In recent studies of primates, the question has been raised whether competitive regimes are species-specific or should rather be considered as sex-specific. To study this problem we use an individual-oriented model called DomWorld in which artificial agents are equipped merely to group and compete. In former studies of this model, dominance style appeared to be strongly influenced by the intensity of aggression: by increasing only this intensity of aggression, a great number of the characteristics of an egalitarian society switched to (...) those of a despotic one. Here, we investigate, using DomWorld, a competitive regime of artificial males and females that differ exclusively in their fighting capacity; males having a higher intensity of aggression and a higher initial capacity of winning, such as may be due to a male-biased sexual dimorphism. Unexpectedly it appears that, in the model, even if the intensity of aggression of males is greater than that of females, their hierarchy is still significantly weaker and thus their society less differentiated and more egalitarian than that of females. The explanation is that, due to the higher initial dominance of males, single events of victory and defeat lead to less differentiation than among females. The greater the sexual difference in initial dominance between the sexes is the more egalitarian the males behave among themselves compared to the behaviour of the females among themselves. These effects are already visible during the initial phases of the hierarchical development. These results resemble findings among primates; in real primates their degree of sexual dimorphism may influence the competitive regime of each sex. (shrink)

Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our (...) own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more ‘cognitively’ than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate ‘theory of mind’ in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about ‘unobservable inner experiences’ or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited ‘theory of mind’ humans actually use, and thinking of animal cognition in an embodied, embedded way; that is, being aware that constraints outside of the brain, and outside of the body, may naturally predispose individuals to produce behavior that looks smart without requiring complex cognition. To enable this kind of thinking, a powerful methodological tool is advocated: Computational modeling, namely agent-based modeling and, particularly, cognitive modeling. By explicitly simulating the rules and representations that underlie animal performance on specific tasks, it becomes much easier to look past one’s own biases and to see what cognitive processes might actually be occurring. (shrink)

Whether any non-human animal can attribute mental states to others remains the subject of extensive debate. This despite the fact that several species have behaved as if they have a ‘theory of mind’ in various behavioral tasks. In this paper, we review the reasons of skeptics for their doubts: That existing experimental setups cannot distinguish between ‘mind readers’ and ‘behavior readers’, that results that seem to indicate ‘theory of mind’ may come from studies that are insufficiently controlled, and that our (...) own intuitive biases may lead us to interpret behavior more ‘cognitively’ than is necessary. The merits of each claim and suggested solution are weighed. The conclusion is that while it is true that existing setups cannot conclusively demonstrate ‘theory of mind’ in non-human animals, focusing on this fact is unlikely to be productive. Instead, the more interesting question is how sophisticated their social reasoning can be, whether it is about ‘unobservable inner experiences’ or not. Therefore, it is important to address concerns about the setup and interpretation of specific experiments. To alleviate the impact of intuitive biases, various strategies have been proposed in the literature. These include a deeper understanding of associative learning, a better knowledge of the limited ‘theory of mind’ humans actually use, and thinking of animal cognition in an embodied, embedded way; that is, being aware that constraints outside of the brain, and outside of the body, may naturally predispose individuals to produce behavior that looks smart without requiring complex cognition. To enable this kind of thinking, a powerful methodological tool is advocated: Computational modeling, namely agent-based modeling and, particularly, cognitive modeling. By explicitly simulating the rules and representations that underlie animal performance on specific tasks, it becomes much easier to look past one’s own biases and to see what cognitive processes might actually be occurring. (shrink)

Charlotte Wolff was born in Riesenburg, West Prussia into a middle-class Jewish family. She studied philosophy and then medicine at several German universities, completing her doctorate in Berlin in 1926. Working in various institutions over the next few years, she was also interested in psychotherapy and had a small private medical and psychotherapeutic practice. In 1933 she was forced to leave Germany because of the Nazi regime, and settled for a few years in Paris. As a German refugee she (...) was unable to practice medicine, so she began her research into the correlation between hand traits and personality. In 1936 she went to London to continue her research work and lived there until her death. An active lesbian from an early age, her later research turned to sexology and her writing on lesbianism and bisexuality were influential early works in the field. This is a great opportunity to rediscover her early work, including her first autobiography. (shrink)

