May, John D'Arcy Review(s) of: Hyphenated Christians: Towards a better understanding of dual religious belonging, by Gideon Goosen, (Oxford/Bern/New York: Peter Lang, 2011), pp. xviii + 172.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:162. THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1979 The Hume literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship : A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; ¿J 5. 50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. Publications of the years 1977 and 1978 were listed in Hume Studies for the last two Novembers. What follows here will bring the record (...) up to the end of 1979. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and to send me offprints of their own articles. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography covering the previous year, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recentlyappearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQ American Philosophical Quarterly JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHP Journal of the History of Philosophy JP Journal of Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PB Philosophical Books PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review RIP Revue Internationale de Philosophie RM Review of Metaphysics TLS Times Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly follow the British Standard (no. 4148). AIKEN, H. D. 'An Interpretation of Hume's Theory of the Place of Reason in Ethics and Polities', Ethics 90, 66-80. 163. ARDAO, A. 'Hume en Latinoamerica', Revista Venezolana de Fil., 143-6. BAIER, A. 'Hume on Heaps and Bundles', APQ 16, 285-96. BAIER, A. 'Good Men's Women: Hume on Chastity and Trust', Hume Studies 5, 1-19. BATTERSBY, C. 'Hume, Newton and "the Hill called Difficulty "', in S. C Brown, Philosophers of the Enlightenment (Royal Inst. Phil. Lectures, 12), 31-55. BATTERSBY, C. 'The Dialogues as Original Imitation: Cicero and the Nature of Hume's Skepticism', in D. F. Norton et al., McGiIl Hume Studies, 239-52. BEAUCHAMP, T. L. 'Self Inconsistency or Mere Self Perplexity ', Hume Studies 5, 37-44. BECK, L. W.? Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant' in D. F. Norton et al.,· op. cit., 63-78. (repr. of 1978 paper. ) BELL, A. 'Some Spurious Hume Documents', Notes & Queries 26, 561. BIRO, J. I. 'Hume's Difficulties with the Self, Hume Studies 5, 45-54. BRANDT, R. 'David Hume: Neuere Bücher, Vorträge, Aufsätze', Philosophische Rundschau 26, 187-97. BROWN, S. C. 'The "Principle" of Natural Order: o£ What the Enlightened Sceptics did not doubt', in S. C. Brown [see BATTERSBY], 56-76. BUTT, J. The Mid-Eighteenth Century, 222-8, 312-14, 354-7. (The Oxf. Hist, of Eng. Lit., 8.) Oxford. CAPALDI, N. 'The Problem of Hume and Hume's Problem', introduction to D. F. Norton et al., op. cit., 3-21. CASULLO, A. 'Reid and Mill on Hume's maxim of conceivability ', Analysis 39, 212-19. CLARK, L. M. G. & LANGE, L. The Sexism of Social and Political Theory. Toronto"^ (includes reprints of Burns 1976 and Lacoste 1976) CONNON, R. W. 'The Naturalism of Hume Revisited', in D. F. Norton et al., op. cit. 121-45. COTTLE, C E. 'Justice as Artificial Virtue in Hume's Treatise', JHI 40, 457-66. 164. CRAIG, E. J. David Hume: Eine Einführung. in seine Philosophie. (144 pp.) Frankfurt am Main. DAVIE, G. E. 'Berkeley, Hume, and the Central Problem of Scottish Philosophy', in D. F. Norton et al., op. cit., 43-62. DEL BARCO COLLAZOS, J. L. 'Sobre la teoría de la imaginaci ón en la filosofía de Hume', Anuario filosofico 12, 131-43. DELEULE, D. Hume et la naissance du libéralisme économique. (400 pp.) Paris. FLEW, A. 'The Red Queen at Substraction? ', Hume Studies 5, 110-11. FORBES, D. 'Hume and the Scottish Enlightenment', in S. C Brown [see BATTERSBY], 94-109. GASKIN, J. C. A. 'Hume, Atheism, and the "Interested Obligation" of Morality', in D. F. Norton et al., op. cit., 147-59. GAUTHIER, D. 'David Hume, Contractarian', PR 88, 3-38. GAWLICK, G. 'Zwischen Empirizismus und Skeptizismus: Neue Literatur zu David Hume- (I) ', Philosophische Rundschau 26, 161-86. GOOSENS, W. K. 'Stove and Inductive Scepticism', Australas... (shrink)

