argue that GenAI’s astounding stream of articulate, truth-semblant, yet worthless texts issues a timely reckoning to modern philosophy’s representational realism. By contrast, Peirce’s pragmatism scaffolds a rich relational realism (Gili and Maddalena 2022), which shows how meaningful concepts, and a grasp of truth, can only occur across multiple cognitive systems who are simultaneously richly related with one another, and a shared environment in which they continually act and receive feedback, within a logical space of reasons. As Peirce himself noted, “Mere knowledge, though it be systematized, may be a dead memory; while by science we all habitually mean a living and growing body of truth”. (shrink)

This study articulates the relationship between conceptualisations of time and the accounts of good care in an acute setting. Neoliberal healthcare services, with their focus on efficiencies, predominantly calculate quality care based on time‐on‐the‐clock workforce management planning systems. However, the ways staff conceptualise and then relate to diverse meanings of time have implications for good care and for staff morale. This phenomenological study was undertaken in acute medical–surgical wards, investigating the contextual, temporal nature of care embedded in human relations. The (...) study interviews involved 17 participants: 11 staff, 3 previous patients and 3 family members. Data were analysed iteratively to surface the phenomenality of temporality and good care. The following constituents of the data set are explored that together illustrate the relationship between the conceptualisations of time and the accounts of good care in an acute setting: patient time as a relational journey; patient time, sovereign time and time ethics and time, teamwork and flow. The findings are clinically significant because they offer a contrasting narrative about the relationship between time and care quality. The experiences of giving and receiving good care are indivisible from how temporality is experienced and the social relations within which care is embedded. Healthcare staff experience temporality differently from patients and families, a point that healthcare participants in this study appeared to comprehend and accommodate. For all parties involved in providing care or being the recipient of care, however, the capacity to be present was valued as a humanising ethic of care. Our study reinforces the importance of not creating presumptive binaries about which temporal structures are more or less humanising—there is a place for a fast‐paced tempo, which can be experienced as being in the flow of human relations with one's team and on behalf of patients. (shrink)

_Using the thought of Christian thinker Thomas Aquinas and Neo-Confucian Zhu Xi, explores how to exercise and limit authority._.

Judith Butler and Catherine Malabou’s recent exchange, ‘You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape and Plasticity in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, is remarkable because in their rereading of Hegel’s famous lord and bondsman parable, rather than focusing on recognition, work, or even desire, Butler and Malabou each wonder about how Hegel contributes to a new way of thinking about ‘having’ a body and how coming to ‘be’ a body necessarily involves a kind of dispossession. Butler and Malabou’s reading (...) of Hegel is congruent with a current shift on the left away from a liberal politics of recognition to a Marxist analytic of dispossession: a move, in other words, away from liberal ‘solutions’ of redistribution – of either goods or recognition – towards thinking through issues of settler colonialism, forced migration and empire. Butler and Malabou’s piece points towards the insight that Hegel’s parable must be thought in terms of the political history of possessive individualism, and so in terms of the history of juridically defined property relations; the history of regarding both the body and the land as property. The ‘two valences’ of dispossession, in other words, refers in fact to a logic of property relations, one between those who ‘have’ property and those who are juridically defined as propertyless. (shrink)

My fundamental argument is that a collective concept of race that presumes that there are, or were at some point in the past, discreet genetic groups that have tracked along continental lines and that those differences are the fundamental basis for our folk and political groupings of white, black, Asian, Native American, and Pacific Islander is a fallacy that will always lead to social inequality. Such an understanding of race currently reverberates through genetic science, but for social and political reasons, (...) and with good intentions. But if we want to move toward a social order that promotes social justice, all of us across the sciences, throughout health policy, and in the wider public will need to reconceptualize race in terms of legacies of discrimination. We will need to shift our focus from molecular differences to social and political differences, especially when we conduct gene‐environment analyses. (shrink)

