DNA profiling and databasing are now commonplace. A body of state and federal legislation enables the establishment and operation of profile databases for law-enforcement purposes. Enabling legislation is usually specific about who, or what evidence, may be profiled for a database. It may be less specific or silent on the issue of specimen retention following profiling and databasing.

Concerns have been raised around the alleged commercialisation of South African genetic material by various research institutes nationally and abroad. We consider whether the Protection of Personal Information Act in South Africa will conflict with or complement existing protections in health law and research ethics. The Act is not applicable to de‐identified samples that cannot be re‐identified but we question whether genetic samples can ever be truly de‐identified. The research participants in this matter provided consent for use of their samples (...) for research but did not consent to commercialisation by global research institutions, and neither did the researchers. We suggest that consent models incorporating broad consent as an option should include explicit discussions around benefit sharing and commercialisation. Mistrust between researchers and participants impedes scientific research and can harm relationships built up over the years between South African researchers and local communities. (shrink)

Until approximately twenty years ago, advances in the study of human genetics had little influence on the practice of medicine. In the 1980s, this changed dramatically with the mapping of the altered genes that cause cystic fibrosis and Huntington disease. In just a few years, these discoveries led to DNA-based tests that enabled clinicians to determine whether prospective parents were carriers of CF or whether an individual carried the Huntington gene and, as a result, would almost certainly develop the disease.Observers (...) interested in the social and economic implications of genetic technology realized that such genetic tests could be used by insurance companies to predict which insurance applicants were likely to become ill or even die from these diseases. (shrink)

The paper uses insights from the so-called rape in disguise case study to describe forensic DNA practices in the Netherlands in late 1980s. It describes how "reliabilities" of forensic DNA practices were achieved. One such reliability - convincing evidence - proliferates body parts through time and space. Then, attention shifts to the individual who was suspected of having committed the rape. He was asked to deliver tissue for DNA typing, but refused to do so. Hence DNA typing could not be (...) used to connect the suspect to a cervical smear collected from the body of the victim. His refusal and the legal impossibility to use force to obtain his biological material led first to questions in the Dutch parliament and then to the Dutch forensic DNA law. Other legal measures enacted after this are also described. I argue that, by means of the various Dutch forensic DNA laws and new forensic genetic techniques, the application of forensic DNA practices have shifted from identification and evidence to a tool for criminal investigation and prevention of future crimes. In the final part of the paper, the right to inviolability of the body and its synonym bodily integrity are emphasised. I argue that despite the various forensic DNA laws, bodily integrity of obtained tissue for DNA typing is still at stake as the result of convincing evidence. (shrink)

Over ten years have elapsed since Virginia passed the nation's first criminal DNA banking law, which authorized law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from certain categories of offenders for the purposes of performing profile analysis. Within nine years, Rhode Island became the fiftieth state to enact a similar statute. The passage of a decade since the first enactment provides a convenient opportunity to assess the strengths and weaknesses of ethical safeguards under present law as well as predict the likely (...) direction of future developments.DNA forensics are merely the latest in a long line of biologically based identifying law enforcement technologies that include fingerprints and serotyping. Nevertheless, DNA has properties that make it significantly different than its predecessors with respect to the ethical and social concerns it raises. (shrink)

In the spring of 2005, the Portuguese government passed legislation paving the way for all residents to contribute their DNA to a national database to be used for medical and forensic purposes. There was no significant opposition. In sharp contrast, the United States will experience a contentious debate with strong opposition from many groups if and when such a law is proposed. Some of the reasons have to do with a history of sharply different experiences with, and trust of, (...) the criminal justice system. (shrink)

One obvious result of DNA exonerations has been the enactment of legislation regulating postconviction DNA testing. But the impact on our criminal justice system goes beyond formal statutory change. The DNA exonerations are changing attitudes towards the death penalty, are focusing attention on how forensic laboratories operate, and are leading to the stricter scrutiny of forensic science.