Taking reduction in the traditional deductive sense, the programmatic claim that most of genetics can be reduced by molecular genetics is defended as feasible and significant. Arguments by Ruse and Hull that either the relationship is replacement or at best a weaker form of reduction are shown to rest on a mixture of historical and logical confusions about the nature of the theories involved.

This paper argues for the importance of approaching medicine, as a theoretical science, through values. The normative concepts of benefit and harm are held to provide a framework for the analysis of medicine which reflects the obligations of the doctor-patient relationship, suffices to define the key concept of medical relevance, yields a general necessary condition for the basic concepts of medicine, explains the role of such nonnormative conceptions as discomfort, dysfunction, and incapacity, and avoids the mistakes of other normative approaches (...) which hold that unhealthy conditions are disvaluable or should be treated. Neutralist analyses are criticized, especially those approaching health through proper functioning. (shrink)

Goosen, Gideon Review(s) of: Towards a Christian Tantra: the interplay of Christianity and Kashmir Shaivinism, by John Dupuche, (Melbourne: David Lovell Publishing, 2009), pp.152, $24.95.

Adolf Grünbaum, [1], and Philip Quinn, [7], have proposed two problems as sharpened versions of theses suggested by Pierre Duhem. Can an hypothesis which in itself has no observational consequences ever be falsified by the evidence? When a theory has observational consequences only in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses and some of these consequences fail, can the theory always be reasonably defended by constructing alternative auxiliary hypotheses?

The central insight of Darwin's Origin of Species is that evolution is an ecological phenomenon, arising from the activities of organisms in the 'struggle for life'. By contrast, the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution, which rose to prominence in the twentieth century, presents evolution as a fundamentally molecular phenomenon, occurring in populations of sub-organismal entities - genes. After nearly a century of success, the Modern Synthesis theory is now being challenged by empirical advances in the study of organismal development and (...) inheritance. In this important study, D. M. Walsh shows that the principal defect of the Modern Synthesis resides in its rejection of Darwin's organismal perspective, and argues for 'situated Darwinism': an alternative, organism-centred conception of evolution that prioritises organisms as adaptive agents. His book will be of interest to scholars and advanced students of evolutionary biology and the philosophy of biology. (shrink)

Welcome to the Post-Truth era-- a time in which the art of the lie is shaking the very foundations of democracy and the world as we know it. The Brexit vote; Donald Trump's victory; the rejection of climate change science; the vilification of immigrants; all have been based on the power to evoke feelings and not facts. So what does it all mean and how can we champion truth in in a time of lies and 'alternative facts'? In this eye-opening (...) and timely book, Post-Truth is distinguished from a long tradition of political lies, exaggeration and spin. What is new is not the mendacity of politicians but the public's response to it and the ability of new technologies and social media to manipulate, polarise and entrench opinion. Where trust has evaporated, conspiracy theories thrive, the authority of the media wilt and emotions matter more than facts. Now, one of the UK's most respected political journalists, Matthew d'Ancona investigates how we got here, why quiet resignation is not an option and how we can and must fight back. (shrink)