Human beings are epistemically interdependent. Much of what we know and much of what we need to know we glean from others. Being a gregarious bunch, we are prone to venturing opinions whether they are warranted or not. This makes information transfer a tricky business. What we want from others is not just information, but reliable information. When we seek information, we are in the position of enquirers not examiners. We ask someone whether p because we do not ourselves already (...) know whether p. So we cannot check our informant’s bona fides by seeing whether she is speaking the truth about p. We need grounds for trust. In What’s the Point of Knowledge? Michael Hannon maintains that this is the predicament that underlies the concept of knowledge. The we here is comprehensive. Evidently, every language has a word for knowledge. This, Hannon suggests, indicates that the concept of knowledge satisfies a universal human need. A goal, if not the goal, of epistemology is to identify that need and ascertain how it is satisfied. Following Craig, Hannon argues that the point of knowledge is to enable us to identify good – that is, suitably reliable – informants. Let us call this the information transfer view. (shrink)

Talents often play a significant role in our personal and social lives. For example, our talents may shape the choices we make and the goods that we value, making them central to the creation of a meaningful life. Differences in the level of talents also affect how social institutions are structured, and how social goods and resources are distributed. Despite their normative importance, it is surprising that talents have not yet received substantial philosophical analysis in their own right. As a (...) result, the current literature is rife with conceptual ambiguity: a talent is referred to as all of a skill, potential, ability, capacity, endowment, and a natural gift. In response to this confusion, in this paper I develop an account of what a talent is, based on the debate concerning the metaphysics of ability and dispositions. I argue for a position that I call ‘talent dispositionalism’: S has a talent for skill A in circumstances C iff S has the general disposition to excellently develop and maintain A when, in circumstances C, she tries to excellently develop and maintain A. On this account, a talent is not the skill itself, but a general iterated ability for the excellent development and up-keep of a particular skill, constituted by an agent’s dispositional properties. I defend the account against four objections usually levelled against traditional dispositionalist theories of ability, and highlight some ways the account may influence debates in other areas of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

Smoking is frequently presented as being particularly problematic when the smoker is a pregnant woman because of the potential harm to the future child. This premise is used to justify targeting pregnant women with a unique approach to smoking cessation including policies such as the routine testing of all pregnant women for carbon monoxide at every antenatal appointment. This paper examines the evidence that such policies are justified by the aim of harm prevention and argues that targeting pregnant women in (...) this way is likely to do more harm than good. Routine carbon monoxide testing is particularly problematic as it sends a message to pregnant women that they cannot be trusted either to truthfully answer questions as to whether or not they smoke, or to make decisions in the best interests of themselves and their future children in the way that non-pregnant individuals are. Further, if the aim is to reduce rates of prenatal harm, the evidence suggests that adopting a supportive and empowering approach to prenatal care is the most effective way to achieve this, something that the current policies aimed at pregnant women are in conflict with. (shrink)

Students of Stoic philosophy, especially of Stoic ethics, have a lot to swallow. Virtues and emotions are bodies; virtue is the only good, and constitutes happiness, while vice is the only evil; emotions are judgements ; all sins are equal; and everyone bar the sage is mad, bad and dangerous to know. Non-Stoics in antiquity seem for the most part to find these doctrines as bizarre as we do. Their own philosophical or ideological perspectives, and the criticisms of the Stoa (...) to which these gave rise, are no less open to criticism than are the paradoxes and puzzles under attack – but they may be, often are, better documented, less provocatively attention-begging, or simply more familiar. Even disputes within the Stoa can be obscured or distorted by modern prejudices. Posidonius rejected Chrysippus' theory of a unitary soul, one rational through and through, on the grounds that such a theory could not satisfactorily account for the genesis of bad – excessive and irrational – emotions, the πάθη . Posidonius' own Platonising, tripartite soul feels more familiar to us because the Republic tends to be a set text rather more often than do the fragments of Chrysippus' de anima; and the balance in Plato's favour is unlikely to change. When Posidonius wrote, on the other hand, the Chrysippean soul was school orthodoxy, and Platonism the latest thing in radical chic. (shrink)