States began passing legislation mandating the collection of genetic material from certain convicted offenders in 1988. By 1998, all 50 states had passed laws allowing DNA databases for convicted sexual offenders, and some states collected DNA from all those convicted of a felony. A survey of 416 persons in Maryland revealed wide support for the inclusion of convicted violent offenders (89%) in DNA databases, in sync with most states’ policies. Between two thirds and three quarters of respondents also supported (...) expanding DNA databases to include those suspected of a violent offense, any convicted felon, as well as all convicted offenders, minor and major. Support for collecting the DNA of those suspected of any crime and for all newborns was considerably less (44% to 45%). Although a comprehensive database is most effective for solving and deterring crimes, vigorously enforced protections against abuse of this technology must be in place. (shrink)

Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. The War Powers Resolution, for example, prohibits any law from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes" them. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required laws to amend FISA or repeal its "exclusive means" provision before they could authorize warrantless electronic surveillance. But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce compliance. The Clinton Administration inferred (...) congressional "authorization" for the 1999 Kosovo War from an appropriations statute that failed to specifically authorize the conflict. And the Bush Administration inferred congressional "authorization" for the NSA surveillance program from ambiguous language in the post-September 11th Authorization to Use Military Force. In both situations, executive-branch lawyers employed expansive theories of implied repeal and constitutional avoidance to evade the codified clear-statement requirements, and Congress and the courts acquiesced to the President's actions. Recent proposals to strengthen the clear-statement requirements in Congress's national-security framework legislation are unlikely to be effective without institutional mechanisms, such as points of order, that can deter future legislators from enacting vague or ambiguous legislation from which the executive might claim implicit congressional "authorization," and that can induce Congress to confront Presidents that act without specific congressional authorization. Simply enacting more narrow or explicit clear-statement requirements, or adding funding restrictions to Congress's framework legislation, fails to counter the aggressive interpretive doctrines that executives of both political parties have used to concoct congressional "authorization" from vague or ambiguous statutory language. (shrink)

This Christian sermon uses a DNA lab experience as a basis for theological reflection on ourselves and our offering. Who are we to God? What determines the self that we offer? Can the alphabet of DNA shed light for us on the Word of God in our lives? This first attempt to introduce the language and laboratory environment of genetic testing (represented by DNA fingerprinting) within a parish preaching context juxtaposes liturgical, scientific, and biblical language and settings for fresh (...) insights. (shrink)

The above bit string encodes personal information about one of the authors of this essay. Of course, without rules to decode the bit string, it is impossible to say whether it is genetic information, weight, age, fingerprint, religion, etc. Layered on top of that technical decoding process is a social decoding process – how sensitive is this information? How useful is it to the government for various purposes? The objective of this paper is to offer some key lessons for the (...) regulation of genetic information collected by the state for law enforcement purposes. In the first part of the paper, we discuss two fundamental principles of informational privacy theory. Utilizing these, we then examine the statutory regimes that have emerged for the regulation of the information that the government collects in three different domains – fingerprints, department of motor vehicle records, and tax records. In the third and final part we use the results of our analysis as analogies for similar regulatory challenges in the regulation of genetic information collected for law enforcement purposes, and make some tentative recommendations. (shrink)

‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (‘CSR’) has gained popularity in corporate as well as academic debates, especially since the 2008 financial crisis (Okpara & Idowu, 2013). Although CSR as an idea has not failed, concerning gaps remain in the theory and practice of CSR. More particularly, in India, the legislature has adopted a ‘one size fits all’ approach which permits businesses to interpret and implement CSR based on their unique circumstances. This leads to persistent and escalating concerns regarding its implementation and limits. (...) The most basic of such concerns is the fact that CSR conceptually lacks a consistent understanding as scholars all around the world have defined it differently (Votaw & Sethi, 1973), which has an effect of conflating CSR with legal obligations or pre-existing moral obligations of the company. This work, limiting the study to Indian context, argues that the effectiveness of any policy or regulation is a direct result of express intention behind it and Indian law lacks such expression. It specifically argues that the framework in India is based on the misconceived idea of CSR resting on ‘neo-liberal’ principles meaning that a corporation’s primary responsibility is maximization of the profits of the shareholders and hence CSR is perceived merely as an add-on. There needs to be a change in this narrative to a ‘socio-economic’ one which could bring CSR within the core functions of corporations and which largely depends on the Corporate Governance ecosystem so in place. India although claims to have adopted the Stakeholder Model of Corporate Governance, in practice it still aligns with the Shareholder Model. It is only when the former is adopted in practice, can CSR be effectively implemented which can be further facilitated through a clear expression of legislative intent behind the provisions and regulations concerning CSR. In order to substantiate these arguments, this work adopts a doctrinal method of research which undergoes a thematic discourse analysis of the issue and its theoretical underpinnings, and also provides certain recommendations in this respect. (shrink)

We should now be able to come to some general conclusions about the main lines of Cuvier's development as a naturalist after his departure from Normandy. We have seen that Cuvier arrived in Paris aware of the importance of physiology in classification, yet without a fully worked out idea of how such an approach could organize a whole natural order. He was freshly receptive to the ideas of the new physiology developed by Xavier Bichat.Cuvier arrived in a Paris also torn (...) by many overlapping debates on the nature of classification, and in particular that between the natural and artificial systems. The very validity of the enterprise of classification was questioned in many quarters. Cuvier's achievement on his entry into the Parisian world of science was not simply to establish himself as a highly competent anatomist: far more important, he also began to use ideas from many different specialties to change completely the notion of what was involved in natural history.124 At the same time that he himself swung away from the guiding image of the field naturalist as the ideal of the specialty, he took ideas from the new physiology to answer questions about the order of the animal world, and from comparative anatomy to resurrect extinct creation — and to come to conclusions from that creation about the history of the forms of life and the manner of their succession. He showed himself able to alter the relationships between natural history and many other fields of study in a way that implied, rightly or wrongly, his own complete mastery over such a movement. Partly he was able to do this because the ideas he borrowed were not themselves logically articulated and thus could be easily adapted and refocused for many different specific purposes. The value of the heuristic possibilities inherent in the idea of life, for example, far outweighed its inability to generate full systems of classification. Cuvier also consistently refused to consider in science matters relating to the first causes of events. Freed from the consideration of first-order phenomena, he was able to use second-order explanations across a far wider field of applicability. Personal doubts about the validity of a theology that had used science in order to bolster its own claims were combined here with the strong influence of the Kantian critique of the limits of human reason.125Cuvier's characteristic mode of procedure was that of intellectual appropriation and a bold capacity for altering the relationships between different fields of knowledge, rather than, with the exception of taxonomy, the technique of expanding their subject matter. His claims to originality came, first, from this reappropriation and reorientation and, second, from the sheer scope of his work, which aimed at nothing less than the cataloging and classification of all animate objects.126 They rested also on his acute use of his assertion of a certain relationship with the past of his subject. Very often he would present this history in such a way as to obscure his own intellectual genealogy, and often too he would give differing accounts of the priority of use of an idea in order to distract attention from the questionable exactitude of his own claims to originality. Cuvier came to Paris at precisely the time when society and institutions were most profitably malleable for a newcomer; it was also a time when many scientific disciplines had reached a stage advanced in terms of their factual content, yet relatively inadequate in conceptual organization. They were ripe for takeover by large-scale organizing ideas such as the animal economy and the subordination of characteristics. Paleontology is a particularly good example of a specialty in this particular form of underdevelopment in 1795.Cuvier paid a high price for his initial success. His electic applications of large-scale organizing ideas tended to mean that little of his own work had complete coherence at all levels. Ideas, as we have seen, that proved capable of providing a complete reform of the larger groups of the animal kingdom were incapable of producing its detailed working-out in the taxonomy of smaller groups, which had to be supplied from observed analogical correlations. Further, his physiological approach to classification involved the breakdown of strict correspondence between organs and functions, which left the way open for workers such as Geoffroy St. Hilaire gradually to tilt the balance away from the study of the correlations of hierarchies of functions, and toward morphology as the basis of the order of nature. Cuvier's brilliant appropriations from physiology from the beginning, therefore, contained the seeds of conflict with Geoffroy.Cuvier's eclectic approach made it very nearly impossible for him to present a clear idea of the ways in which the life sciences could be said to be lawful. In spite of his efforts to assimilate them to the position of the physical sciences in this respect, he was forced in the end to accord only an ambiguous status as “laws” to observational correlations. From this area of failure came much of the attempt to give his own two laws — the correlation of parts and the subordination of characteristics — predictive qualities, particularly in relation to paleontological research.It is not surprising that Cuvier's title as the “legislator” of natural history should represent more a claim than a reality. How, then, was he able to emerge as the leading French naturalist of his day? First of all must be adduced the sheer scale of his undertakings. Then comes his expertise as a practical anatomist, and the range of different topics toward which he turned his interest. His collaborators cannot be given credit for his output nor, as we have seen, for slavish adherence to his ideas. Cuvier was able to successfully claim to have dominated the underdeveloped specialties, such as paleontology, and turned them into a major heuristic input into both geology and comparative anatomy; but in other fields, such as physiology, he appropriated concepts and encouraged research but made little impact on the field himself. His attempts in 1812 to head off, or neutralize and absorb the growth of morphological studies landed him in a dangerously rigid position, which despite his encouragement of the new physiological research under the Restoration made further elaboration of his own conceptual underpinnings almost impossible.Cuvier's authority in the scientific world would in any case have been great because of his substantive achievement in taxonomy, but the rest of his work had enough ambiguities and dislocations for it to need the support of his political and social power. Cuvier's detractors seized on a vital fragment of the truth when they accused him of finding the political dimension all-important: it obscured the disjunctions in his theories and at the same time gave him the authority to make new claims for the status of the observational sciences - and for their relations of power with their surrounding specialties. Cuvier's science both thrived on and was halted by the power games of intellectual appropriation, manipulation of the past to confirm the present, and continual claims for hegemony. (shrink)