IntroductionFirst aiders are commonly exposed to different forms of traumatic event during their duties, such as Chronic Indirect Vicarious Exposure which refers to an indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma. If the psychopathological impact of TE is well documented, the mental health of first aiders remains neglected. Therefore, our main objectives are to study the link between exposure to traumatic events and psychopathological outcomes and to quantify the rates of mental health disorders among first aiders.MethodOur sample comprised of (...) 53 volunteer first aiders with an average age of 32.4 years. Traumatic event exposure and mental health were assessed through a set of validated questionnaires completed online.ResultsRates of mental health outcomes were higher than within the general population. Females showed higher scores of post-traumatic stress disorder than males. PTSD scores were significantly correlated with all mental issues scores, apart from tobacco use and eating disorders scores. There was a significant correlation between the number of traumatic events and the years of experience. Exposure to traumatic events only correlated with nicotine dependency. No other correlation reaches statistical significance.DiscussionThe scores of all mental health outcomes were high; a surprising result, as volunteer first aiders are thought to be recruited for their strong dispositional cognitive and emotional abilities. The high levels of post-traumatic stress disorder and burnout, along with the prevalent anxiety and depression, highlight the need for greater psychosocial support. Resilience training and peer support would be useful interventions in this group. (shrink)

Charlotte Sabourin | : Cet article se penche sur la contribution de Gabrielle Suchon à la célèbre « querelle des femmes ». J’y démontre que, quoique Suchon défende l’égalité des deux sexes en ce qui a trait à leurs capacités à la liberté, à la science et à l’autorité, elle vise ultimement à montrer que les femmes peuvent se rendre supérieures aux hommes. Je montrerai que son projet d’élévation des femmes ne peut être accompli qu’en soustrayant les femmes à (...) l’influence des hommes, les relations entre les deux sexes étant foncièrement préjudiciables aux premières. | : This paper examines Gabrielle Suchon’s contribution to the famous “querelle des femmes”. I argue that although Suchon is a proponent of the equality of the sexes with respect to their capacities for freedom, science and authority, she ultimately suggests that there is a way in which women can make themselves superior to men. I will show that her project for the elevation of women can be accomplished only by isolating women from men, given that the relationships between the sexes will always be detrimental to women. (shrink)

ABSTRACT When does a state of affairs constitute a harm to someone? Comparative accounts say that being worse off constitutes harm. The temporal version of the comparative account is seldom taken seriously, due to apparently fatal counterexamples. I defend the temporal version against these counterexamples, and show that it is in fact more plausible than the prominent counterfactual version of the account. Non-comparative accounts say that being badly off constitutes harm. However, neither the temporal comparative account nor the non-comparative account (...) can correctly classify all harms. I argue that we should combine them into a hybrid account of harm. The hybrid account is extensionally adequate and presents a unified view on the nature of harm. (shrink)

This article examines stasis in Chantal Akerman's cinema by means of a genealogical study into its minimalist origins in order to make visible its political operationality in her work and, by extension, its inherent political potential. Stasis is an aesthetic effect generated through the use of repetition, seriality, and duration in temporal media that proliferated in Minimalism across artforms and was taken up by Akerman during her séjour in New York in the early 1970s. The characteristic endless temporality created by (...) stasis in temporal media takes shape in Minimalism due in part to the movement's literalist, phenomenological orientation, which at one point caused Minimalist art to be regarded as nonideological – this while the static quality in Akerman's work appears to be constitutive of its political character. A study of her early films Hotel Monterey (1972) and Je tu il elle (1974), clearly influenced by the Minimalist scene she was immersed in, illustrates how stasis emerges analogously in Minimalist music, dance, and Akerman's cinema. Minimalism's paradigmatically phenomenological orientation and its intricate entwinement with stasis are examined in relation to Akerman's work to reveal their inherent potential for political operationality in art. (shrink)