Media and Moral Education demonstrates that the study of philosophy can be used to enhance critical thinking skills, which are sorely needed in today’s technological age. It addresses the current oversight of the educational environment not keeping pace with rapid advances in technology, despite the fact that educating students to engage critically and compassionately with others via online media is of the utmost importance. -/- D’Olimpio claims that philosophical thinking skills support the adoption of an attitude she calls critical perspectivism, (...) which she applies in the book to international multimedia examples. The author also suggests that the Community of Inquiry – a pedagogy practised by advocates of Philosophy for Children – creates a space in which participants can practise being critically perspectival, and can be conducted with all age levels in a classroom or public setting, making it beneficial in shaping democratic and discerning citizens. -/- This book will be of interest to academics, researchers and postgraduate students in the areas of philosophy of education, philosophy, education, critical theory and communication, film and media studies. (shrink)

Mind, Meaning, and Reality presents fifteen philosophical papers in which D. H. Mellor explores some of the most intriguing questions in philosophy. These include: what determines what we think, and what we use language to mean; how that depends on what there is in the world and why there is only one universe; and the nature of time.

Chez les commentateurs platoniciens de l’époque impériale, l’un des problèmes majeurs liés à la théorie des Idées concernait le domaine d’application de cette doctrine. L’exégèse de la première partie du Parménide de Platon donnait occasion à diverses discussions sur ce sujet. Le Commentaire de Proclus sur le Parménide est sans doute la plus précieuse source qui soit parvenue de l’Antiquité jusqu’à nous pour la reconstitution de ces débats. Alors que la grande majorité des commentateurs anciens étaient convaincus que les Idées (...) ont un domaine assez restreint, le Commentaire de Proclus nous révèle l’existence d’une lecture alternative, selon laquelle il y a des Idées de « toutes choses ». Proclus relie cette interprétation alternative en particulier à l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises et d’individus, probablement parce que ces deux classes d’objets étaient vraiment les dernières choses dont un platonicien orthodoxe voudrait admettre des Idées. Amélius est le seul néoplatonicien connu pour avoir soutenu l’existence des Idées de choses mauvaises. Dans cet article j’essaie de montrer que, selon toute vraisemblance, Amélius est également la cible de la réfutation des Idées d’individus par Proclus dans son Commentaire. La conclusion qui s’ensuit naturellement est qu’Amélius était très probablement l’un de ces philosophes qui, d’après Proclus, admettaient des Idées « de toutes choses ». (shrink)

A laboratory-testable, solid-state Maxwell demon is proposed that utilizes the electric field energy of an open-gap p-n junction. Numerical results from a commercial semiconductor device simulator (Silvaco International–Atlas) verify primary results from a 1-D analytic model. Present day fabrication techniques appear adequate for laboratory tests of principle.