According to the Standard Picture of how law works, the content of the law that is created by legal texts such as statutes and constitutional provisions is determined by the meaning of these texts. Most proponents of this picture claim more specifically that the relevant notion of meaning in play is the communicative content of legal texts and that communicative content is itself determined by considerations of the intentions of legal authorities. In recent years, the Standard Picture has become the (...) subject of heated philosophical debate. Focusing on statutes as the paradigmatic type of legal texts, this thesis aims to contribute to this debate in two central ways. First, it argues that the aforementioned ‘intention-based’ versions of the Standard Picture lack convincing responses to three important objections that have been raised by critics. First, they lack an adequate account of how legislative bodies can be reasonably ascribed the intentions that they would need according to such versions. Second, they fail to explain important aspects of legal practice. Third, they provide at best a parochial theory of the content of the law that is generated by statutes. The second contribution is to provide a more sustained defence of the Standard Picture by developing a new ‘commitment-based’ version of this view. This version is based on an alternative theory of communication and claims that communicative content is not determined by considerations of intentions but rather by the commitments that are incurred by means of communicative acts. It is argued that this version can deal with the objections that have been raised by critics and therefore provides a more robust version of the Standard Picture. (shrink)

This article considers Dworkin's influential argument against legislative intent in chapter 9 of Law's Empire. The argument proves much less than is often assumed for it fails to address the possibility that the institution of the legislature may form and act on intentions. Indeed, analysis of Dworkin's argument lends support to that possibility. Dworkin aims to refute legislative intent in order to elucidate his own theory of statutory interpretation. That theory fails to explain plausibly legislative action. Dworkin's argument does not (...) refute legislative intent but instead suggests there is reason to think that the legislature is capable of intentional action. (shrink)

The metaphysics of legalism -- The individual in context -- Rationality in context -- Freedom in context -- Strong legalism or the absent theory of legislation -- Legitimacy and legitimation : from strong legalism to legisprudence -- From proxy to trading off : the principles of legisprudence -- Legisprudence and the duties of power : a legisprudential assessment of rational legislation.