In March 2020, the Government produced a document entitled “Responding to COVID-19: The Ethical Framework for Adult Social Care”(‘The Ethical Framework’). In this article, we summarise the key features of the proposed ethical framework and subject it to critical analysis. We highlight three primary issues. First, the emphasis placed on autonomy as the primary ethical principle. We argue if ever there was a context in which autonomy should dominate the ethical analysis, this is not it. Second, we examine the interface (...) between ethics and law which is largely overlooked in the document. Finally, we explore the surprising lack of attention paid to the concept of responsibility and communal obligations within the framework. (shrink)

InThe Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir argues that women are often complicit in reinforcing their own unfreedom. But why women become complicit remains an open question. The aim of this article is to offer a systematic analysis of complicity by focusing on the Heideggerian strands of Beauvoir's account. I begin by evaluating Susan James's interpretation of complicity qua republican freedom, which emphasizes the dependent situation of women as the primary cause of their complicity. I argue that James's analysis is compelling (...) as far as it goes, but that it implies complicity is the inevitable outcome of women's current existence and fails to adequately account for Beauvoir's claim that women actively embrace their own unfreedom. I then draw out the Heideggerian strands of Beauvoir's analysis, demonstrating how this enables us to systematize Beauvoir's account of women's oppressive situation with her claims regarding the active role women can play in reinforcing their own unfreedom. I argue that this approach preserves the strengths of the republican interpretation, but provides a better account of cases where complicity may not be inevitable and yet some women still act to reinforce rather than resist their own unfreedom. (shrink)

In cases of complicity in one’s own unfreedom and in structural injustice, it initially appears that agents are only vicariously responsible for their complicity because of the roles circumstantial and constitutive luck play in bringing about their complicity. By drawing on work from the phenomenological tradition, this paper rejects this conclusion and argues for a new responsive sense of agency and responsibility in cases of complicity. Highlighting the explanatory role of stubbornness in cases of complicity, it is argued that although (...) agents may only be vicariously responsible for becoming complicit, they can be held more directly responsible for entrenching their complicity. The complicit agent is responsible for their complicity to the extent that they fail to take responsibility for it. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:This paper explores how corporations, through their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities, can help to effect positive developmental change. We use research on institutional change, deinstitutionalization, and institutional work to develop our central theoretical framework. This framework allows us to suggest more explicitly how CSR can potentially be mobilized as a purposive form of institutional work aimed at disrupting existing institutions in favor of positive change. We take the gender institution in the Arab Middle East as a case in point. (...) Our suggestion is that the current context of the Arab Spring, which combined with increasingly obvious endogenous institutional contradictions, has created a fertile ground for shaping change processes within the gender institution. Finally, we provide concrete examples of CSR initiatives that regional corporate actors can engage in for positive developmental change supporting women. (shrink)

This study focuses on how moral aspects of purpose shape collaborative processes. It does so by analyzing the unfolding of 21 relationships between four nonprofits and their funders using a framework based on French pragmatist sociology to help uncover the deeply held, ideological and moral beliefs that underscore assumptions about what the overarching purpose of a collaborative effort is or should be. This study contributes to the literature on single and cross-sectoral collaboration by showing that the way partners handle and (...) reconcile differences about purpose is related to the forms of agreement likely to be achieved. It also suggests that certain forms of agreement are inherently more enduring than others. Taken as a whole, this study provides some plausible explanations as to why so many collaborations fail despite their seeming benefits for all the parties involved. (shrink)

Charlotte Sabourin,Marguerite Deslauriers.