SummaryThe crux of Quine's argument against synonymy— and therewith for a version of pragmatism, and independent/y against mentalism — is his challenge to the other side to explain the behavioural difference between the disposition to employ two predicates, say, interchangeably because of habitually “believing“ them coextensive, and the disposition to do so because of “meaning” the same by each. Since synonymy is taught behaviourally, the distinction in question must make a difference behaviourally, but not necessarily one explainable wholly non‐mentalistically. The (...) distinction is drawn in terms of what would extinguish the disposition. The resultant concept of cognitive synonymy is then used to clarify the difference between trivial and non‐trivial necessary truth, and explain how logical deduction by tautological steps can lead to new knowledge.RésuméLe noeud de I'argumentation de Quine contre la synonymie— et donc pour une version de pragmatisme et indépendamment contre le mentalisme — réside dans le défi lancéà la partie adverse d'expliquer en termes de comportement la différence entre d'une part la disposition à utiliser deux prédicats de façon »interchangeable« parce qu'on les »tcroit« habituellement coextensifs, et d'autre part la disposition à le faire parce que l'un et l'autre »signifiant« la même chose. Puisque la synonymie est prise dans un sens comportemental, cette distinction doit se manifester par une différence de comportement, mais n'est pas nécessairement totalement explicable sans recourir au mental. La distinction est faite en considérant ce qui supprimerait la disposition à les utiliser de façon interchangeable. Le concept de “lsynonymie cognitive” qui se dégage de cette analyse est ensuite utilisé pour clarifier la différence entre des várités nécessaires triviales et non triviales et pour expliquer comment une deduction logique par pas tautologiques peut conduire à des connaissances nouvelles.ZusammenfassungDer entscheidende Punkt in Quines Argument gegen die Synonymitrtt— und damit für eine bestimmte Version des Pragmatismus und unabhängig davon gegen den Mentalismus — ist seine Aufforderung, den verhaltensmässigen Unterschied zu erklaen zwischen einerseits der Disposition, zwei Prädikate in austauschbarer Weise zu verwenden, weil man sie gewohnheitsmässig für Koextensiv hält, und andererseits der Disposition, dies zu tun, weil sie gleiche »Bedeutung« haben. Da die Synonymitlit behaviouristisch gelehrt und gelernt wird, muss die zur Diskussion stehende Unterscheidung verhaltensmässig einen Unterschied ausmachen, welcher jedoch nicht notwendigerweise ganz in nicht‐mentalistischer Termen erklärbar ist. Die Unterscheidung wird in Termen formuliert die die Disposition aufheben warden. Der Begriff der kognitiven Synonyrnitlft. der daraus resultiert, wird dann verwendet, urn den Unterschied zwischen trivialen und nicht‐trivialen notwendigen Wahrheiten zu erläutern und um zu erkläen, wie eine logische Deduktion durch tautologische Schritte zu neuem Wissen führen kann. (shrink)

The popular trend of manifesting involves supposedly making something happen by imagining it and consciously thinking it will happen in order to will it into existence. In this paper Laura D'Olimpio explains why manifesting is a form of wishful thinking and argues that it is an epistemic vice. She describes how such wishful thinking generally, and manifesting in particular, are epistemically problematic in the ways they obstruct the attainment of knowledge. She further adds that manifesting leaves the epistemic agent vulnerable (...) to unrealistic expectations, being set up for failure, and being prone to self-blame, and it also encourages a blurring of the distinction between thought and truth. D'Olimpio offers an example that demonstrates how manifesting as a particular instantiation of wishful thinking invites and encourages obsessive and compulsive habits and rituals that corrupt the epistemic agent's rational conclusions. Wishful thinking and manifesting negate the role for luck and privilege in achievement and downplay the role of effort and action. D'Olimpio concludes that as educators we may play a role in dispelling the myth that manifesting is a virtuous or beneficial practice and instead teach our students that, as a form of wishful thinking, it is an epistemic vice best avoided. (shrink)

L’entreprenariat social nous engage dans deux formes de responsabilité, l’une obligataire, qui ressortit au registre juridique et moral, l’autre mondaine ou cosmologique, qui ressortit au registre de l’action et de la création. La pratique entrepreneuriale en tant que telle honore prioritairement la responsabilité cosmologique, tandis que la dimension sociale de cette pratique réfère, quant à elle, au caractère obligataire. Dans cet article, nous proposons de revenir sur la généalogie de ces deux acceptions fondamentales de la responsabilité, qui ont trouvé dans (...) le kantisme à la fois leur lieu de formulation philosophique et leur point de bifurcation, mais aussi de dégager la portée et les limites de leur dialectisation dans l’activité sociale-entrepreneuriale aujourd’hui. Nous montrons que la première convoque en son sein plusieurs traditions de philosophie morale impliquant différentes extensions du concept, ce qui oblige à nous interroger sur sa propre opérabilité. La seconde, que nous aurons à cœur d’illustrer en rapportant certains discours d’entrepreneurs, a été davantage honorée à l’époque contemporaine par les approches phénoménologiques et de philosophie de l’action de tendance analytique. Nous terminons en envisageant la possibilité pour l’entrepreneur social de s’extraire de cet atermoiement entre deux formes de responsabilité dans le contexte actuel, naguère anticipé par Hans Jonas et dont témoignent aujourd’hui le succès des thèmes de l’écologie politique et du développement durable, opérant ainsi un renversement du rapport de l’action humaine à la peur de l’avenir – peur à laquelle s’est substituée au fil du temps la projection raisonnée d’un futur malheureux, toutes choses égales ailleurs. Classification JEL : M13, M14. (shrink)