HIV-related state laws are being created transnationally though the use of omnibus model laws. In 2004, the US Agency for International Development funded the creation of one such guidance text known as the USAID/Action for West Africa Region Model Law, or N'Djamena Model Law, which led to the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS laws, including the criminalisation of HIV transmission, across much of West and Central Africa . In this article, I explicate how an epidemic of highly problematic legislation spread (...) across the region as a result of a text-mediated work process enabled through model laws. I theorise the textual genre of model laws arguing that these texts are best understood as ‘preoperative documents’ which, when activated, can lead to swift legislative reform in and beyond the field of HIV/AIDS governance. The legislative process being investigated was made visible through participant observation, archival research, textual analysis and informant interviews with national and international stakeholders . This involved ethnographic research in Canada, the USA, Switzerland, Austria, South Africa and Senegal . The untold policy processes and narratives explored in this article make evident how the work of contesting problematic HIV/AIDS model laws and newly drafted state laws involves both creating new texts and contesting the legitimacy and efficacy of others. (shrink)

0n a lucid, concise volume, Jeremy Waldron defends the role of legislation, presenting it as an important mode of governance. Aristotle, Locke and Kant emerge as proponents of the dignity of legislation. Waldron's arguments are of obvious importance and topicality, especially in countries that are considering the introduction of a Bill of Rights. The Dignity of Legislation is original in conception, trenchantly argued and very clearly presented, and will be of interest to a wide range of scholars (...) and thinkers. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Images of Legislation Legislation in Legal Theory Analytics of the Legislative Process Interpreting and Applying Legislation A Forum of Principle? References.

DNA identification methods are such an established part of our law enforcement and criminal justice systems it is hard to believe that the technologies were developed as recently as the mid-1980s, and that the databases of law enforcement profiles were established in the 1990s. Although the first databases were limited to the DNA profiles of convicted rapists and murderers, the success of these databases in solving violent crimes provided the impetus for Congress and state legislatures to expand the scope of (...) the databases with little critical examination of each expansion's value to law enforcement or cost to privacy and civil liberties.We are now entering a new stage of DNA forensics, in which successive database expansions over the last decade have raised the possibility of creating a population-wide repository. In addition, new applications of DNA profiling, including familial and low stringency searches, have been added to DNA dragnets, the use of medical samples for forensic analysis, and other measures to create a series of crucial, yet largely unexplored, second-generation legal and policy issues. (shrink)

Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise. Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his (...) opposition to theological voluntarist accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors. In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A correct understanding of Kant's development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism. (shrink)

The article analyzes the system of legal regulation of the higher education in Lithuania with the purpose to determine the boundaries of exercising the discretionary powers of the executive institutions in the field of higher education. The article is made of two parts. Discretionary powers of the executive institutions in legislative field are discussed in the first part. The power of legislative discretion is described as a right to set the legal regulation by way of a subject who is granted (...) such discretionary power. Problems may arise in cases when the law granting such discretionary powers is too abstract or declarative. The main criteria in determining the boundaries of exercise of discretionary powers are the provisions of Constitution and laws, and constitutional law principles. The system of delegation of legislative powers in the field of regulation of the higher education in Lithuania is analyzed in the second part of the article. The permanent changes in administrative legal regulation of higher education and studies determined by a vast amount of subjects issuing post-legislative legal acts in this field, as well as rather tedious legal regulation which, in turn, calls for frequent changes in legal acts, raises doubts regarding a possibility to implement main principles of the studies, such as freedom of creation and scientific research or academic freedom and autonomy. (shrink)