Even though The Medium Place is overshadowed by the dramatic events that unfold in the fake Good Place neighborhood, it is more significant to The Good Place. The Medium Place is described as an individually tailored “eternal mediocrity,” a place of neutrality and compromise. One of the most prominent contemporary cultural theorists, Homi K. Bhabha, calls this space of becoming, where contradictions and differences are explored rather than resolved, a “Third Space”. Bhabha claims that despite its importance, being “in‐between” is (...) usually “unrepresentable,” and Roland Barthes too refers to his idea of the “third possibility” as having “no place” of its own. But the writers of The Good Place have proved them wrong—they have found a way to represent this middle “in‐between” space it as a geographical neighborhood. The morality of The Medium Place is the most human and realistic of all The Good Place neighborhoods. (shrink)

This brief but ambitious book explores our relationship with nature through the imagery we use when we talk about Mother Nature. Employing the critical tools of religious studies, psychology, and gender studies, Catherine M. Roach examines the various manifestations of nature as "mother" and what that idea implies for the way we approach the natural world. Part One, "Nature as Good Mother," discusses the notion that nature is, or is like, a beneficent and nurturing mother who provides and maintains (...) life. In studying the "green" slogan "Love Your Mother," Roach questions the effects—for women and for the environment—of imputing female gender to nature. She asks us to look at the associations that "motherhood" and "mothering" carry within a culture still shaped by patriarchy. She notes the danger of such an apparently pro-environmental slogan if "mother" evokes the bountiful, self-sacrificing provider who herself requires no care. Part Two, "Nature as Bad Mother," looks at the contrary notion of nature as a violent, threatening, and wrathful mother. This image arises most often when humans and technology are depicted as masters of unruly nature. Here Roach draws on theological reflection to analyze this ambivalence toward nature manifested in a fantasy that casts humans as gods. She explores the contributions of eco-theology and eco-psychology to a "heart of darkness" perspective. Finally, Part Three, "Nature as Hurt Mother," looks at possibilities and pitfalls of environmental healing inherent in the image of nature as a mother we have wounded and now seek to heal. (shrink)

Plato's discussion of women in the Republic is problematic. For one, arguments in Book V which purport to establish that women should guard and rule alongside men do not deliver the advertised conclusion. In addition, Plato asserts that women are "weaker in all pursuits" than men. Given this assumption, having women guard and rule seems inimical to the health, security, and goodness of the kallipolis. I argue that we best understand the inclusion of women by seeing how women's inclusion contributes (...) to the civic unity of the kallipolis. I further argue that Plato's Laws reveals that (a) women will become more virtuous by doing similar jobs to men; and (b) women will be given lesser responsibilities than men in any polis approximating justice. (shrink)

A leading philosopher shows that if the pursuit of happiness is the question, Epicureanism is the answer Epicureanism has a reputation problem, bringing to mind gluttons with gout or an admonition to eat, drink, and be merry. In How to Be an Epicurean, philosopher Catherine Wilson shows that Epicureanism isn't an excuse for having a good time: it's a means to live a good life. Although modern conveniences and scientific progress have significantly improved our quality of life, many of (...) the problems faced by ancient Greeks -- love, money, family, politics -- remain with us in new forms. To overcome these obstacles, the Epicureans adopted a philosophy that promoted reason, respect for the natural world, and reverence for our fellow humans. By applying this ancient wisdom to a range of modern problems, from self-care routines and romantic entanglements to issues of public policy and social justice, Wilson shows us how we can all fill our lives with purpose and pleasure. (shrink)