Dans la septième dissertation de son Commentaire sur la République de Platon, Proclus fournit les éléments d’une philosophie politique néoplatonicienne très structurée. Fidèle, de façon générale, à la description platonicienne de l’âme tripartite et des quatre vertus cardinales, il introduit cependant d’importantes nuances dans cette théorie. L’idée de la prédominance d’une partie de l’âme sur une autre et l’idée de « vies mixtes » où deux parties de l’âme prédominent en même temps élargissent la description platonicienne des différents types poli­tiques. (...) En outre, en s’efforçant de donner diverses explications métaphysiques de la nature et du nombre des parties de l’âme et des vertus, Proclus inscrit la philosophie politique platonicienne plus ou moins tout d’une pièce dans une hiérarchie cosmique néoplatonicienne. (shrink)

In Rationalities in history, the distinguished historian David d'Avray writes a new comparative history in the spirit of Max Weber. In a strikingly original reassessment of seminal Weberian ideas, d'Avray applies value rationality to the comparative history of religion and the philosophy of law. Integrating theories of rational choice, anthropological reflections on relativism, and the recent philosophy of rationality with Weber's conceptual framework, d'Avray seeks to disengage 'rationalisation' from its enduring association with Western 'modernity.' This mode of analysis is contextualised (...) through the examples of Buddhism, Imperial China, and sixteenth-century Catholicism--in the latter case building upon unpublished archival research. This ambitious synthesis of social theory and comparative history will engage social scientists and historians from advanced undergraduate level upwards, stimulating interdisciplinary discourse, and making a significant contribution to the methodology of history. D'Avray explores the potential of this new Weberian analysis further in his companion volume, Medieval religious rationalities"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

RésuméLa croyance que l'on est (ou pas) dans un état de douleur est singulière en ceci qu'elle semble pouvoir être qualifiée d'infaillibilité ou d'incorrigibilité logique, de même que le cogito. Mais comment se peut-il que l'existence d'une croyance (vraie) et l'existence du fait qui est l'objet de cette croyance puisssent constituer la même existence? Je propose ici une réponse à cette question. Parfois, une croyance peut être un désir.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Movements of the Mind. A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action by Wayne WuDiego D’AngeloWU, Wayne. Movements of the Mind. A Theory of Attention, Intention and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. 257 pp. Cloth, $80.00Wayne Wu presented a theory of attention as selection-for-action in 2014. According to this theory, given a behavioral space in which the agent has multiple inputs and outputs to choose from, attention involves (...) the selection of a particular course of action, that is, of certain outputs based on certain inputs. In the present work Wu puts to use the selection-for-action theory to shed light on the broader topic of the “movements of the mind”: intentionality and action. Action and movement are mostly not intended as bodily movement: By focusing on mental actions Wu aims to simplify philosophical explanations. His overall theoretical approach remains consistent with his work on attention, which involves a quest to develop rigorous philosophical concepts while incorporating insights from the empirical sciences. Interestingly, biology takes precedence over cognitive sciences and psychology for him; he says, “I aspire to a biology of agency” in which philosophical analysis must respond to “empirical friction.” In this framework, this book puts forth four main claims. The first concerns the general structure of action—action arises from solving a selection problem. Second, intentional actions can be differentiated from unintentional actions using the concepts of automaticity and control. Third, Wu argues that attention is a necessary aspect of every theory of action. Fourth, he claims that intention is practical memory for action. These four are woven throughout the different chapters of his book.The first part analyzes the structure of action along three axes: how the agent “takes things to be” as the basis for selection, the agent’s response to those things, and the biases that explain the link between perceptions and responses. In the second part, Wu presents a theory of intention as practical memory. The theory is surprising, as Wu himself acknowledges when he says, “The approach to intention will, I think, jar many readers.” And indeed, it does, but Wu provides strong arguments, and future work will determine if the theory is feasible. The third part of the book explores the implications of his theory of action for specific forms and aspects of action; the first chapter in this section deals with automaticity and biases, [End Page 734] the second deals with deductive reasoning, and the third deals with introspection.According to Wu’s theory, action involves a complex combination of elements. The agent is faced with many inputs and potential outputs within a behavioral space. She takes inputs in a certain way: The way she sees things is influenced by myriad aspects, such as intentions and biases of various forms. Action and intending to act are solutions to the problem of selecting appropriate inputs and outputs. Wu thematizes the role of attention in this process of selection. Attention comes in three different forms. It can be an action itself (“attending,” for example, in searching for something); it can mean “vigilance” as readiness to act; and most importantly, attention is “mental guidance.” Every action is guided by attention insofar as a selection problem must be solved: Attention is guiding when perceptual input “plays a functional role of guiding.” Attention also shapes the agent’s actions through remembering, and remembering in turn is nothing else then attending to remembered content. This attended content provides the agent with biases and reasons to select a particular course of action. Therefore, intending to act is nothing else than practical memory, that is, memory put to work in the choice of actions.One particular type of action that is crucially important for philosophical research is introspection. According to Wu, introspection, like every kind of mental action, is not entirely reliable—as some theories would have it—or entirely unreliable but, instead, depends on context. Like any other action, introspection follows the same guiding principle, attention, specifically, perceptual attention. Therefore, introspection is a particular type of perceptual experience where attention is focused on one’s own mental states. In this way, Wu establishes criteria for veridical introspective reports, such... (shrink)