The notion of moral expertise poses a variety of challenges concerning both the question of existence of such experts and their identification by laypeople. I argue for a view of ethics expertise, based on moral understanding instead of on moral knowledge, that is less robust than genuine moral expertise and that does not rely on deference to testimony. I propose identification criteria that focus mainly on the awareness and communication of implicit biases and situated ignorance. According to the account of (...) ethics expertise presented in this paper, the expert's testimony is not an epistemic reason for the layperson's belief, but merely an epistemic influence. The epistemic reasons for the layperson's belief are largely independent from the expert. But there is still some epistemic risk involved in the proposed method of knowledge transfer, and therefore criteria for the identification of a trustworthy expert are necessary. The risk involved in knowledge transfer can be both due to willful manipulation and due to the expert's implicit biases and situated ignorance. While willful manipulation cannot really be avoided, the influence from biases and ignorance can be minimized. I argue that the best way to do this is if the expert is aware of their own biases and ignorance and communicates them. Combined with evidence of the expert's education in moral philosophy and experience with the topic in question, this gives the layperson the best chance to identify someone who can really help them consider all relevant aspects of a situation and come to a better justified decision. (shrink)

The global development of human embryonic stem cell science and its therapeutic applications are dependent on the nature of its engagement at national and international levels with key cultural values and beliefs concerning the moral status of the early human embryo. This article argues that the political need to reconcile the promise of new health technologies with the cultural costs of scientific advance, dependent in this case on the use of the human embryo, has been met by the evolution of (...) bioethics as a political community, transnational network, and bureaucratic device. Bioethics has become the political means for the creation of a global moral economy where the trading and exchange of values is normalized and legitimated. As a result of such trading, value compromises are produced capable of legitimizing the regulatory policies necessary for maintaining public trust in the new science. (shrink)

In the development of governmental policy for artificial intelligence that is informed by ethics, one avenue currently pursued is that of drawing on “AI Ethics Principles”. However, these AI Ethics Principles often fail to be actioned in governmental policy. This paper proposes a novel framework for the development of ‘Actionable Principles for AI’. The approach acknowledges the relevance of AI Ethics Principles and homes in on methodological elements to increase their practical implementability in policy processes. As a case study, elements (...) are extracted from the development process of the Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI of the European Commission’s “High Level Expert Group on AI”. Subsequently, these elements are expanded on and evaluated in light of their ability to contribute to a prototype framework for the development of 'Actionable Principles for AI'. The paper proposes the following three propositions for the formation of such a prototype framework: preliminary landscape assessments; multi-stakeholder participation and cross-sectoral feedback; and, mechanisms to support implementation and operationalizability. (shrink)

In this article I consider how our experiences of bodily privacy are changing in the contemporary surveillance society. I use biometric technologies as a lens for tracking the changing relationships between the body and privacy. Adopting a broader genealogical perspective, I retrace the role of the body in the constitution of the modern liberal political subject. I consider two different understandings of the subject, the Foucauldian political subject, and the Lacanian psychoanalytic subject. The psychoanalytic perspective serves to appraise the importance (...) of hiding for the subject effects of excessive exposure to the Other’s gaze. I conclude to the importance of the subject’s being able to hide, even when it has nothing to hide. By considering these two facets of subjectivity, political and psychic, I hope to make sense of our enduring and deeply political passionate attachment to privacy. (shrink)

Many people believe that we have moral duties towards those we bring into existence in the short term: our children. Many people also believe that we have moral duties towards those we bring into existence in the long term: future generations. In this article, I explore how these beliefs are connected. I argue that the present generation is morally responsible for future generations in virtue of bringing them into existence. This responsibility entails moral duties to ensure that future people have (...) adequate life prospects. These duties are held directly towards future generations. I argue that this direct argument can overcome challenges that indirect arguments, which justify moral duties concerning future generations via moral duties towards present children, face. The upshot is that considerations from procreative ethics help to illustrate that the present generation stands in a morally relevant special relationship to future generations, a fact that is often overlooked in intergenerational ethics. (shrink)