At Republic 370c–372d, Plato presents us with an early polis that is self-sufficient, peaceful, cooperative, and which provides a comfortable life for its inhabitants. While Glaucon derides this polis as a ‘city for pigs’, Socrates is quick to defend its virtues characterizing it as a city which is not only ‘complete’, but a ‘true’ and ‘healthy’ city. Is Plato sincere when he lauds the city of pigs? if so, why does the city of pigs degenerate so precipitously into the luxurious (...) city? Some commentators have been unable to find any place for the ‘city of pigs’ in the substantive argument of the Republic. Other commentators have supposed that the source of instability in the city of pigs is the nature of human desire. I argue that these interpretations miss what is most deeply interesting about the city of pigs. On my reading, the city of pigs is healthy and true in that it is a unified community. However, this unity depends on good fortune, is highly contingent, and thus unstable. (shrink)

Understanding, as I construe it, is holistic. It is a matter of how commitments mesh to form a mutually supportive, independently supported system of thought. It is advanced by bootstrapping. We start with what we think we know and build from there. This makes education continuous with what goes on at the cutting edge of inquiry. Methods, standards, categories and stances are as important as facts. So something like E. D. Hirsch’s list of facts every fourth grader should know is (...) slightly silly. What makes for a good fourth grade education is not the set of facts the fourth grader knows, but the level of understanding she has achieved and the resources she can deploy to advance that understanding. Facts are part of the story, but so are fictions, methods, standards, and categories. A major part of understanding is recognizing what problems remain to be solved. (shrink)

This paper argues that social contexts of inequality are crucial to understanding the ethics of gestational harm and responsibility. Recent debates on gestational harm have largely ignored the social context of gestators, including contexts of inequality and injustice. This can reinforce existing social injustices arising from colonialism, socio‐economic inequality and racism, for example, through increased regulation of maternal behaviour. To demonstrate this, I focus on the related notions of the ‘future child’ and an obligation of easy rescue, which have been (...) used to discuss the ethics of gestational harm in the context of alcohol consumption during gestation and foetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD). I use a feminist perspective to evaluate these ideas and conclude that anyone concerned with remediation of social injustice has good reason to be suspicious of the notion of the future child in the context of gestational harm. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Human Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic ThemesCatherine E. MorrisonHuman Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic Themes by Paul Schollmeier Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. x + 302. $80.00, cloth.This is a book about spirits—human, godly, ghostly, and alcoholic. Paul Schollmeier's Human Goodness: Pragmatic Variations on Platonic Themes explores how humble humans act morally in an absurd world. Schollmeier contends that the Socratic spirit, or daimon, of self-knowledge and (...) hypothesis testing provides the foundation for a deeply human moral philosophy. It is, in Schollmeier's elegant phrasing, daimonic rather than eudaimonic, joining Aristotle and Plato with William James, as well as contributions from the ghosts of David Hume and Immanuel Kant and a few rounds of whiskey. Spirits abound! Mixing Socratic skepticism with Jamesian empiricism, Schollmeier argues that we act best when we apply general principles held as opinion (not as certain knowledge), and tested through experience, to our particular situation. When these opinions yield fruit, we find ourselves less at the whim of our capricious surroundings; when they do not, we are obliged to recognize the provisional nature of our opinions and change them. The ends of these day-to-day activities reflect a far grander cosmological order, one we ignore to our mortal (and moral) peril. It is by engaging in this intellectual activity that we are made happy, and it is in measured pursuit of this happiness that we are virtuous. Our actions are neither absolutely true nor perfect. They are instead the best that we can do. And for a reviewer attempting to encapsulate a finely nuanced book in a small space, this is comforting advice indeed. [End Page 190]The book begins with a puzzle: The curious twin claims in Plato's Apology that, true to the Delphic oracle's proclamation, Socrates is both wise and knows nothing. The key to this apparent paradox, Schollmeier contends, is the difference between divine knowledge, "ultimate, nonhypothetical knowledge of final causes" (6), and human knowledge, which is hypothetical only. Schollmeier marshals William James to argue that as humans, we encounter objects of knowledge perceptually; even our concepts are fashioned from this meager material. Without access to divine knowledge, humans must test hypotheses and assume that they are true only provisionally.James's (and Hume's) emphasis on the passions as the foundation for action, however, gives Schollmeier pause. In order to construct a moral philosophy that avoids absolutism but remains objective, Schollmeier argues for a harmony between the intellectual and the passional that is ultimately rational, our Socratic daimon. We are neither gods nor animals. Should we surrender rationality to desire, Schollmeier warns in concert with Socrates, our already fragile perceptual knowledge will be further distorted by fickle emotion. It is precisely because our grasp on the world is so tenuous that we must pay heed to cool intellect rather than hot passion.Such skepticism of our claim to know might make one hesitant to engage in the enigmatic world—but we have no choice! In order to find our hybrid daimon, both Socratic and pragmatic, Schollmeier suggests rhetoric as the methodology best suited to serving practical knowledge because it eschews certainty in favor of probability and acknowledges that the hypotheses on which we act are tentative and revisable. To this end, Schollmeier highlights the enthymeme and argument by example as the two techniques that best suit the nature of our hypothetical knowledge, and he urges a return to philodoxy, the love of opinion.Giving up our claim to certainty need not be a dismal proposition. Having established his methodology, Schollmeier begins building a moral philosophy that embraces an ontology of change and contends that our happiness provides us with stability in the form of a rational teleology. The objects of our human happiness are fleeting and changeable, so happiness cannot be static but is, rather, an activity that is its own end, "an activity that is an intellectual inquiry" (78). Our happiness is contingent on our ability to hypothetically determine, in our particular setting, our function and then fulfill this role to the best of our abilities. Depending on the setting, it may be dancing, parenting, or simply a lively... (shrink)