Educating against extremism doesn't just involve seeking to prevent individuals from becoming extremists or radicalized, although that, of course, is a significant concern. There is also an important role for education in teaching the rest of us, the general populace, the best way to react and respond when we learn of a terrorist attack or consider the potential risk of violent extremism in our community, or even worldwide, given we are connected globally via technology. In this article, Laura D'Olimpio argues (...) that educators have a central role to play in teaching young people to respond to the news of violent extremism and the worry about terrorists and terrorism in ways that support our sense of community and personal well-being. Among the ways in which educators may support such aims is by educating the emotions. There are practical and moral reasons to temper our fearful reactions, and it is in our best interest to educate pupils to avoid allowing fear of terrorists or violent extremism to interfere with their daily lives and actions. D'Olimpio claims that our best response to extremism, both representationally and practically, is to refuse to be terrified. By not being overwhelmed by fear or altering our day-to-day activities, we not only better support a well-functioning democracy and our own happiness or flourishing, but we also disempower rather than empower extremists. (shrink)

The substance of the authors' disagreement with the views of D. Gutkowski and M. V. Valdes Franco is presented.

CONTENTS: -/- SEZIONE I IL TUTTO E' UNO? IL RISVEGLIO DI UN PROBLEMA TRA SCOLASTICA E RINASCIMENTO Il principio omne causatum est compositum fra Tommaso e Cajetano Igor Agostini, p. 25 Parti e tutto in Montaigne. La natura e l'individuo tra frammentazione e integrazione Raffaele Carbone 45 Le minuzzarie e il tutto. Giordano bruno e la conoscenza universale Maurizio Cambi 75 -/- SEZIONE II A PARTIRE DA CARTESIO. COME PUO' ESSERE UN TUTTO L'UOMO? -/- Mente/Corpo in Cartesio. Spunti per un'interpretazione (...) mereologica Stefano Di Bella 93 Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemus ad Deum. Appartenenza, dipendenza e relazione nel pensiero e nel lessico di Arnold Guelincx Cristina Santinelli 115 L'integrità di corpo e mente nell'"invenire" terapeutico di E. W. von Tschirnhaus Manuela Sanna 133 L'indivisibilità della natura umana e della società in Francesco Longano. Un episodio della ricezione di Locke in Italia Roberto Evangelista 147 -/- SEZIONE III L'IRROMPERE DELL'ORGANICO. LA BIOLOGIA FILOSOFICA TRA SEI E SETTECENTO -/- Convenienza e discrepanza. Parti e tutto nella Lettera 32 di Baruch Spinoza Francesco Toto 169 Mereologia della sostanza e mereologia del vivente in Leibniz Enrico Pasini 197 Teleologia e mereologia dell’organismo da Leibniz a Bonnet Francesco Piro 209 Il nesso delle parti: mereologia e scienza secondo Christian Wolff Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 239 Il problema del tutto e delle parti. il caso del vitalismo di Montpellier Charles T. Wolfe 257 -/- SEZIONE 4 TOTALITA' CRITICHE: DALLA CRISI DEL NATURALISMO ILLUMINISTICO ALLA FILOSOFIA DELLE CULTURE -/- La logica del tutto (e delle parti di tutto, vale a dire niente) in Dom Deschamps Jean-Claude Bourdin 273 l’(in)afferabile forma. Totalità e contingenza nel pensiero di Kant tra Critica della ragion pura e Critica del giudizio Luigi Imperato 303 la relazione Parte-Tutto nel primo Schelling Giuseppe D’Anna 327 