This article develops an account of the nature and limits of the state’s legislative authority that closely attends to the challenge of harmonizing Kant’s ethical and juridical theories. It clarifies some key Kantian concepts and terms, then explains the way in which the state’s three interlocking authorities – legislative, executive, and judicial – are metaphysically distinct and mutually dependent. It describes the emergence of the Kantian state and identifies the preconditions of its authority. Then it offers a metaphysical model of (...) the Kantian state and uses it to argue that the activity of juridical lawgiving is an act of the omnilateral will itself. Legislative authority is limited in the sense that it does not include the capacity to create juridical laws that are conceptually incompatible with the idea of universal external freedom. I argue that my proposed account of the legislative authority is wholly consistent with that authority’s exclusive lawgiving capacity and does not threaten the possibility of ‘distributive justice’ – the legal finality that is the sine qua non of a civil condition. (shrink)

A comprehensive account of English legal thought in the age of Blackstone and Bentham for nearly a century, The Province of Legislation Determined advances an ambitious reinterpretation of eighteenth-century attitudes to social change and law reform. Professor Lieberman's bold synthesis rests on a wide survey of legal materials and on a detailed discussion of Blackstone's Commentaries, the jurisprudence of Lord Kames and the Scottish Enlightenment, the chief justiceship of Lord Mansfield, the penal theories of Eden and Romilly, and the (...) legislative science of Jeremy Bentham. The study relates legal developments to the broader fabric of eighteenth-century social and political theory, and offers a novel assessment of the character of the common law tradition and of Bentham's contribution to the ideology of reform. (shrink)

Researchers have consistently identified the disparity between teachers’ practical and legal knowledge regarding teachers’ right to discipline students. However, few studies have investigated teachers’ construction processes that form construction outcomes, which would help navigate the role of legislation in school discipline. This study contributes to a holistic picture of the neglected disciplinary rights that teachers construct in teaching practice and their underexplored attitude toward the law, using an interview-based constructionist method on twelve teachers of Lvliang city in a Chinese (...) K-12 context. The findings suggest that the participants prefer to acquire discipline knowledge by interacting with multiple power relations in their local environment and that their knowledge is historically and culturally specific. Although the disciplinary right they construct is never static, balanced, or essentialised, the participants’ constructions are commonly not in line with legal provisions or the aims of the law. Furthermore, school discipline legislation plays a silent role in empowering teachers to discipline students, but it is more visible in holding back teachers’ use of corporal punishment. These findings illustrate the complexity of implementing school disciplinary law as a universal national policy. (shrink)

In the last years of his life, Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., defied illness to continue his work on the philosophy of law. This book is a monument to MacCallum’s effort, containing fourteen of his essays, five of them published here for the first time. Two of those previously published are widely admired and reprinted: “Legislative Intent,” certainly one of the best papers ever published on its topic, and “Negative and Positive Freedom,” which offered a new way of looking at a (...) distinction that had been canonical for the last two centuries. To complete MacCallum’s unfinished pieces, Marcus G. Singer and Rex Martin painstakingly consulted MacCallum’s notes for planned revisions. MacCallum discusses legal reasoning, the application of rules, the interpretation of statutes and constitutional provisions, and the relation of these matters to morality and justice. In the last decade of his working life, he became greatly concerned with the interrelated themes of integrity, autonomy, conscience, and violence. He wished to relate competition to morality and justice to adversarial systems of law. These themes are woven together in Legislative Intent and constitute the main subject of some of the essays. MacCallum was engaged in a constant search for truth and understanding, and in his life and work lived up to Emerson’s vision of the “American Scholar” as a “human being thinking.” These essays are informed by the author’s deep curiosity, penetrating intelligence, wide knowledge, and outstanding character. They will be treasured wherever these characteristics and true philosophy are treasured. (shrink)