This study articulates the relational constituents of good care beyond techno‐rational competence. Neoliberal healthcare means that notions of care are readily commodified and reduced to quantifiable assessments and checklists. This novel research investigated accounts of good care provided by nursing, medical, allied and auxiliary staff. The Heideggerian phenomenological study was undertaken in acute medical‐surgical wards, investigating the contextual, communicative nature of care. The study involved interviews with 17 participants: 3 previous patients, 3 family members and 11 staff. Data were analysed (...) iteratively, dwelling with stories and writing and rewriting to surface the phenomenality of good care. The data set highlighted the following essential constituents: authentic care: caring encompassing solicitude (fürsorge); impromptu care: caring beyond role category; sustained care: caring beyond specialist parameters; attuned care: caring encompassing family and culture; and insightful care: caring beyond assessment and diagnosis. The findings are clinically significant because they indicate the importance of nurse leaders and educators harnessing the potential capacity of all healthcare workers to participate in good care. Healthcare workers reported that participating in or witnessing good care was uplifting and added meaning to their work, contributing to a sense of shared humanity. (shrink)

"I have noticed, increasingly, that people after the age of 65 or thereabouts begin to experience the fear of death in a very palpable way. While in their childhood and youth they had viewed death as happening only to grandparents, while in middle age they could still afford to relegate death to remote corners of their consciousness where it could not intrude upon the pleasures of living, the advent of old age after 65 brings to them a deeply disturbing sense (...) of mortality." So begins An Equal Joy, a collection of essays in which award-winning author Catherine Lim undertakes a bold and intense exploration into the fear of death, the nature of religion and the question of who we are. Drawing on her own experiences and myraid influences--from the Taoist "Sky God" of her childhood and the Christian God Jesus of her adulthood to scientist Pascal and philosopher Socrates; from intimate conversations with close friends to the imagined world of fictional characters--Lim reflects on the beauty of both the natural world and the world of faith. As Lim writes, "Truth, Goodness and Beauty. For me, they form the goals of a perfect life." In sharing her insights, Lim not only provokes us to reflect on the meaning of life but also encourages us to live as meaningful a life as possible. (shrink)

Reversing centuries of methodological caution and skepticism, philosophers have begun to explore the possibility that experience in some form is widely distributed in the universe. It has been proposed that consciousness may pertain to machines, rocks, elementary particles, and perhaps the universe itself. This paper shows why philosophers have good reason to suppose that experiences are widely distributed in living nature, including worms and insects, but why panpsychism extending to non-living nature is an implausible doctrine.