Hegel o della totalizzazione dello spazio di interiorità Vittorio Morfino 343 A partire da Kant: Begriffsbiìldung teleologica e relazione Parti-Tutto nelle indagini di Rickert sulla logica delle scienze storiche della cultura Edoardo Massimilla 359 . (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans ÉTUDES/INUIT/STUDIES, 24, no 2, 2000, p. 89-113. Québec : Département d'anthropologie de l'Université Laval. Nous remercions Bernard Saladin d'Anglure de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Les rites inuit de la première fois, qui célèbrent les premières performances effectuées par les enfants et les adolescents inuit, ont été souvent mentionnés par les ethnographes de l'Arctique mais jamais véritablement analysés comme « séquence cérémonielle », pour - Anthropologie.

Socrates: the philosopher whose questioning gave birth to the foundations of Western thought, and whose execution marked the end of the Athenian Golden Age. Yet despite his pre-eminence among the great thinkers of history, little of his life story is known. What we know tends to begin in his middle age and end with his trial and death. Our conception of Socrates has relied upon Plato and Xenophon--men who met him when he was in his fifties, a well-known figure in (...) war-torn Athens. There is mystery at the heart of Socrates's story: what turned the young Socrates into a philosopher? What drove him to pursue with such persistence, at the cost of social acceptance and ultimately his life, a whole new way of thinking about the meaning of existence? In this revisionist biography, classicist Armand D'Angour draws on neglected sources to explore the passions and motivations of young Socrates, showing how love transformed him into the philosopher he was to become. What emerges is the figure of Socrates as never previously portrayed: a heroic warrior, an athletic wrestler and dancer--and a passionate lover. Socrates in Love sheds new light on the formative journey of the philosopher, finally revealing the identity of the woman who Socrates claimed inspired him to develop ideas that have captivated thinkers for 2,500 years."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

Inspiring and distinctive, After Meaning provides a radical challenge to the way in which international law is thought and practised. Jean d'Aspremont asserts that the words and texts of international law, as forms, never carry or deliver meaning but, instead, perpetually defer meaning and ensure it is nowhere found within international legal discourse. In challenging the dominant meaning-centrism of the international legal discourse and shedding light on the sovereignty of forms, this book promotes a radical new attitude towards textuality in (...) international law. The author offers new perspectives on interpretation, critique, history, comparison, translation and referencing, inviting international lawyers to reinvent their engagement with these discourses. Chapters define meaning and form in international law, explore deferral of meaning and make an unprecedented use of post-structuralist theory to rethink international law. After Meaning will be an essential reference point for legal scholars, researchers and students who seek to understand a different way of thinking about meaning in international law. The book's engagement with post-structuralism will also prove beneficial to anyone interested in the philosophy of language and literary theory. (shrink)