There is a widely held view that legislative intention determines the meaning of a statute. The focus of this article is meaning in the sense of full linguistic content, which may not be the same as legal content. Linguistic intentionalism appears to have its greatest appeal when a statute has a partly implied linguistic meaning. It seems natural to suppose that the part of the meaning that is implied by the explicit wording in the statute is determined by an intention (...) of the legislature—roughly, what the legislature intended to imply. The purpose of this article is to present some new reasons to doubt linguistic intentionalism and to offer an alternative for a particular kind of implied statutory meaning that some philosophers of language call implicitures. Rather than legislative intention, the meaning of implicitures is metaphysically determined by intention-free pragmatic linguistic norms, the grasp of which is part of the language competence of ordinary law subjects. The use of these norms, in combination with certain facts about background social practices and other conventions, generates implicitures that may be inconsistent with actual communicative intentions. These intention-free pragmatic norms, and the implicitures they generate, are explanatorily prior to the fact—if there is such a fact—of what impliciture it is reasonable to infer that the enacting legislature (or the legislators collectively) intended. Reference to legislative linguistic intention (actual or reasonably imputed) is thus explanatorily inert. (shrink)

This book discusses how Plato, one the fiercest legal critics in ancient Greece, became – in the longue durée – its most influential legislator. Making use of a vast scholarly literature, and offering original readings of a number of dialogues, it argues that the need for legal critique and the desire for legal permanence set the long arc of Plato’s corpus—from the Apology to the Laws. Modern philosophers and legal historians have tended to overlook the fact that Plato was the (...) most prolific legislator in ancient Greece. In the pages of his Republic and Laws, he drafted more than 700 statutes. This is more legal material than can be credited to the archetypal Greek legislators—Lycurgus, Draco, and Solon. The status of Plato’s laws is unique, since he composed them for purely hypothetical cities. And remarkably, he introduced this new genre by writing hard-hitting critiques of the Greek ideal of the sovereignty of law. Writing in the milieu in which immutable divine law vied for the first time with volatile democratic law, Plato rejected both sources of law, and sought to derive his laws from what he called ‘political technique’. At the core of this technique is the question of how the idea of justice relates to legal and institutional change. Filled with sharp observations and bold claims, Platonic Legislations shows that it is possible to see Plato—and our own legal culture—in a new light “In this provocative, intelligent, and elegant work D. L. Dusenbury has posed crucial questions not only as regards Plato’s thought in the making, but also as regards our contemporaneity.”—Giorgio Camassa, University of Udine “There is a tension in Greek law, and in Greek legal thinking, between an understanding of law as unchangeable and authoritative, and a recognition that formal rules are often insufficient for the interpretation of reality, and need to be constantly revised to match it. Dusenbury’s book illuminates the sophistication of Plato’s legal thought in its engagement with this tension, and explores the potential of Plato’s reflection for modern legal theory.”—Mirko Canevaro, The University of Edinburgh. (shrink)

It would be unproblematically correct to say "the laws of Pennsylvania have it that a person is eligible to vote at age eighteen." But whether someone is actually mature enough to exercise his electoral franchise appropriately will very much depend on the individual. In setting the voting age by fiat, Society leaps in where Nature fears to tread. Many quantities that figure importantly in shaping our conduct of affairs are not specified by nature but are artifacts of human contrivance. At (...) what age, for example, is a person old enough to marry, drink alcoholic beverages responsibly, handle fireworks safely, manage his own property, enter into contracts, see a violent movie, serve on a jury, or hold a public office? These are not quantities writ large in nature's impersonal scheme of things but matters of social decision made for reasons of public polity and administrative convenience. They are legislated quantities. (shrink)