Menu labelling is a public health policy intervention that applies principles of nutrition labelling to the eating out environment. While menu labelling has received a good deal of attention with regard to its effectiveness in shaping food choices for obesity prevention, its premises have not yet been fully explored in terms of its broader applications to social equity and population health. In the following case, we focus on the example of menu labelling within the context of food policy at the (...) local level, a fruitful substantive area of consideration for public health ethics. (shrink)

Public values failure occurs when the market and the public sector fail to provide goods and services required to achieve the core values of society such as equity (Bozeman 2007). That public policy for emerging health technologies should address intrinsic societal values such as equity is not a novel concept. However, the ways that the public values discourse of stakeholders is structured is less clear and rarely studied through the lens of public interests. This is especially true in the health (...) sciences discourse. Using the public value mapping (PVM) model I present a case study of the intrinsic value of equity in nanomedicine for cancer and the imperatives for translational research, an instrumental value to achieve equity. After reviewing and coding nearly 700 value statements from several hundred public documents, I find that that the discourse on values varies between documents that address basic research and documents that address the application of the knowledge produced in basic research, with some especially notable disconnections. This paper demonstrates the importance of further refinement of methods for testing the PVM framework if the societal goal is to improve consistency of the public value discussion by those involved in developing and applying new technologies. The paper also demonstrates the value of a PVM approach for complex science policy analysis, especially for emerging technologies like nanomedicine. (shrink)

In chapter 7 of the third book of De anima Aristotle is concerned with the activity of the intellect, which, here as elsewhere in the work, he explores by developing parallels with his account of sense-perception. In this chapter his principal interest appears to be the notion of judgement, and in particular intellectual judgements about the value of some item on a scale of good and bad. In this paper I shall argue, firstly that there is in fact a coherent (...) structure and focus to this chapter, which has therefore unjustly been criticized as disorganized or corrupt; and secondly that, in the light of such a coherent understanding of the chapter as a whole, we can resolve the difficulties in interpreting the central passage concerned with cross-modal perceptual judgements, and thereby also throw some further light on the related passages in the second chapter of De anima 3, which had been directly concerned with that topic. (shrink)

This dissertation is designed to discuss central issues raised by two of the evolutionary behavioral sciences, sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. Both sciences purport to be able to explain the origins of human behavioral and cognitive adaptations respectively and give us some insight into "human nature." My purpose is to go some way towards determining how well these two sciences do as means of determining human evolutionary origins, both by examining some of the central issues that they face, and by examining (...) several case studies in which their methods have been applied to specific human behaviors. ;Sociobiology in particular has had a bad reputation, at least in part because s few of its proponents have used the project as a forum for pushing conservative social values. It has attracted a lot of criticism: in particular for being unwarrantedly adaptationist, and for addressing its explanations at behavior, rather than at psychology. Evolutionary psychology, on the other hand, has been better received; there is some belief that it is a more appropriate, less "behaviorist" project than sociobiology. I spend the first part of the dissertation examining some of these criticisms; however, I believe the charge adaptationism to be founded on the practices of individuals rather than being a central commitment of the project; I also conclude that the claim that behaviors cannot be adaptations to be unfounded. Furthermore, far from being a better project than sociobiology, I conclude that evolutionary psychology relies on a flawed central commitment to universal domain-specificity to establish its psychological conclusions, and its models rely on an unanalyzed notion of good design. ;In the second part of the dissertation I evaluate three well known and controversial studies that use sociobiological or evolutionary psychological methods to try to account for some bard to understand elements of human behavior: namely infanticide, art and altruism, and rape. Although the quality of this work is rather mixed, I conclude there is reason to think that natural selection is implicated to some degree in the origins of some of these behaviors. (shrink)