Hegel est parfois tenu pour un métaphysicien, à l’encontre de son propre sentiment. Il s’est pourtant livré à une critique constante, minutieuse et acerbe de la métaphysique en laquelle il ne voyait qu’un prolongement de la manière de penser primitive et naïve. Les hommes ne saisissent d’abord que métaphysiquement la réalité objective qui se présente à eux. Intégrant à sa propre logique spéculative des éléments de la métaphysique éclatée, mais se rattachant luimême surtout à la critique kantienne, il tente de (...) surpasser tous les points de vue limités, unilatéraux, antithétiques, pour les réduire au rôle de moments ou d’étapes d’un développement qui les surpasse tous. C’est toutefois à la métaphysique qu’il réserve ses désaveux les plus explicites. (shrink)

Parmi les 'but de l'homme' (puruṣārtha) qui orientent la vie humaine dans le monde indien, le dharma occupe une position très élevée, au-dessus de 'l'intérêt' (artha) et du 'désir' (kāma), respectivement la sphère du pouvoir (politique, économique, social) et celle de l'amour (y compris les passions et les plaisirs de la vie). Enfin, le dharma englobe le quatrième et ultime but de l'homme, la 'délivrance' (moksa). Le caractère normatif du dharma fixe la place de chacun dans la société, par l'exercice (...) de son devoir spécifique. Mais il ne se décline pas moins selon les dispositions individuelles de chacun, et l'action de l'homme en est la véritable mesure. Par-delà la littérature du dharma, le volume réunit des enquêtes sur cette notion 'en contexte,' de la poésie védique à la grammaire, de l'épopée au théâtre, des traditions religieuses et philosophiques--les premières Écoles bouddhiques, la Mīmāmsā, le tantrisme--à la médecine classique (Āyurveda) et jusqu'à la jurisprudence indienne moderne (du XVIIe au XIXe siècle) avec deux éclairages inédits sur le dharma des femmes. Une telle approche tend à restituer la complexité de quelques visages du dharma ainsi recomposés, non pas 'tel ou tel' aspect mais pour chaque cas le 'tout' d'un système à plusieurs facettes, à l'appui d'une histoire singulière dont les auteurs s'attachent à montrer points forts et limites, situations ambiguës, paradoxes et contradictions."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

À partir du témoignage de Sénèque et d’Épictète, le présent article vise à montrer comment les stoïciens rendent compte des réactions involontaires à partir de leur propre psychologie de l’action. Les références faites à Zénon et les allusions à Chrysippe prouvent qu’une théorie des « affections préliminaires » existait dès les débuts du Portique. Le fragment 9 d’Épictète et l’ouverture du deuxième livre du De Ira sont ainsi interprétés comme deux versions concurrentes se rapportant à deux théories subtilement différentes. À (...) partir du matériau textuel emprunté aux premiers stoïciens, on montre l’influence de Zénon sur le De Ira et celle de Chrysippe sur le passage du livre perdu des Entretiens. Cette hypothèse a pour conséquence d’accorder l’exposé de Sénèque à l’orthodoxie stoïcienne défendant un monisme psychologique, et non à la filiation posidonienne, marquée par un dualisme psychologique à tendance platonico-aristotélicienne. (shrink)

This CQ department is dedicated to bringing noted bioethicsts together in order to debate some of the most perplexing contemporary bioethics issues. You are encouraged to contact department editor, D. Micah Hester, UAMS/Humanities, 4301 W. Markham St. #646, Little Rock, AR 72205, with any suggestions for debate topics and interlocutors you would like to see published herein.