Paternalism has attracted new defenders in recent years. Such defenders typically either downplay the normative significance of autonomy or deny that we are sufficiently rational for paternalistic interventions to be objectionable.1 Both of these argumentative strategies constitute challenges to John Stuart Mill’s influential anti-paternalistic ‘harm principle’, which states that coercive interference with the liberty of competent adults is justifiable only if such interference prevents harm to non-consenting third parties (Mill, p. 23).2 In this journal, Wilkinson has provided a novel, provocative (...) defence of paternalism in the medical context—one that (provisionally) accepts rather than challenges Mill’s harm principle.3 Wilkinson’s argument is complex. But he begins with Parfit’s influential account of personal identity.4 According to Parfit, Alice at T1 can be the same person as Alice at T2, but the extent to which Alice at T1 and Alice at T2 are similar depends on the extent to which there are ‘chains’ of strong psychological connections between Alice at T1 and Alice at T2. Strong psychological connections, in turn, are mental states such as intentions or beliefs, or psychological traits. For example, if Alice at T2 remembers very little about herself the day before, and the day before that, all the way to Alice at T1, Alice at T2 has completely different psychological traits than Alice at T1—for example, Alice at T1 was courageous, whereas Alice at T2 is cowardly—then Alice at T1 and Alice at T2 are distinct persons. If the harm principle is correct and Alice is autonomous, it is permissible to interfere with Alice’s liberty only if it prevents harm to some non-consenting third party. But if we accept Parfit’s view on personal identity, then a novel defence of paternalistic intervention emerges: Alice at T2 may well be a distinct person from Alice at T1. So, …. (shrink)

The article examines the construction of “Big Data” in media discourse. Rather than asking what Big Data really is or is not, it deals with the discursive work that goes into making Big Data a socially relevant phenomenon and problem in the first place. It starts from the idea that in modern societies the public understanding of technology is largely driven by a media-based discourse, which is a key arena for circulating collectively shared meanings. This largely ignored dimension invites us (...) to appreciate what matters to journalists and the wider public when discussing the collection and use of data. To this end, our study looks at how Big Data is framed in terms of the governmental use of large datasets as a contentious area of data application. It reconstructs the perspectives surrounding the so-called “Handygate” affair in Germany based on broadcast news and social media conversations. In this incident, state authorities collected and analyzed mobile phone data through a radio cell query during events to commemorate the Dresden bombing in February 2011. We employ a qualitative discourse analysis that allows us to reconstruct the conceptualizations of Big Data as a proper instrument for criminal prosecution or an unjustified infringement of constitutional rights. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractDriving patterns of coral bleaching over reefs are a suite of biophysical interactions where the physical environment modulates organism response through an interplay with intrinsic biological functioning. Flow conditions over reefs can mitigate the physiological impacts of thermal stress across multiple spatial scales. More details can be found in article number 1800226 by Charlotte E. Page et al., Seeking Resistance in Coral Reef Ecosystems: The Interplay of Biophysical Factors and Bleaching Resistance under a Changing Climate, DOI: 10.1002/bies.201800226.

In ‘What is Enlightenment?’, Kant claims that no women are currently enlightened. Here I argue that this exclusion is due to certain legal restrictions guiding Kant’s conception of enlightenment. As enlightenment is intended to take place in society, it appears that Kant has a specific legal context in mind that affects its enactment. His twofold conception of citizenship and the dimension of subordination he puts forward by restricting the private use of reason will prove useful in clarifying those legal restrictions. (...) It thus seems unlikely that Kant intended women to take an active part in enlightenment. (shrink)

The Metaphysics of Gender is a book about gender essentialism: what it is and why it might be true.

In recent decades, rescue archaeology in Europe has uncovered a much larger number of remains than planned archaeology. The mass of information resulting from this preventive research is such that its processing is a colossal task, but also unavoidable if preventive excavations are not to become synonymous with the destruction of the remains – which is precisely what they are supposed to prevent. The effort that our society must make (in terms of time and financial resources in particular) may seem (...) heavy, even insurmountable to some; nevertheless, this effort is imperative and essential, because preventive excavations raise major challenges, both scientific and societal. This article aims to detail these issues and analyse them in the light of the deleterious effects of neoliberal logic on rescue archaeology and the associated ecological and societal difficulties. (shrink)

Im Rahmen des George-Kreises wurde das Idealbild einer guten Ordnung nicht im Bereich des Utopischen belassen, sondern in der Lebens- und Forschungspraxis der Kreismitglieder zu verwirklichen versucht. Der Autor Prof. Bertram Schefold ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der Johann-Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt. Mehrfach Berater des Deutschen Bundestages zu energiepolitischen Fragen und geschäftsführender Herausgeber der Reihe 'Klassiker der Nationalökonomie'.