The concept of ‘information’ is central to our understanding of financial markets, both in theory and in practice. Analysing information is not only a critical part of the activities of many financial practitioners, but also plays a central role in the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The central claim of this paper is that different data can count as information in fi-nancial markets and that particular investors do not consider all of the available data. This suggests that firstly, saying the price (...) of a stock should be $X once a particular piece of information has been incorporated in the price is only justifiable if we know that this information really is relevant for other investors. Sec-ondly, the EMH is often tested by looking at market behaviour after the release of information; again, this is only justified if we know that other market participants share the view that this is information. The purpose of this chapter is to suggest that there are good reasons for thinking that we do not know this. Finally, this chapter also suggests that bubbles in financial markets are best understood in terms of salience of information, rather than irrationality. (shrink)

Simon argues that there is an objectivity possible in moral action analogous to the objectivity found in science. While it does not allow algorithmic reasoning to certain conclusions, it does allow the agent who is determined to achieve the good to attain a relative level of comfort in his choices while acknowledging the possibility of a bad outcome resulting from contingency or unavoidable ignorance. Simon calls this "affective knowledge." He argues that the best way to grasp this "affective knowledge" is (...) to explore "intentional" relations. Simon argues that there is an analogical relation between intentional existence as it is found in cognitive knowledge and as it is found in affective knowledge. In this thesis we explore the nature of the object that exists intentionally in cognition and compare it with the object that exists intentionally in acts of volition. ;We argued that, according to Simon's metaphysics, the cognitive object is involved in several different intentional relations that deliver it intact to the cognitive agent and allow the agent to be formed by the thing itself, precisely as that extramental thing is formed in the world. Things in the world are able to make their forms present to the knower and the knower is able to achieve that form without altering the form or itself. This is intentional existence in the realm of forms. ;In volition, the agent conforms his own possibilities in relation to the good he desires to constitute a physical action that is determined to achieve that good. What allows us to choose one good possibility over another is the intentional relation our created nature gives us to that which is good in itself. We make the possible good actual. This is intentional existence in the realm of finality. ;The objectivity of knowing, then, is a relation of formal consonance between the thing itself and that thing known. The objectivity of practical action is an existential consonance between the good of the possibility, the truly good desire, and the good choice. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Did Diodorus Siculus take over Cross–References from His Sources?Catherine RubincamA systematic answer to the question posed in the title of this article requires, first, a careful analysis of the implications of various different formulations of the question and, second, a thorough discussion of the evidence relating to all the cross–references in the Bibliotheca. No such systematic approach has ever been attempted, to my knowledge. It will emerge that (...) different formulations of the question produce different answers on the basis of the evidence surveyed.The "slavish dependence" of Diodorus on his sources has been a theme repeated relentlessly for more than a hundred years by practitioners of Diodoran source criticism.1 A frequent component of the traditional opinion has been the argument that in composing his Bibliotheca Historica Diodorus reproduced from the more detailed histories which he was condensing not only the narrative of events but also material which was patently inappropriate to his own work, such as references to the earlier writer's own experience or lifetime, or cross–references between different parts of the earlier work. This assertion was not based, however, on a thorough general investigation of this alleged aspect of Diodorus' practice. Rather, the argument that this contemporary reference or that cross–reference was taken over by Diodorus from his source of the moment tended to be invoked in particular cases, usually in support of a particular hypothesis concerning the source(s) used by Diodorus for a certain part of his Bibliotheca.2 Sporadic challenges have [End Page 67] been mounted to particular aspects of this general attitude, more frequently in recent years. The most thoroughgoing, so far, has been Kenneth Sacks's attempt to treat Diodorus as a serious writer in the context of his own era. Sacks devoted a chapter to a vigorous but summary re-examination of the allegedly derivative nature of three important aspects of Diodoran historiography: "organizational and chronological markers, speeches, and polemics."3 To judge from the reviews, by no means all readers were totally convinced by Sacks's energetic defense of Diodorus' independence of his sources in these respects.4 I think, therefore, that the question deserves a more systematic and explicitly methodological discussion. The results will show that although Diodorus cannot be proven to be entirely independent of his sources in all his cross–references, there is good reason, nevertheless, to defend him from the charge of mindlessness.The groundwork for such a systematic answer to the question whether Diodorus took over cross–references from his sources was laid by two articles published a few years ago,5 which collected all the cross–reference passages in the whole work, analyzed their style, their degree of fulfillment,6 and the way they function, and compared Diodorus' use of cross–references with that of some other ancient authors. Before embarking on the discussion of these detailed data, it is important to consider the implications of different formulations of the question. The formulation "Did Diodorus copy out cross–references from his sources?" suggests a wholesale mindless transfer of references from the sources into the Bibliotheca. "Did the cross–references in the Bibliotheca originate with Diodorus?" focuses more specifically on the opposite possibility. I have preferred in my title a third formulation—"Did Diodorus [End Page 68] take over some or all of the cross–references in the Bibliotheca from his sources?"—which neither states nor implies any judgment about how consciously this might have been done. A further variable that needs to be made explicit is whether Diodorus must necessarily have behaved always in the same way. Too often it seems to have been assumed that if one Diodoran cross–reference could be shown to be in some sense derived from a source, then they all must be.7 Yet this need not necessarily be so: some inconsistency of practice would be both possible and understandable in an author who spent thirty years compiling a comprehensive digest of all the history he thought worth reporting, from the creation of the world to his own lifetime.It seems to me, therefore, that the processes that may underlie the cross–references in the Bibliotheca are more complicated than is generally... (shrink)