In Rousseau’s political theory, the Legislator’s task is to draft the best possible Constitution for a given people. His goal is to maintain the public liberties and to ensure the preservation and prosperity of the State. However, the main problem is “to put law above men” – that is: above the citizens in general and the members of the executive in particular. This paper examines how the Legislator takes up the problem by educating the citizens. The process of education implies (...) the development of reasonable thinking as well as the education of desire. Reasonable thinking is achieved through the formation of the general will. Education of human desire must be understood with respect to the distinction between amour-propre and amour-de-soi. The extension of amour-de-soi to a communityof fellow citizens plays a central role in the formation of the general will and contributes to the development of solidarity among the different social classes. Education of amour-propre plays a role in the development of a national identity. It plays also a role in the political governance of individual desires by means of an administration based on a hierarchy of functions, supervised by public opinion. However, the political governance of desire is challenged by the invisible power of money, which Rousseau tried to neutralize by limiting and slowing down the monetary circulation. (shrink)

This article analyzes the epistemological aims and justification of character education legislation passed by the North Carolina General Assembly. I take this specific state law as representative of the broader national trends in the character education movement. I primarily use the work of Richard Rorty as the theoretical lens for the analysis and critique. I conclude by commending aspects of the legislative effort, but I suggest that greater emphasis must be placed on strengthening students' ethics through democratic action inside (...) and outside schools and not on a right-leaning, conservative, and didactic curriculum. Further, as social foundations educators, it is imperative to make strides in our classrooms to expose preservice teachers to the apparent and hidden contradictions of using character education as a tool of educational reform. (shrink)

Battles against domestic violence in the People’s Republic of China have been carried out since 1995. In this study, legislative progression of laws related to domestic violence is first examined and clarified; second, findings from the legislative review are investigated on the basis of civil and criminal cases; third, the interaction among social and traditional norms, legislation, and judicial outcomes is explored and interpreted from a sociosemiotic perspective. It is found in this study that: 1) legislation and judicial (...) practices of domestic violence in the P. R. C. are closely intertwined with social and traditional norms; 2) there is a gap between judicial practices dealing with domestic violence and the legislation; 3) the Anti-Domestic Violence Law offers a notch for state powers to embrace the familial relationship and to safeguard a victim. (shrink)

The phenomenon of domestic violence is as old as humanity itself, but legal protection against violence both internationally and nationally begins to be provided very late. In the Republic of North Macedonia, until 2004, there was no legal protection of victims of domestic violence, nor was adequate sanctioning of perpetrators. Only since 2004, with the amendments and additions to the Criminal Code in the criminal sphere, and the Law on the Family in the civil sphere, the phenomenon of domestic violence (...) began to receive due legal attention, with the application of provisions for the sanctioning of perpetrators and temporary measures protection for victims. The adoption of the Istanbul Convention (The Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence) and its ratification in 2018 undoubtedly contributed to the Republic of North Macedonia undertaking a series of reforms in the field of domestic violence. So initially, in 2021, the new Law on domestic violence was adopted in harmony with the principles of the Istanbul Convention, whereas in 2023 the Law on the amendment of the Criminal Code was adopted. This law focused on changes in criminal offenses related to domestic violence and gender-based violation, as well as the incorporation of new criminal offenses in this regard. These legislative reforms, especially the amendments approved in February 2023 which are of particular importance in the prevention and fight against domestic violence and violence against women in the Republic of North Macedonia are the focus of this research. Here we have analyzed and commented the approved changes to the Criminal Code of RNM. (shrink)

On September 22, 1998, California Governor Pete Wilson signed Senate Bill 1785 into law, dramatically affecting the entire California animal sheltering community. Dubbed the "Hayden law" by the animal protection community after the bill's sponsor, it represents the state of California's attempt to legislate a solution to both the companion animal overpopulation problem and the friction between the agencies trying to end it. The persistence of the bill's primary supporters, a Los Angeles veterinarian and a UCLA law school professor and (...) the overall lack of opposition to it helped SB 1785 sail through the California legislature. Because of the scope of the bill and the immense cost of implementation, its passage shocked many in the sheltering community. This case study highlights the consequences of legislation that was crafted based on worse case scenarios and over which there was little collaborative effort. It concludes with suggestions that might be useful to other states contemplating similar such legislation. (shrink)