In the current paper, our aim is to explore the latent power dynamics surrounding corporate social responsibility in developing countries. To do this, we synthesize an analytic framework that borrows from both cross-cultural management literature as well as feminist considerations of power. We then use the framework to examine three streams of CSR literature. Our analysis uncovers the prevalence of arguments and discussions about indigenous and power-over themes rather than more generative, endogenous, and power-to themes. The paper concludes with the (...) suggestion for more space in the CSR literature for examining the realities and potentialities of local SME CSR expressions to counterbalance the overwhelming focus on MNCs. Such counterbalancing can better lead to the recognition that power and domination are not the only important dynamics to examine in CSR research. Just as important is the need for a more nuanced consideration of the role and contributions of different actors to the continuously unfolding CSR discourse. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to illustrate concrete problems in the asymmetrical nurse–patient power relationship. It is an ethical demand that the nurse is faced with the challenges that the power in the relation is administered so that the patient's room for action is expanded and trust maintained. It is an essential message in care philosophy, but in clinical practice, success is not always achievable. A hidden and more or less unconscious restriction of the patient's room for action may (...) result in the excesses of care. Three selected aspects: dependence, trust, and power described by the Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup and the Norwegian nursing philosopher Kari Martinsen's care philosophy has inspired this empirically based examination of some current barriers in the asymmetrical nurse–patient relationship. On the basis of qualitative interviews with six patients and six nurses, the research thus provides an identifying and problem‐exploratory examination of some current obstacles in which the handling of trust and power reflects the excesses of care. The findings develop three themes. ‘Being a burden’ acknowledges that the balance of power will always tip to the nurse's advantage. The second theme, ‘Doing only what's absolutely necessary’, shows how a fixation with ‘technicalism’ creates a distance between people that may constrain the patient's room for action. The last theme is concerning the nurse's ability to navigate between closeness and distance is essential in avoiding ‘the excesses of care’, paternalism, and overprotectiveness. A situation in which distance takes the upper hand and care turns into paternalism. A different situation would arise if the nurse's emotions became sentimental or intimate with the result that closeness gets the upper hand. To avoid a harmful exercise of power and the excesses of care, the findings have demonstrated that a relationship‐based caring is a demand for situation‐specific sensitive attention skills. (shrink)

Hume is committed, By one of his criticisms of reason as the route to moral knowledge, To an internalist position. In the argument from motivation, Hume starts by observing that morality is practical--That morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. But, Hume argues, Rationalist moral theories cannot explain how moral considerations motivate. This is because reason alone is incapable of motivating us. The premise that morality is practical, However, May be interpreted in two ways--Either in an externalist or internalist (...) manner. Charity requires us to adopt the internalist reading because only then is the argument valid. An internalist reading of the argument, However, Commits hume, In his constructive phase, To construing the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval as possessing motivational influence by themselves. But an examination of what hume has to say about the motives that prompt us to do what is right shows that he fails to provide such an account himself. This points to an inconsistency in hume's moral theory. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Testimony from victims of gendered violence is often wrongly disbelieved. This paper explores a way to address this problem by developing a phenomenological approach to testimony. Guided by the concept of ‘disclosedness’, a tripartite analysis of testimony as an affective, embodied, communicative act is developed. Affect indicates how scepticism may arise through the social moods that often attune agents to victims’ testimony. The embodiment of meaning suggests testimony should not be approached as an assertion, but as a process of (...) ‘articulating an understanding’. This account is deepened in the discussion of testimony as a communicative act. It is argued that testimony must be considered as a relational whole, and thus our aim in receiving victims’ testimony should be to honour the relational conditions under which the truth of testimony can be heard. Approaching testimony as the collaborative process of enabling an understanding to be articulated can enhance our conception of gendered violence, whilst also better serving the victims of gendered violence by helping to overcome the lack of trust and excessive scepticism with which victims’ testimony is often met. (shrink)