This paper aims at understanding why Rousseau excluded women from citizenship. Citizenship, for Rousseau, is not a matter of right, not even a matter of behaviour (of how to behave individually to be a good citizen). It is a matter of social condition. How should society be constituted so that there can be citizens? The answer to this question is that there must be women in the private sphere so that there can be citizen in the public sphere. The paper (...) begins with Montesquieu's model of the republican condition of women, considers the way Rousseau updated this model, and concludes with the idea, that much more than the male figure of citizenship (which remains a stereotype), the woman, in Rousseau, is the true figure of modernity. (shrink)

A universal basic income is an unconditional allowance, sufficient to live on, paid in cash to every citizen regardless of income. It has been a Green Party policy for years. But the idea raises many interesting philosophical questions, about fairness, entitlement, desert, stigma and sanctions, the value of unpaid work, the proper ambitions of a good society, and our preconceptions about whether leisure or jobs are the thing we should prize above all for free citizens. Coming from the perspective of (...) ancient philosophy, I consider the answers offered in the ancient world to some of these questions, and how we might learn from rethinking our notions of how to create a good society in which people can be free and realise their creative and intellectual potential. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Two Seekers After Truth Coincidence and Divergence The Good World Doctrine Appendix: Passages Relating to Shared Doctrines in Augustine and Descartes References and Further Reading.

Natural philosophers seem to have good reasons to prefer that the kallipolis, the maximally just community of the Republic, is never realized. If such a community is realized, philosophers are under the obligation of a just demand that they govern. However, a life that contains governance as a significant part is not the happiest life a philosopher can live. The happiest life for a philosopher is one consisting entirely or largely in philosophical contemplation. I confront this puzzle by arguing that (...) natural philosophers gain benefits in the kallipolis that are not available to them in other communities, primarily opportunities for correction and punishment. While other communities may offer philosophers more opportunities for philosophical contemplation, these communities do not provide a reliable mechanism for counteracting potentially dangerous moral blindness. In contrast to other communities, the kallipolis institutionalizes and reliably replicates the structures necessary for counteracting moral blindness. (shrink)